Dahm, Werner Karl. January 25, 1990. Interviewer: Michael Neufeld. Auspices: DSH. Length: 1.25 hrs.; 33 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Dahm discusses his birthplace, education, military service and arrival in Peenemünde. Discusses aerodynamics and supersonic aerodynamics at Aachen and the Peenemünde wind tunnel. Discusses the Project Office and its involvement in A-9 work 1942-43, A-9 revived as A-4b at end of war, Wasserfall design, reconfiguration of A-4b (A-9) trajectory. Discusses in depth the Wasserfall project: its guidance development, fins and wings, launches and his role in wing loading. Concludes with events at end of the war: evacuation to central Germany and later Bavaria: completed diploma in Aachen (1947); moved to United States.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Birthplace, education, military service and arrival in Peenemünde
2-3 Aerodynamics and supersonic aerodynamics at Aachen
3 The Peenemünde supersonic wind tunnel
3-5 Experience with the Versuchskommando Nord
5-6 Wasserfall aerodynamics design work at Roth's Project Office
6-7 A9 work in the Project Office, 1942-43; division of responsibility with the wind tunnel group
7-9 A9/A10 idea and its unworkability due to heat transfer
9-10 A7 (subscale A9) project and cancellation
10-11 A9 revived as A4b at end of war and its purpose
12-13 Beginnings of the Wasserfall project (1941-43)
13-15 Wasserfall engine development and earlier nitric acid work
15 Wasserfall guidance development
16 Project Office's involvement in Wasserfall design; reconfiguration of the A4b (A9) trajectory
16-17 Design of the Wasserfall fins and wings; problems with the straight-wing configuration
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
17-18 Redefinition of the wing shape
18-19 Conflicts between Hermann (wind tunnel) and Roth (Project Office)
19-20 Wasserfall launches made on Oie; never saw one
20-21 Role of the Flakversuchsstelle (Luftwaffe) in detailed design
21-22 Materials laboratory involvement with Wasserfall; corrosive propellants
22-23 A4 (V-2) air burst problem and solution
23-24 Roles of the Project office and Luftwaffe design group
24 Dahm's role in calculating Wasserfall wing loading
24-26 Luftwaffe-Army cooperation was good; conflicts inside the Air Ministry over Wasserfall
26 Reduction of efficiency due to dispersal after their raid
26-28 Living conditions at Peenemünde before and after the air raid
28-29 Had little contact with the foreign laborers at the construction sites; swampy character of the land
29-30 The A4b "bastard" version and launches (1944-45)
30-31 Evacuation to central Germany and mood toward the end of the war
31-32 Evacuation to Bavaria and situation there
32-33 Finished diploma at Aachen in 1947 and went to the United States
Dannenberg, Konrad K. November 7, 1989. Interviewer: Michael Neufeld. Auspices: DSH. Length: 2.8 hrs.; 68 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Dannenberg discusses his early life and education and residence in Hannover; origins of his interest in rocketry. Discusses involvement with Pullenberg's rocket group and arrival at Peenemünde. Discusses engineering education and assistantship at TH Hannover. Hired by Thiel and assigned to A-4 engine injection system and JATO. Involved in refinement of the 1.4 and 4.2 ton thrust motors used in testing the A-4 injection systems and the 25 ton A-4 engine. Dannenberg discusses the design of the film cooling system for the 25 ton engine. Shortages of high quality metals forced changes in production; difficulty in getting production drawings that worked, parts often defective. Discusses in depth Reidel I, III and von Braun. Discusses difficulties resulting from August '43 air raid. Concludes with description of end of war and move to U. S.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Birthplace, father's occupation, early residence and education in Hannover, origins of interest in rocketry
2-3 Involvement with Pullenberg's rocket group in Hannover, education, drafting into Army, industrial experience and arrival at Peenemünde
3-4 Witnessed Opel rocket rail car tests and Valier lecture; origins of work with Pullenberg
4-5 Read Oberth and Goddard books; after experimenting with solid rockets went to liquid fuels; got liquid oxygen from a professor at the TH Hannover; experiments were earlier than Opel experiments (1927-28). [Dannenberg subsequently retracted latter claim. - MJN]
5-6 Not a member of the VfR; had own Hannover group; raised some money with public launchings
6-7 Engineering education and assistantship at the TH Hannover in diesel combustion
7-8 Industrial experience and Army service in France, 1940
8-10 Contact with Pullenberg leads to civilian draft assignment to Peenemünde later in 1940
10-11 Not a member of the Versuchskommando Nord, which was created later; Army officers confined largely to administration at Peenemünde
11-12 Hired by Thiel not long after he had moved from Kummersdorf; assigned to injection system of A-4 engine and JATO
12-13 Involved also in burn through problems of the 1 ton thrust JATO (Starthilfe) project for the Luftwaffe; witnessed aircraft tests at Peenemünde-West
13-14 Design of the injectors for the A-4 motor; experimentation with atomizing nozzles and straight holes
14-16 Worked empirically but had some useful advice from combustion and injection specialists from the TH Dresden; Lindenberg came from Dresden
16-17 Combustion/injection research of a NACA engineer also used; Dannenberg had seen at Hannover
17-18 Thiel deserves much of the credit for the A-4/V-2 engine; his death in the bombing raid was a big loss; with him they mighthave succeeded with the Mischduese, which had combustion instability problems
18-20 The A-3/A-5 engine designed at Kummersdorf; he had nothing to do with it; participated in refining the 1.4 and 4.2 ton thrust motors used to test the A-4 injection system
20-21 25 ton A-4 engine already designed when he arrived; involved in refinement, also of the throat area and film cooling
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
20-21 Repeated testing of the 25 ton engine facilitated by exchangeable nozzles
21-22 Problems in drilling the injector holes properly could result in burn throughs
22-26 Design of the film cooling system for the 25 ton engine; function of the expansion joints
26-28 Film cooling cost performance, but was necessary; not used anymore; at the time could not get the high-quality metals of today
28-29 Later in the war shortages of material forced incorporation of new changes; aluminum had to be used for the lox tank, but paperboard tank considered for the alcohol fuel
29-32 Competing designs and problems of the Mischduesen ("mixing nozzles") which were investigated as competitors of the 18 injector system
32-34 Problems with the Mischduesen; vibration problems of the injector plate
34-36 Wasserfall used a smaller version of the injector plate; he was not involved with it because he was assigned to getting the A-4 engine into production and controlling the changes
36-38 Purpose of Stahlknecht's Nachbaudirektion; replacing of Riedel I by Riedel III; to some extent Riedel I ["Papa"] treated badly; attempt to create a set of production drawings a failure
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
39-40 There were serious problems getting production drawings that worked; parts were often defective
40-41 For the rest of the war (1943-45) was deputy of Riedel III in the Design Office; worked on production drawings; involved in the air burst problem
41-42 Riedel III was a good engineer and manager; pushed hard but held together the organization after the dispersal; dispersal reduced efficiency
42-43 The in-house research-and-development philosophy was furthered by problems getting manufacturers; but in mass production had to go to contractors; materials problems made it difficult to get good production; but in the end all missiles made at Mittelwerk
43-45 Von Braun had a very impressive personality; an aristocratic and military bearing; not a snob; communicated with all levels of the organization
45-46 Von Braun wanted another year of development on the A-4; did not hear that Dornberger criticized von Braun for not being focused; was reasonably conservative in his design approach
46-47 Some left the group in Huntsville because they felt that von Braun's philosophy was too conservative; but he was correct in his approach and his decision to stay with the US government
47-48 Von Braun and Medaris pushed the in-house development philosophy/arsenal system; forced to depart from that during the Saturn V period by NASA
48-49 Von Braun was more than a manager in the German period; contributed ideas, especially in guidance and control
49-50 Von Braun was not much involved in propulsion while Thiel was alive; after Thiel's death, he became more involved; Schilling mainly handled testing and propulsion development really slowed down
50-51 Wasserfall development had lower priority, and was often forced aside by V-2 problems; handled by Luftwaffe people at Peenemünde
51-52 Scheufelen and the Taifun; a desperation project
52-53 Dornberger was a distant figure to him at Peenemünde; did not have much interaction with him
53-54 Dornberger opposed the bunker idea; he and Klaus Riedel pushed the mobile launch concept
54-55 Did not travel much during the war, except a few times to the Mittelwerk; problems always pressing
55-56 Himmler came to Peenemünde in 1943/44; von Braun's arrest an attempt to remove an obstacle to a takeover
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
58-61 Does not know of the Zanssen affair and the SS's role; liked Stegmaier and thought him a competent administrator; many people found Zanssen difficult
59-60 Did not have any direct contacts with Kammler; only with Sawatzki at Mittelwerk, who demanded drawings
60-61 Conversion to a company made little difference; does not remember change in pay, but money late in the war was not important, rations were; conditions ok
61-62 Air raid of August 1943 disruptive; loss of a few months due to dispersion, reorganization; does not remember other raids; air raid warnings not disruptive
63-65 At the end of the war production became more and more difficult; went straight on to Bavaria without staying in central Germany long
65-66 Stayed in Oberammergau until the end of the war; situation was tense and difficult; foot shortages and threatened with shooting
66-68 Went to Backfire, then to States; reasons for going to the US; discussions about going to the US before the end of the war kept only among friends
Haeussermann, Walter. January 24, 1990. Interviewer: Michael Neufeld: Auspices: DSH. Length: 2.25 hrs.; 53 pp. Use restriction: Permission required to quote, cite or reproduce.
