Augenstein, Bruno. Dates: July 28, 1986; January 9, 1987. Interviewers: Martin Collins and Joseph Tatarewicz. Auspices: RAND. Length: 2 hrs.; 65 pp. Use restriction: Open.
After reviewing his upbringing and post-graduate education at CALTECH in aeronautical engineering, Augenstein (b. 1927) describes working at North American's Aerophysics Laboratory from 1946 to 1948 on such projects as weaponizing the V-2, his informal contacts with RAND while at the lab, and teaching at Purdue in 1948. Augenstein then discusses his impressions of and career at RAND from 1949 until his move to Lockheed in 1958, including working on satellite and missile studies; the interaction between the social scientists and other scientists; the importance of Frank Collbohm and others to the success of RAND; the informal working atmosphere; the internal review process for studies, etc.; and the major contributions of RAND in such areas as linear programming and artificial intelligence.
July 28, 1986
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Family background
1 Childhood interests
2 Influential teachers
2-3 Brown University
2 B.S. degree in physics and mathematics
3 Description of the Physics program at Brown
3 Theoretical interests at Brown, 1940-43
3-5 CALTECH
4 Research interests at CALTECH; interest in high speed aerodynamics
5 Effect of war effort upon training at CALTECH
5-7 North American Aviation
5 Decision to accept position at North American Aerophysics Laboratory, 1946
5-6 Relationship between aircraft companies and CALTECH
6-7 Early projects; ramjet propulsion; subcontracting with RAND
7 Elaboration of work at North American; the winged V-2
7-9 Relationship with RAND
7-8 Interaction with RAND concerning various missile projects
8-9 Support from the AEC
9 Working conditions at North American; Bill Bollay as director
9 Accepted position at RAND, 1949; mention of others such as Bob Salter and Bill Fry who came to RAND
10-11 Reiteration of work done at North American; guidance and propulsion
11-12 Relationship with other organizations such as APL
12-13 North American's perception of its direction after WWII
13-14 Laboratory as a way to attract non-traditional business to the industry
14 Independence at North American lab; Chauncey Starr and the evolution of the basic research division
14-15 How the relationship with RAND affected working conditions at North American
15 RAND's special place as a novel organization; the laboratory'sunderstanding of RAND's mission
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
16-17 Reasons why RAND seemed an attractive opportunity
17-18 Interests at the Laboratory; further discussion of guidance and propulsion problems
18 The Navy study during the late 1940s
18 Vannevar Bush and George Gamov; discussing the feasibility of inertial guidance systems
19-20 How the feasibility problem affected the Aerophysics Lab
20-21 Techniques by which laboratory colleagues shared their information
21-22 Assignment of tasks; discussion of the management approach
22 Contact with the Hermes
22 Relationship with the von Braun group at Huntsville
23 Laboratory's assessment of V-2 technology
23-24 Navy's role and relationship with the lab
24-26 Decision to teach one year at Purdue
26 Contact with the NACA at the laboratory
26-27 Transition from Purdue to RAND, 1949
27 Interest in Soviet progress in weapons and missile delivery systems
28-29 Involvement in satellite studies
29-30 Military activity in rocket programs; high level guided missile committee
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
30-31 RAND missile technology studies
31-32 Interest in the ICBM program, 1952-53
32 Scientific satellite work at RAND related to IGY
32-33 Interest in the re-entry question
33-34 Tenure at Lockheed during the late 1950s
34-35 Reasons why Augenstein left RAND for Lockheed
36-37 Sketch and outline of the remainder of Augenstein's career
January 9, 1987
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
38-39 RAND's reputation as a place where wild ideas could be developed, i. e., linear and dynamic programming
39-40 Influence of social scientists on RAND
40-41 Resistance of hard scientists to introduction of soft scientists to RAND
42-43 Relationship between the hard sciences and social sciences in 1949; Bob Salter's opinion of economists
43 Early Air Force opinion regarding social sciences introduction to RAND; Frank Collbohm's work to ease Air Force resistance
44 Multi-disciplinary projects not encouraged at universities
44-45 Encouragement of interdisciplinary projects at RAND
45-46 Process of determining which projects are done under umbrella contracts
46 Incentive to promote individual ideas
47-48 Background knowledge of sponsors enabled RAND projects results to suit sponsors needs; RAND Research Council
