Jacobs, Donald. Dates: February 28, 1989; May 9, 1990. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 2 hrs.; 40 pp. Use restriction: Open.
After briefly describing his post-graduate education and work on various rocket problems as an officer in the USAF in the early 1950s, Jacobs discusses his work for Ramo-Wooldridge on the Atlas project after leaving the USAF. He next reviews his transfer to Boeing in 1959 and assuming the vice president's position in the Space Division; initial work on the Saturn project; relations with Marshall, Wernher von Braun, and George Stoner; and later work on and impressions of the Apollo-TIE program.
February 28, 1989
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Decision to work on Apollo-TIE program
2-4 Assessment of Washington, D.C. from an engineering standpoint
4 Role as chief engineer; work with Sam Phillips
4-5 Effect of TIE upon Boeing's business during the 1970s
5-6 Complexities of NASA's internal control and contractor relationships
6-7 Assessment of problems at Rockwell
7-9 Participation in Apollo Mission Readiness Assessment Board activities
9 TIE's value to NASA as an organization
9-10 Solving engineering problems within the political realm of business
May 9, 1990
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
11-13 Graduate education at Stanford University in rocketry; work for Boeing in Bomarc unit; received commission in Air Force to work on various rocketry related problems
14 Hired by TRW [Ramo-Wooldridge] to work on rocketry; development of Atlas rocket and testing at Sycamore Canyon; Jacobs' relationship with Convair on Atlas Project
14-15 Ramo-Wooldridge lack of staff with practical rocket experience
15-16 Air Force management of contractors (Martin, General Dynamics)
16 Air Force difficulty in retaining officers with technological capability
17 Jacobs' observations of von Braun research team, differences from Air Force approach to production
17-19 Jacobs' decision to leave TRW for Boeing; his belief that contractors no longer needed close oversight; cancellation of Dyna-Soar
19-22 Work on Boeing's Saturn proposal; design concept and presentation; relationship with von Braun team
22-24 Refinement of Saturn design; Jacobs' work on dynamics and control problems; transfer of Minuteman knowledge to Saturn effort (Lionel Alford, Mark Miller)
24 Jacobs' experience as vice president of Boeing Space Division
24-25 Boeing's engineering capability, contrasted to other companies
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
25-26 Saturn V guidance and integration, especially use of computer software
26-27 Attitude of Marshall toward Boeing people
27-30 Impact of Saturn experience on the Boeing company; reminiscence of George Stoner, his role and interest in communications
30-32 Jacobs' role as Saturn V chief engineer; technical problems engaged with: Pogo effect, basic trajectory; parallels with Jacobs' Ramo-Wooldridge experience; development and applications of Simulation Center
32-33 Attitude of Marshall people toward use of computers; Jacobs' observations of Marshall organization; contacts at Marshall with von Braun, Giessler, Hauserman, Widener
34 Von Braun's involvement in technical problems and his management approach
34-37 Work as head of technical team under General Phillips in Washington, D.C.; reminiscence of George Stoner as manager
38-40 Studies for NASA on future directions after Apollo, including Mars; removal of Jim Webb from NASA under Johnson Admministration
Mettler, Ruben F. Dates: June 22, 1989; January 10 and June 26, 1990. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Length: 6.75 hrs.; 75 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Mettler (b. 1924) initially reviews his upbringing, undergraduate education at Stanford interrupted by service in the US Navy from 1942 to 1946, and finishing his undergraduate education at and receiving a PhD in electrical engineering from CALTECH after being discharged from the Navy. He then discusses his recruitment by Si Ramo and Dean Wooldridge to Hughes in 1949 and eventually becoming the project leader for the development of the fire control system of the F-102 and later the project leader for the development of the F-104's electronic system. Following this, Mettler describes his consultantship to Don Quarles in 1954 and 1955 analyzing bombing navigation systems, and interaction with RAND personnel in this work. He next covers his career beginning in 1956 with Ramo-Wooldridge, including initial responsibilities studying the Thor missile, key developments and problems in this program, heading the Minuteman feasibility study, evolution of the organization of Ramo-Wooldridge, creation of STL and Aerospace Corporation, and the contributions of the USAF and various firms to the missile programs.
June 22, 1989
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Overview of personal and family background, education, and Navy experience
2-4 Early interests; graduate studies in electrical engineering at CALTECH; professors and fellow students
4-7 The Navy's V-12 program; Radiation Laboratory at MIT; Naval Research Lab experience; radar work in the Pacific during World War II
7-8 Post-war activity; role as an instrumentation specialist on Bikini Island
8-9 Further discussion of graduate experience at CALTECH in electrical and aeronautical engineering; classmates
9-10 Thesis project at CALTECH, (use of glow discharge for anemometric purposes in a wind tunnel); how this project evolved under Professors Fred Lindvald and Hans Liebman
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
10-12 Industry people connected with CALTECH, particularly Ramo and Wooldridge; physics course taught by Wooldridge
12 Mettler discusses his first missile launch, which was a failure
13-14 Mettler's recruitment to Hughes Aircraft by Ramo and Wooldridge; initial responsibility writing proposal as project leader MX-1179, fine control system; discussion of design work for that system
14-15 Interaction between Mettler's group at Hughes and the Air Force, especially General Saville, on questions of tactics and strategy for MX-1179
16-17 Discussion of technological components of MX-1179; the lead collision idea
17 Interaction with RAND people, especially Ed Barlow, during development of MX-1179; RAND's weapons effectiveness work
17-18 Mettler's evolving managerial responsibilities at Hughes in thecourse of MX-1179; learning to balance new technology and the practicalities of operating it and paying for it
18-20 Mettler's responsibilities for recruitment and working conditions at Hughes as project leader of MX-1179; contact with UCLA, CALTECH, Purdue and other universities for recruitment purposes; Howard Hughes' contributions to working conditions at Hughes
January 10, 1990
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
21 Final assignment at Hughes: Project manager of MX-1179 and F114 integrated electronic system
