Atwood, J. Leland. Dates: January 19, June 20 and 24, August 22 and 25, 1989; January 12 and June 25, 1990. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 12..25 hrs.; 157 pp. Use restriction: Open.
After describing his upbringing, education, and work at Wright Field beginning in 1928, Atwood (b. October 26, 1904) reviews his work for Douglas Aircraft in the early 1930s and his acceptance of the position of chief engineer at North American shortly thereafter. He then discusses North American's wartime efforts; its early post-war work on airplanes, rockets, and missiles; projects beginning in the 1950s for the USAF and NASA, including Saturn, Minuteman, and Apollo; post-war changes in organizational structure; contracting procedures and problems with various federal agencies; the responsibilities and ramifications from the Apollo 204 fire; his promotions at North American; and relations over the years with Arthur Raymond, Dutch Kindleberger, James Webb, Stan Smithson, Fred Black, and others.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Family background, early education
2 Rating on the civil service examination in 1928; acceptance of position at Wright Field
2-4 Description of projects in the airplane branch of the Air Material Division
4-5 Stress analysis and static testing
5 Decision to leave Wright Field for a commercial venture
5-6 Work with Fred Herman; move to position at Douglas in 1930
6-7 Association with Dutch Kindleberger and Arthur Raymond; contributions in aircraft design
7-8 Acceptance of chief engineer position at North American
8-9 North American's goals in the aviation industry
9-10 Accomplishments in design and production
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
10-11 Contributions to wartime effort; exceptional record of the P-51
11-13 Process of improving combat aircraft
13 Key factors in production costs
13-14 Working relationship with Dutch Kindleberger
14-15 Description of North American as an organization during WWII
15-16 Promotion to first vice president, 1941
16 Broadening managerial responsibilities as first vice president
16-17 Transition from war effort to postwar business projects
17-18 Development of missile and space capability
18-19 Expansion of research within North American
19-20 Contact with Project RAND at Douglas
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
20 North American's contributions to early satellite studies
20-21 Development of rocket capability at North American
21-22 Further discussion of postwar corporate activity; pursuit of military contracts
22-23 Relationship with government and the military during the postwar period
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
24-26 Postwar activities of North American; work on the B-45, F-86, and P-82
26-27 Increase in postwar scientific and technological capabilities; contributions by Bill Bailie
27-30 Technological design and development of Air Force Navaho Missile, 1946-48
30-32 Creation of divisions within North American; MACE organization becomes obsolete
32-34 Ramifications of growing demand for missiles; changing relationship with Air Force
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
34-35 Evolution of missile, rocket and guidance activity; Lawrence Waite's role in contract administration and planning
35-37 Impact of Navaho contract upon North American's expertise level and financial status
37 Discussion of R&D money vs. production money during postwar period
37-38 Autonetics contribution to aircraft contracts
38-40 Individual activities and contributions to North American; Bill Bailie, Chauncey Starr
40-41 Atomics International interaction with rest of the corporation
41-42 Management of Autonetics; Lawrence Waite and John Moore
42-43 Atwood's responsibilities as president, 1948; work with Dutch Kindelberger, Arthur Raymond and Stan Smithson
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
43-44 Further discussion of Dutch Kindelberger
44-47 Scope of problem analysation; staff organization within headquarters
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
48-50 Means of information exchange between divisions within North American
50-52 Elements of decision-making process; review of major programs such as the B-70
52-54 Postwar transition from prototypes to "paper competition"
54-56 Changes in resource allocation; increased contact with Congress and the Military
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
56-57 Further discussion of Congress and the Military
57-59 Nature and evolutions of representation in Washington; hiring of Fred Black as consultant
59-60 Kindelberger's approach to relationship with Congress and DOD
61-63 Description of James Webb document detailing decision on selection of a contractor for the Apollo Spacecraft
63-64 Fred Black's activities in support of NAA's interests; contact with Senator Kerr
64 Establishment of North American facilities in Oklahoma and WestVirginia
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
64-67 Further discussion of MacAlester Plant in Oklahoma
67-69 Increased need for politically oriented staff in the 1950s and 1960s; conflicts with technical decision making
69-71 Question of obtaining information; determination of reliability
71 Post Fred Black arrangements; appointment of Ralph Watson
72 Closing comments
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
73-74 Fred Black's remunerations at North American
75-77 Importance of knowledge of technical requirements for future programs
77-79 Understanding military needs and requirements; technical evaluation
79-80 Ramifications of shift from corporate to governmental technical judgement
80 Ensuring North American's corporate viability
80-81 Relationship with military and NASA; effect upon organization of technological resources
81-82 North American's contact and relationship with NACA during the 1950s
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
82-85 Increase in business during the early 1960s; organizational and managerial problems
85-86 The S-II as the critical element in the development of SATURN V
86-88 Marshall's role in technical direction and design
89-90 Impact of contract complexities upon North American; interface problems
90-91 Procedures for managing large-scale projects at North American
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
92-93 Level of involvement in contract process from proposal effort to implementation
93-95 Discussion of program visibility to top management; organizational requirements
95-96 North American's relationships with Air Force and NASA
96-97 Relationship between North American and Marshall; program review meetings with NASA; Mueller's establishment of Apollo Executives Group
98 Problem solving with division presidents
98-100 Solicitation of contract for the command system module; description of contract proposal submission
100 Acceptance of team bids for contracts
100-101 Organizational changes to support CSM contract
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
101-102 Independence level of divisions; impact upon corporate decision-making
102-103 Utility of the contract schedule as a milestone device
103-104 North American and NASA discussions on proper technical approach
104-106 Design requirements on the S-II; CEO involvement
106-108 NASA Tiger Team Evaluation, 1965
108-109 Phillips Report; illumination of organizational problems
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
109-110 Time spent on NASA contract before and after the Apollo Fire
110-112 Atwood involvement in specific engineering problems
113-114 Characterization of contact with James Webb
114-117 Assessment of management effectiveness; personnel changes after release of Phillips Report
117-118 Discussion of Harrison Storms and James Webb
118 Closing comments
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
119-121 North American's responsibility in Apollo 204 fire; discussion of North American's management and engineering capabilities
121-123 Adequacy of management tools for tracking progress of problems; schedule and cost implementing of North American Apollo contracts; role of establishing firm product specifications
123-124 Poor communication between North American and NASA
124-125 Specification responsibility at North American
125 Perception of NASA's design instruction as confusing to North American
125-127 General comparison of North American's management of NASA programs with North American's standard practice for producing airplanes
127-128 Perception of NASA management of NAA contracts as "speaking with many voices"
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
128 Difference in contract specifications between the Saturn II and MSC
128-129 Perception of avoidance of specification formalization in CSM
129-130 Minuteman guidance system
130-131 Problems between North American and the Air Force on Minuteman guidance system; comparison with North American and NASA relationship
131-132 Air Force and NASA evaluation of key management personnel: the case of Fred Eyestone, President of Autonetics Division
132 North American's responsibilities after the fire; Thompson Committee
132-133 Replacement of Harrison Storms; Olin Teague's Committee
133-134 Congressional feedback concerning the fire and North American's role
134-135 Congressional Record excerpts relating to Phillips' report
136 Impressions of cause of fire in news accounts
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
137-138 Repairing North American's relationship with Congress after the Apollo fire
138 Atwood invited by Tiger Teague to Lunar Landing commemoration ceremony
138-139 NASA comparison of uncompleted capsule (#17) with burned Apollo capsule; NASA amplification of defects found in capsule 17
139 Atwood's feeling of oxygen in capsule as cause of fire
140 North American pressed by technical problems; Dale Myers and weight problems with the spacecraft
140-141 FBI sent by NASA to look for crimes at North American; recovery of North American in moral and management
141-142 Impression of misunderstanding between North American and NASA in NASA accounts; Atwood's acknowledgement that personality conflicts might have led to misunderstandings
142-143 Atwood's perception that relations between North American and NASA were harmonious prior to the fire; Atwood's assessment of Harrison (Stormy) Storms
143 George Mueller's knowledge of technical and organizational aspects of the Apollo program; invention of "Mueller" Graphs as scheduling aid
143-144 Discussion of concurrence in scheduling
144 Discussion of Apollo fire investigation; NASA's ambivalence in capsule design
145 Larry Greene's discussions with Webb; removal of Harrison Storms
145-146 Evolution of Contracts and Proposals organization
146 Alex Burton: responsibility for military relations
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
147 Continuation of discussion of Alex Burton
147-148 Discussion of Requests for Proposals
148 Explanation of use of outlying offices
148-149 Value of contacts with Air Force Laboratories; additional offices
150 Redesignation of Contracts and Programs to Market Planning
150-152 Value of extensive staff capability at corporate level; Stan Smithson; E.D. Starkweather
152-154 Value of knowledge gained Air Force interests in formulating proposals
154-156 Key people at North American during Atwood's tenure: Stan Smithson, Raymond Rice, Carl Hansen, Larry Waite, Bill Bailie, Harrison Storms and Bill Snelling
157 Closing Comments
Bradshaw, Delmer. Date: August 26, 1988. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 24 pp. Use restriction: Public.