48-49 Augenstein's discussion of satellite and ICBM study problemswith social scientist
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
49-50 Further discussion of social scientists impact on satellite and ICBM study problems; work with Bernard Brody, Victor Hunt and Albert Wohlstetter
50-51 Augenstein's method of phrasing questions to social scientists in order to obtain specific answers; soft scientists contribution of critical review capability
51-52 Communication channels within RAND; use of internal memoranda, electronic mail
52-53 Ease of verbal communication between past and present RAND employees; restrictions placed on written correspondence with people outside RAND
53-54 Circulation of RAND employees between private sector and RAND; RAND attitude toward circulation
54-56 Augenstein's opinion that no good history of RAND has been written; areas where RAND histories fail
56-57 Augenstein's comments on Bruce Smith's and Fred Kaplan's histories of RAND
57-58 Sources of information on linear and dynamic programming: George Danzig and Mario Juncosa
58-60 Description of the formal review process of studies before they become RAND reports or are sent to the Air Force
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
60 Further discussion of formal review process; different process with purely scientific issues
60-61 Coordination of review procedures
61-62 Comparison of RAND with aerophysics lab experience
62-63 Broader approach taken by RAND than industry in developing proposals
64-64 Latitude in evaluating requirements incorporated into RAND's setup by Frank Collbohm enabled RAND to influence things before they occurred
65 Interaction with industry when examining project requirements
65 Closing Comments
Bacher, Robert and DuBridge, Lee. Date: July 21, 1987. Interviewers: Martin Collins and Joseph Tatarewicz. Auspices: RAND. Length: 2 hrs.; 45 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Bacher and Dubridge review their pre-WWII work at Rochester and Cornell respectively, and their association with the MIT Radiation Laboratory during World War II. Bacher next discusses leaving MIT in 1942 to work at Los Alamos, and the controversy over whether Los Alamos should be run as a military or civilian lab. Bacher then describes his post-war work at the AEC and CALTECH; Dubridge his at CALTECH and on RAND's Board of Trustees. Both give their impressions of Frank Collbohm and John von Neumann, and describe RAND's contributions in various areas including the development of systems analysis and advising the government on scientific questions.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 DuBridge background from later '30s: work in nuclear physics at University of Rochester: Ernest Lawrence: Alfred Loomis: Karl Compton
3-5 Establishment of MIT Radiation Laboratory; microwave radar; (E.G. Bowen); final report of lab's technical work
5 DuBridge return to University of Rochester; invitation and acceptance of invitation to become president of CALTECH
5-6 Postwar work on advisory committees to military branches and AEC; Rowan Gaither; invitation to DuBridge to join RAND board of trustees; selection of board chairman
7 DuBridge experience on RAND board, impressions
8-12 Bacher background from late '30s; doing neutron work at Cornell, invitation to join Radiation Laboratory; arrangement for commuting between Cornell and Radiation Lab
9-12 Bacher's discovery of error in Fermi's measurement of cross section for boron
10 DuBridge commuting between Rochester and Radiation Lab
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12-13 Bacher's experience at Radiation Laboratory (cont'd); Boyce McDaniel
13-16 1942 planning meeting for Los Alamos project: Robert Bacher, Oppenheimer, I. Rabi, General Groves, Dana Mitchell; plans for Los Alamos originally militarily oriented; discussion of how military orientation is anathema to good research practice; Groves-Conant letter
16-19 Bacher and Ken Bainbridge from Radiation Lab go to work at Los Alamos; cooperation from other laboratories in sharing intelligence; difficulty with use of plutonium
19-21 Bacher returns to Cornell at end of WWII; meeting with Frank Collbohm concerning plans for Project RAND; membership on Atomic Energy Commission
21-23 Sense among scientists at the end of the war that first priority was to return to training next generation of scientists and doing civilian research at universities
23 Relationship between scientists, military, and government in postwar period
23-24 Length of Bacher\DuBridge association
23-25 Bacher becomes head of CALTECH physics division in 1949; invited to serve on CALTECH board of trustees
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
25-26 DuBridge's first impressions of RAND; role as a board member; perception of Frank Collbohm's role