Haeussermann begins by discussing his early life, education and work experience at Robert Bosch. Discusses his electrical engineering education at TH Stuttgart and Darmstadt; civilian draft to Peenemünde on December 1, 1939; initial assignment to Kreiselgeraete and Siemens Dec. 1939-March 1940; ideas for A-4 platform and one-axis simulator undertaken. Interested in rocketry in late 1920s/early 1930s; did not see "Frau im Mond." Discusses simulation of guide-beam response; A-4 and A-5; appointment to the Institute for Applied Physics; origins of the pendulum simulator; involved in Wasserfall guidance and control problems. Contacted by American intelligence after the war; offered position with the von Braun team; worked on Hermes II project; Peenemünde's in-house emphasis compatible with Army arsenal system; problems with US contractors on Redstone guidance system. Discusses Hoelzer, Steuding, Siemans, Steinhoff, von Braun and others.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Birthplace, early education, father occupation and work experience at Robert Bosch
2-3 Electrical engineering education at the Technische Hochschule Stuttgart and Darmstadt
4 Darmstadt and Berlin were the best TH's
4-5 Was not able to finish doctorate before the war; civilian draft to Peenemünde on Dec 1, 1939
5-6 Darmstadt had the largest role of any university because of Steinoff's role and individual recruitment
6-8 Interested in rocketry in late 1920s/early 1930s; did not see "Frau im Mond"; later assignment to Peenemünde unconnected
8 Initial assignment from Peenemünde to Kreiselgeraete and Siemens Dec 1939-Mar 1940
9-10 At Kreiselgeraete first ideas for an A-4 platform, and one-axis simulation being undertaken
10 No simulation at Siemens at this time; simulation with whole rocket at Peenemünde
10-11 Organization of the control laboratory at Peenemünde in 1940; roles of Hoelzer and Steuding
11-13 Simulation of guide-beam response; some data acquired from airplane flights; all simulations time-frozen
14 Primary jobs from 1940-42 were improving simulators and time response of control systems
14-16 Aware of competing Kreiselgeraete and Siemens systems; Askania-Moeller system dropped out quickly
16-17 Stable control systems produced for A-5 based on rate gyros, but not an ideal solution; Hoelzer advocated use of electronic differentiation problems with whole-rocket simulation
17-18 Siemens system favored over Kreiselgeraete for production simplicity; but still competitors for A-4 when he left Peenemünde in May 1942
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
18-19 Steinhoff competent in building up the guidance and controllaboratory
19-21 Surprised at von Braun's age but soon convinced of his leadership abilities and technical competence; von Braun was very interested in guidance and control
21-22 Von Braun played a significant role in guidance-and-control development reasons
22-23 von Braun never left the impression of being aristocratic; always an engineer to him
23-24 Had very little contact with the Army officers, even socially
24-25 Reasons for his return to Darmstadt in 1942; appointment to the Institute for Applied Physics
25-26 Contracts with Peenemünde of Professors Viewing, Walther, Buchhold and Hueter at the TH Darmstadt
26-27 Spirit of cooperation with Peenemünde and other Darmstadt institutes, as well as friendly competition
27-28 Archive reports as a form of substitute secret publication
28-29 His work also led to his doctoral dissertation, which was classified
29-30 Reports and results were necessary all the time to justify draft-exempt status; one could never be overconfident; for the same reasons viewing got involved with Navy research
30-31 Not aware of any Nazi Party or Reichsforschugsrat pressures on the university of even the Volksturm in 1944/45
31-32 Origins of the pendulum simulator and manufacturing of same
32-33 Dimensions of the pendulum simulator
33-35 Became involved also in Wasserfall guidance and control problems, but not well acquainted at the time about the program
35-36 Conditions for work increasing difficult, especially after the destruction of Darmstadt in a bomber raid
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
36-37 Development of ability to determine stability in nonlinear systems an important accomplishment at Peenemünde
37-38 Accelerometer development also an accomplishment
38 A surplus Siemens guidance system for the A-4, or an American copy, used for the Explorer I launch in 1958
38-39 Contacted immediately after the end of the war by American intelligence; offered a position with the von Braun team; surprised that it was voluntary; did not go immediately because wife was ill
40-41 Taught in Darmstadt until end of 1947; then went to permanent immigration
41 Contacted by the French, but refused them; the US was "the land of the future"
41-42 Convinced by Dr. Hoelzer and Steinhoff by telephone to come over; some disappointment at conditions at Fort Bliss, but also optimism
43-44 Work on the Hermes II project challenging; Redstone work at Huntsville different because of the time pressure to finish an actual missile
44-45 Organizational system more or less the same in the Army arsenal system
45 Definition of the limits of the guidance-and-control laboratory maintained from Germany to the US
45-47 One of von Braun's unique contributions was emphasizing horizontal communication between groups to solve problem; he was the primary initiator of this management concept
48-49 Fortunate that Peenemünde's in-house emphasis compatible with the Army's arsenal system; advantages of same in dealing with contractors
49-50 Problems with contractors in the United States on the Redstone guidance system; relations later with Bendix
50-52 The large in-house laboratory concept for guidance-and-control at Peenemünde largely forced by the circumstances of heavy time-pressure and lack of industrial experience; ideology unimportant
52-53 People selected at Peenemünde to personal acquaintance and "networking"
Heimberg, Karl. November 9, 1989. Interviewer: Michael Neufeld. Auspices: DSH. Length: 4.25 hrs.; 87 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Heimberg discusses his birthplace and early education. Discusses engineering education at the TH Darmstadt; university requirement and importance of practical experience in german engineering education; deficiencies in practical experience of american engineers. Manufacturing of Redstones in Huntsville and industry objections. Opposed to Hitler. Leaves for job in Japan after getting in trouble with authorities (1936-37); travels through Soviet Union; experience in Japan; departure from Japan, June 1941. Interlude at Stuttgart and Karlsruhe before drafted; assignment to the Versuchskommando Nord at Peenemünde. Hired by Ludwig Roth for Project Office; Roth's personality and management style. Involved with A-9 (A-4b); first launch and failure. Wasserfall: origins of and assignment to; work on test stand and floating test stand (Schwimmweste). Discusses von Braun; initial impression; advocates underestimating costs to sell projects; forced to wear SS uniform; arrest with Gròttrup and Reidel II. Discusses Zanssen's disapproval of regime and removal. Saved central records to use as bargaining chip; evacuated by Americans.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-3 Birthplace and early education
3 Engineering education at the TH Darmstadt
3-5 Importance of the practical experience in German engineering education in contrast to American; manufacturing of Redstones in Huntsville and industry objections
5-6 University requirements for experience; conditions and pay of these positions in industry
6-9 Friction between Diplom-Ingenieure and Fachschul-ingenieure not typical; differences in the nature of education
9-10 Deficiencies in the practical experience of American engineers
10-11 Education interrupted by period at brother's plant
11-12 Opposed to Hitler; leaves for Japan after getting in trouble with the authorities (1936-37)
12-14 Travel to Japan through the Soviet Union, and his job there
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14-16 Experience in Japan
16-17 Design of the A-7 in the Project Office
17-18 Depart Japan for leave, June 1941; interlude at Stuttgart and Karlsruhe before drafting
18-20 Assignment to the Versuchskommando Nord at Peenemünde; problems with NCO's
20 Origins of Wasserfall and assignment of Luftwaffe personnel to Peenemünde
20-21 Hiring by Ludwig Roth for Project Office; role of TH Darmstadt in hiring at Peenemünde
21 Size of the Project Office and organizational position
21-23 Von Braun advocates underestimating costs in order to sell projects; idea of engine clustering for Saturn I and the test stand for same
23 Initial impression of von Braun
24-25 Roth's personality and management style; attention to detailsimilar to Helmut Hoelzer
25 Transferred to testing
25-26 Involvement with the A-9 (A-4b); first launch and failure (1944)
26 Little knowledge of the A-9/A-10; U-boat launch idea
26-27 Schwimmweste project for a floating Wasserfall test stand
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
27-28 The A-7 (winged A-5) program and cancellation (1942)
28-29 Departure from the Project Office and assignment to Test Stand 7
29-30 First met Oberth when Oberth's daughter killed in a liquid oxygen plant explosion
30-31 Difficulties dealing with Oberth; von Braun brings him to Huntsville in the late fifties
31-32 No knowledge of the spaceflight/rocketry fad of the twenties
32 Discussion of spaceflight at Peenemünde only privately
32-33 For most people at Peenemünde atmosphere was nothing special
33-35 Test-stand calibration of turbopumps and combustion chambers necessary because of variations
35 Problems with the injector plate design
36-37 Witnessed the first A-4 launches; functions of Test Stand 7
37-38 Engine test stand at Vorwerk Sued (Schlier) in Austria; danger and accident there
38-39 Assignment to the new Wasserfall test stand, and functions of the various test stands
39-41 Special problems in working with nitric acid and hypergolic fuels; advantages of same
41-42 Origins of Wasserfall and reasons for his assignment to build the engine test stand
42-43 Worked with Luftwaffe people Haase and Scheufelen; Scheufelen had idea for Taifun
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
44-45 Relations between Army and Luftwaffe people good at the working level
45-46 Involvement with Schlier in Austria; Lehesten engine test stands built over a quarry
46-47 His work on the Wasserfall test stand and the floating test stand (Schwimmweste)
47-48 Use of prisoners on test stand construction at Peenemünde and Lehesten
48-50 Bunker vs. road-mobile systems for launching the A-4; advantages of the bunker
50-51 Training of the troops on the test stand and at Heidelager (Bliszna)
51-52 Von Braun forced by Dornberger to wear his SS uniform for Himmler; later arrest of von Braun, Gròttrup and Riedel II