After briefly reviewing his education in electronics, Bradshaw describes coming to Boeing and in 1967 being assigned to the Boeing-TIE program at the Manned Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Houston. He then discusses Boeing's responsibilities in the TIE program and the procedures by which they were established, his work in the TIE program and eventual promotions to configuration manager and then engineering manager, interaction between Boeing and NASA personnel and certain disputes that developed, NASA's acceptance of TIE as a management system, and the background of the Apollo Mission Readiness Assessment Board.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Early interests and educational experience
2 Decision as an engineer to pursue a career in aviation and space related applications
2-3 Assignment to Boeing-TIE Program in Houston; initial impressions of the Manned Space Flight Center
3-4 Evaluation of contributions from high level management; George Mueller and Sam Phillips
4-5 Characterization of MSFC in the aftermath of the 1967 Apollo fire
5-6 Types of functions performed by Boeing under the Apollo-TIE Program
6-7 Interaction between Boeing people and MSC in problem-solving
7-8 Boeing's ability to bring in needed staff
8-9 Reliance upon corporate sources for technical expertise
9-10 Competing needs for individual expertise within Boeing and commitment to NASA; solutions to a potential problem
10-11 Striking a balance between scientific and engineering directives
11 Boeing's familiarization with MSC procedures during early TIE Program
12 Bradshaw's initial responsibilities with the TIE Program
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12-13 Responsibilities after initial simulation work at MSC; configuration management and specifications
13-14 Dissemination of information; meetings with contractors
14-15 Process by which Boeing achieved understanding of configuration requirements and management
16 Record-keeping as integral part of program management
17 NASA's acceptance of TIE as a new management system
17-18 Existence of friction between Boeing and NASA centers during early TIE Program
18-19 Teleconferences and their advantages
19-20 Move from configuration manager to engineering manager; scope of duties
20-21 Task assignments and division of labor
21 The function of the Apollo Mission Readiness Assessment Board
21-23 Boeing's parallel readiness assessment
23-24 Closing comments
Bradshaw, Delmer. Date: August 26, 1988. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 24 pp. Use restriction: Public.
After briefly reviewing his education in electronics, Bradshaw describes coming to Boeing and in 1967 being assigned to the Boeing-TIE program at the Manned Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Houston. He then discusses Boeing's responsibilities in the TIE program and the procedures by which they were established, his work in the TIE program and eventual promotions to configuration manager and then engineering manager, interaction between Boeing and NASA personnel and certain disputes that developed, NASA's acceptance of TIE as a management system, and the background of the Apollo Mission Readiness Assessment Board.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Early interests and educational experience
2 Decision as an engineer to pursue a career in aviation and space related applications
2-3 Assignment to Boeing-TIE Program in Houston; initial impressions of the Manned Space Flight Center
3-4 Evaluation of contributions from high level management; George Mueller and Sam Phillips
4-5 Characterization of MSFC in the aftermath of the 1967 Apollo fire
5-6 Types of functions performed by Boeing under the Apollo-TIE Program
6-7 Interaction between Boeing people and MSC in problem-solving
7-8 Boeing's ability to bring in needed staff
8-9 Reliance upon corporate sources for technical expertise
9-10 Competing needs for individual expertise within Boeing and commitment to NASA; solutions to a potential problem
10-11 Striking a balance between scientific and engineering directives
11 Boeing's familiarization with MSC procedures during early TIE Program
12 Bradshaw's initial responsibilities with the TIE Program
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12-13 Responsibilities after initial simulation work at MSC; configuration management and specifications
13-14 Dissemination of information; meetings with contractors
14-15 Process by which Boeing achieved understanding of configuration requirements and management
16 Record-keeping as integral part of program management
17 NASA's acceptance of TIE as a new management system
17-18 Existence of friction between Boeing and NASA centers during early TIE Program
18-19 Teleconferences and their advantages
19-20 Move from configuration manager to engineering manager; scope of duties
20-21 Task assignments and division of labor
21 The function of the Apollo Mission Readiness Assessment Board
21-23 Boeing's parallel readiness assessment
23-24 Closing comments
Burnett, James R. Dates: June 19, 1989; January 10, 1990. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 4 hrs.; 67 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Burnett (b. November 27, 1925) initially discusses his upbringing, graduate education in electrical engineering, and teaching at Purdue in this field from 1950 until his move to TRW as a staff engineer in 1956. He then describes TRW's work on various missile projects at that time and his contributions thereto; his relations with Bob Bennett, Bob Whitford, and others at the company; and the procedures for resolving differences and evaluating progress both internally and with the USAF and subcontractors. Burnett next reviews his work as head of the Titan guidance and control section; the use of many contractors on one project and the problems generated therefrom; key technical challenges of the Minuteman and other missiles and how they were resolved; and his thoughts on the nature of and problems with the government-industry partnership in the ballistic missiles field.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Family background
1-2 Interests as a young man; joining Marines; entering V-12 program
2-3 Training in V-12 program
3 Exposure to new developments in electronics; radar
3-4 Post-war interests: feedback control systems, servo-mechanisms, digital computers
4 Earned PhD from Purdue, 1949
4-5 Industry's interest in university work
5 Consultant to Argonne Labs
5-6 Burnett's engineering style
6-7 Burnett's introduction to Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation by Bob Whitford; transition from university life to work in industry
7 Family life; wife Anne
8-9 Initial projects at TRW: Atlas, Titan and Thor control systems; Gene Armstrong
9-11 Comparison of TRW organization with university experience; TRW more interdisciplinary
11-12 Working for Bob Bennett; Bob Whitford, George Gleghorn, Bob Walquist
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12-14 Trouble shooting in computer developments; interchangeable inertial guidance system
14-15 System specifications
15-17 Technical direction meetings
17-18 Response of associate and subcontractors to technical direction; cost-plus fixed fee contracts
18-19 Formal procedures for resolving difference of opinion
19-21 Burnett becomes head of Computers and Control Department; first management experience
21 Ensuring staff competence and expertise
21-23 Working with contractors; tension between people with university background and people with industry back-ground
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
23-25 Progress reviews of subcontractors by Benny Schriever and Si Ramo; selecting the best personnel for the project
25-27 Problem solving with the Air Force, contractors and internally
27-28 Senior staff, weekly staff and Black Saturday meetings to resolve internal problems
28-29 Independent review committees; encouraged by Schriever
29-30 Contributions of independent review committees
30-33 Experiences with AC Sparkplug, Stark Draper and Draper Labs; philosophical differences with Draper
33 Closing comments
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
34 ARMA guidance system for Thor and Atlas Missiles: all inertial system
34-35 Comparison of Minuteman guidance system with ARMA; invention of disk type memory
35-36 Engineering and strategic assessment of fully guided missiles; concern about missiles' vulnerabilities
36-37 Concentration on inertial system; Advanced Ballistic Ranger Systems Program (AIRES)
37 Original Burroughs computer: core memory programming
37 Burnett as head of Titan guidance and control section; AC Sparkplug guidance system
38-40 Comparison between Draper and Autonetics guidance systems; Minuteman and Polaris reliability requirements
40-41 Burnett's contact with Draper; Draper's distinctive jargon
41-43 Technical direction meetings; implementation of technical directives and contract changes
43-46 Contracts defined testing programs; encouraged "inventions to order"
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
46-47 Systems, materials and process inventions: swivel nozzles on solid rockets, aluminized propellant, cork as exterior insulation
47-48 Staging problems with Atlas and Titan
48 Burnett's involvement in Minuteman Guidance Specifications
49 System integration: Burnett's preference of one contractor for whole job on Minuteman; solving problem of hydraulic connection leak
49 Multi-contractors on Atlas; Titan rocket "plumbers nightmare"
49-51 Key technical challenges of Minuteman: firing from silos, ISP problems, third stage thrust termination
51 Concerns with Minuteman re-entry vehicle
51-52 Minuteman launch control and basing system: Air Force requirement for unmanned silos
52 Maintaining management control of Minuteman; personal visits to contractors with Sam Phillips
53 Time spent with contractors: review progress charts, contractor control rooms, inspection of hardware
53-54 Burnett's ideas of good program manager characteristics
54-55 Contacts maintained on Minuteman project: President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), Schriever's committee
55 Burnett's role to brief PSAC and Schriever's committee on Minutemans' progress
55-56 Burnett's role in budget negotiations with DDR & E
56 Boeing as assembly and test contractor for Minuteman
56-57 Boeing's role and ability in production control
57-58 Condition for Boeing being chosen to do launch control systems: TRW to technically direct subcontractor RCA
58 Boeing's willingness to learn from TRW on Minuteman: application of techniques to other aspects of corporate system business
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
58-59 Systems requirement process: new analytical techniques
59-60 Specifications and configuration control for Minuteman weapons system
60 Boeing "Masters" of the art of scheduling
61 Air Force 375 regulations
61 Minuteman as team effort among associate contractors: Thiokol, Autonetics and Boeing
61-62 Recent DOD procurement practices: lack of authority of SPO directors, difficult for SPO directors to form teams with their contractors
62-63 Members of Autonetics Management removed from Minuteman program, not moving production at proper rate
63-64 TRW top management evaluation of mid-level managers; quantitative and qualitative goals; quality management: satisfied customers, product reliability
65 Nature of government-industry relationships in ballistic missile program: cooperation among top executives and among corporate technical staff
65-66 Contact with fleet ballistic missile program: cooperation to harden electronics to nuclear effect
66 Cooperation and competition between the military services
66-67 Minimize expenditures in procurement: get job done quickly, decide and follow schedule and budget money to be used to develop alternate technical options
67 Closing comments
Demitriades, Paul. Date: February 28, 1989. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 1 hr.; 24 pp. Use restriction: Open.