21-22 Mettler as Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary [Don] Quarles, Consultant to Quarles on B-47 and B-48 bombing and navigation system problems
22-23 Work with President's [Eisenhower] Science Advisory Committee, Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation
23 Mettler approaches Quarles for a job, hired as consultant
23-25 Project leader of first integrated electronic fire control navigation communication system
25 Engineering consulting machinery in Washington, senior people available to advise Quarles
25-26 Electrical problem: national security problem; work with Curtis LeMay of SAC to solve problem
26-27 Contact with RAND and Ed Barlow on reliability issue studies; electrical problem impact on National Security
27-28 Mettler's operational visits to manufacturers: IBM, Sperry and Westinghouse
28-29 Air Force's capability to deal with technical problems for sophisticated equipment
29 General Gordon Saville's idea to hold design competition for MX-1179; contract won by Hughes
29-30 Hughes mockup of F-104; demonstration to General Boyd
29 Solving of electronics problem on B-47
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
30-32 General Gordon Saville pioneered idea of: integrated electronics system, system purchased on associate contractor basis directly for the Air Force and airplane should accommodate electronics
31-32 Membership of PSAC; concern with Soviet Missile program and radar in Turkey
32-33 Hired by Ramo and Wooldridge; appointed head of study team for future Thor missile
33 TRW chosen to examine Soviet Program: ballistic missiles
33-34 Member of Strategic Intelligence Panel
34-35 Mettler program manager of Thor; Ramo-Wooldridge selected as system engineering technical direction
35 Contractors for Thor chosen by capabilities competition; Saville system used to build Thor
35-36 Crash program to build Thor
36-37 Testing of Thor at Cape; failure of first missile
37 Reaction of Ramo and Schriever to Thor failure
37-38 Problem with Thor turbopump; solving of Atlas engine problems in Thor flight test program
38 Decision of Eisenhower and Churchill to deploy the Thor to Italy and England
38-39 Indirect use of intelligence information of Soviet program in Thor and Minuteman programs; knowledge of Soviet telemetry
39 Atlas ruled not suitable for strategic capability; ballistic missile strategy shifted to Minuteman
40 Mettler to head study to design solid propellant missile, becomes head of Minuteman program
June 26, 1990
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
41 Air Force systems integration for F-102
41-42 Mettler's role in Thor contracting process; Ramo- Wooldridge study of intermediate range ballistic missile
42-44 Early design work on Thor; role of Douglas in missile sizing and autopilot; Atlas as model for propulsion, re-entry vehicle, role of AC Sparkplug and MIT in inertial guidance system
44-45, Launch of first Thor missile at the Cape
45-47 Air Force's requirements for Thor design
46 Mettler's background and preparation for role as Thor program manager; influence of Louis Dunn on Mettler
46-47 Communication among staff, Air Force, contractors; General Bernard Schriever's Black Saturday meetings (Si Ramo, Colonel Terhune); monthly technical direction meetings with contractors
47-48 Impact of RAND studies on Hughes and Thor design work
47-50 Assessment of contractor capabilities: Rocketdyne, Draper Labs, AC Sparkplug, Douglas; staff capability and management commitment (Bob Johnson, Jack Bromberg, Donald, Douglas, Bob Anderson)
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
50-51 Role and commitment of contractor top management: Douglas; monthly technical direction meetings
51-52 Rocketdyne turbopump issue; impact on Thor and Atlas, policy and technical elements
52-54 Top strategic priority given to Thor development and its impact on project communication channels
54-55 Impact of IRBM development on ICBM; related project structures of contractors
55-56 Mettler's assignment to Minuteman; feasibility study for Minuteman, including silo launch; coordination with Boeing
56-57 Relationship of Army Jupiter Redstone program to Thor; competition between two programs, fuel sloshing problem, turbopump
58 Acceleration of Thor program after Sputnik; cost projections for Thor
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
58-59 Costs of Thor development (continued); cost concerns for Minuteman deployment
59-60 Organizational development of Ramo-Wooldridge; evolution of STL; role of Si Ramo
60-61 Staffing of Thor program: George Mueller, Jim Fletcher, Frank Leehan, George Solomon, Dick DeLauer, Milton Clauser, Myron Nichols
61-63 Relationship between Ramo-Wooldridge and industry; Boeing, Convair, Douglas: relations between T. Wilson (Boeing) and Bill Besserer (RW); design reviews
63-67 Configuration control and documentation for Thor and Minuteman; Douglas, turbopump, Boeing
67 Attitude toward staff with university backgrounds
67-68 Role of missile project managers in future planning for ballistic missile development; relationship with Air Force, evolution of Aerospace Corporation
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
68-69 Ramo-Wooldridge appeal to Air Force for basic research funds
69-70 Evolution of solid propellant ICBM concept; role of Air Force, Louis Dunn, CALTECH Jet Propulsion Lab; relationship of solid propellant feasibility to Minuteman development
70-71 Role in Thor testing of Mettler, Douglas, AEC, General Electric, Boeing; training of Air Force personnel to operate Thor
72 Development of Thor targeting software
72-73 Knowledge of Soviet system and capability; Mettler's role in interpretation of intelligence data; relationship of intelligence to Minuteman design
73-74 Creation of nuclear effects laboratory to test Minuteman resistance to nuclear explosion
74-75 Contractor selection process and cost projection for Minuteman; Boeing proposal
75 General Bernard Schriever's vision of creating industrial capability
Miller, Mark. Dates: February 28, 1989; May 10, 1990. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 3.5 hrs.; 46 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Miller initially reviews his first involvement at Boeing with systems development beginning in 1960 while working on the Minuteman, transitions first to the Saturn program and later to the Apollo-TIE program, and the differences between working for the USAF and NASA. He then discusses Boeing's and his personal responsibilities in the TIE program, NASA's internal systems analysis, and his contacts with Mueller and others in the TIE program. Following this, Miller describes starting with Boeing in 1948 and working on the B-52 and other projects, his responsibilities in the Minuteman program as chief engineer at Vandenberg and some of the problems overcome in developing the missile, and involvement in the 747 tests. He last reviews his and Boeing's role in the B-1 contract proposals and his impressions of the changes over the years in the relationship between the government and the aerospace industry.