26-27 Interdisciplinary make-up of RAND staff; contrast to Radiation Laboratory staff
27-28 Development of systems analysis at RAND; contribution of economists
28-29 RAND board of trustees relations vis-a-vis Air Force
28-29 Air Force supports Project Vista at CALTECH
29 Growth in relationships between military services and RAND personnel
30 Issue as to whether RAND should contract with agencies other than Air Force
30-31 Establishment of RAND Washington office
31-32 Bacher's first impression of RAND
32 Impact of RAND studies on Air Force policy and procedures
32 Bacher's view of his role on the Board
33-34 John von Neumann; his impact on RAND
34-36 Whether RAND atmosphere was conducive to research; John Williams; comparison to atmosphere of wartime project; comparison to university atmosphere
36-37 Relationships between RAND and universities
37 Jet Propulsion Laboratory
37-38 RAND's uniqueness as a "think tank"
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
38 RAND briefings
38-39 Bacher's reflections on interdisciplinary nature of RAND
39-40 Bacher and DuBridge impressions of Frank Collbohm
40 Spin-off of Systems Development Corporation from RAND
41 CALTECH orientation towards interdisciplinary work
41-43 President's Science Advisory Committee; Killian Report; relationship between PSAC and Eisenhower
44 Bacher and DuBridge, decreasing connections with RAND
44-45 RAND's place in context of science advising in the fifties; comparison to Institute for Defense Analysis
Barlow, Edward. Dates: February 10, 1988; October 11, 1989; November 10, 1990. Interviewers: Martin Collins and Joseph Tatarewicz. Auspices: RAND. Length: 7 hrs; 139 pp. Use restriction: Open.
After reviewing his upbringing, work at Sperry Gyroscope from 1942 to 1948, and post-war graduate education at Columbia in physics, Barlow discusses his move to RAND's Electronics Department in 1948 and various aspects of his roughly twelve-year career there. He describes the department's work on the two air defense studies and other projects, his contributions to them, interaction with other departments and outside institutions, impact of RAND's work on USAF policy, and his posting as a RAND liaison in the Office of the Assistant for Developmental Planning in the mid-1950s. Barlow also extensively covers the origins and production of the Strategic Offensive Forces Study, its major points, the contributions of various RAND personnel to it, and SAC's involvement in and reaction to it.
February 10, 1988
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-3 Barlow's family, early education,early interest in science and technology
4-5 Undergraduate study at Cooper Union
5 First job with Sperry Gyroscope, Brooklyn Poly course in microwaves; becomes Sperry Scholar and enrolls at Columbia University for graduate study in physics
6-8 War time work at Sperry; gyrocompasses; moves to Sperry Lab and works on klystron, Doppler, CW radar
8-10 Atmosphere within Sperry Lab; relationship of Lab with rest of Sperry; relationship of Lab with MIT
10-12 Sperry Lab production of prototypes: testing of pulse Doppler radar; Barlow's role in theoretical mathematical analysis of systems in order to evaluate the systems; filter system for pulse Doppler radar
12-14 Impact of WWII ending on Sperry; departure of senior physicists and reemphasis of profit motive; Barlow studies design of radar system to detect incoming ballistic missiles, and studies high-powered klystrons; impact of research and staffing
14-15 Barlow's experience at Columbia
15-16 Decision to leave Sperry for RAND after the war; Jess Marcum
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
16-18 Barlow's experiment with relativity theory, presentation at Princeton, comments by Einstein
18-19 Aspects of Marcum's presentation that attracted Barlow to RAND; offer to Barlow
20-21 Barlow's initial position at RAND; distinction between RAND electronics and physics departments; atmosphere of intellectual freedom,interdisciplinary work
21-23 Barlow's impressions of RAND culture under Frank Collbohm; intellectual independence from the Air Force; devotion to one client only; each RAND staff member is free to decide what to work on; John Williams
23-24 Physical quarters of RAND
24-25 Barlow's work on radar technology and radar defense networks
25-30 Relationship between RAND and Air Force; General Gordon P. Seville; SAC (General Powers) response to study of strategic forces design; attempt to balance independence from Air Force with responsiveness to their needs: Larry Henderson, Frank Collbohm
30-31 RAND efforts to avoid conflicts of interest
31-33 Research on low altitude radar problems; develop concept for combining many radar screens into one; Lloyd Young decision to develop prototype radar and demonstrate to Air Force.