After a brief overview of his graduate education in accounting and economics, Demitriades discusses his work as an industrial engineer at Boeing beginning in 1959 on such projects as Bomarc and Saturn. He then describes his association with the Apollo TIE program from 1967 to 1969, including the development of the program plan upon which the TIE contract awarded to Boeing was based and his and others contributions thereto; Boeing's work as the TIE contractor, his role as a program manager in this work, and particular problems that arose with NASA HQ, NASA centers, and contractors; and some of the management techniques utilized in the TIE contract. Demitriades next compares TIE and USAF management techniques, and gives his thoughts on political problems inherent in working in Washington, D.C.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Description of educational background
2 Boeing management techniques for large-scale projects
2-4 Defining a program plan for the Apollo-TIE contract
4-5 Use of a matrix in organization of program elements
5-7 Structure of Apollo-TIE contract within NASA; center-contractor relationship
7-9 Description of formal review system; program integration function in TIE
9-10 Key elements in management assessment
10-12 Three party working agreement between NASA HQ, Apollo-TIE contractor, and centers
12-14 Process of enabling contract changes; management of data and information flow
14-16 Advanced management techniques used on Apollo-TIE
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
17 Identification of critical points and milestones; Flight Readiness Review
17-19 Balance between informal and formal methods of communication in the project process
19-21 Description of Apollo program management flow chart
21-22 Comparison of Apollo-TIE and Air Force management techniques
22 Political aspects of work in Washington, DC
22-24 Interaction between Boeing TIE/Washington staff and Headquarters staff
24 Closing comments
Doll, Edward. Date: June 23, 1989. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 16 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
After reviewing his upbringing, master's and doctorate programs at CALTECH in electrical engineering and engineering respectively, work as assistant head of the fusion department at Los Alamos from 1944 to 1946, career as an electrical engineer at North American Phillips from 1946 to 1949, and work in the physics department at Stanford Research Institute from 1949 to 1955, Doll (b. September 24, 1912) discusses his move in 1955 to the Guided Missile Research Division at Ramo-Wooldridge. He then describes the organizational structure of the firm's missile programs; its relations with contractors; the role of James Fletcher and others in these programs; and his own responsibilities as head of the Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman project offices. Doll next discusses his move to NASA in 1963 and relations with some of the key figures there.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Family and educational background
1-2 Employment at Los Alamos; military testing of nuclear weapons
2-4 Initial responsibilities at Ramo-Wooldridge; work in the Guided Missile Research Division
4 Involvement in the contracting process
5-6 Key problems associated with the Atlas Program; relationship with Jim Dempsey
7-9 Organizational structure of the Atlas Program; work with Jim Fletcher
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
9-10 Discussion of missile program officer; reporting structure
10-12 Initial work at NASA; recollection of experiences with Robert McNamara and Harold Brown
12-13 General Schriever's recommendation that Doll replace Brainerd Holmes; discussions with Si Ramo concerning the move
13-14 Relationship with Rocketdyne and Kurt Debus
14 Recollections of Wernher von Braun and Eberhardt Rees
15-16 Nature of work with the Air Force from 1955-63
Downey, Peter. Date: February 28, 1989. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 1 hr.; 17 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
After briefly reviewing his education and early work experience at Boeing, Downey discusses his initial responsibilities at Cape Kennedy with the Apollo-TIE program as a monitor of the spacecraft portion of the testing program. He then describes his relations with various contractors and the program's other offices, the process of establishing and implementing goals at Boeing, and the growing complexity of contracting with the federal government.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Education background and early work experience
1-2 Business development prior to TIE
2-3 Assessment of the fire's impact upon the progress of the Apollo program
3-5 Initial responsibilities and activities at Cape Kennedy
5 Difficulties of review and analysis procedures
5-6 Boeing's integration process for the STAC of Apollo Saturn V
6-7 Assessment of NASA's level of internal review of its activities
7-8 Contact and interaction with the Rockwell people
8-9 Necessary level of knowledge of management systems needed for Apollo-TIE
9-10 Use of teleservicing system for improved communication
10-11 Nature of contact with program offices in Houston, Huntsville and Washington
11 Systems integration and contact with Bellcomm
11-12 The role of new business activities within Boeing
12-13 Contribution of creative people to new business activity
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
13-14 Discussion of schedule orientation towards events
14-15 Nature of proposal preparation and review
15-17 The issue of conflicts of interest and changes in contractor-government relationship
17 Closing comments
Duff, Brian. Dates: April 24 and 26, May 1 and 24, 1989. Interviewer: John Mauer. Auspices: GWS. Length: 4.5 hrs.; 82 pp. Use restriction: (2) Public, (2) Not established.
Duff initially reviews his recruitment by Julian Scheer to the public affairs office of NASA, the open space program and its impact, and impressions of working daily with Jim Webb. He then discusses the differences between line and staff officers at NASA, his transfer to Houston and work there, and the division of responsibilities between the centers and NASA HQ. Duff next covers his close relationship with Scheer, his move to HEW and later Amtrak when Scheer left NASA, conflicts between the manned and unmanned space flight divisions of NASA, and his return to NASA's public affairs office.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Duff's summary of his pre-NASA experience; his original hiring at NASA by Julian Scheer; his summary of what that job involved
2 Duff's relationship with Julian Scheer
3 Evolution of the open space program under Scheer; NASA's public relations style; development of live coverage of recovery
3-4 Duff's disagreement with Donald (Deke) Slayton about live coverage from space, and his appeal to Robert Gilruth
4 The open space program
4-5 Duff's disagreement with Deke Slayton over having a pool reporter in mission control, and his appeal to Robert Gilruth
5-6 Apollo 13; Roy Neill of NBC as pool reporter, and his public contradiction of Walter Cronkite on the air
6 Reasons for having an open space program; advantages of an open space program
6-7 Duff's disagreement with Pete (Charles) Conrad and about the open space program, and arguments against it
7-8 Duff's exchange of memos with Hans Mark; Mark's attitude toward the open space program; the IMAX project at the National Air and Space Museum
8-9 IMAX and the problem of exclusivity
9-10 Duff discusses the concept of a government agency covering itself by collaborating with world news agencies; NASA Select; NASA feeds to the networks; evolution of the networks' reliance on NASA, beginning with Mercury
10-11 Discussion of the period when Duff first came on board at NASA; his relationship with James Webb; his travels with Webb; his view of how Webb operated in the public forum; Webb's speeches; the Webb personality
11-12 Technology utilization as a benefit of the space program
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12-13 Establishment of technology utilization center at Wayne State University
13-15 Webb's speech for Senator Stennis in Mississippi
15-16 Webb's relationship with the White House and Congress, especially George Mahon
16-17 Webb's trip to Lubbock with George Mahon; political appeal of the space program
17-18 Webb's trip to Kansas City with Stuart Symington
18-19 Duff recounts what it was like to work with Webb on a day-to-day basis; Webb's view of public service and the management of a large organization like NASA; Webb's view of the contributions of the space program to society
19 Webb's dealings with Mendel Rivers and George Mahon
20 Webb's personal style - a sense of chivalry
20 Webb's part in public affairs at NASA and in developing the open space program; Webb's relationship with Julian Scheer
20 The role played by the open space program in building NASA's constituency
21 The "glass slide" incident, illustrating Webb's view of the rationale for an open space program; the need for public support of the program
22 Duff discusses how public relations is a long-term exercise in building good feelings with constituencies; the success of Apollo public relations as an example