52-53 Wasserfall engine testing and success with the injector plate; A-4 engine redesign sidetracked by mass production
53-54 Involved with A-4 mass production engine testing; repulsed by Mittelwerk; plans for Lehesten and Berlin official and von Braun confirm feeling of imminent defeat, end 1944
54-55 Became assistant to Hueter at the end of 1943; organizationalstructure of the test field under Schilling
55-56 Schilling as assistant to Thiel
56 Von Braun's and Thiel's management style
56-57 He liked Thiel; Thiel's death in the air raid (1943)
57 The nature of the work in Hueter's office
57-59 Modification of the A-4 engine constant because of changes in steel or other things; changes on test stand and modification of the drawings
59-60 Living quarters and working conditions; worked 12-14 hours a day
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
60-64 Careless procedures and the explosion at Schlier (Austria); Schlier and Lehesten under Mittelwerk; comparison of the management of the two
64-65 Mass production engine testing on Test Stand 8; von Braun told them to test until the jet deflector burned out
65 Assembly locations and manufacturing of A-4 engines
65-67 Mass production testing of combustion chambers and turbopumps separately; matching of their characteristics
67-68 Evacuation of testing to Lehesten already in late 1944
68 Did not notice any change in relations with Army officers when Rossmann there
68-69 Zanssen more difficult to work with than Dornberger; Zanssen's disapproval of the regime and removal
69-70 Stegmaier was narrow-minded and an old member of the party like Zanssen; does not know of his role in Zanssen's removal
70-71 Zanssen's effrontery to the Gauleiter and his comments against the regime foolish
71-72 Von Braun's position reduced by the reorganization into the Elektromechanische Werke on a formal level; but informally much the same as before
72 Storch's appointment as head did not make much difference
72-73 Worked very long hours; living conditions and food ok
73-74 Engine testing like an assembly line, but he was not involved with it unless something went wrong
74-75 Not much involved in Luftwaffe projects; Schwimmweste never used; Flakversuchsstelle had an office in his building; generally dispersed throughout the organization
75-76 The U-boat launch canister for A4 and the Taifun were desperation projects
TAPE 3, SIDE 2
76-77 Sent to Lehesten, Nov./Dec. 1944; planning for a test stand for complete vehicles
77-78 Moved to Bavaria; returned after end of the war with Riedel III to burn design office files
78-79 Stayed in Lehesten from late 1944 to early April 1945
79 Reasons for wanting to leave Oberammergau and go back to central Germany to burn files
79-80 Central records saved and other files burned in order to preserve the records as a bargaining chip
80-81 Conditions in the Mittelwerk very unpleasant; did not see prisoners
81-82 Evacuation by the Americans before the Russians took over occupation of the area; Heimburg encouraged others to do so
82-83 Evacuated to Witzenhausen; participated in British Operation Backfire
83-84 Went to the United States expecting that the stay would be temporary; that may not have been the opinion of von Braun since rockets were his life
84-85 Remembers von Braun saying that it would have been preferable to develop rocketry for space travel rather than war, but a necessity; Dornberger ordered von Braun not to mention space in Hitler's presence; said these things only in presence of a small number of people; it was risky
85-87 Von Braun's management style stressed the responsibility of individuals, not committees; was able to talk to everybody at every level; but going past subordinates and giving orders to someone below them caused friction
Hoelzer, Helmut. November 10, 1989. Interviewer: Michael Neufeld. Auspices: DSH. Length: 3.25 hrs.; 71 pp. Use restriction: Public.
Hoelzer begins by discussing his birthplace and early education; parents background. Discusses engineering education and doctoral dissertation on ground speed measurement. Hired by Telefunken (Berlin); worked on wave propagation and TV systems. Discusses the development of the guide plane system (1939-40); guide beam; Schlitt lateral accelerometer. A-5 guidance system; problems with instability in the A-5/A-4 guidance and control systems; in-house capability; role of corporations; the origin of the mixing computer and simulators for guidance control systems; development of simulation and the analog computer; development of accelerometers. Discusses von Braun, Dornberger, Zanssen, Rust and others.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Birthplace, parent's background and early education
2-3 Work experience preparatory to engineering school; choice of specialization
3 Conflict with the Nazi student organization; loss of scholarship to the TH Darmstadt (1933)
3-5 Teaching in Frankenhausen and return to Darmstadt
5-6 Completion of studies at Griesheim/Darmstadt; employment by Telefunken (Berlin)
6-7 Interest in measurement of ground speed of an aircraft through accelerometers as doctoral dissertation
7-8 Work at Telefunken on wave propagation and TV systems
8-11 First meetings with Wernher von Braun; impression of his personality and arrival in Peenemünde (1939)
11-12 Origins of the guide beam and the Schlitt lateral accelerometer
13-14 Development of A-5 guidance systems by four companies; the Moeller (Rechlin) system
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14 Problems and instability in the A-5/A-4 guidance and control systems
14-17 Principle of the guide-plane system; Hoelzer's improvement over the Lorenz system
17-19 Instability problems in the guide-plane system and their correction
19-21 Development of electronic differentiation and integration for the guide-plane system
21-22 Guide-plane system developed 1939-40
22-23 Origins of the mixing computer and von Braun's initial opposition
23-24 Arrival of Steinhoff and rivalry with Reisig
24-27 Development of a large in-house capability, role of industry in Germany and Huntsville and role of Dornberger
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
27-28 Development of in-house capability (con't); role of corporations, the SS and Speer's ministry
28-29 Organization of the guidance and control laboratory
29-31 Origins of the mixing computer and of simulators for theguidance and control system
31-35 Replacement of the mechanical control systems with the mixing computer
35-36 The Nyquist method for determining the stability of a feedback system
36-39 Dornberger stops the mixing computer; all other systems unstable; decision reversed
39-41 Manufacturing of the guide-plane and mixing computer systems; inclusion of guide-plane signal
41-43 Reasons why the guide beam was not used on most V-2s
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
43-44 Development of simulation and the analogue computer; relations with Prof. Walther, TH Darmstadt
44-47 Hoelzer's dissertation and its fate (1943-46); early years in the United States
47-49 Development of the Messina 2 telemetry system
49-50 Only two or three analogue computers, and only in Peenemünde
50-53 Development of the Schlitt, Mueller, Buchhold and Wagner accelerometers
53-55 Development of the second guide-beam system
55-56 Involvement with Wasserfall limited
56-57 Reasons for the failure to finish the Wasserfall guidance system
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
57 Location and formation of Flakversuchsstelle; formation of the Versuchskommando Nord
57-58 VKN and problems with officers
58-59 Darmstadt and its role in recruiting for Peenemünde
59-60 Role of Wolman and TH Dresden in recruiting
60-61 Dealings with Education Minister Rust; no knowledge of the Reichsforschungsrat
61-62 Dornberger, Himmler and the Zanssen affair
62-64 Von Braun's arrest and SS membership; his meeting beforehand with Himmler (1944)
64-66 Dornberger's personality, recruitment of the spaceflight enthusiasts and high-level connections
66-67 Zanssen's personality and friendship with Dornberger; contrast to Dornberger's willingness to evade regulations
67-68 Stegmaier; no memory of Rossmann
68-69 Changeover to Elektromechanische Werke had little impact
69-71 Von Braun's leadership and management role in Peenemünde
71 Conclusion
Mueller, Fritz. November 6-8, 1989. Interviewer: Michael Neufeld. Auspices: DSH. Length: 4.5 hrs.; 114 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Mueller begins by discussing his upbringing, early interests and education. Discusses hiring by Kreiselgeraete (1931); development of the A-3 and A-5; proposed use of Sg 64 for Wasserfall (1941); comparison of Siemens and Kreiselgeraete systems; Askania's guidance and control system; involvement of the Navy in Peenemünde guidance efforts; Mueller's development of the gyroscopic integrating accelerometer (1939-42); Sg 66 design (1939-42); accelerometer development; impact of evacuation of Kreiselgeraete's development labs to Sudetenland (1943); antiaircraft homing devices; knowledge of the early rocket groups and spaceflight fad (late 1920's-early 1930s); travel to US and reaction to Fort Bliss/El Paso and Huntsville, Alabama (1945-1950s); gyro development at Fort Bliss; Redstone missile development. Discusses Boykow, von Braun, Kummersdorf, W. Riedel I and III, Steinhoff and others.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-3 Upbringing and education
3 Hiring by Kreiselgeraete (1933) and nature of the company
3-4 Early interests and education
4-6 Kreiselgeraete work for the German Navy; description of Direktor Boykow
6-7 First encounter with Wernher von Braun and Kummersdorf
7-8 Non-guidance work for the rocket program; cryogenic valves and recording instruments
8-9 Beginnings of the A-3 guidance system
9-10 Description of von Braun and his spaceflight interests in the mid-1930s
10-12 Description of Walter Riedel I, conflicts with Diplom-Ingenieure and replacement by Walter Riedel III during the war
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12-13 Encounters with Dornberger and Zanssen
13-17 Development and design of the A-3 stabilized platform (1935-37); flaws of same
17-19 A-3 control system and jet vanes
19-20 Test-stand simulations
20-22 A-3 launches (1937) and reasons for the guidance and control failure
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
23-24 Tests and analysis of the A-3 failure
24-27 Design of the A-5 platform and control system Sg 52 (1938-39); improvements over A-3
27-29 Improved A-5 system Sg 64 and launches
29 Proposed use of Sg 64 for Wasserfall (1941)
30-32 Involvement of Siemens and Askania in guidance and control development for Peenemünde; Kreiselgeraete's small size and flexibility vs. Siemens' manufacturing capacity
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
32-33 Comparison of Siemens and Kreiselgeraete systems; developmentof the Mischgerat and elimination of the rate gyros (1940-42)