February 28, 1989
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Early education and work background; Involvement in Minuteman missile program; first experience with system development
3-4 Applicability of management tools from Minuteman to the Saturn program
4-5 Marshall centers reaction to Boeing's systems procedures
5-6 Association with George Mueller and Sam Phillips; their role in implementation of systems controls
6-7 Strength of NASA centers in implementing decisions
7 Comparison between Huntsville activity and Boeing Air Force relationship on Minuteman
7-8 Corporate contract negotiations; attitude toward the buyer organization
8 Effect of corporate politics upon NASA, the Air Force, other buyer organizations
8-9 Transition from the Saturn program to Apollo TIE
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
9-10 Involvement of top people on Boeing TIE; assignment of personnel
10-12 Miller's placement in Washington D.C. office; initial responsibilities
12-13 Boeing review of NASA and contractor procedures
13-14 Working relationship with Mueller and Phillips
14-15 NASA's development of internal systems analysis; design and Flight Readiness Reviews
15-16 Degree of Miller's contract with contractors; interaction with Bellcomm
16-17 Boeing development of new management techniques through the TIE program
17-18 Assessment of George Stoner involvement with TIE
18 Closing comments
May 10, 1990
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
19-21 Early employment with Boeing on B-52, Dash 367-80, and preliminary aircraft design; Air Force service in Japan; design of Minuteman separation system; design of combat-training launch instrumentation package
21-23 Miller's work as chief engineer at Vandenberg test base; failure of first operational test of Minuteman; war configuration of missiles during Cuban Missile Crisis; difference between war and test configuration
23-24 Analysis of static charge problem in Minuteman guidance system
24 Internal audit of C-1, Saturn V
24-26 Miller's transfer to Michoud as chief engineer; relationship with Marshall engineers; issue of overall responsibility for design (Rees, Rudolph); Marshall design approach and relationship with contractors
26-28 Miller's role as chief engineer at Vandenberg; generalist skills; managerial role
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
28-29 Establishment of Minuteman test program; creation of testing procedures and specifications
29-30 Impact on Boeing of its role in developing Minuteman operational system; insight into Air Force practices; Vandenberg launch control facilities
30-31 Air Force reliance on STL for support in technological development and in operational maintenance
31 Lack of involvement with the press
31-33 Miller's move to Michoud; reminiscence of Clint Wilkinson; distinction between Boeing staff with Bomarc and B-52 backgrounds, and differences in their approaches to design and testing; relationship between people of Bomarc background and Marshall
33-34 Boeing's inexperience with boosters
35 Working relationship between Boeing and Marshall
35-36 Saturn 1-C design, especially propulsion system; actuator design; Mississippi Test Facility
37 Miller's work on 747 for Boeing; impact of Minuteman on 747 testing
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
38 747 test program (continued); resistance of aircraft people; cost-efficiency of coherent test program
39-41 Miller's role in preparation of B-1 competition proposal; earlier work on preliminary design of WS 110-A; breakdown in Air Force/Boeing rapport; B-1 design problems; process of proposal design; ascertaining Air Force needs
41-42 Boeing wins avionics contract for B-1
42-44 Boeing makes minimal efforts to market themselves in Washington, D.C. for B-1 contract
44-45 Importance of technical expertise vs. marketing in winning contracts; Miller's role as president of Aerospace
45-46 Impact of recent government regulation of contacts between industry and government
46 Miller's perspective on transition in engineering design at Boeing from company-driven to customer-driven
Mueller, George. Dates: January 12, April 30, and July 17, 1987; February 15, May 2, June 22, and November 8, 1988; January 10 and May 1, 1989. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 17.25 hrs.; 237 pp. Use restriction: Open (7); Permission required to quote, cite or reproduce (2).
After reviewing his upbringing and education, Mueller discusses his work on airborne radar and other projects at Bell Labs beginning in 1940, Ph.D program in physics at Ohio State from 1946 to 1951, and consultancy in 1955 to Ramo-Wooldridge on missile guidance radars. Mueller then covers his involvement at Ramo-Wooldridge from 1957 to 1959 in systems engineering for ballistic missiles, and the background of the establishment of STL and his responsibilities there from 1959 until 1962 when he became an associate administrator at NASA. Following this, he reviews the evolution of NASA's organizational structure and decision-making processes; NASA/contractor relations and changes in contracting procedures; Apollo-TIE program; his contacts with and impressions of Webb, Seamans, Paine, Fletcher and others at NASA; relationship between manned spaceflight and space science activity at NASA and the roles of various advisory bodies in this; and post-Apollo planning.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Parents' occupations; father's work as an electrical contractor in St. Louis, MO
2-3 Early interest in building model ships and model aircraft; analysis of this interest
3 Father's influence - watching and experimenting in the workshop
3-4 Further discussion of father's occupation; employment during the Depression
4-5 Description of elementary school education; early interest in reading
5-6 Extracurricular activities at Benton Elementary and Normandy High School
5 Family move to Bel Nor, just outside St. Louis
6-7 Summer activities - hunting, fishing and swimming in the Ozarks with Bill Heidi
7-8 Introduction to physics and chemistry; transition to reading serious literature
8 Elective courses in mathematics
8-9 Writing for the school newspaper
9 Influence of high school chemistry and English teachers
9-10 Plans for college; choosing School of Mines at Rolla
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
11 Renting a room from Professor Bradley
11-12 Rolla School of Mines and its relationship to the University of Missouri; the quality of the engineering school
12 Switching major from mechanical to electrical engineering
12-13 Enrolling in extra physics classes; further discussion of the curriculum
13 Varied curriculum; study of French and German at Rolla
13-14 Social activities; involvement in a local Methodist Church; description of Mueller family members' religious philosophies
14-15 Comparison of hiring conditions in Rolla and St. Louis
15-16 Assessment of the quality of the faculty and engineering facilities at Rolla
16 Project to build pumping station for electron tube work
16-17 Vector analysis on broad band amplifiers
17 Relationship with fellow students
17 Broadening of departmental interest in electronics
18 Preparation for a position in industry; searching for job opportunities
18-20 Decision to continue studies in graduate school; acceptance of a Purdue scholarship
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
20 Sources of financial support while at Purdue
20-21 Developing a background in understanding of physics and math; primary goal at Purdue
21 Involvement in a television project; work with Professor Roys
22 Industry funding of engineering projects
22-23 Academic requirements for masters and doctorate programs
23 Decision to pursue employment upon completion of a master's degree
23 Contact with family during the Purdue years
24 Influence of international events upon activities
24-26 Acceptance of position at Bell Labs in July 1940; interview process at Bell Labs
26 Marriage plans
26-27 Building receivers for Bell Labs airborne radar systems
27 Enrollment in PhD program at Princeton
28 Closing comments
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
29 Mueller's decision to leave Purdue for Bell Labs
29-32 Atmosphere and structure for research at Bell Labs
30 First assignment as MTS in television group under Axel Jentsen; Barney Oliver
30 Orthicon technology at Bell
31-34 Mueller's work on amplifiers at Bell
34-37 War time (WWII) airborne radar development at Bell
35-36 Polyrod antenna development for the radar
36 Collaboration within different labs at Bell
37 K-band research
38 Radio noise from the sun
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