22-23 The Apollo 204 fire, as contrasted with the Challenger accident, from a public relations point of view
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
24-25 Duff describes his views of being a staff officer versus a line officer
25 The effect of a strong personality and longevity of tenure on an employee's personal influence, as exemplified by the career of Julian Scheer
25-26 Line officers and staff officers: permanently delegated authority versus surrogate authority
26 Duff's travels with James Webb in his capacity as a public affairs staff officer
26-27 Duff discusses the reasons why he was sent to Houston; Paul Haney's problems in Houston; the relationship of a NASA field center to Headquarters
27-28 How public affairs operates in a field center in relation to Headquarters; how Duff's understanding of this relationship influenced his decision to go to Houston
28 Paul Haney's relationship with Robert Gilruth
28 Duff's concerns about going to Houston and how he would be perceived by the staff; his conversations with Robert Gilruth and Christopher Kraft
28-29 Duff's views of how a public affairs officer should operate; further discussion of Paul Haney's problems with Headquarters and with the press
29-30 The situation in Houston when Duff arrived; his treatment as a celebrity
30 Duff's refusal to be an on-the-air commentator, and his determination to keep a low profile as public affairs officer in Houston
30-31 Duff describes how he handled commentator duties upon his arrival in Houston; how he viewed his function in Houston; his refusal to be a "publicity hound"
31-32 Duff's acceptance by the Houston senior staff
32 Duff's views of working with engineers versus scientists; the staff in Houston in their new role as celebrities
32-34 Duff's HQ-Washington background as an asset in acceptance in Houston; Duff recommends pool reporters in mission control and live TV press conferences in space; resistance to these measures from astronauts (McDivitt and Slayton); congratulatory telegram from the White House
34 The NASA institutional hierarchy; line authority versus functional authority
34-35 Duff discusses communications breakdowns within NASA; institutional chains of command; function of ombudsman; public affairs as an agency-wide, versus field center, function
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
35-36 Duff discusses the degree of involvement of the president in NASA affairs; field center public affairs officers in relation to Washington; Duff's return to NASA during the "shuttle crisis" (period before shuttle flight was achieved) and reasons why he was called back
36-38 Duff describes the feeling of teamwork and sense of camaraderie among NASA employees; further discussion of Paul Haney's problems with Washington; Washington's role in relation to the field centers; the "planting a tree Israel" issue
38-39 Duff discusses the small size of NASA and its public affairs staff - everyone knew each other and enjoyed working together; the impact of a launch on the agency, especially public affairs; the NASA Alumni League
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
40 The relationship between Julian Scheer and George Mueller, and its impact on the administration of NASA
40-41 Duff refutes Mueller's contention that NASA had an adversarial relationship with the media
41 Discussion of Julian Scheer's strong personality; Duff suggests that Scheer possibly had an adversarial relationship with individual reporters
41-42 Scheer's relationship with George Low; Scheer's reputation; Scheer's lasting effect on NASA public affairs
42 Effect of Scheer's resignation on Duff's decision to leave Houston and take a position with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
42-43 Duff's relationship with George Low; Duff contrasts Low's style with James Webb's style
43-44 Duff describes the situation between Houston and NASA HQ; the dynamic tension between field centers and Headquarters; "Headquarters hummers"
44-45 Effects of travel and telecommunications (especially the NASA television system) on relationships at NASA
45-46 Duff leaves NASA and goes to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and then to Amtrak
46-47 Duff contrasts HEW with NASA: teamwork, achieving objectives, internal fighting, sense of esprit de corps
47-48 Division within NASA between manned space flight and space science from a public affairs point of view; role played by Carl Sagan in this debate
48-48 Further discussion of the tension between manned and unmanned space flight (engineers and scientists), and public affairs' handling of it; Carl Sagan's desire for an advocacy-oriented public affairs program
49 Duff goes back to NASA for a third time
50 Duff describes the situation in NASA's public affairs upon his return for the third time
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
50-52 Further discussion of situation in NASA's public affairs office; Duff's once-a-week press briefings; the Shuttle Press Manual; the flow-of-information technique
52-54 Duff describes how he got the press and NASA senior managers to cooperate during the shuttle pre-flight period; stopping the flow of bad press
54-55 Effect of Duff's tactics on negative coverage of NASA; solutions to some shuttle engineering problems, and the effect on negative press
55 Duff describes the high point of the NASA public affairs program; the distinction between a briefing and a press conference
55-56 Discussion of the Challenger accident; press coverage of the Challenger accident and the Apollo 204 fire
56-57 Duff describes how a public affairs office should handle catastrophes
57-58 General discussion of Duff's experiences of press coverage problems in NASA and at Amtrak; how public affairs should handle problems in general
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
59-60 Duff discusses his return to NASA for the third time, as director of public affairs, during the "pre-shuttle" crisis; negative press coverage of NASA at this time
60 Engineering problems NASA was having with the shuttle: tiles, zipper effect
60-61 Duff discusses the reasons for his being hired for a third time
61-63 Duff discusses James Webb's (and his) view of public affairs and public service
63 Duff discusses the downgrading of the public affairs position between his second and third terms at NASA
63-64 The effect of party politics on NASA public affairs; examples: Elliott Richardson at HEW, and White House staffs
64-66 The corporate view of public relations (James Beggs and Alan Boyd); contrast with public service view of Webb and Richardson: Duff describes what it was like to work for Frosch, Gilruth and Lovelace
66-67 Taking the Enterprise to the Paris Air Show; Beggs' reaction
67-68 More anecdotes: working for Frosch, Lovelace and Beggs
68 Duff's conflicts with James Beggs
69-70 Voyager from a public affairs viewpoint; Duff's relationship with Hans Mark; Mark's view of public affairs
70-71 Beggs' view of Duff's style; what Beggs wanted in a public affairs officer; discussion of corporate style
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
71-73 Description of George Will incident
73-74 Aftermath of Will incident; Duff's discussion with Beggs about it; Will's reaction
74-75 Factors leading up to Fonda incident: lack of a NASA constituency among women and minorities
75-76 Reasons for inviting Jane Fonda to pre-launch party before Sally Ride's first flight
76 Description of the pre-launch party and the Fonda incident
76-78 Analysis of the Fonda incident; Beggs' reaction to it
78-79 Aftermath of the Fonda incident; Duff's firing
79 Transition period during which Duff phased himself out of NASA; the Bluford flight
79-81 Duff's summary and assessment of his NASA career; Apollo 13 as the peak
82 Closing
Elms, James. Dates: January 13 and July 1, 1987; March 2, May 5, and September 16, 1988; January 12, 1989. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 14.25 hrs.; 224 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Elms initially reviews his upbringing, undergraduate education in English at CALTECH and the University of Chicago, first job at Convair in 1939 and 1940, service in the Army Air Forces during World War II working on such projects as missile guidance systems, and post-war graduate studies at UCLA under Louis Slichter and at CALTECH in physics. He then discusses his career at North American from 1950 to 1957, including impressions of Dutch Kindelberger, work on such projects as the MG-4 fire control unit, the organizational structure of the firm, and North American's relations with the USAF. Following this, Elms covers his move to Martin to work on the Titan, initial impressions of the firm, the USAF's and Ramo-Wooldridge's roles in the missile programs, and his careers at AVCO-Crossley and Ford Aeronautics. He next covers his tenure at NASA's Manned Space Flight Center beginning in 1963, including involvement in the 1963 reorganization, relations with George Mueller and others, and management philosophy and practices; and then his subsequent career at Raytheon. Finally, Elms reviews his return to NASA as Mueller's deputy, assuming the directorship of the Electronics Research Center in 1966, and the background of its evolution into the Transportation Systems Center.