33-35 Design of the Kreiselgeraete Sg 66 electromechanical control system; advantages of the Mischgeraet system
35-37 Design of the Sg 66 platform and gyroscopic accelerometer
37-39 Incorporation of the pitch program; comparison to the Siemens system
39-41 Development of electrical differentiation and the Mischgeraet; substitution for rate gyros and purpose of latter
42-43 Growth of the Guidance and Control Laboratory at Peenemünde; disadvantages of vacuum tubes
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
43-44 Askania's guidance and control system and disadvantages
44-45 Involvement of the Navy in Peenemünde guidance efforts
45-46 Kreiselgeraete organization and involvement in north-seeking and air-bearing gyros and antiaircraft missile guidance
46-48 Personality of Ernst Steinhoff
48-50 Other Peenemünde contacts; impression of the organization and relationship to Kreiselgeraete and other corporations
50-52 Sg 66 platform for the A-4 and redesign as Sg 70
52-54 Design of the Sg 66 electromechanical control system (1940-43)
TAPE 3, SIDE 2
54-56 Development of the gyroscopic integrating accelerometer by Mueller (1939-42)
56-58 Competing accelerometers and turn to mass production of Kreiselgeraete one
58-66 Detailed description of the Kreiselgeraete accelerometer
TAPE 4, SIDE 1
66-68 Design and accuracy of the accelerometer; manufacturing begins 1943-44
68-70 Sg 66 design (1939-42); competition with the Siemens system
70-72 Kreiselgeraete involvement with Navy and disinterest in large-scale manufacturing; impact of priority demands and lack of crucial raw materials
72-75 Redesign of the Sg 66 as Sg 70 to eliminate aluminum gimbals
75-77 Sg 66 and 70 launches (1944-45), design problems and inclusion of accelerometers
77-78 Sources of error in the Siemens system
TAPE 4, SIDE 2
78-81 Sources of error in the Siemens system, continued
81-82 Apollo-Saturn guidance and control systems
82-84 Accuracy of the Sg 66 and the problem of trajectory control and accuracy generally
84-86 Accelerometers on the Sg 66 and the problem of integration over time; the Mischgeraet
86 Accelerometers on Redstone, Jupiter and Pershing (1950s) and at Fort Bliss
86-89 Development of synchronous and symmetric gyros, and servo systems in the United States
89-92 Inadequacy of servo systems and the development of air-bearing gyros in Germany
TAPE 5, SIDE 1
92-94 Impact of the evacuation of Kreiselgeraete's development labs to Sudetenland (1943); air raids in Berlin
94-96 Political control and threats by Nazis in the company
97-98 End of the war and foreign occupation
98 Initial contact and cooperation with the American forces
98-99 Job offer from Leitz and previous work with them on antiaircraft missile homing devices
99-102 Renewed contacts with Peenemünders and von Braun, and reasons for decision to go to US
102 Knowledge of the early rocket groups and spaceflight fad (late 1920s-early 1930s)
TAPE 5, SIDE 2
103-104 Travel to the United States, and reaction to Fort Bliss/El Paso and Huntsville, Alabama (1945-1950s)
104-106 Gyro development at Fort Bliss and the early years at Huntsville
106-107 Redstone missile guidance
107-108 Comparison to Draper inertial guidance systems and development of internal gimbal system
108-109 Jupiter and Pershing inertial guidance systems
109-111 Cooperation and competition with Draper systems; air-bearing versus
liquid-bearing gyros; application of air-bearing gyros to Saturn, and disadvantages for spaceflight
112 Organization of the guidance and control laboratory at Huntsville; promotion to deputy of Haeussermann
112-113 Departure to private industry (1960) and tasks there
113-114 Von Braun's role as leader in Huntsville
Spencer, Nelson. Date: December 22, 1986. Interviewer: David H. DeVorkin. Auspices: SAOHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 49 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Spencer begins by discussing his early training in electrical engineering at Michigan; his migration into space work. Discusses faculty; William Dow; becomes Dow's assistant circ 1941; worked for Sciaky Brothers (1941-43); Discusses Navy years (1943-1945); LORAN officer in Boston Navy Yard; schooling in radar electronic Harvard; MIT radar school. Discusses work on Bumblebee project; returns to work for Dow (1946); upper air work; V-2 Panel structure. Acquires skills for rocket science; building ionospheric probes; research in flying ionization gauges. Recollections of White Sands ca. 8/46; Langmuir Probe work; NRL's mass spectrometer results; Project Blossom; interservice rivalry between manned aircraft and rocketry proponents; Viking rocket; Air Force role in Aerobees; University of Michigan Space Research physics Lab; SCIGY and the IGY. Discusses Dow, Golay, Krause. O'Day and Havens
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-4 Early training at Michigan in electrical engineering
1-2 Economic background
2 Migration into space work at Michigan
2-3 Courses
3 Faculty and meeting William Dow
3-4 Dow's specialties, interests and character
4 Assistant to William Dow ca. 1941
4-5 Aluminum welding
4 Lack of drive for graduate work
5 Alumina and Duraluminum
4-7 Work for Sciaky Brothers 1941-1943
5-6 Contributions
6 Refinement of resistance welders and their technique
6-7 Refine circuit breaker designs and replacing circuit breakers with electronic units
7-9 Navy years and influence of friends 1943-1945
8 Opportunity for further schooling in radar; move to Harvard for training in electronics for radar; MIT radar school
9 Duty in the Boston Navy Yard radar office as LORAN officer; digression to discuss Dow's post war support
9-10 Work in Buffalo 1946; work at Cornell Aeronautical Laboratories on the Bumblebee Project
10 Contact with school mate from Michigan about working for Dow; return to Michigan to work for William Dow 1946; flying instrument on rockets
10-11 Three Michigan groups in upper air work competing Dow-Conlon-Nicholas-Leslie Jones (see pages 17, 24, 28, 41)
11 Structure of groups and finding; competition; contact with Marcel Golay; switch of patronage to Marcus O'Day
12-13 Discussion of V-2 Panel structure send membership (see page 22)
12 Attending meetings; Krause
12-13 Krause as chairman
13 Dow's involvement and personality
13-14 No real competition for berths
14-16 Acquiring skills for rocket science and shared responsibilities
14 Air Force as maverick; O'Day as instigator; scrapping with the Air Force - contracting
14-15 Building ionospheric probes
15 Research areas-flying ionization gauges-measuring the ambient density of the atmosphere
16 Motives for research - Dow interests; Air Force interests
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
17 Shared laboratory responsibilities in Upper Air Research; machine shop; Conlon's interests in aeronautical department
17-18 Conflicting measurement results with ionosphere gauge
18 Similar work at NRL; The "Panel Atmosphere"
19 Interest centered on doing the experiment rather than analyzing the data; recollections of White Sands ca. August 1946
19-20 Rocket failures
20-21 Preparing experiments for launch
21 Question of ruggedizing and drive for miniaturization; Langmuir Probe work at Michigan
21-22 Spencer's dynamic probe and contact with Ralph Havens
22 Value of attending V-2 Panel meeting (page 24)
22-23 Success rates
23 Problem with data reduction and contamination; value of NRL's mass spectrometer results
24 The Air Force and the V-2 Panel; Project Blossom-holds more instrumentation; O'Day's push for Blossom nose cone
25 Interservice rivalry and competition between manned aircraft and rocketry proponents
26 Viking rocket; turn to Aerobees
26-27 Air Force role in aerobees
27-44 University of Michigan Space Research Physics Laboratory
27 Instrumentation of Aerobees at Michigan
27-28 Staff changes, funding gets thin
28 Aide of V-2 Panel
28-29 SCIGY and the IGY
29 Improved support with the IGY; better conditions at Fort Churchill
29-30 Name change and Dow's reaction
30 Dow's worsening attitude for space research as opposed to engineering research; measuring composition-Langmuir probes and thermionic gauges
31 Competition with Les Jones of the aeronautical department competition; building mass spectrometer and for support from NASA
31-33 Use of Langmuir probes
32 Problems with Langmuir probes; pressure, temperature and density measurements
32-33 The dumbbell probe
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
33-35 Langmuir probes (continued)
33-34 First results
34 Growth of Space Physics Group at Michigan
34-35 Interest in Langmuir probe techniques
35 Relations between H. Friedman and H. Newell
35-36 Reduction techniques
36-37 Size of groups at Michigan
38-39 Discussion of documents
40-41 Photographs and film of V-2 shots
41 Recollections of V-2 Panel meetings
41-42 Panel minutes
43 The Committee on space-COS
43-44 The National Space Establishment
44 Move to NASA 1960; NRL as driver; role of Air Force and Signal Corps in origins of NASA Space Science
44-46 Discussion of DeVorkin's book and need to acknowledge Russian V-2 program
46 Ann Arbor meting and resultant book; Scientific Uses of Earth Satellites
47-48 Discussion of articles and photographs; Langmuir probe; Sparrowbee
49 Closing
Oberth, Herman. November 14 and 15, 1987. Interviewers: Martin Harwit and Frank Winter. Auspices: DSH. Length: hrs.; 67 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Oberth discuses his early life and early interest in rockets and space travel; influence of books. Discusses "Frau im Mond"; relationships with other spaceflight and rocket enthusiasts. Discusses von Braun, Goddard, Ziolkowsky, von Karman and others. Discusses Kegeldüse motor; 1929 rocket explosion; Wasserfall missile; V-2 and other rockets. Discusses work in Peenemünde and Reinsdorf; post-war activities; occupation in America; Sputnik; moon landing and the Challenger disaster.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Introduction
2-3 Birth in Hermannstadt, Rumania; citizenship
3-5 Early interest in rockets and space travel
5-6 Comet Halley, 1910
6-7 Influence of books
7-11 Evidence of early work
11-14 Earliest mathematical and physiological researches
14 First proposal to the German Ministry of Armaments
14-17 Post-war events, studies and early career as a teacher
17 Goddard; Die Rakete zu den Planetenrümen
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
17-19 Further discussion of Goddard; Ziolkowsky
19-29 Relationship with other spaceflight and rocket enthusiasts
29-30 REP-Hirsch Astronautics Prize
30-32 Ziolkowsky, Goddard and von Braun
31 Kegeldüse motor (conic nozzle)
32-34 "The Woman on the Moon" ("Frau im Mond") film; Rudolf Nebel
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
34-35 1929 rocket explosion and exhaustion
35-38 Return to Rumania and further experiments
38-39 1938 call to Vienna, Dresden and Peenemünde
39-42 Peenemünde
42-44 V-2 and other rockets
44 Arrest of von Braun
45-46 Attitude towards National Socialists (NAZIS)