38-39 Mueller's work with different groups at Bell, contacts with other laboratories
39 Millimeter wave research; transistor development
39-40 Mueller's position at Bell; his decision to return to Ohio State for Ph.D
40-41 Recognition of research accomplishments at Bell
41 War time workload
41-42 Movement of projects from research into production; Pulse Position Modulation system
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
43 Bell Labs, research documentation
43-44 Bell Labs, publications process
44-45 Bell Labs, informal internal communications re: research
45 Bell Labs, patentable work
45-46 Mueller's personal contacts, research at Bell: Charles Townes, Bill Schockley, John Pierce, Dean Wooldridge, John Whinery
46-48 Mueller's decision to return to Ohio State for Ph.D
46-47 Bell Labs atmosphere, end of WWII
48-49 Mueller's department Ohio; involvement in communications curriculum; polyrod antennas
49-51 Problems with student preparation
51-52 Mueller's teaching duties
52-53 Mueller's research at Ohio State: vacuum tubes, dielectric antennas
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
53 Structure of communications group in Ohio State engineering department
53-54 Mueller's research: polyrod antenna, wave tubes, super-gain
54-56 PhD course work, teaching, committee responsibilities; dissertation
56 Ohio State antenna lab
56-59 Mueller's connection with Bell while at Ohio State
57-58 Ohio State contract with Air Force, other services
58-59 Mueller's contacts with other universities
59-60 Ohio State engineering research foundation
60-62 Ohio State contract negotiation process
62-63 Mueller involvement with Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
63-68 Mueller consultant for Ramo-Wooldridge, radar accuracy, staffing of Ramo-Wooldridge, Atlas program, management consulting
67 Procurement process for Thor, contrasted to contemporary situation
68 Mueller returns to Ohio State; decision to return permanently to Ramo-Wooldridge
68-72 Mueller becomes manager of R-W electronics laboratory; reorganization; Mueller's management responsibilities
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
72-74 Mueller's research activities; telemetry, integrated circuits, engine development
74-75 Staffing, organization, budget of research projects
75 Other R-W departments, role vis-a-vis research group
76 Air Force open satellite program, Thor, Able, Pioneer program
76-77 Mueller's role in marketing R-W
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
78-80 Organizational relationships among TRW, Space Technology Laboratories (STL), Ramo-Wooldridge; Air Force funding and support; STL systems engineering and purveyor of space activities for NASA; issue of whether profit or nonprofit corporation should contract with Air Force; Jimmy Doolittle
80-85 Muller's first impressions of Ramo-Wooldridge (1957), organizational strength; R-W role in development of Minuteman weapons system: conceptualization; selling of ideas to the Air Force: selection of contractors; R-W program control function; support for parallel approaches; leverage with contractors; interaction with Air Force
85-86 Contrast between project development involving R-W and other approaches; phased approach to technical work; the review process; Congressional pressure for public accountability
86-87 Relationship between R-W (later STL) and contractors; role of interface documents and headquarters control of guidance equations
87-88 Expansion of systems engineering concept and definition of interfaces
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
88-90 Application of systems approach to ballistic missile development; preparation of interface documents and definition of subsystems; impact of budget considerations on subsystem definition
90-92 Knowledge of state of the art as factor in sub-systems development; how R-W staff kept current with state of the art; decisions to push boundaries of state of the art; contracts/consultantships let for research
92-93 Initial R-W work for NASA, as well as work for Air Force; NASA organizational weakness; comparison of NASA's management of Pioneer and Apollo programs
93-94 Key elements of R-W approach in addition to interface documents; design specs (system specs, subsystem specs, test programs, reliability criteria and budget, operations plans); program control organization
94-95 R-W interaction with contractors
95 Comparison between Air Force and NASA evaluation of contractors
95-96 R-W response to Sputnik launch, R-W role in early reconnaissance satellites
96 Gaither report's impact on TRW
96-98 STL spin-off from R-W and shift to hardware development; marketing to and development of new customers; construction of satellites
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
98-99 After TRW spin-off development of TRW and R-W business; reemerging of STL with Thompson-Ramo-Wooldridge
99-100 STL product/concept development; Able satellite series, Advent system; general turmoil within space industry; continuation of work for Air Force in systems engineering
101 Mueller's experience with guidance equation error in
103-104 Atlas probe launch, as early example of troubleshooting software
101-102 R-W STL leadership in computer design and application
102-104 Inertial guidance system research, work with MIT (Stark Draper) laboratory and General Motors A.C. Delco; R-W staff, Bob Burnett and Bob Bennett
104 Pioneer Program; building of digital telemetry system and second stage firing problems
104-105 Difficulties with subcontractor performance, STL experience contrasted to R-W
105-106 Impact of PERT approach on management at R-W, NASA
106-107 Recruitment of Mueller for NASA associate administrator position; Jim Webb, Brainerd Holmes, Dave Wright, Ed Dahl; Mueller and Bob Seamans plan restructuring of NASA
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
107-108 Mueller's initial discussions with Jim Webb; Mueller's ideas for restructuring management structure
108-109 Discussion of lunar orbit rendezvous vs. earth orbit rendezvous vs. direct flight and return
109 STL and R-W liaison with Washington, D.C.; Si Ramo, Jimmy Doolittle, Mueller's informal network
109-111 Mueller's discussions with Webb as to nature of job; Mueller's requirement that center directors report directly to him; financial costs of accepting job; TRW attitude towards Mueller's accepting job
111-113 Mueller's initial meetings with center directors, their perceptions of problems; conversation with George Low and Joe Shea; feud between Bob Gilruth and Harry Goett; Wernher von Braun; Kurt Debus' perspective on situation
113-115 Planning for NASA reorganization, dual reporting structure; Mueller's establishment of program chain of command distinct from institutional chain of command; comparison to R-W management and reporting structure; Conversations with Homer Newell, Jim Begg, PSAC members; PSAC criticism of NASA; conversations with Harry Goett
115-116 Restructuring NASA programs, schedules, introduction of all up testing, parallel development approach at subsystem level
116 Attitude within NASA to systems engineering; involvement of George Low and Joe Shea
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
117-120 Dual reporting structure established by Mueller to manage Apollo program and response within NASA; Mueller also sets up under program directors a five-element reporting structure
120-121 Impact on contractor relationships of NASA management structure; Apollo Executive Group and associated meetings of program directors with contractors
121-122 NASA approach to structuring of contractor management during Apollo; contractor inexperience with projects as large as Apollo
122-124 North American S-2 development (Harrison Storms, Ralph Ruud,need to develop automated welding system)
124-125 NASA work with North American on J-2 and F-1 engine instability problems
125-126 Constraints in working with unionized corporations
126-127 Difficulty of working within contractor's established bureaucracy and procedures; for example, effort to introduce PERT system
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
127-128 Other options for dealing with contractor problems; impact or parallel development approach on contractor relations
128-129 Mueller's knowledge of NASA situation prior to taking on the associate administrator position
129-131 Process of redefining what was expected of contractors; all up testing introduced; elimination of NOVA; limitation of Saturn 1-B; rescheduling of Gemini; defining of development plans for each element; including interface specifications; renegotiation of contracts to cost-plus incentive fee basis