January 13, 1987
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-11 Elms' personal biography, family, high school
5-12 Friendships with George Johnsen, Billy Martin and Glenn Brink
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
13-19 CALTECH (continued)
17-18 Decision to transfer to University of Chicago
18 C. C. Lauritsen, Edward Teller, Louie Pipes
19-20 University of Chicago, Gregory Bard, Mortimer Adler
20-25 Decision to travel in Europe, life in Paris, trip to London
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
25-27 Italy, social life and friends in Europe
28 Return to United States; meets Patricia Pafford, future wife
28 Berkeley; meets Luis Alvarez
28-29 Employment with Convair (Consolidated Aircraft); Walter Munk
29 Navy aeronautical engineering training program
30-31 Rejected for Army Air Forces flight training; marriage; called up for military service
July 1, 1987
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
32-34 Elms' Army Air Forces WWII training and assignments
34-35 Wright Patterson Field Armament Lab: V-1, V-1 type research
35 Re-enrolled at CALTECH; job at Gianinni and Co
36-37 AAF bureaucracy; Armament and Ordnance Labs; Elms' gadget for machine gun
37-38 Introduction of computers into fire control
38 Elms' initial management experience
38-39 Army Air Forces interest in guided missiles; Elms' work on guidance system
40-41 Institute of Geophysics with Louis Slichter; Mohorovicic discontinuity data
41 Elms takes job at North American
41 Army interest in transporting V-1, V-2 to US after war
42 CALTECH studies
42-43 Working with Slichter
43-44 CALTECH studies and professors
44-45 Elms' work on gravimeter
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
45-46 Birth of children; personal finances
46-49 Work with Slichter at UCLA; masters' studies
49-50 Move to NAA; Dutch Kindelberger hires Elms, Hoffman, Edlefsen, Chauncy Starr and establishes Astrophysics, Space, Rocketdyne and Autonetics divisions; John Moore
50-52 North American; Kindelberger's handling of design flaw in F-100 airplane
52 Elms' heart attack
52-54 Kindelberger relations with Air Force; development of P-51, F-86, F-100; relations with Ernie Breech, Lee Atwood, James Smithson
54-56 Reuther attempt to organize North American; John Moore and Kindelberger; Kindelberger advice on reorganizing organizations; Gilruth and Elms' reorganization of Houston
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
56-57 Ernie Breech; Ford Motor Company
57 Kindelberger's influence on Elms as manager
57-58 Kurt Debus; Apollo security
58 Security problem at Martin on Titan
58-60 Kindelberger management style, effect on Elms
59 Elms and Bank of America
60-61 Ernie Breech as manager; retirement speech; TWA rescue
61-62 Elms' position at North American, assignments
62 E-7 fire control system
63-64 North American contract to build NATO interceptor airplane; MG-4
61-62 John Moore; Elms' work on meter to measure voltage and phase
63-64 E-7 system cost overruns; MG-4 development; AF relations; government restrictions
65 Elms' borrows Joe Geissler to work on MG-4
65 Staff of Elms' fire control unit; Robert Case, Rulon Shelley
66 Move to Martin; Ron Greenslade
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
66-67 Quality of work at North American; Elms' as project manager
67-68 Tension between Air Force procurement regulations and contractor's freedom of operation
68-69 Freedom of research in four experimental units created by Kindelberger at NAA
69 Development of E-7, MG-4, compared
69 Chronology of Elms' titles at North American
69-70 Development of NASARR radar
70-71 Relations among divisions within North American
71 Integration of fire control and flight control systems with aircraft
72 Intracompany advising at North American; Warren Swanson
72-73 Marketing at North American; Bill Fort
73-74 Booz Allen Hamilton evaluation of North American; Norm Parker
74-75 NASARR; Elms' technical contribution to it
March 2, 1988
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
76-78 Elms' recollections of Dutch Kindelberger's management style at North American
78-80 Research and product development at North American; relationship between financial and engineering personnel; decision-making by line management
81 Air Force support for development of E-7 by North American
81-84 Elms' considers leaving North American Autonetics to work with Martin; influence of Sputnik launch; General Benny Schriever; Colonel Paul Blasingame; George Trimble; Lee Atwood; Colonel Albert "Red" Wetzel; Dalimil Kybal
84-85 Elms' decision to accept position at Martin on development of Titan missile; Bill Purdy; Larry Adams; Roy Jackson; Albert Hall
85-86 Elms' finds Martin inexperienced in electronics integration within aircraft; hires Ron Greenslade; resignation from North American submitted to John Moore; Gene Shelley
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
86-88 Departure from North American; Gene Shelley; relationship among staff of Autonetics, fire control division
88-89 Elms and Greenslade innovations in Martin management; Titan missile testing
89-90 Ramo-Wooldridge involvement in missile program; PET (Production Environmental Test)
91 Elms' experience with North American contrasted to Martin
91-95 Elms recruited by Newman; friendship with Jack Reith; J.J. Kerley; Reith's management style
94-95 Elms applies Martin and North American experience to reorganization with Bob Gilruth of Houston NASA Center
May 5, 1988
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
96-98 Martin ballistic missile program; role of Ramo-Wooldridge, Elms' and Ron Greenslade's organizational restructuring
98-100 R-W role; reliability testing, PET (Production Environmental Testing), Titan explosion
100-105 Relationships among Martin, R-W, Air Force, and sub-contractors; Paul Blassingame; Gen. Benny Schriever
106 Electronics Research Center
106-107 Ron Greenslade's repair of Apollo computer at Raytheon Elms'career path; advantages of work with Jack Reith at AVCO-Crossley
108 Crossley aeronautics work; Karl Kober, Ernst Steinhoff
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
108 Crossley business areas
109 Jack Reith's death
109-113 Impact on Elms of Reith's death; discussions with Gerry Lynch of accepting position with Ford Aeroneutronics; Political atmosphere within Crossley after Reith's death; Elms' decision to leave Crossley
112 Elms' work at Ford Aeroneutronics on signal radio sent to moon; development of Ford Aeroneutronics
113-115 Elms' responsibilities at Ford Aeroneutronics; the company's work in guidance and control; computers; Shillelagh missile; role of financial personnel within Ford
115-118 Private industry's need to be educated about contracting with government, military; J.J. Kerley; financial advisor to TWA, Ford, etc.; Internal Research and Development
118-119 Elms' decision to leave Ford for NASA; influence of Brainerd Holmes
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
119 Elms' decision to accept NASA position
119-121 Elms' working relationship with Bob Gilruth
121-123 Organizational problems at NASA Houston; need for organizational ability as factor in Holmes' recruiting Elms; Wes Hjornevik; Max Faget; efforts to restructure Houston organization by Elms, Gilruth
September 16, 1988
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
124-128 Early relationship with Robert Gilruth
128-130 Examples of Gilruth's management style
130-133 Discussion of Manned Spaceflight Center reorganization, 1963
133-135 MSC's relationship with North American; influence of Charlie Feltz on NASA contracts
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
136-139 Developing technical direction at MSC in conjunction with private contractors
139-141 Brainerd Holmes' perceptions of weaknesses at MSC
141-142 Further discussion of the NASA/contractor relationship
142-143 Creation of the Program Office by Brainerd Holmes; relationship between the Engineering and Program Office
143-145 Division of responsibilities between the NASA HQ and the Centers
145-146 George Mueller's assessment of the organizational hierarchy
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
146-147 Use of Martin organization; advantages of having Gemini and Apollo Program Offices
147-149 Results of 1963 reorganization; Elms' role in management andorganization of resources
149-151 How reorganization affected individuals and parts of the organization
151-156 Elms' role in public relations at MSC
156-157 Relationship with the science editor of the Boston Globe; Macelany
157 Contact with the press while at MSC
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
157-160 Jim Chamberlain's contributions to the Gemini program
160-161 Examples of Elms' management style in the procurement process
160-163 Reaction to Neil Armstrong's Gemini flight; spinning in the Agena
163-164 Responsibility for problems with systems interfacing
164 Discussion of general management philosophy
164-165 Gilruth's post-reorganization role
165-166 Tackling daily problems at MSC
166-167 Elms' contribution to building design
167-169 Prioritization of Center business
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
169-170 Necessity of micromanagement in solving problems
170 Relationship with George Mueller and Bob Seamans while deputy director
171-172 Role in procurement activities; the Center's role in awarding primary contracts
172-173 Reasons for leaving Houston; move to Raytheon
173 Ed Bowles affiliation with Raytheon
173-174 Assessment of the move back to industry
174-175 Location of the Office of Space Information Systems at Raytheon in Santa Barbara
175 Working with Brainerd Holmes at Raytheon
175-176 Attitude of Raytheon concerning Elms' heart attack
176-177 Opportunity to run Electronics Research Center
177-178 Frequent travel to Los Angeles while working at Houston
178-179 Assessment of possible management weaknesses at NAA prior to the Apollo fire
TAPE 3, SIDE 2
179-180 Apollo fire review process
180 Dealing with political accountability; influence and effect of Congress
180-181 Accidents as an indication of management problems in government and industry
181-182 Approaches to project execution
182-183 Meetings of the Apollo Executives Group
183-185 Remembering advice from Henry Ford II
185-186 Reasons for leaving Raytheon; serving as assistant consultant to James Webb
187 Position as Mueller's deputy
187-189 Discussion of individual leadership qualities
189 Responsibilities as Mueller's deputy
January 12, 1989
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
190-193 Sense of Electronic Research Center's mission at its inception in 1966
193-194 Assessment if ERC reputation and effectiveness
194-195 Awareness of early planning for ERC
195-196 Elms' role in committee selection process
196-198 Decision to close ERC; switch to TSC
198-200 Discussion of proper spheres of activity for industry and government
200 Committee agreement on course of action at ERC
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
200-202 Usefulness of Advisory Committee to ERC
202-203 Personnel; requirements and inherent limitations; development of in-house core of researchers
203-204 ERC/contractor relationships
204-205 ERC working relationship with NASA Centers
205-206 Purpose of Office of University Affairs
207 Procurement requirements and the contract process
208 Importance of student interns at ERC
209 ERC/military relationship
209-210 Discussion of ERC's role as a government-wide resource
210-211 Importance of technology utilization
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
211 Center's role in post-Apollo fire investigation and recovery
211-212 Differences between Webb and Paine administrative styles
212-214 Process of transition from NASA to Department of Transportation
214-217 Interest in saving ERC
217-220 Congressional reaction to transition; ERC-Congress relations before & after DOT change
220-221 Policy and management decision at ERC and TSC
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
222-224 Definition of Center technical direction; ERC sense of competition and role vis-a-vis industry
224 Closing remarks
Fletcher, James. Date: May 15, 1989. Interviewer: John Mauer. Auspices: GWS. Length: 1 hr.; 29 pp. Use restriction: Public.
Fletcher focuses primarily on various aspects of the space shuttle program during his two terms as head of NASA beginning in 1971. He describes the competing designs offered for the shuttle; how and why the design adopted was selected; and his role, as well as the roles of key government and private sector personalities, in the selection process. Fletcher also discusses the budget problems generally facing NASA and NASA's role in technological progress.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-3 Situation at NASA when Fletcher becomes administrator in 1971; future planning, budget, relations with OMB
2-5 General discussion of space shuttle planning; alternate designs; impact of budget issue; role of contractors; Dale Myers, George Low and Wernher von Braun
4-6 Rejection of fully reusable shuttle concept; impact of OMB cost criteria
5-6 Mission models; studies by Aerospace Corporation, Mathematica, Inc.