46 Lectures in Peenemünde
47-48 Work in Peenemünde and later in Reinsdorf
48-49 More about the V-2 and other rockets
49 Aerial bombardment of Peenemünde
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
50 Aerial bombardment of Peenemünde (con't.)
50-51 Wasserfall missile
51-52 Hanna Reitsch - flight on a V-1
52-54 Von Braun and National Socialism
54-55 Post-war years: Dustbin and interrogation before Dr. Theodore von Kármán
55-56 Contacts during the post-war years
56-59 Work in Switzerland and Italy
57-58 Son, Adolf Oberth
59-61 Occupation in America
61 Sputnik
61-63 New proposals
63 Landing on the moon
63-65 Challenger disaster, construction concepts
65-67 Various details
Rees, Eberhard and Mrs. Rees. November 8, 1989. Interviewer: Michael Neufeld. Auspices: DSH. Length: 2 hrs.; 45 pp. Use restriction: Permission required to quote, cite or reproduce.
Rees discusses his early life and education. He then discusses his engineering education at Stuttgart and Dresden and his early work experience. Recruited by Peenemünde as replacement for Heidebrock; he later becomes von Braun's assistant. Discusses von Braun: his personality and talents, enthusiasm for spaceflight, anti-Nazi attitude and arrest. Discusses Dornberger, Stegmaier, Oberth, Zanssen and Reidel I, II and III. Discusses the pilot production plant; impact of changing priority on development; danger of air raids. Discusses the origin of in-house capability and compares German and US capability. Evacuated to central Germany; remained until overrun by US forces.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Birth date, birthplace and early education
2-4 Early work experience and engineering education at Stuttgart and Dresden
4-6 Work experience in Leipzig (1935-40) and recruitment by Peenemünde as replacement for Heidebroek
6 Role of TH Darmstadt and TH Dresden in recruiting
6-7 Job in Peenemünde as von Braun's assistant, and production of missiles; Rudolph
7-8 Recruitment to Peenemünde; Mrs. Rees' first husband
8-9 Von Braun's personality and talents
9 Atmosphere of Peenemünde
9-10 Oberth, his position at Peenemünde and Rees' knowledge of the Weimar rocket pad
10-11 Von Braun's enthusiasm for spaceflight and his arrest
11-12 Von Braun's anti-Nazi attitudes; party meetings in Peenemünde
12-13 Personality of Dornberger
13-14 Zanssen, his absences and his removal
14-16 Stegmaier's personality; no knowledge of Nazi enthusiasm
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
16-17 Development of Peenemünde's fabrication shops; improvements in welding
17-18 Origin of the large in-house capability and the expression "Alles unter einem Dach"
18-19 In-house capability in the US, the arsenal concept and NASA
19-20 In-house construction and industrial purchase for the A-4 development vehicles
20-21 University research; role of Steinhoff and BSM
21-23 Riedels I, II and III and their jobs
23-24 Involvement of Zeppelin in manufacturing; visits of Dr. Eckener
24-25 The pilot production plant; cooperation with Rudolph
25-26 Vertical vs. horizontal A-4 assembly
26-28 Impact of changing priority on development and pilot production plant; Hitler's attitude
28-29 Danger of air raids; effect on plans
29-30 Problems with finishing the production drawings; material shortages
30 The air raid of August 1943
30-32 Prisoners and POW's at Peenemünde
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
32-34 Wasserfall and Army-Luftwaffe cooperation
34-35 No memory of shifting fabrication to the production plant after the air raid
35 Mittelwerk and Blizna
35-36 Himmler's visits to Peenemünde
36-37 Relationship with SS-General Kammler
37 Dornberger's stay at Peenemünde
37-39 Relations with Rossmann, Zanssen and other Army officers
39-40 Conversion to Elektromechanische Werke and opinion of Storch; Wasserfall development problems
40-42 Conversion makes no difference to von Braun's position or Dornberger's role
42-43 Evacuation from Peenemünde to central Germany
43-44 Attitude to work and the war in 1945
44 Remained in central Germany until overrun by the US forces
44-45 Conclusion
Reisig, Gerhard. June 27, 1985. Interviewers: David DeVorkin, Martin Collins. Auspices: DSH. Length: 2 hrs.; 64 pp. Use restriction: Open.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Family Background
3-6 Early education
5-6 Awareness of Oberth's ideas
7-9 Gymnasium education
7 Nikolai Schule
8 Natural science and math emphasis
9 Interest in physics or medicine
9 Selecting a university
10-16 University education (Dresden)
11 Specializing in engineering physics
11-12 Building radios
12 German education system
13 Two semesters in Leipzig with Debye, Heisenberg and Hund
14-15 thesis in acoustics un Barkhausen (1934)
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
15-16 Practical application of thesis
16 Winning a prize essay with the thesis
17-21 Siemens (1935-1937)
18 Laboratory for measuring-devices
19 First encounter with telemetry
20 Remote control of battleships for target practice
20 Aryan physics
21 Father looses job after Nazi regime in power
22-44 Peenemünde
22 Kummersdorf; chief of measuring devices
23 Knowledge of Goddard's work
24 Setting up the measuring system for rocket power plant
25 Knowledge of Goddard's work
25 Military connection at Peenemünde
26 Paper by G. Reisig, Entwicklung der Apollo-Rockete Saturn V
27-28 Launch site at Greifswalder Oie
28 Atmosphere at Peenmüende von Braun
29-30 Knowledge of the development of a military capability at Peenemünde
30 Altvater
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
31 After 1939, role in the A3 and A5
32 Parachute retrievals of the A5
33-34 Building the A4
35 Regener project
36 Criticism of von Braun by Dornberger
37-38 Meeting Regener (1942); going to Friedrichshafen with von Braun, Steinhoff, and Zanssen
39-40 Impression of Regener, Ehmert, Schopper
41 Subjects discussed at the meeting
42 Regener's interest in UV research and cosmic ray research
43 Pfotzer and Ehmert
44 Reisig's role as technical liaison
44-57 Joining General Donberger's staff in 1943, Project Wasserfall
45-46 Records of meetings in 1943 in Friedrichshafen discussing the Regener Tonne
46-47 Atmosphere at Peenemünde during the war
47 Use of highly qualified Peenemünde R&D staff for V-2 production
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
48-49 Program of the Regener-Tonne
49 Moving to Dorneberger's staff
50-51 Creating an army contingent at Peenemünde
51 Gròttrup's contribution toward the V-2 Regener project
53-54 Von Braun, K. Riedel, and Gròttrup arrested by the Gestapo
55-56 Why Gròttrup went to the USSR
57 Interrogations
57-58 Regener records found at the Deutsches-Museum
59-61 Opinions of Irving, Beyerchen, and Simon on the role of science and scientists in WWII
62-64 Reisig's feelings about the alleged German stereotype of over-instrumentation, over-design
Reisig, Gerhard. June 5-7, 1989. Interviewer: Michael Neufeld. Auspices: DSH. Length: 4 hrs.; 111 pp. Use restriction: Permission required for access.