131-132 Nature of Mueller's role: provide central direction, initiate tools such as design specs and interface specs, and decision-making on technical matters
132-134 Integration of Mueller's idea with pre-existing management structure of Program Approval Documents and Program Development Plans; Role of Bellcomm
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
135-137 1963 management and organization changes in NASA HQ, centers prime contractors; reliability and quality control groups
137 NASA internal organizational communications
137-138 Functions of NASA program control, systems engineering groups
138-139 Functions of NASA reliability and quality assurance, test and flight operations groups; involvement of Chris Kraft and Houston astronauts office
139 NASA monthly review meetings
139-141 Mueller's role in internal communications, information input; formal reporting systems (PERT, GANT)
141-144 NASA development of incentive contracts; defining and clarifying contract specification; role of engineers
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
144-145 Lunar Excursion Module contract
145 Ground support contracts
145-146 NASA procurement and source evaluation process; role of James Webb; Source Evaluation Board
146-147 Comparison of DOD and NASA project planning systems (William Rieke); phasing of projects and its impact on bureaucracy
147-148 Reasons for development of phased planning; became both an engineering and political tool
148 Role of top management in decision-making process
148-149 Contractor eligibility for bidding on successive contract phases
150 Involvement of prime contractors in total project conception; TRW contracting through concurrent process
150-151 NASA consideration of concurrent vs. phased approach
151-153 Role of Bellcomm in NASA organization, in systems engineering
153 Relationships among Mueller, Robert Seamans, Hugh Dryden, James Webb
153-154 Weighing of fundamental space research vs. manned program concerns
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
154-155 Mueller's assessment of a good government-industry working relationship; Ramo-Wooldridge/Air Force relationship; NASA/contractor relationships
155-156 Impact of conflict-of-interest laws on government -industry communications; lack of trust of government employees
156-157 Corporate lobbying of US Congress
157 NASA centers lobbying US Congress; lack of trust in NASA/Congress and NASA/media relationships
157-159 Industry-government relations (cont'd); James Beggs; SR-71 program
159-160 Impact of public scrutiny on Apollo program
160-161 Industry's perspective on phased project planning; phased vs. parallel approaches
161-162 Role of GE contract with NASA; Mueller's conception of integration contractor
162 Apollo systems integrator function, roles of Bellcom, GE Boeing, task groups
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
163 Apollo systems integration task groups (cont'd); role of contractors in interface problem-solving GE, Boeing, task groups
163-164 Relationship between NASA Office of Manned Space Flight and Office of Industry Affairs (William Rieke); labor unions
164-165 Impact of NASA reporting requirements on Office of Manned Space Flight
165-167 Congressional liaison for OMSP (Tiger Teague, Walt Williams' critique of Mercury program); Media relations and OMSP (Julian Scheer)
167-168 Mueller relationships with executive branch, OMB Office of Space Policy (Ed Welch), PSAC (Charlie Townes, Edwin Land, Jerome Wiesner)
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
169 Relationship between manned spaceflight and space science activity at NASA
169-170 Mueller's assessment of existing friction; establishment of the Science and Technology Advisory Committee
170-171 Homer Newell's problems with manned space science; concerns of the space science community relating to NASA's activities
171-173 Planning process developed by Homer Newell as articulated in Beyond the Atmosphere
173-174 Differences between the engineering and science constituencies; the supporting University Program
174-175 Responsibilities of the Science and Technology Advisory Committee (STAC)
175-176 Incorporation of science into space program after first lunar landing
176-178 Creation of manned space science division
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
178 Discussions of documents relating to the formation of the Ramsey Committee
178-180 Early considerations of the post-Apollo role of space science in NASA
180-181 Ramsey Committees recommendation for creation of Scientific Advisory Board; scientists as a political force
181-182 Mueller's establishment of the Apollo Applications Office
182-183 Webb's and Seamans' attitude toward mid- and long-range planning
183-184 Characteristics of employees suited to planning activity
184 Contractor interest in NASA's development of long-range planning
184-186 Effect of Webb's lack of commitment to long-range planning on NASA centers
186-187 Arnold Levine's characterization of NASA's long-range planning in Managing NASA in the Apollo Era
188-187 Planning activity in relation to the 1967 Apollo fire
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
187-188 The creation of the Space Task Group, its charge and characteristics of its operation
188-189 Mueller's assessment of possibilities for NASA under Tom Paine
189 Relationship with Congress and OMB concerning the NASA budget
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
190-191 Meeting of the Apollo Executive Group the night of the fire; immediate actions taken
191 Relationship with the 204 Review Board
191-193 Implications of the Phillips Report
193 Change from cost plus fee to incentive type contracts, 1963-68
194-195 Assessing problems at North American; quality control
195-196 Governmental influence in industry management changes
197 Assessment of George Stoner's capabilities and work at Boeing
197-198 NASA's testing and quality control mechanisms at the time of the fire
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
199-200 Further discussion of Probability Risk Agreement
200-201 Examination of managerial lessons learned from the Apollo 204 fire
201-202 James Webb's personal and professional reaction to the fire
202-203 Group morale; ability to move forward with the program
203 Creation of Harry Finger's office for Organization and management
203-206 Involvement with Boeing-TIE Program
206-207 GE and Bellcomm roles in recovery after the fire
207 Boeing and GE relationships with NASA Centers
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
208 Morale and the process of recovery
208-209 Individual and personal impact of the fire
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
210-211 Beginning of post-Apollo planning immediately following the 204 fire
212-213 Importance of the Integrated Space Plan
213-214 Planning efforts of the Planning Steering Group
214 James Webb's role in the Integrated Space Plan
214-215 Creation of the space station as a possible goal
215-217 Recognition of the space shuttle as a key element in NASA future
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
217 Johnson Center's role in preparing the Integrated Space Plan
217-218 Necessary organizational changes to implement the Integrated Space Plan
218-219 Description of the Space Task Group and its purpose
219-220 Conflict between space science and manned space flight
220-221 Purpose of establishing Science and Technology Advisory Committee
222-223 Shuttle configuration decision
223-224 Evolution of shuttle phases and contractor involvement
224 Formalization of the Joint Planning Effort
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
224-225 Interaction with Air Force or DOD; NASA-military relationship
225-227 Mueller's view of Shuttle during early stages
227-229 Discussion of budget concerns; reorganization possibilities
229-230 Problems with Budget Office and the White House
230-231 Mistake or retaining shuttle
231-232 Positive results of taking technological risks assessment of NASA administrators Paine, Fletcher and Frosch and their management styles
233 Further discussion of reorganization needs at NASA
233-234 Involvement in Mathematica Inc study
234 Use of alternate studies
234-235 Working relationship with Congress and OMB
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
235 Role of president in space program decisions
235-236 Value of corporate lobbying
236-237 OMB influence in cutting front end costs
237 Closing comments
Phillips, Samuel. Dates: February 23 and June 29, 1988; January 16, August 23, and September 8 and 28, 1989. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 16.25 hrs.; 185 pp. Use restriction: Open.