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
33 Demonstration of radar to Air Force (continued)
33-34 Barlow's illness with polio
34 RAND contracts for hardware
34-36 Study of training of radar operators introduces social science perspective and leads to creation of SDC; response of Air Force to study and to question of social science input
36-40 Interest of RAND staff in hands-on development projects; Barlow's shift towards that position; his regret that RAND work had not had more impact; his belief that aerospace industry growth made it more difficult for RAND to contribute to technology; RAND access to corporate data; SDC
41 Santa Monica community response to RAND
41-45 Electronics department activity; air defense, missile guidance, equipping strategic force; cooperation with other organizations
45-49 Systems analysis: cycle of acceptance within RAND, Charles Hitch, adaptations of systems analysis to deal with uncertainties, Latter Brothers
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
49-50 Physics department problem choice; factors in choice of study questions within RAND; factors in conducting systems analyses, balance between broad and specific studies
51-53 Balance between individual staff choice and research team demands; role of department head in team formation
53 RAND paper and course on systems analysis pitfalls; Ed Quade
54-55 SOFS study comparing performance of B-52, B-58, B-47 early mathematical and power limitations of computer analyses
55-56 RAND computer development
56-57 Analyses using hand calculations
57-58 Air defense study of Soviet attack using atomic bombs, then adapted to H-bomb attack
58-60 RAND studies of US strategic force and air defense; conclusion that effective air defense system impossible after H-bomb; Lincoln Labs and Jerome Wiesner meeting with RAND staff; shift to focus on strategic force and deterrence
60-63 Practice of systems analysis within RAND
October 11, 1989
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
64-67 Barlow begins working on radar at RAND, expanding on his previous work at Sperry to deal with radar system coverage: the introduction of computers into radar networks (Lincoln Labs digital versus University of Michigan analogue computer approaches), low altitude radar, airborne early warning
67-68 Early evolution of thinking at RAND about active air defense, bombers and missiles, role of Lincoln Labs, and impact of H-bomb; perspective of Jerry Wiesner
69-70 Origins of first air defense study on A-bomb; previous RAND research on the problem, RAND's encouraging staff to initiate studies, support for interdivisional studies
70-74 Barlow's conception and staffing of the first air defense study; working relationship with Jim Digby; mathemathical analysis of a strike as synthesizing element of the air defense studies; necessity of skepticism about assumptions and conclusions; different methodologies for examining impact of variable factors
74-75 Parallel to other RAND developments: systems analysis, Ed Paxson's bomber study
75-77 Relationship between RAND air defense studies and Lincoln Labs; competition between RAND and Lincoln Labs for AF attention; differences in expertise of RAND and Lincoln Labs
77-78 Air defense committee study involving Barlow, Ivan Getting; Barlow's role in Lincoln summer study
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
79-80 RAND resistance to Barlow's participation in Lincoln summer study; role of Robert Oppenheimer, I.I. Rabi
81 Barlow's recollection of another study based in Old State Department building involving MIT and Air Force staff, possibly a discussion of DEW Line, Mid-Canada Line
81-85 Promulgation of RAND results to Air Force: formal briefings, documents; Air Force response and practical constraints; impact of RAND air defense studies on Air Force policy; distinction between first and second RAND air defense studies
85-87 1952 Michigan Air Defense conference; competition between University of Michigan and Lincoln Laboratories concerning analogue versus digital computer-based radars
87-88 [Mervin] Kelly Committee (1953)
88-89 Origins of second RAND air defense study on H-bomb
89-92 Liaison year in Pentagon Development Planning Office; interservice rivalry within Pentagon; role of Development Planning Office; other RAND points of liaison with AF
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
93-95 Air Force response to RAND, how Barlow's Pentagon experience enhanced his understanding of Air Force; Air Force response to first RAND air defense study
95-96 Origins of second RAND air defense study; evaluation of RAND studies by Air Force; method by which second air defense study was conducted
96 Barlow's knowledge of ICBM study (B. Augenstein)
96 Barlow's knowledge of basing study (A. Wohlstetter)
97 Concern for civilian targets in RAND air defense studies; mutual assured destruction
97-100 Involvement of RAND social scientists in air defense strategy; war-fighting capability; Herman Kahn's position on mutual assured destruction concept
100-101 Relationship of Barlow and Wohlstetter on SOFS study
101-102 Origins of SOFS study; position of RAND on inter-divisional studies; Barlow appointed director of interdivisional projects
102-104 Role of SAC in SOFS study
104 Conditions under which Barlow sees studies like SOFS to be justified
104-105 Ways to motivate people to work on interdivisional studies
105 Wohlstetter's lack of involvement with SOFS
105 Role of Gus Shubert in SOFS
November 10, 1990
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