Reisig begins by discussing his hiring at Peenemünde in October 1937; temporary transfer to Kummersdorf; works on test stand measurements. Reisig discusses the A-4 and 25 ton engines; guidance control problems in the 1930s; organized December 1937 A-3 firings. Discusses experimentation with multiple guidance system (1938-41); origins of the pilot production plant; beginning of university involvement with the rocket program; development of the Wolman Doppler tracking system; development of the unbalanced gyro accelerometer, telemetry system. Discusses von Braun, Hermann, Thiel, Dornberger, Steinhoff, Klaus Riedel, Siemans and others. Discusses Wa Pruef 10; A-4 and A-5 launches, telemetry; A-5 oscillograph/camera system problems; A-4 mobile launch system. Discusses origins of "everything under one roof" concept for Peenemünde; its continuance in America; reason Peenemünde protected from outside influences; protectors of Peenemünde; Army-Luftwaffe conflicts not present at working level. Discusses JATO; rocket-plane work; Wasserfall; the SS; the Zanssen affair (1943); von Braun's arrest. Closes with reaction to Hitler assassination attempt; reasons for continuation to fight to the bitter end; evacuation to Central Germany.
June 5, 1989
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Started at Peenemünde in Oct. 1937; temporarily transferred to Kummersdorf to work on test stand measurements with the propulsion group
2-3 Thiel's combination of injectors into the 4- and 25-ton engines
3-5 Design of the injector pots used in the A-4 engine
5-6 Initially combustion chambers too long; caused incomplete combustion and burn-throughs; moved to a spherical chamber; in the US, cylindrical
6-7 Haackh replaced Reisig on test stand measurements; Thiel's contributions to propulsion
7-9 Problems with guidance-and-control in 1930s; Kreiselgeraete experienced in Navy equipment, not rockets
9 Failure of the A-3 platforms; von Braun's demonstration afterward of why
9-12 Reisig organized the Dec. 1937 A-3 firings; conditions on the Oie
12 Siemens brought on board as second source for guidance systems
12-13 Early launches of A-5s with and without guidance
13-16 Experimentation with multiple guidance systems (1938-41) on A-5, including Siemens, Mueller and Navy
16-17 Determination of the A-4/A-5 aerodynamic configuration; body based on the "S" bullet; refinements in Hermann and Wieselsberger's wind tunnel at Aachen
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
17-18 Rudolph Hermann's personality, acquaintance with Reisig, and role in hiring latter
18 Thiel's personality; Von braun's personality, lack of snobbery
18-21 Von Braun's aristocratic background; influence of his parentson his personality
21-22 Von Braun's management talent, and emphasis on horizontal communication
22-24 Problems with hierarchical and bureaucratic management in the United States, especially in NASA; Medaris learned from von Braun
24 Dornberger's role in supervising von Braun and protecting the group from German Army bureaucracy
24-26 Conflicts with Gen. Rossmann and Wa Pruef 10 after Dornberger's departure from Army Ordnance
26 Conflicts between Hammler and von Braun
26-27 Dornberger had to criticize von Braun for not concentrating on immediate military tasks; but himself a space enthusiast
27-29 Dornberger angry when failure occurred, but no hard feelings; nervous because he promised early deployment
29-30 Origins of the pilot production plant
30-31 Reisig's involvement with the beginnings of the guidance group; Steuding's role in theory
31-33 Beginning of university involvement with rocket program; Profs. Wieselsberger and Hase before the war
TAPE 2, SIDE 1,
33-34 For A-5 measurements taken by using an oscillograph photographed by a movie camera
34-36 Development and principle of the Wolman Doppler tracking system for A-4
36-37 Modification of the Wolman system for engine cutoff by radio; integration of the tracking data by physically counting on paper rolls
37 Substitution of accelerometers for cutoff due to the fear of jamming
37-38 Development of the unbalanced gyro accelerometer by Kreiselgeraete and its principle
38-39 Principle of the Siemens guidance system based on two gyros for attitude and pitch program
39 Both accelerometer and radio cutoff used in the field, but latter system superior in accuracy
39-40 Guide beam versus accelerometers for lateral dispersion due to wind; need for three-axis platform to make the lateral accelerometer work and delays with finishing the same
40-41 Priority problems slowed down development of the missile; problems with the Vienna communications institute and higher priority for Luftwaffe production
June 6, 1989
42 Development of the telemetry system; Siemens refused the contract because overburdened with the Luftwaffe and series too small
43-45 Telemetry developed by Hell; influence of Reisig's experience with multiplexing telegraphy; difficulties of radio telemetry
45-46 A-5 and A-4 launches and telemetry
46 Limitations of the telemetry system and conflicts with the propulsion design group over same
46-47 Problems with the oscillograph/camera system on A-5
47-49 Later telemetry development, especially with the Technical University of Vienna
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
49-50 Telemetry development; Vienna more significant than Technical University of Berlin for this work
50-51 Absence of a range-safety destruct system for A-4; military did not adequately consider the danger; Reisig's involvement with the control system for the air and jet vanes
52-54 Steinhoff's arrival as head of guidance-and-control; Reisig's opinion that Steinhoff was incompetent and authoritarian; Steuding's role as head of guidance theory
54-55 Reisig's conflict with Steinhoff leads to his drafting; sent to boot camp in Russia; later recalled
55-56 Klaus Riedel unsuccessful as head of test stands; von Braun put him on the development of the mobile launch system for A-4 where he was very successful
56-57 Klaus Riedel was very sociable and likeable; anecdotes
57-58 Hitler wanted the huge concrete bunkers, not so much von Braun and the engineers; Dornberger from military experience knew this to be a mistake; bombed
59 British unsuccessful in destroying the mobile-launch sites in Holland
59-60 Origins of the "everything under one roof" concept for Peenemünde
60-61 continuation of the concept in America; US Army officers very understanding; possible influence of the arsenal concept; conflicts with NASA management
61-62 Industry not ready or interested in development; in-house development more efficient at that stage; Siemens and Kreiselgeraete, for example, knew nothing of control theory; Steuding and Geissler's contributions
62-63 Conflicts with NASA over the in-house system; change to contracting contributed to the Challenger disaster
63-64 Advantages and disadvantages of solid-fuel rockets
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
64-65 Reasons why Peenemünde was protected from outside influence; role of von Brauchitsch; Dornberger served under him in the Reichswehr
65-66 Army Ordnance chiefs Becker and Leeb also protectors
66 Speer also important as a protector; later he came into conflict with other groups in the Third Reich, including the SS
66-67 Reisig's objections to Hòlsken's book Die V-Waffen
67-69 Army-Luftwaffe conflict not present at the working level between Peenemünde-East and West; Reisig in charge of tracking networks and cooperated with Luftwaffe counterparts on V-1 and V-2
69-70 Overheard Milch advocating "Kirschkern" (V-1) to Speer at first A-4 launch attempt
70-71 Origins of the Long Range Bombardment Commission and visit to Peenemünde; Luftwaffe hoped to kill A-4; both approved
71 Army-Luftwaffe conflict basically high-level; the SS took over and eliminated the conflict
June 7, 1989
72 Peenemünde engineers poorly prepared for the conversion from laboratory development to production of the A-4; assignment of a contractor (Henschel) at outset for transferring Wasserfall development to production was superior
73 Arrival of Stahlknecht from Armaments Ministry (mid-1942); design office poorly prepared to do production drawings; pilot production plant had not affected planning for production earlier
74 Problem of 65,000 changes in missile and Hòlsken's interpretation of it
74-75 JATO and rocket plane work with the Luftwaffe
75-76 Rocket aircraft (He 112) accident due to base pressure flame suction; same effect on A-4
76-77 Rocket-plane experiments ended by Luftwaffe about 1940; not due to interservice conflict; not important to Army side
77-78 Conflicts over Wasserfall mostly internal to the Air Ministry
78-80 Difference between types of German engineers; weak engineering corps in the Luftwaffe and poor leadership
80 Under Dornberger on the other hand, engineers had own say, protected by Dornberger; not typical of Army
TAPE 3, SIDE 2
80-82 The SS, the Zanssen affair (1943) and Stegmaier's role
82 Von Braun arrest (1944) ordered by Himmler as revenge for not wanting to take the team over to the SS
82-83 Dornberger distrusted the SS as the enemy of the Army
83-85 The SS more effective in organizing the V-weapons campaign because of interservice rivalry and poor leadership on the part of the Army and Luftwaffe
85-86 Dornberger did not switch loyalties to the SS (contra Hòlsken); Steinhoff conspired with Stegmaier to take over Peenemünde
86 No significant tensions in the engineering leadership over the Party or political questions; not aware that Debus was in the SS
86-87 Von Braun accepted honorary rank in the SS; discussed with the group whether it would be valuable
87-88 Seriously ill in summer 1943 after return from the boot camp; involved with Klaus Riedel's ground equipment group
88 Transfer to the Dornberger staff (Bzbv Heer) in late fall 1943 after acting as liaison
88-90 Removal of Dornberger from Army Ordnance, probably by Fromm, a good idea
90-91 Friction with the new head of Wa Pruef 10, Rossmann
91-92 Dornberger responsible for testing ground equipment and continuing development testing at the Blizna SS range in Poland