6-7 Fletcher's criticism of systems analysis
7-8 Fletcher's presentations of the case for the shuttle to OMB and to the White House
8 Impact of aerospace industry employment on shuttle discussions
8-9 Fletcher's view of White House stance on the shuttle; recollections of George Shultz, Peter Flanigan, John Ehrlichman
9 Fletcher's view of shuttle capabilities
10-11 Elimination of space tug concept
10-11 Impact of 1972 budget cuts on NASA; role of Caspar Weinberger
11-12 Discussion of eliminating NASA
12 Ford Administration support for space program; role of Roy Ash
12-14 Role of Ed David in planning for shuttle; establishment of PSAC Flax Committee
14-15 Fletcher's recollections of Don Rice and his perspective on the shuttle
15 Discussion of broadening NASA's role in technological development; role of George Shultz
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
15-16 NASA's role in technological development
16-19 Development of shuttle design; relative role of OMB and NASA; roles of Fletcher, Myers, Low, Richard McCurdy
19-22 Process of selecting among alternate shuttle designs; roles of George Shultz, Bill Anders, Wernher von Braun, Ed David; emergence of parallel burn configuration as favored approach
22-23 Proposals for glider-type approach; Rockwell study
24-25 Emphasis on cost concerns; Mathematica studies
25 Opposition of Don Rice to shuttle development
25-29 Meetings that reached final decision on Shuttle design; roles of George Shultz, Don Rice, Oscar Morgenstern
Gilruth, Robert. Dates: March 21, May 14, June 30, and October 2, 1986; February 27 and March 2, 1987. Interviewers: David DeVorkin (5), Martin Collins (3), John Mauer (2), Linda Ezell (2), and Howard Wolko (1). Auspices: GWS. Length: 17.75 hrs.; 375 pp. Use restriction: Public.
Gilruth initially reviews his upbringing, education, and Jean Piccard's influence on him at the University of Minnesota. He then discusses various aspects of his career at NACA from 1937 to 1958, including working at Langley Field during World War II on various aerodynamic problems, directing the guided missile research station at Wallops Island after the war and its work on missile projects, being promoted in 1952 to the Assistant Chief of Research at the Langley lab and its involvement in such projects as the X-15, and working beginning in 1957 with Hugh Dryden and others on a possible manned satellite program as a member of the Special Committee on Space Technology. Gilruth next describes various facets of his career at NASA from 1958 to the early 1970s, including initially working on the Space Task Group; the various proposals reviewed to put a man in space and the evolution of the Mercury program; contacts with and impressions of such key figures as Jim Webb, John Kennedy, Jerome Wiesner, and T. Keith Glennan; and moving to the Manned Spacecraft Center in 1962 and his involvement there with the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-10 Early family background
1 Nashwauk, Minnesota
2 Ethnic heritage
2-4 Influence of maternal grandfather
4-5 Parents
5-6 Early interests
6-7 First interest in aeronautics; reading AMERICAN BOY MAGAZINE
7-8 Father's problems with the Board of Education in Hancock, Michigan
8-9 Move to Duluth, Minnesota
9-10 Sister, Jean Marian Gilruth
10-24 Duluth Normal School
10-11 Classmates
11-12 Teachers, especially Miss Horn
12 Building model airplanes
12-13 Influence of Mr. Rappold
13-14 Tools and materials readily available
14-16 DULUTH NEWS TRIBUNE model airplane contest, 1925
16 Building a radio
17 Reliving the contest; preparatory class with Mr. Rappold
18 Building a "Baby Rog", based on Merle Hamburg's articles in the AMERICAN BOY
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
18-19 Improving model designs
19-20 Impressions of first book on aeronautical engineering, by Max Munk, at age 13
20-21 Inventing a feathering propeller for model airplanes
21-22 Experimenting with airfoils
22-24 Learning of NACA through a SATURDAY EVENING POST article
25-28 Duluth Central High School
26 Mechanical drawing and mathematics courses
27 Goal to design airplanes
27 Awareness of MIT and names like von Karman
28 Traveling during summers
29 Junior college, two years
29 Building models, reading AERODIGEST and AVIATION MAGAZINE
30 Interest in sports
30-32 Lewis Rodert's courses in aeronautics at the junior college
32-47 University of Minnesota
33 Switching to a pure engineering curriculum at the University
33 Joining an engineering fraternity, Theta Tau
34 Classmates in aeronautics
35-36 Theoretical versus experimental work; lab work
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
36-37 Engines
37 Working with classmates
38 Job placement in aeronautics upon graduation 1935; classmates
38-39 Gilruth's disinterest in learning to fly
39-40 The department's interests and goals
40-42 Desire to work for NACA, knowledge of NACA
43 Fellowship in aeronautics after graduating
43-44 Ackerman's hot air balloon experiment
44-46 University of Minnesota graduate program
46-47 Course work in structures and metallurgy
47 Thesis topic for master's degree, 1935-36
48 Topics for further sessions
48 Jean and Jeannette Piccard
48-49 Influence of Methodist upbringing
49-54 Titles of miscellaneous papers and reports by Gilruth
54-57 Thoughts regarding the Challenger 51-L accident
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
58-73 Gilruth's graduate years at the University of Minnesota
58 Description of Gilruth's research fellowship
58-59 Gilruth's first balloon project with Ackerman
59 Jean Piccard's arrival at the University of Minnesota
59 Century of Progress Exhibition and Balloon Flight
59-60 Working with Jean Piccard as part of the research fellowship; his duties and projects
60 Jean Piccard's showmanship qualities; presentation of self-regulating pressure valve; talks to citizens groups, clubs and organizations
60-61 Funding for University projects; support from private concerns such as General Mills
61-68 Jean Piccard; Gilruth's recollection of Piccard's personal life and professional activities
61 Work at Hercules prior to University appointment
62 Robert M. Silliman and the first telemeter
62-63 Gilruth's recollection of August Piccard, Jean's brother
63 Jean Piccard's wife Jeanette and her involvement in Jean's work
63 Piccard's influence upon Gilruth's professional career
63-64 Further discussion of pressure valve
64 Gilruth's examples of the "Piccard philosophy" in his early days at NACA
65 Gilruth's first wife Jean Barnhill and her work with Jean Piccard
65-66 Piccard's negative experience with National Geographic
66 Gondola and balloon design
66-67 Jeanette Piccard as a consultant for the Manned Spacecraft Center
68 Gilruth's assessment of Jean and Jeanette Piccard's personal and professional relationships
69-73 Work with Professor Barlow on airplane design and stress analysis; the Roscoe Turner airplane
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
73-74 Barlow and the wind tunnel; Gilruth's project responsibilities
74 Gilruth's design philosophy
74-75 Piccard's influence upon his Master's Thesis
75-76 Junior Aeronautical Exam, 1936; selected as junior engineer at NACA
76 The state of American aviation during the 1920s and 30s; the direction taken by NACA in 1937
77-125 Gilruth's career with the NACA
77-80 Gilruth's first appointment at NACA in Flight Research Department; working for Floyd Thompson
80-81 Assignment with Hartley Soulé; determination of rational standards for flying and handling qualities of airplanes
81-82 Testing the Martin B-10B, B-15, B-17
82-83 Design problems with the DC-3
83 Gilruth's report "Requirement for Satisfactory Flying Qualities of Airplanes"
83-84 Use of report by Army Air Corps and Navy
84-85 British interest in report
85 Key people in British aeronautical establishment at Farnborough (1943)
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
86-87 Gilruth's advancement in NACA; discoveries in longitudinal stability and lateral control
87-88 Work at Langley Field; importance to British and Americans
87-88 Pilot feedback on airplane performance
88 Description of acceptable flying conditions
88 Test pilots from Grumman; Mel Gough, Chief test pilot
89 Improvements in instrumentation; the importance of the yaw vane
89-90 Correcting the problem of rudder lock
90-93 Gilruth's administrative duties at NACA; research and publishing of reports
93-94 NACA budget and staff organization prior to WWII
94-95 Enlisted reserve duty during WWII
95-96 WWII and NACA expansion
96 Gilruth's working relationship with Cortland Perkins at WrightField
96-97 The problem of "stick freezing"; Gilruth's analysis and solution
98-99 Conditions simulation in a wind tunnel
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
99 Pushing closer to the speed of sound
99-101 Gilruth's invention of the wing flow technique in 1945
101-102 Gilruth put in charge of a guided missile station on Wallops Island
102 John Stack and the slotted throat tunnel
102-103 Description of Gilruth's free flow wing technique
104 NACA missile research
105 Tiamat subsonic missile at Wallops Island
105 Gilruth's systematic models; breaking the sound barrier
106-107 Testing model missiles; how ailerons worked through the speed of sound
107-108 New work with PARD [Pilotless Aircraft Research Division]
108-110 NACA-Military relations; Special Committee on Self-Propelled Guided Missiles
110-112 The Ramjet program; its development and subsequent failure
112-113 Gilruth's impressions of life in Hampton
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
114 Experimentation with hydrofoils
114-15 Vannevar Bush and airfoil drag calculation
115 Mrs. Gilruth's activities during WWII
115-116 Relationship between NACA and the community of Hampton
116-117 Relationship between NACA and Muroc
117-118 Gilruth's appointment as Assistant Chief of Research in 1952
119 Pentagon reorganization, 1952-53