After briefly reviewing his upbringing and education, Phillips (b. February 19, 1921) discusses various aspects of his thirty-one year Air Force career beginning in 1942 and his subsequent career with NASA. He initially describes his World War II experience as a fighter pilot in Europe and introduction there to many technological advances, immediate post-war assignments including obtaining a M.A. in electronics, and work at Wright Field's Armament Laboratory from 1950 to 1956 including being project director for the B-52. Phillips then reviews his responsibilities from 1956 to 1959 as logistics officer for an overseas SAC squadron, and from 1959 to 1963 as program manager for Minuteman. He next discusses his various work beginning in 1963 for NASA's Apollo program.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-4 Phillips' early life, his family, father and uncle's influence on his early interest in electronics and radio
4 High school years and influence of teachers
4-5 University of Wyoming
5-6 Experience with CAA radio station at Cheyenne Airport
7 Learns to fly
7-8 Phillips' family economic situation, his early employment during summers, after school, and experience gained in electronics
8-9 Advent of WWII, graduates from University of Wyoming
9-10 Phillips' ROTC experience, earns regular Army commission
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
10-12 University of Wyoming faculty who influenced Phillips, his finances while at the University
14 Phillips' initial Army training, marriage
14-16 Transfer to Army Air Forces, flight training, fighter pilot training
16 Assignment to base in East Anglia, England
16-17 Mrs. Phillips' living arrangements during the training period and WWII years, birth of first daughter
18 Impact of war experiences with technology on Phillips: first exposure to concept of radar
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
19-23 German antiaircraft and proximity fuse, Weary Willie program's conversion of B-17s into "guided missiles," the V-1 attacks, the V-2 attacks, the German Me 163, the German Me 262, development of fuel additive for P-51
23-24 Phillips' postwar assignment to General Eisenhower's headquarters in Frankfurt, Germany
24-25 Phillips' wartime promotions, first managerial experience
25-27 Navigation aids available to flyers during WWII: development of innovations during wartime at the East Anglia base, approaches to bad weather landings, air control issues
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
27-28 Phillips' off-duty experimenting with navigation systems and IAGI design antenna at East Anglia base, military support during WWII for innovation, RAF experimental base at Bovington
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
30 Brief discussion of navigation device development for area navigation during World War II in Honington, England
30-31 Retraining fighter group for war in the Pacific; how tactical requirements differed from those in Europe
31-32 Postwar orders to USFET [United States Forces European Theater] in Frankfurt, Germany
32-34 The question of postwar troop morale and interaction with the German people
35 Educational opportunities for US occupation forces
35-36 Orders to Langley Air Force Base, the first AACS Wing
37-38 Early evolution of the Air Force; responsibilities as director of operations for the AACS Wing
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
38-39 Creating a uniform system for air traffic control; coordinating the military and civilian sides
39-40 Interest in graduate education; attending University of Michigan for M.A. in electronics
41-42 Colleagues in the guided missile program; awareness of military applications
43 Support for scholarship in Air Force
44-45 Assignment to the Air Materiel Command at Wright Field
45-46 Responsibilities as monitor of procurement, research and development and production
46-48 Weapons test in Project Greenhouse experience at Eniwetok
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
48-49 Further discussion of Eniwetok experience
49-59 Course work at the Air and Command Staff School, Maxwell Field
50-51 Return to Wright Field; work in the Armament Laboratory on the B-36
51-53 Improving the reliability of the fire control system on the B-36
53-54 Impact of Korean War upon activities at Wright Field
54-55 Early perceptions of Soviet Union as a military threat
55-56 Predominance of Hughes in the fire control field
56 Involvement in missile projects in the Armament Lab
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
56-57 Use of fire control computers in the late 1940s
57-58 Appointment as project director for the B-52
58-60 Work with SAC headquarters on performance requirements
61-62 Contracts for R&D on the B-52 project; relationship with Boeing as prime contractor
62-63 Role of ARDC in executing integration function
63 Discussion contract type: cost plus fixed fee for the B-52
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
64-65 Discussion of B-52 cockpit configuration; importance to Curtis Lemay
65-68 Boeing's role as a modified prime contractor in the B-52 program
68-69 Evolution of Boeing's relationship with the Air Force
69-71 Shared responsibilities as program manager for the B-52; work with Ed O'Connor and Jim Foster
71-72 Duties and responsibilities of Administrative Contract Officers
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
72-74 Procurements and contracting practices on the Minuteman Program
74-75 Further discussion of contract changes on the B-52
75 Origins of the Change Control Board in the Minuteman Program
75-78 Description of daily routine as program manager for the B-52
78-79 Work with counterparts at Boeing and ARMA; description of the level of interaction
79-80 Preparation for responsibilities as B-52 program manager
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
80-82 Contract Technical Compliance Inspection on the B-52
82 Discussion of additional responsibilities on the B-52; progress reviews and upgrading configurations
82-83 Development of the MA-2 bombing system
83-85 Model changes and systems improvement
85-88 Reassignment to SAC, the 7th Air Division in England; range of responsibilities
88 Logistics of handling nuclear warheads
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
89-90 Political implications of placing missiles in England
90-91 Question of survivability and vulnerability in evaluation of overseas basing plans
91-92 Differences between Schriever's ballistic missile group and SAC
92-93 Explanation of distinction between developmental testing and initial operating capabilities
93-94 SAC's operational responsibility for ICBMs
94 Closing comments
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
95-96 Phillips' recollections: as Director of Armament Laboratory at Wright Field, of relationship between the AF and Hughes and of Hughes management difficulties
96-98 Position in AF 7th Air Division working with British on Thor installation; Phillips' transfer from SAC to Minuteman; T. Terhune's possible influence in that reassignment
98-99 Phillips' perception of Air Force interests in space during late 1950s; Wright Field seminar on development of large rockets and guided missiles like the Atlas
99-101 Wright Field adoption from B. Schriever's Western Development Division of new procedures for contract competition and selection; Presidential-level (von Neumann Committee) decision to establish special management procedures (Gillette Procedures) to expedite long-range ballistic missile development; Schriever's initiative in eliminating bureaucracy; Phillips' perception of parallel between WWD and NASA in freedom to rewrite procedures
101-102 Transition at Wright Field from prototype to paper competitions for procurement; F-102 proposals
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
102-104 Interservice rivalry on ballistic missile development, linked to later interest in space