92 Dornberger set up a rocket school for the troops at Kòslin; Stegmaier made commander; had an unpleasant personality
92-94 Reisig's jobs on the Dornberger staff; endless changes in the missile had to be communicated to the troops
94-96 Dornberger not allowed to command the missile units, probably by the general staff; Kammler later takes over when Himmler gets the Reserve Army after assassination attempt on Hitler
TAPE 4, SIDE 1
96-97 First encounter and personality of Kammler
97-98 SS solely responsible for conditions at Mittelwerk; Rudolph had no control over situation
98-99 Reisig made one trip to the west regarding launching sites but mostly stayed at Schwedt in east
99 Launches in Poland; Kammler wanted to launch against Polish towns but Army objected
99-100 Mostly involved with straightening out details of the mobile launch equipment and units
100 Dornberger's dislike of Kammler; Kammler's restlessness and instability
100-102 V-2 targets determined by Hitler; ignored Eastern Front; more missiles fired at Antwerp than London
102 Evacuation of Dornberger's staff to central Germany and new responsibilities; conditions at the end of the war
103-105 Reasons for continuing to fight to the bitter end; reaction to the assassination attempt on Hitler
105-107 Principle of the trajectory of the Wasserfall antiaircraft missile; role of Geissler and Ludwig
107 Maneuverability of Wasserfall meant ability to stand high forces and cross-wing design to exploit lift
108 Large explosive charge and shrapnel would have had a considerable effect on bomber streams; political interference similar to the Me 262 jet fighter
108-109 Evacuation of the Dornberger staff to the Bavarian Alps ordered by Kammler
109-111 Conclusion
Rudolph, Arthur. August 4, 1989. Interviewer: Michael Neufeld. Auspices: DSH. Length: 5.5 hrs.; 110 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Rudolph begins by discussing his engineering education; knowledge of the spaceflight fad of the late 1920s; Max Valier. Discusses Heylandt works; Heylandt rocket car (1931); Valier's rocket engine; its problems, explosion and death of Valier. Rudolph's redesign of Valier's injection system; rocket experimenters; forced to join Army Ordnance, his reluctance; reasons for joining Nazi party; 1934 Rudolph motor. Describes concept of in-house development; origins of Peenemünde and cooperation with Luftwaffe; duties at Kummersdorf (1931-37); early planning of A-4 and later problems: design not finished, drawings a mess, vane motor problems; propulsion research; 1950s publications on Mars exploration; involvement in A-2 launches (1934); JATO project; design of A-3 and A-5 guidance systems. Discusses Walter Riedel, Pietsch, von Braun, Schneider, Zanssen, Dornberger, Speer and others.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Engineering education
1-2 Knowledge of the spaceflight fad of the late 1920s and of Max Valier
2-4 Heylandt works, character of Mr. Heylandt and involvement of the firm in rocketry
4-5 First encounters with Valier and Hermann Oberth
5-6 Not a member of the VfR or the Raketenflugplatz
6-9 Problems with Valier's rocket engine leading to the explosion and Valier's death; Rudolph's experiments afterward
9-10 Rudolph's redesign of Valier's injection system
10-11 Heylandt rocket car (1931) and publicity failure of same
11-12 Description of Alfons Pietsch
12-15 Design of the 1931 rocket car engine; introduction of cooling jacket
15-16 Heylandt's problems during the depression; lay-off of Rudolph and Pietsch
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
16-17 Walter Riedel's involvement with rocketry at Heylandt and description of personality
17-18 Pietsch asks for money from the SA leader in Berlin, the Kaiser-Wilhelm Gesellschaft, and industry
18-20 Contract with the Army, and Pietsch's disappearance (1932-34); Rudolph joins Army Ordnance
20 Pietsch threatens Dornberger with lawsuit (1950s)
20-21 Difficult living conditions during unemployment; no income from SA or the party, or the contract
21-22 Employment of Wernher von Braun and Riedel by Army Ordnance
22 Riedel's involvement in rocket work for Army Ordnance at Heylandt (1931-33)
22-23 Other rocket experimenters
23-25 First encounters with von Braun and impressions
25-27 Impressions of Dornberger and Zanssen; Zanssen's doubts and the problems with the injection system of their group
27-28 Dornberger forces him to join Army Ordnance; Rudolph's reasons for reluctance
28 Reasons for joining the Nazi party
28-30 Design of the 1934 Rudolph motor
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
30 Rudolph's hiring and Dornberger's reason for eliminating contractors
30-32 Dornberger and the concept of in-house development
32-33 Origins of Peenemünde and cooperation with the Luftwaffe
33-34 Enthusiasm of von Braun and Rudolph for the Luftwaffe
34-36 Army red-tape; conflicts with Army administrators and Rudolph's reorganization of the ordering system at Kummersdorf and Peenemünde
36-37 Duties at Kummersdorf (1934-37)
37-39 Cooperation with the Luftwaffe in building Peenemünde conflicts with the base commander, Gen. Schneider
39-40 Superiority of the Luftwaffe to the Army administrative system; further conflicts with Schneider
40-41 No desire to move over to Luftwaffe; role of Dornberger
41 Zanssen's role; separation of two halves of Peenemünde and appointment of Zanssen as Army base commander
41-42 Von Horstig and relationship to von Braun as an aristocrat
42-43 Von Braun advocates spaceflight to General Becker
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
43 Meeting with Becker probably 1935; early planning of A4 and Peenemünde
43-45 Organization at Kummersdorf; roles of von Braun, Rudolph and Riedel I
45-47 Wahmke and Thiel and their role in propulsion research; von Braun difficult to control
47-48 Von Horstig's position and later disappearance from rocket program
48-49 Wernher von Braun's personality and the advantages of his aristocratic background
49-50 Rudolph and von Braun lay plans for spaceflight at the Kummersdorf officer's club in 1935; basis for 1950s publications on Mars exploration
50 Von Braun's lack of aristocratic pretensions
50-52 Problems with Riedel I and his dislike of academically trained engineers; later replacement by Riedel III
52 Involvement in the A-2 launches (1934)
53-54 Engine design; involvement with the Luftwaffe and Heinkel in aircraft rocket engines
54 The Starthilfe (JATO) project
55 Construction of the A-3 at Kummersdorf
55-57 Involvement with Boykow and Kreiselgeraete in gyroscopic guidance; reasons for failure of the A-3 guidance system
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
57-59 Design of the A-3 and A-5 guidance systems
59-60 Other corporate contractors, in particular for turbopumps
61-62 Origin of the 25 ton engine and the A-4 (1935-36)
62-63 Knowledge of Robert Goddard's work
63 No knowledge of the VfR or of the Gesellschaft fürWeltraumforschung
63-65 Planning and construction of Peenemünde; Rudolph's role in the organizational plan
65-67 The Peenemünde fabrication and assembly shops; surface protection and aluminum alloys
67 Problems with General Schneider
67-68 Recruitment of personnel to Peenemünde
68 The A-10 and role in determining shop size
68-69 No knowledge of plans for a "rocket city"
69-70 Friction between Rudolph and von Braun due to latter's tendency to be involved in everything
70-71 Rudolph's assistants and problems with them after Rudolph went to the Versuchsserienwerk
71-73 Organizational plan for Peenemünde; von Braun's conflict with Dr. Schroeder
TAPE 3, SIDE 2
73 Peenemünde organization and Rudolph's position (1937-38)
74 Organizational plan; roles of Schroeder, Hermann (wind tunnel) and Thiel
74-76 Steinhoff and the creation of the guidance and control division; Steinhoff's personality
76-77 Origins of the Peenemünde production plant; opposition of von Braun and Rudolph
77-79 Dornberger's motivations for in-house production; Rudolph's conflict with Dornberger and later acceptance of decision
79-81 Appointment of Schubert as Rudolph's boss; nature of position and organization of the Versuchsserienwerk
81-87 Construction planning for the production plant and its tremendous size
87-88 Support and friendship of Zanssen; conflict with assistant (Stegmaier)
TAPE 4, SIDE 1
88 Conflicts with major (Stegmaier); support by Zanssen
88-89 Zanssen and absence during the Russian campaign
89-90 Problems with the development drawings; appointment of Stahlknecht; conflict with Stegmaier
90-91 Organizational relationship to Army ordnance and the base commander
91-93 Design of the main assembly hall and takeover by the Development Works after 1943 air raid
93 Arrival of Stahlknecht; Speer and Armaments Ministry pressing for ever larger numbers of A4s
93-95 A4 drawings were in a mess; fault for same; conflicts with Saur and the Armaments Ministry; Thiel threatens to quit
95-96 Engine was too complex; forced into production
97 Reasons for disorganization in the war economy; work force for the production plant and takeover of the maintenance building by the development works
97-98 A4 design not finished; constant redesign by development people disruptive
98-100 Determination of number of people needed by the production plant; Versuchskommando Nord
100-101 Role of Speer, Baugruppe Schlempp and Organisation Todt in construction
101-102 SS intrudes into the program (1943); Himmler and Kammler
102-103 Stegmaier; no knowledge of SS connections
TAPE 4, SIDE 2
103-104 Zanssen's removal and friendship with Dornberger
104 Role of the SS
104-106 POW's and concentration camp prisoners at Peenemünde
106-107 Location of Rudolph's offices
107-108 Planned horizontal production line in the Versuchsserienwerk
108-109 Zeppelin and Rax works as other production plants
109-110 Numbers of A4s expected at Peenemünde; problems with the vane motors
110 Conclusion