119 Exploratory work at NACA; development of the Northrop Snark missile
119-120 Direction of NACA during the mid-1950's
120 Gilruth's assessment of the beginning of the Soviet-American space race
121 Civilian Upper Air Panel and the V-2
121-122 NACA observer on the Civilian Air Panel; William O'Sullivan
123 Location of O'Sullivan's papers
123-124 O'Sullivan's project "Echo"; his personal and professional life
124-125 Discussion concerning further interviews
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
126-127 Work at Langley with the Flight Test Group, under Floyd "Tommy" Thompson (1937)
127 Physical and organizational layout of Langley; new developments such as the "Free Flight Tunnel"
128 Discussion of key people at Langley during the late 1930s; Dick Rhode, "Tommy" Thompson, and Charlie Donlan
128-129 Pre- and post-war aircraft testing at Langley; similarities and differences between the two periods
129 Problems with military aircraft such as the P-47 and P-38; Testing of foreign aircraft: Hurricane, Spitfire, and the Japanese Zero
129-130 Explanation of specific flight test procedures
130 Gilruth's recollection of test pilot Mel Gough
130-131 Aircraft acquisition procedures
131-132 Use of telemetry and resulting changes in flight testing
132 Drop-testing with models at Wallops; going through the speed of sound
132-133 Wing flow experiments with the P-51
133-134 Stick freezing and the dive recovery flap
134 John Stack and Ray Wright's development of the slotted throat tunnel
134-135 Flight of an X-l model through the speed of sound
135-137 Ezra Cotcher and the development of the first supersonic aircraft
137 Douglas D-558-l: Navy subsonic jet
137-138 The supersonic D-558-2: the first high speed rocket aircraft with a swept wing
138-139 Flying the X-series; Gilruth's recollection of Scott Cross field, a NACA test pilot
139 Lewis and Ames Laboratories during WWII: their use of full scale and hypersonic wind tunnels
139-140 Gilruth's measuring of Mach numbers reached with the P-51
140-141 Gilruth's professional relationship with theoretical aerodynamicist von Karman
141-142 Description of drop-testing procedures; Gilruth's research of transonic effects
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
142 Investigation of aileron effectiveness (Wallops Island)
143-144 Relationship between industry and NACA during the early l940s; industry lobbying for an increased budget at NACA
144 Further references to Ezra Cotcher and the X-l
144-145 Bell Aircraft and the ill-fated X-2
145 Gilruth's recollection of key people at Bell such as Bob Stanley and Paul Emmons
145-146 Gilruth's assessment of interaction between the military, industry and NACA
146-147 Testing of the Lockheed Electra upon the request of the Air Safety Board
147 Difficulties with the swept wing; loss of aileron control
147-148 Gilruth's evaluation of the Bell P-39
148 Gilruth's own "design evolution" from the late l930s to the l950s
148-150 Gilruth's Technical Report 755; assessment of proper flight specifications and handling qualities (1943)
150-151 The Structures Group at Langley headed by Gene Lundquist
151-152 Measuring the lift, drag and moment using the P-51 and the Wing Flow Technique
152-153 Gilruth's encounter with the transonic
153-154 Gilruth's synopsis of his years as a student and his work with the NACA
155 End of Session
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
156-158 Discussion of possible topics for the interview; papers written by Gilruth and how they might give insight into Gilruth's role in NACA and NASA
158-159 Appointment at Wallops Island; missile testing
159 Finding the missile range site
159-160 Military reaction to Wallops Island missile range; their relationship with the NACA
160 As a member of several NACA committees; Dr. Lewis' perception of Wallops
161 Circumstances surrounding appointment at Wallops; relationship with key people at Langley; Floyd Thompson and Gus Crowley
161-162 Role in establishing Wallops; early responsibilities
162-163 Wallops as a division of Langley
163 Committee support for tripling the budget; advocacy by major corporations such as North American
163-165 Working relationship between Langley and Wright Field Cortland Perkins as the contact person at Wright Field
166 Description of project Bumble Bee; Merle Tuve as a program developer
166-167 Advances in telemetry as a result of the Bumble Bee Program
167 Discussion of decision-making processes
168 Determination of staff competency; evaluation procedures and initiation structure for new staff members
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
169-170 Discussion of hiring procedures; Civil Service engineering test
170-171 Screening process; the 6 month probationary period
171-172 Management promotion; the case of William J. O'Sullivan
172-173 Evaluation of managerial qualities; the question of technical ability as a necessity for technical management positions
173 Support for Wallops Island; interest in aerodynamic data
173-174 Committees associated with NACA, such as the Flutter Committee, Aerodynamics Committee, and the Guided Missile Committee
174-175 Rocket testing; the collection of aerodynamic data on various models
175 Why NACA did not test the V-2
175-176 Difference between Army information and NACA atmospheric tables
176 Hypersonic re-entry problems; Wallops heat transfer studies
177 Pre-Sputnik studies of manned space flight; work at Langley
177-178 Evolution of Manned Space Flight Program; Air Force involvement
178-179 Appointment to assistant director in 1952
179 Development of the X-15 research airplane
179 Harvey Allen; the first proposal to use blunt body design for manned satellites
179-180 Discussion of various proposals for the configuration of manned satellites; Max Faget's theory
180-181 Reasons for choosing blunt re-entry vehicle
181 Importance of the space race; attempts to "outdo" the Soviets
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
181-182 The choice of blunt re-entry design; Hugh Dryden's role
182-183 Testing Allen's design using solid rockets
183-184 Discussions with Jerome Wiesner and the President's Science Advisory Committee (during the Kennedy Administration)
184-185 Impact of the Big Joe experiment; tension between Kistiakowsky and NACA
184-187 Press coverage of rocket launches; conflict between NACA and the Air Force
185-186 Consultation with influential scientists concerning NACA's technical work
187-188 Civilian-Military relationship in development of re-entry vehicle
188 List of seven elements of design essential to the manned environment
189-190 Interaction with Huntsville concerning the ejection system
190-191 Transition from NACA, a non-contracting agency to NASA, a contracting agency
191-192 Personal interaction with companies such as McDonnell-Douglas; realization that contracting was a necessity
192 Starting the Space Task Group; Gilruth's analysis of his career move
192-193 Further discussion of the US-Soviet space race; its impact upon the evolution of the American space program
193-194 Eisenhower and Kennedy: differences in perception of the space program
194-195 Effect of contracting upon research centers
195-197 Question of where to build a manned spaceflight center; Houston chosen as the site
197-198 Assessment of Homer Newell's interpretation of Silverstein and Dryden's goals to put man in space
198 Van Allen Belts; the question of radiation safety
199 Closing comments; points of further discussion
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
200-202 Impact of second Sputnik on technical community and on Eisenhower Administration; impetus to man in space program
202-203 Gilruth's confidence that US could put man in space
203-204 Lifting Body Conference at Ames (1957); PARD report on ballistics
204 Creation of Special Committee on Space Technology
204 Hugh Dryden
204-205 NACA Budget support for man in space
205 Wind tunnel research
206-210 Gilruth made director of Wallops; development of mission
207 Acquisition of solid rockets from Navy at Chincoteague
208 Use of existing radar; Doppler radar
208-209 Testing models at Wallops
209-211 Improving rockets: Monsanto, Atlas
210-212 NACA mission to acquire new knowledge; support to industry and military
211 Improving Doppler radar
212 Wallops Island budget
212-213 Committee on Aerodynamics
213 Hypersonic research
213 Atlas rocket
214 Industry confidence in Wallops R & D
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
215 Round 3
215-217 Planning for man-in-space at Langley; anticipation of NACA becoming a space agency; testimony by Gilruth to Congress
216-217 Special Committee on Space Technology
217-219 Atlas, Titan
217-218 Ballistic design development; Hugh Dryden
219-220 Race with Soviet Union for man in space
220 Escape system design
220-221 Gilruth's philosophy of engineering
221-223 Appointment of Doolittle as NACA chair; compared to Hunsaker
223-225 "Young Turks' Dinner"; John Stack; Hugh Dryden
226-229 Dryden support for manned space effort, for re-entry approach; Glennan rather than Dryden made NASA director
226-227 Gilruth testimony to Congress on manned space; Select Committee on Astronautics and Space Exploration
228-229 Gilruth works on plans, budget for effort at Langley
229-230 Military interest in manned space
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
230-231 Gilruth begins organizing man in space effort at Langley Field; "borrowing" from defense services
231-233 Staffing
233-234 Importance of Gemini program on development of Apollo effort
234-235 Hot summer of '58; team planning for what became Mercury
235-237 Opponents of manned space; Gilruth's conviction that program would be manned
237-240 Hugh Dryden
241 Problems in moon flights
242-243 Don Putt (Air Force) and Dryden
243-245 Recruiting staff for Mercury; Wes Hjornevik
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
246 Relationship with contractors