106-110 Decisions in structuring the Strategic Offensive Forces Study; consideration of a counterforce weapon system; active and passive defense
110-112 Complexities of deterrence within the framework of SOFS
112 Technological implications of strategic policy decisions
112-113 Air Force ability to be primary decision-maker; increase in diversity within R&D
113-115 Counterforce capabilities concept; prioritization of strategic systems
115-116 SOFS study as joint enterprise between RAND and SAC; SAC's level of contribution
116-118 SOFS limitations; Air Force reluctance to share sensitive information
118-119 Individual contributions to the project - Wohlstetter, Kahn, Enthoven, Rowen and Klein
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
119-121 Preparing briefing for Air Council; first presentation to SAC
121-122 Description of Pentagon briefing
122-123 Synthesis of RAND research over decades
123-125 Description of math division, physics division, and political science division at RAND; discussion of "Theory of Planning" document dated 1 September 1948
125-126 Kahn and Wohlstetter's attitudes towards Barlow's role in RAND
126-127 Intellectual leadership at RAND
128-129 Frank Collbohm's sense of strategic conceptual issues
129-130 Process of synthesizing materials for large studies
130 RAND interest in policy issues
131-132 Ed Quade's development of a systems analysis course
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
132-135 Nature of the advisory process; decision making as political rather than intellectual
135-136 Decision making as rooted in crisis
136-137 Cost issues; work with David Novick
137-138 Discussion of the total cost concept
139 Closing comments
Belzer, Robert. Date: July 23, 1987. Interviewers: Martin Collins and Joseph Tatarewicz. Auspices: RAND. Length: 3.25 hrs.; 47 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
After briefly reviewing his upbringing, education, Marine Corps service in WWII, and post-war teaching position in the math department at the University of Santa Clara, Belzer (b. January 1924) discusses how and why he went to work for RAND in 1948. He then describes his early years at RAND, including mathematical assistance to other departments on projects like the strategic bomber study and game theory; impressions of fellow RAND mathematicians, including John von Neumann, John Williams, and Oskar Morgenstern; and RAND/USAF interaction. Belzer next discusses various aspects of his assignment to RAND's Washington office in the mid-1950s, including briefing responsibilities and the briefing process in general; full-time work with the Killian Committee; and creating and running the Washington Defense Research Division from 1969 to 1971.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-4 Suggested people for RAND oral history interviews: Charlie Hitch, Freddy Clay, Alfred Goldberg (historian), Bill Jones (military aspect), Ed Quade (taught systems analysis courses to military), Bob Specht (systems analysis), Alex Mood (mathematical statistician), Jack Vogel (head of RAND reports), Burt Klein (reconnaissance study that led to U-2), Gene Root (early head of Aircraft Division), Tom Jones
3-4 Belzer participation in study of radar absorbent material, connection to Stealth
4-5 Early biographical and educational information leading up to hiring Project RAND; early mathematical interests, influences on Belzer
6-7 Belzer recruited by RAND; caliber of mathematics department there, including John von Neumann, John Williams, Morgenstern
6 Belzer's teaching position at University of Santa Clara
7-9 Initial experiences as RAND employee, clearance and secrecy requirements, Belzer's personal focus on game theory
9-11 Belzer's first 3 years at RAND; mathematical problems related to game theory; systems analyses & military application studies; study recommends AF develop turboprop bomber
11-12 Senior mathematicians at RAND during early '50; RAND a center for work on game theory
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12 Computational problem-solving; computer approximations; John Williams' encouragement of interdisciplinary work
12-16 Construction of mathematical model for bombing reconnaissance campaign
13-14 After first three years at RAND Belzer increasingly involved with strategic problems; his relationships with Strategic Air Command personnel, observation of their work
14 RAND publication classification system
14-15 RAND department structure in early fifties
16-17 Relations between RAND and Air Force
17-18 Theory of games work attracted both those interested in its military applications and those interested in mathematicalissues
18-20 John Williams: relationship with Belzer, death, authorship, management approach as head of mathematics department
20 Gene Root's management style; Olaf Helmer's management style
21 Ways of establishing study teams; management committee role
22 Air Force pressure on RAND to perform short-term work
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
22-23 Loan of RAND personnel to Air Force offices
23-24 RAND review of requirements documents for AF; maintaining good relations with AF
24 RAND staff resistance to pressure; screening of requests RAND staff resistance to pressure; screening of requests to RAND for assistance
25 Direct relationships between Air Force and RAND personnel: Glen Kent
25-26 Belzer runs Washington Defense Research Division
26 Requests from outside for RAND assistance
26-27 Transition from Douglas to Project RAND to RAND
27-28 Move into new building; J. Williams' role in designing it; Belzer's move to RAND Washington office; RAND staff members who spent much in Washington, D.C.