Tessman, Bernhard and Karl Heimburg. January 23, 1990. Interviewer: Michael Neufeld. Auspices: DSH. Length: 2.25 hrs.; 52 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Tessman describes his early life in the Peenemünde area, Berlin and his father's occupation. Discusses his education and early work experience; first meeting with von Braun (1935). Little knowledge of spaceflight; saw sets for "Frau im Mond" at UFA where father worked. Tessman's arrival at Kammersdorf; discusses Reidel I, von Braun and Rudolph. Changes from engine testing to facilities. Involved in planning for Peenemünde began in 1936; construction and first testing of Test Stand I. Involved with wind tunnel. Tessman discusses A-4: design of ground equipment, early launches and accidents. First 25 ton engine tests and thrust measurement systems. Discusses Zanssen, Stegmaier and the Zanssen affair. Involved in planning of underground facilities in Austria. "Papa" Riedel in Austria; at end of war and after; his replacement by Reidel III. Discusses relations between Luftwaffe/Peenemünde-West and Army side. Herman Oberth at Peenemünde. Tessman involvement with Wasserfall; launch accidents. Safety problems of hyperbolic fuels vs. liquid oxygen. Von Braun and Heinkel rocket fighter development (mid 1930's). Starthilfe (JATO) and Heinkel rocket fighter project. Tessman evacuated to Thuringia at end of war.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Birthplace and birthplace; description of Peenemünde area
2-3 Father's occupation and upbringing in Berlin
3 Education and early work experience
4-6 First meeting with Wernher von Braun (1935) and how it came about
6-7 Little knowledge of spaceflight, but had seen the sets for "Frau im Mond" at UFA, where father worked
7 Von Braun's work habits; a late-riser
7-8 Arrival at Kummersdorf; Riedel I and Rudolph
8-10 Other people at Kummersdorf and Peenemünde
10-11 Switch from engine-testing to facilities; design of Test Stand I and other test stands at Peenemünde
12-13 Description of the Peenemünde development works
13 Involvement in planning for Peenemünde began in 1936
13 Flying with von Braun
14-15 Natural beauty of the Peenemünde area; first mention of the facility to Tessmann
15-16 Went to Peenemünde in late 1936; construction of same and destruction of nature
16-17 Construction and first testing of Test Stand I
17 Involvement with the wind tunnel
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
18 Involvement with the wind tunnel, continued
18 Transfer of Tessmann's section from Riedel I to Thiel
18-20 Test stands at Peenemünde and limitations of Kummersdorf
20-21 Thrust measuring systems
21-23 Accidents with the A4 on the ground
23-24 First 25 ton engine tests and the thrust measurement system
24-26 Zanssen, Stegmaier and the Zanssen affair
26-27 Evacuation to Koelpinsee; design of the ground equipment for A4 units
27-28 Involvement with planning of underground facilities in Austria
28-30 "Papa" Riedel I in Austria; earlier displacement by Riedel III
30-32 Project Zement and connection to Mittelwerk
32 Riedel I at the end of the war and after
32-33 Early A4 launches and accidents
33-34 Peenemünde near beach resorts
34 Peenemünde work train very loud and uncomfortable
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
34-36 Relations between Luftwaffe/Peenemünde-West and Army side
36 Hermann Oberth at Peenemünde
36-37 Involvement with Wasserfall
37 Wasserfall launch accidents
37-38 Safety problems of hypergolic fuels compared to liquid oxygen
38-39 Rotary test rig ridden by von Braun for Heinkel rocket fighter development (mid-1930s)
39-40 Starthilfe (JATO) and Heinkel rocket fighter projects
40-41 Günther Haukohl and other people involved with Heinkel
42 Luftwaffe-Army cooperation
42-44 Von Braun's personality and management style
44 Von Braun meets Hitler--anecdote
44 Lower priority for the A4
45 Involvement with testing of mass production A4 engines
45-48 Planning for facilities at Peenemünde, including the Versuchsserienwerk; role of the A10 in this
48-50 Oral history and conflicts in the organization
50-51 Need for a map of Peenemünde
51-52 Evacuation to Thuringia at the end of the war
von Tiesenhausen, Georg. January 22, 1990. Interviewer: Michael Neufeld. Auspices: DSH. Length: 1.25 hrs.; 26 pp. Use restriction: Public.
Von Tiesenhausen begins by discussing his birth in Latvia; his youth and education in Hamburg. Impact of movie "Frau im Mond" (1929). Discusses his engineering education; his drafting into the Army; recalled from Luftwaffe signal corps; finishes education; assigned to Flakversuchsstelle; involvement with test stands; the submarine V-2 project (Pruefstand XII); floating Wasserfall test stand (Schwimmweste) and static testing of rockets in gimbal rings. US arsenal system compatible with Peenemünde system; advantages and disadvantages of German and American engineering education. Discusses air raid of August 1943; evacuation to Austria. Closes with discussion of political intervention on A-4; Army-Luftwaffe relations.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Birth in Latvia, aristocratic heritage, youth and education in Hamburg
2-3 Impact of Fritz Lang's movie "Frau im Mond" (1929)
3-4 Engineering education and drafting into the Army, 1936-38; assignment to Peenemünde, 1943; no knowledge that rocket work actually being done
4-5 Met von Braun and discovered that they were distantly related
5-7 Was in the Luftwaffe signal corps on the Eastern Front but recalled and finished engineering education; then assigned to the Flakversuchsstelle
7-8 Assigned to work in the test stand group; temporarily transferred to Austria after the Aug. 1943 air raid; Flakversuchsstelle people not separated
8 Although enlisted men often over officers, it worked
8-9 Was not assigned to Peenemünde-West; did not see any noticeable friction between Luftwaffe and Army people
9-11 Von Braun's charismatic leadership and ability
11 Involved with test stands, the submarine V-2 project (Pruefstand XII) and the floating Wasserfall test stand (Schwimmweste)
11-12 "Parties with rocket fuel" using ethyl alcohol; tremendous strain and hard work but enthusiastic
12-13 Involved with static testing of rockets in gimbal rings
13-15 Team feeling at Peenemünde and continuance of same in the United States
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
15 No significant problems integrating Americans and keeping up "team spirit" in Huntsville
15-16 Arsenal system in the US compatible with the Peenemünde system; changes under NASA and loss of in-house capability
16-17 Advantages and disadvantages of German and American engineering education
17-18 Thiel correct but distant
18-19 Work with test stand design, including Schwimmweste
19-20 Air raid of Aug. 1943; sent wife away and evacuated to Austria
20-22 Sent to the Raxwerke in Wiener Neustadt to build a Wasserfall engine test stand from scratch; foundations poured, but never completed; recalled to Peenemünde
22-23 Worked on the exhaust deflector for the V-2 submarine launch canister
23-24 Designed Test Stand II for Wasserfall engine testing; completed after return in early 1944
24-26 Political intervention mostly noticeable on A-4; Army-Luftwaffe relations in Wasserfall were cordial
Wiesman, Walter. January 24, 1990. Interviewer: Michael Neufeld. Auspices: DSH. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 29 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Wiesman begins by discussing his early life, education and parents' occupation. Discusses his drafting into the Luftwaffe (1940); service as radio operator/instructor. Drafted into valve lab; its relocation after August 1943 air raid; becomes administrative organizer of valve lab. Discusses Klaus and Walther Riedel; von Braun; Medaris and Lindenmayr. Discusses the inappropriateness of term "rocket scientist"; doubts about Nazi propaganda; contrast between his views and most members of rocket team. Discusses evacuation to central Germany in February 1945; first contact with Americans; role in management reorganization and internal communication at Fort Bliss and Huntsville; legacy of Peenemünde for organization in America; decision to retire from NASA (1970).
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Birthplace, birth date, parents' occupation, and early life; attitude to the Third Reich
3-4 Education and drafting into the Luftwaffe (1940)
4-5 Service in the Luftwaffe as radio operator/instructor
5-6 Encounter with Klaus Riedel and drafting into the Peenemünde valve laboratory
6-7 Relocation of valve laboratory to Anklam after August 1943 air raid; and relocation to Friedland after another raid; combination with materials testing
7-8 Assigned to Flakversuchstelle; contrast between FVS commander and VKN commander
8-10 Difficulties with the old Army administrative system
10-11 Had little contact with people at the top; knew Klaus Riedel; valve laboratory under Walther Riedel
11-13 Luftwaffe/Army relations good; Wiesman and many others discharged from Luftwaffe and VKN; anti-intellectual attitude of VKN commander and NCOs
13-14 Role as administrative organizer of the valve laboratory
14-15 Impact of dispersal on efficiency probably more favorable than unfavorable
15-17 Evacuation to central Germany in Feb. 1945; first contact with the Americans
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
17 Organization of the evacuation to central Germany; evacuation from there by the Americans after the end of the war
17-18 Location at the end of the war and entry into US service
18-19 Little pretense to working in Thuringia; knowledge of the evacuation of others to Bavaria
19-20 Inappropriateness of the term "rocket scientist"
20-21 Doubts about Nazi propaganda; opposition and brief arrest of Lindenmayr
21 Party and SS membership often honorary
21-23 Role in management reorganization and internal communications at Fort Bliss and Huntsville
23-25 Management philosophies andreorganization at Huntsville under Medaris and at NASA
25-27 Legacy of Peenemünde for organization in America; von Braun's personal management and leadership style; styles of Medaris and others at Huntsville
27-28 Decision to retire from NASA in 1970
28-29 Contrast between his views and most members of the rocket team; their tendency to stick with their laboratories
Rev. 10/13/95