247-249 Atlas "belly band" improvement
249-251 Wiesner Committee; Jim Webb; opposition to manned space
251-252 Killian Committee meeting
252-253 Project Mercury startup; staffing; Floyd Thompson
253-255 Space Task Group formed; Donlan assistant director
255-257 Gilruth's resistance to permanent move to headquarters
257-258 Original staff and start up of Mercury
258-259 Flexible Mercury administrative structure compared to Apollo
259-261 Atlas, other rocket development
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
261-262 Press attention to Mercury
262 Staffing of Space Task Group
262-263 George Low
263-264 Abe Silverstein
264-265 New Projects Panel
266-269 Gilruth's philosophy of developing ideas, supporting staff; Guy Thibedeau
269-270 Gilruth fires a staff person without authority
270-271 Accessibility of management
271-273 Nature of management in scientific enterprise; selection of managers
273-275 Gilruth appointed assistant director of Beltsville Center (not built by Dryden)
275 New Projects Panel suggestion of three-man capsule
275 Kennedy's announcement of moon program
TAPE 3, SIDE 2
276-278 Kennedy's announcement of moon program; Jim Webb and Gilruth
278 New technology required for moon program
279 Gilruth's sense of difficulties facing moon program
280-281 Gilruth's meetings with Kennedy
281-282 Testimony to Wiesner Committee on effects of weightlessness
282-283 Wiesner Committee delays first US man in space launch
283-284 Contingency planning for Mercury program; inherent dangers
284-286 Challenger disaster compared to Mercury
286-287 Openness of management under Gilruth
287-291 204 fire; review panels by NASA and Congress
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
292-293 RFP process for Mercury; Gilruth's previous experience in contracts
293-296 Gilruth's style, technique as manager
294-296 Wes Hjornavic
296-297 Canadian personnel hired for Space Task Group
297-298 C.B. Moore; advocates for using manned balloons to test spacecraft systems
298-302 Gilruth's relations with James Webb
299-300 Gilruth's relations with T. Keith Glennan
302-303 Liaison with scientific community; POISE committee
303-304 Siting of Lunar Sample Lab in Houston
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
304 James Van Allen
304-305 Scientific critics of man-in-space
306-307 Scout rocket
306 Little Joe rocket
307-309 Delay in John Glenn flight
307-308 Jerome Wiesner Science Advisory Committee
309 Change in terminology from "capsule" to "spacecraft"
310 Redstone and Atlas rockets, management relationships with von Braun and Air Force
310-311 Impact of Lunik 1 on public and on US man-in-space staff
311-312 Establishment of Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, later the Johnson Spacecraft Center
312-314 Political reasons for construction of MSC in Houston rather than in Virginia
314-316 Relocation to Houston of STG and Mercury personnel
315 Importance to Gilruth of proximity to Washington, DC
317 Gilruth marriage; personal relocation to Houston
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
317 Construction, moving into MSC
318-319 Gilruth's personal life, sailing
319-320 NASA staff retreats
320 Robert Seamans made NASA business officer
320 Gilruth's relationship with Glennan
320-321 Gilruth's relationship with Hugh Dryden
321-322 Relationship between MSC and contractors, e.g., General Electric
323-324 Gilruth's relationship with Brainard Holmes
324-325 Gilruth's relationship with George Mueller
325-326 Gilruth's sense that Apollo moon-landings should end
326-327 Space station concept
327 Technological obstacles faced by Apollo
327-329 Contracting for Apollo, Gemini, Mercury
329-330 Relations between NASA HQ and centers
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
330-332 Relationship between Gilruth and von Braun
332-333 Movement of staff from Mercury to Gemini and Apollo
333-334 NASA budget
334-336 NASA planning for post-Apollo
336-337 Competition for projects between centers
337-339 Skylab; space stations
339 NACA administrative structure compared to NASA
340-341 Gilruth's experience compared as administrator in NACA and in NASA
341-342 Development of research airplane, X-1, thin wing, swept wing
342-343 NACA relations with military in WWII
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
343 NACA criticized for insufficient attention to jet propulsion
344-345 Gilruth's attention to advance planning
345-349 Debate among scientists over earth orbit rendezvous, direct descent, and lunar orbit rendezvous: John Houbolt, Stark Draper, Charles Frick, von Braun
346, Importance of computer development to lunar orbit
349-351 Rendezvous plan; IBM
352-354 Problem of payload weight
354 Possible failure points in Apollo
355-356 Place of astronauts in MSC organizational structure
356-358 Procedures for MSC reporting and communication among offices
357-358 Selection of managers for communication skills
TAPE 3, SIDE 2
358 Gilruth's relationship with George Mueller
359-361 Gilruth's role in Shuttle development
359-360 Skunk Works
360-362 Development of Skylab, space station ideas
362-365 Gilruth's role in budget process; testifying to Congress
365-368 Space Shuttle plan
366 George Mueller
369 Gilruth witnesses launches
370 Apollo 10; decision not to land on the moon
371-372 Astronaut selection; Deke Slayton
372 Al Shepard's second flight
TAPE 4, SIDE 1
372-373 Gilruth takes position as Fletcher's director of key personnel development; wife's illness
373-375 Gilruth's reactions to launching Apollo 11
375 Gilruth's satisfaction with his career
Glennan, T. Keith. Dates: June 6 and October 31, 1986; February 6 and 20, May 29, and September 7, 1987. Interviewers: Martin Collins (6), David DeVorkin (1), and Allan Needell (4). Auspices: GWS. Length: 12.75 hrs.; 195 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Glennan (b. September 8, 1905) initially reviews his upbringing, undergraduate education at Yale in science, and work in the motion picture industry and briefly at Lockheed before moving to the Navy's Underwater Sound Laboratory in 1942. He then discusses his career as Operations Manager and later as Director of the lab, including the projects worked on, scientists with whom he came into contact, and relations with other labs. Following this, Glennan describes his work beginning in 1945 for ANSCO and as president of Case Institute from 1948 to 1950, and the growth of the university during this period. Glennan next covers his service as an AEC Commissioner in 1951 and 1952, including impressions of Lilienthal, Teller, Lawrence, Oppenheimer, and others; AEC support of universities and the nuclear power industry; and relations with the General Advisory Committee, Military Liaison Committee, and Congress. Finally, he reviews his return to Case as president from 1952 to 1957 and subsequent career as NASA's first administrator, including the circumstances of his recruitment; selection of assistants; relations with Eisenhower, Congress, scientists, DOD, and the media; and how and why certain programs and goals were developed during his tenure.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-3 Childhood and Family Background Description of family members; father's work on the railroad
3-4 Early memories of Eau Claire, Wisconsin; influence of high school teachers
4-6 Relationship with brother Gordon
7 Problems with family finances
7-8 Friendship with the Midelfort family
8-10 Discussion of college education plans; acceptance at Yale
9-11 Summers at Three Forks, Montana Years at Yale
11-13 Organizational structure at Yale; enrollment in the Sheffield Scientific School
13-14 Description of course work; interest in electrical engineering
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
15-17 Relationship with the Adams family
17-18 Working for Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company; setting up the York Hall Scholarship Fund
19-20 Employment decisions after graduation
21 Work as an engineer at ERPI
21-23 Management courses at college; interest in management positions
24-27 Installation of sound systems with ERPI
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
28 Transfer from Seattle to Los Angeles; move to England
28-29 Influence of boss Gard Knox
30-32 Further discussion of job as service manager in England
October 31, 1986
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
33-38 Career at ERPI
33 Return from England; appointment to position as manager for the Southeastern District
34-36 Innovative management techniques
37-38 Managing Audio Cinema Studio; discussion of influential people such as Whitford Drake, Gard Knox and Herbert Wilson
38 Glennan's notion of success
39-48 Years at Paramount
39-40 Examples of management style at Paramount as studio manager; development of pre-cutting technique
40-41 Work with studio designer Bill Peirera; building a new Paramount
41 Interaction with unions; negotiations between studio management and union representatives
42-43 Discussion of politics during the 1930s; movie industry view of President Roosevelt and the New Deal
43-44 Description of unionism in the movie industry
44 Management style at the studio
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
45 Salaries at the laboratory during WWII
45-46 Further discussion of Paramount; special problems in a large organization
47 Clarification of the relationship between ERPI and Paramount
46-48 Fired from Paramount; tensions which brought about this situation
49-51 Lockheed Experience
49 The unemployment experience; employment options
49 Employment at Lockheed; description of the company's operation during WWII
50-51 Duties as hole coordinator; assistant to the general manager
50-52 Organizational inadequacies at Lockheed
52 Return to studio management - employment at Sam Goldwyn's
52 Employment with the Underwater Sound Laboratory
52-53 Desire to contribute to the war effort
53 Attempts to contact Verne K