28-29 Belzer's shift away from strictly mathematical studies courses taken
29-32 Tours of briefing, specifically the base study; structure of RAND briefing; necessity of briefing lower level employees as well
32-33 How a briefing was set up; B-series documents
33 Method of selecting invites to briefing
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
34-35 Strategy for working out arrangements for briefings including personnel; Bill Jones
35-37 Conduct of an early briefing; roles of participants
37-38 Tailoring of briefings to audience
38-39 Functions in the administrative office
39-40 Belzer's role in the briefing process
40-42 In RAND Washington office report to Larry Robinson; liaison with Air Force offices
41 Belzer' responsibilities in Washington Defense Research Division
42-45 Technology and Capabilities Panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee; study of offense, defense, and intelligence implications of surprise attack by Soviet Union on US; symmetric analysis
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
45-47 Technology and Capabilities Panel (cont'd); briefings to panel from SAC and the Navy
Blasingame, Paul. Date: November 14, 1990. Interviewer: Martin Collins. Auspices: RAND. Length: 2 hrs.; 24 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Blasingame describes first his education, engineering work in the Army Air Forces during World War II, and his post-war graduate study in instrumentation at MIT sponsored by the USAF. He next discusses his career with the USAF beginning in 1952, including working on the Development Planning Objective (DPO) for strategic bombers while at the Office of the Assistant for Development Planning; the input of RAND, Cornell, SAC, and others into this DPO; and the relationship between the Office of the Assistant for Development Planning and other offices in DCS/Development. Blasingame then reviews his move to the USAF ballistic missile program, the input of RAND and others into this program, and eventually being placed in charge of the Titan program.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Blasingame's education in engineering; service in the US Air Force: tour of duty in Armament Laboratory; recollections of Lee Davis
2-5 Blasingame's graduate study at MIT underwritten by Air Force; recollections of Stark Draper, Robert Seamans; thesis on inertial guidance
5-6 Employment in the Pentagon; involvement with development planning and development of next strategic bomber; recollections of General Bernard Schriever
6-7 Exploration of low-altitude flight; development of turbofan engine; relationships with RAND, Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory, General Electric Company
8-9 Studies of weapon payload issues; recollections of Sam Cohen, John von Neumann
8-9 Shift of interest from strategic airplanes to ballistic missiles
9-10 Recollections of Scientific Advisory Board nuclear panel and Teapot Committee studies of reducing warhead size
10-11 Selection of targets in the Soviet Union; SAC opposition to refueling of bombers; recollections of General Curtis LeMay
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
11-12 Organization of Schriever's development planning efforts; use of experts; recollections of Colonel McGowan, Mike Chaffee
12-13 RAND contribution to development planning efforts; collections of Gene Root, Jesse Macrum, Sam Cohen, Tom Jones
13-14 Coordination and presentation of disparate studies
14-16 Nature of coordination between development planning effort and various Air Force commands; disagreement with SAC; recollections of General LeMay and General Jewell Maxwell
16-17 Roles of Directorate of R & E and Directorate of Requirements
17 Relationship between development planning and Wright Field, ARDC Baltimore
17 Examination of system costs; contributions of RAND
18 Blasingame's involvement with Scientific Advisory Board and Research and Development Board
18-20 Blasingame's shift to work on guidance equipment for ballisticmissile program and redesign of Atlas; evolution of intermediate-range missile
20-21 Blasingame appointed director of Titan program; development of elevator design for storing Titan
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
21-24 Blasingame's contacts with RAND while in the ballistic missile program; commitment to inertial guidance system; issue of system reliability
Bowles, Edward L. Dates: July 14 and 15, August 20, 1987. Interviewers: Martin Collins and Michael Dennis. Auspices: RAND. Length: 11 hrs.; 129 pp. Use restriction: Public.