103 Institute of Electric Engineers 1956 annual meeting session on earth-orbiting satellites, the Vanguard
104 Impact on Thor installation in Great Britain of Sputnik launch and US planning for its interests in space
104-105 Organization of Ballistic Missile Division (BMD) in late fifties into two major elements: ballistic missiles, headed by John McCoy, and space, headed by Dick Curtin; space component including Samos, Midas projects
105-106 Function, structure, participants of "Black Saturday" meetings convened by B. Schriever
106-107 Phillips' recollections of his dealings with Aerospace Advance Research Project Agency (ARPA), and Weapons System Evaluation Group (WSEG) on Minuteman
107-108 Status of Minuteman program when Phillips became program manager in 1959; status of contractors and assignments; key personnel
108-109 Technical group within BMD, headed by Guy Middlekoff, doing independent R&D on re-entry vehicle; Kwajalein test range; relationship of RV study with STL; RV group becomes Advanced Ballistic Re-entry Systems program
109-110 Strategic operations analysis unit in BMD
110 Silo-launch testing at Edwards Air Force Base
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
110-111 Silo-launch testing (cont.); Phillips' decision to cancel additional testing; controversy between Boeing and STL
111-112 Phillips' sense of his decision-making authority as program director; criticism of later constraints
112-113 Authority of Air Force Air Materiel Command for contracting andprocurement; relationship between AMC and Phillips that gave the latter contracting authority
113-118 New management structures for system engineering and for program planning and control developed for Minuteman; created "configuration management," including a formal structure of design reviews; borrowed Boeing techniques
114-116 Minuteman management structures that evolved from Phillips' B-52 program experience: e.g., the mock-up review as precursor to Minuteman preliminary design review, engineering change proposals
116 Creation of Minuteman configuration control board
116-117 Shifts in ARDC and AMC authority for engineering and procurement
117-118 Minuteman system engineering performed by AF/STL, rather than prime contractor
118 Technical direction (TD) meetings sponsored by STL with associate contractors
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
118-120 New management structures for system engineering and for program planning and control developed for Minuteman (cont'd)
118-119 Technical direction (TD) meetings sponsored by STL with associate contractors (cont'd), leading to contract changes
119 Contrast between B-52 and Minuteman contractor relationships
120 Development of Air Force 400-Series Regulations, institutionalizing missile program procedures
121 Minuteman effort to develop large solid rocket engines; decisions on missile basing
121-123 AF Ballistic Missile Committee, established by Gillette Procedures; B. Schriever's role
123-124 Independence of BMD from ARDC and air staff; Schriever's role in creating that independence; role of von Neumann Committee and Gillette Committee in authorizing special management procedures for ballistic missile program
125-126 Push for ballistic missile development at first from national leaders, not from within the Air Force; initial resistance of SAC under C. LeMay to ballistic missiles; creation of SAC-MIC liaison group
126-127 Correction of problems that caused first Minuteman launch from silo (404) to explode
127-128 Minuteman inertial guidance problems Phillips' involvement in solving technical problems; role of Black Saturday meetings in keeping him involved
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
129-130 Structure, function, and participation in "Black Saturday" meetings convened by Air Force Ballistic Missile Division commander (Bernard Schriever)
130 Management review sessions conducted by Phillips to involve industrial contractors
130-132 Minuteman Executive Meetings convened by Air Force Ballistic Systems Division (Tom Gerrity) during site activation phase, including Air Force, contractor CEOs and managers; dimensions of site construction work
132 Staff level meetings and communication among Air Force, STL, and industrial contractors
132-133 Role of the Air Force plant representatives
133-134 Establishment of Minuteman Production Board by Phillips during site activation to coordinate production
133-134 Nature of Phillips' involvement in interaction between STL and contractors: visits to contractor plants and test ranges, TD meetings
134-135 Chain of command between Phillips and STL; STL project manager functioned as Phillips' technical deputy
135-136 Response of contractors to new contractual requirement for formalized technical direction under Minuteman; relationship between Bill Besserer of STL and Boeing; disagreement over cable construction
136 Resolution of disagreement on technical issues
136-137 Dimensions of Air Force technical direction effort
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
137-141 Phillips' response to initial Minuteman design, the so-called "wooden missile" which did not allow removal of re-entry vehicle and guidance system in the field by SAC
139-140 Missile assembly and installation; implications for design requirement that re-entry vehicle and guidance section be removed
140 Efforts to improve reliability and lifetime of missile
141 Air Force develops Newark, Ohio, depot for repair of guidance and control systems
141-142 Air Force testing and durability of rockets motors
142-143 Self-monitoring of guidance and control system for failures
143-144 Phillips and SAC consideration in strategic planning of potential Minuteman failures
144-145 Relationship between SAC as operator and BMD as developer of Minuteman; Phillips' role in increasing interaction; establishment of SAC-MIC; Phillips' visits with top SAC staff
145 Missile assembly; SAC and BMD responsibilities in installation, including warhead loading
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
146-149 Concern about and testing for silo vulnerability; contract with Bell Laboratories to assess vulnerability of entire launch systems, including cable
147 Discussions with National Security Agency on design of digital codes for launch control
148 Phillips initiates Project Button Up to identify places silos could be broken into; design changes instituted
149 Creation of Launch Enable System, a safety system for launch control
149-150 Testing and standards for site invulnerability to nuclear blast; Scientific Advisory Committee (Al and Dick Latter, Edward Teller) created to advise Minuteman program on nuclear effects and survivability
150-151 Evolution of Minuteman design; growing role of SAC
151-152 Mobile version of Minutemen; cancellation by Department of Defense under Robert McNamara and rationale for cancellation; resurrection of some design elements in Peacekeeper development
151 Briefings of McNamara, new Secretary of Defense, of ballistic missile programs
152-153 Increased involvement in Minuteman of Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) with advent of Kennedy Administration; transition in strategic approach from massive retaliation to strategic approach from redesign of Minuteman to incorporate individual missile launch and multiple targeting
153-154 Impact on Minuteman of McNamara's reservation to himself of all decisions involving more than ten million dollars
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
154-156 Phillips' view of impact of increased OSD authority over program management; contrasted to BMD management 1954-63; increased need for Minuteman management to go through reviews by multiple Air Force units
156-159 Phillips departure from Minuteman to NASA to become Apollo program director; roles of Jim Webb, George Mueller, McNamara; Phillips' initial reluctance
159-160 Phillips' brings to NASA 55 AF officers with program experience; NASA response
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
161-164 Site activation task forces established for Minuteman, Atlas, and Titan programs; roles played by Tom Gerrity and Harry Goldsworthy; Malmstrom Air Force Base
164-165 Phillips' initial assignment and responsibilities in NASA Apollo program; relationship with George Mueller; basic program structure
165-166 Priority placed on hiring for Apollo positions: Jerry Kubat, Jim Skaggs in Washington office; hiring for Marshall; hiring for Cape Kennedy
166-169 Phillips' conception of the functions of configuration management and program planning/control: his analysis of the essential components of any complex program organization; Apollo program structure; Apollo inter-face documentation and control; Apollo system engineering design reviews
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
169-171 System engineering functions (continued); definition of Apollo test program; testing of Saturn V; test sites in New Orleans, White Sands, Tullahoma, and Downey
171 Status of NASA organization in 1963-64
171-173 Response of NASA staff to organizational approaches implemented by Phillips and George Mueller; experience of NASA centers with the military
173-175 Difficulties with organizational interfaces between Washington and the centers and among the centers; Phillips places priority on team building
174-175 Tensions between NASA HQ, and Houston and Marshall; issue of location of system engineering function; role of review panels and review board
175-176 Structure of Washington organization; role of Bellcom responsibility for configuration management placed in Apollo program planning and control, headed by Jack Colopy
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
176-178 Role of BellComm in configuration management, panels, review board; example of the safety panel's role in enabling flight crew to fly launch vehicle manually
178-179 Phillips' role in systems engineering and integration, design reviews, center program reviews with their contractors
179 Phillips establishes test organization, directed by Roy Day; role of BellComm
179-180 Administration of panel structure performed by General Electric as support contractor
180 Selection of Boeing Company to perform "technical integration and evaluation" (TIE) role: problem solving and in-depth involvement in testing activities, POGO oscillation problem on Saturn V, Saturn V 502 failures; Apollo decision to permit no anomalies in test programs
181-182 Teleconferences for problem solving
182-183 Impetus for TIE contract: Apollo fire, role of Jim Webb, Phillips Report review of North American
183 Differences between capabilities of BellComm and Boeing
184 Other components of Apollo Headquarters organization: reliability, quality and safety organization, and operations
184-185 Relationship between organizational structures of the centers and of Headquarters
Ramo, Simon. Dates: June 27, 1988; January 25, 1989. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: GWS. Length: 3.5 hrs.; 62 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Ramo reviews various aspects of his career from 1945 to the early 1960s, including his work on Project Hermes for General Electric immediately after the war; move to Hughes Corporation and responsibilities in missile projects there; contacts between Hughes and other commercial firms, universities, and RAND; and the importance of developing systems engineering. He then discusses leaving Hughes to form Ramo-Wooldridge, its interaction with the USAF on the ICBM program, and conflict-of-interest problems some believed Thompson-Ramo-Wooldridge had in working for the USAF. Ramo next describes the significance of the firm's international business and key difficulties in the government/industry relationship.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-3 Background of "systems" concept; post-WWII status of aeronautical industry; necessity for electronics and systems based technology in new guided missile and postwar defense efforts
3-4 Ramo's assessment of General Electric in postwar period; its emphasis on commercial/industrial applications; marketing survey for TV
4 Ramo's involvement in Project Hermes; CALTECH Jet Propulsion Laboratory (Theodore von Karman, Clark Millikan)
5-6 Ramo's decision to begin new company; assessment of GE and aircraft companies (Pratt and Whitney, United Technology, Rocketdyne, Aerojet, Thiokol, Hercules); compares to failure of major companies to keep up with computer development
7-10 Ramo's initial development of Hughes company; his emphasis on hiring "systems engineer" types; importance of "systems" thinking; necessity for balance of specialists and generalists
10-12 Style of communication among staff: formality vs. collegiality; Ramo's book, Cure for Chaos; principles of systems engineering; elements of systems engineering at GE; concept of "unwanted mode"
12-13 Hughes' cooperation with scientists and engineers working elsewhere; ease of attracting electronics and high tech scientists to Hughes; aircraft companies' difficulties in doing so
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
13-14 Ease of attracting scientists and engineers to Hughes Co. under Ramo; Ramo's confidence that there would be government funding for air defense systems
15-17 Cost-plus contract as form of government contracting procedures; adaptability of Hughes Tool Company to Ramo's purposes
17-19 Contacts between Hughes and university laboratories: MIT, Stark Draper, NRL, JPL; military science advisory boards; Ramo's friendship with von Karman; importance of university connections to success of Hughes, Ramo-Wooldridge, and ICBMprogram
20-24 Academic scientists' perspective on academic vs. classified or military research, shifting attitudes from post-WWII through Vietnam era; examples of McCarthy era clearance denials
24-26 RAND Corporation activities in 1950s; Ramo's assessment of RAND's value; RAND Project Feedback; ICBM program
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
26-29 John von Neumann role in mid-fifties; Von Neumann Committee, hearings related to ICBM; degree of Rand influence on ICBM and other decisions
29-30 Ramo's experience at Ramo-Wooldridge and at TRW; working relationship with Air Force during development of ICBM program; development as a result of ICBM contract of conflict-of-interest problem for R-W; consideration of government takeover of R-W
30-32 Creation of Aerospace Corporation (Ivan Getting), of Space Technology Laboratories (Jimmy Doolittle)
32-33 Ramo considered for US Defense Department, NASA posts
33-36 Ramo-Wooldridge potential for conflict-of-interest problems; industry, Congressional, Ramo's perceptions of situation
34-36 General Dynamics interest in prime contract for technical direction of ICBM program
36-37 TRW and Air Force roles in defining prime contractor tasks for ICBM program
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
38-40 Discussion of role in TRW during the late 1950s; contributions to the ICBM program
40-41 Importance of international activities; relationships with Japanese and Europeans
41-43 Increasing emphasis upon strategy and planning
43 Further discussion of international business with Japan
43-46 Working relationship with upper and middle management on the ICBM program
46-48 Degree of involvement in technical decisions; ability to recognize small and large systems perspective
48-51 Relationship with Air Force and associate contractors
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
51-52 Decision to bring ICBM Program to public attention
52-53 Assessment of relative success of U. S. Space Program; par vs. outstanding programs
53-54 National distribution of industrial capability for defense of space business
54-56 Consequences of aerospace industry dependence upon government contracts
57-58 Comparison between government and commercial contracts
58-62 Reconciliation of scientific and technical needs with fiscal considerations
62 Financial managers' appreciation of the character of the corporate enterprise
Rev. 09/06/96