After a brief overview of his background and education, Bowles (b. December 9, 1897) describes his work for the National Defense Research Committee (later the Office of Scientific Research and Development) and the establishment of the MIT Radiation Laboratory. He then discusses his appointment as special assistant to Secretary Stimson; work on antisubmarine warfare and other projects; and impressions of the Secretary, General Arnold, and others. Bowles covers next his close relationship with General Arnold and their efforts to bring industry into strategic planning, culminating in the establishment of the RAND project at Douglas Aircraft. Finally, Bowles describes his relationship with various RAND personnel such as Frank Collbohm and David Griggs, and his thoughts on the success of the RAND experiment.
July 14, 1987
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-8 Family background: parents, religion, community of Westphalia, MO; early education through grammar school, mechanics, saddlery, forging, carpentry, electricity, work as a repairman, Sears Roebuck catalog, and medicine through his father's work as a doctor
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
8-10 Continue early background
10-14 High school years in St. Louis, his mother's encouragement, chemistry, furniture making, reading of Shakespeare and other literature, exposure to Christian Science, Boy Scout experience, family and boarding house residences
14-16 Undergraduate work at Washington University, courtship and marriage, military training at Ft. Sheridan, job at Springfield Gas and Electric Company with streetcars
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
16-18 Origins of (NDRC) Microwave Committee: Bowles at MIT; Vannevar Bush, National Defense Research and Committee of NDRC (became Office of Scientific Research and Development or OSRD); antipathy between Admiral Bowen and Bush, Karl Compton; committee access to radar and sonar information; members of Committee: Bowles; Alfred Loomis, Chair; Bown from Bell Labs; Metcalf from GE; Hutchinson from Westinghouse
18-21 Committee meeting and contracts; decision that Committee needed its own independent laboratory: Bowles interest in MIT location; discussion among Bowles, Frank Jewett, Compton, Bush, Loomis, out of which comes decision to locate lab at MIT
21-23 Relations between Microwave Committee and the military: Army, Army Air Forces, Navy, Signal Corps; military attitude toward likelihood of building working radar device
23-25 Bowles' assignment by Bush to Fog Navigation Committee (also Jewett, Mason, George Freed); radar and infrared solutions to fog navigation problem
25-26 Tizard Mission from Great Britain; Taffy Bowen
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
26-27 Taffy Bowen's (contd.) work on airborne radar; Oliphant M Magnetron; contract to Raytheon for magnetron; Microwave Committee role diminishes
27-28 MIT Radiation Lab; Lawrence and work on cyclotron; Lee Dubridge
29-33 Microwave Committee contracting process; airborne radar contract problem with Signal Corps; "Few Quick" organization
33-35 Relationship between Bush and Bowles
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
36-40 Further discussion of relationship between Bush and Bowles
37-40 MIT and its patent policy; Bowles involvement in patent litigation; Edgerton, Germeshausen and Grier
40-44 Bowles and the Microwave Committee; Loomis; Round Hill Research Division; Julius Stratton
July 15, 1987
TAPE 3, SIDE 2
45-52 Bowles appointed to serve Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson; Stimson's interest in radar; possibility of Bush having role in his appointment
47-49 Politics surrounding MIT presidency: Loomis, Compton, Dubridge
49-50 Appointment to Stimson (cont'd); Harvey Bundy
50-52 Flight test of magnetic anomaly detector (MAD); Bowles' introduction to antisubmarine problem; conflict between Navy Air and Army Air Forces
TAPE 4, SIDE 1
52-54 Experience working with Stimson; Stimson's orientation toward action and toward results; Eleanor Roosevelt; Stimson's secretary Miss Neary
54-56 Bowles' trip to Panama for Stimson to assess radar situation; General Andrews; relationship to General Marshall; Bowles briefed on cross-channel invasion plans (WWII)
56-57 Bowles' assessment of need for B-24 (four-engine) bombers; Army Air and Navy Struggle; Admiral Adolphus Andrews
56-58 Antisubmarine report prepared by Bowles; Bowles introduction earlier to Admiral King and General Arnold when MIT had contract with the Civil aeronautics Administration; Army Air Corps lighter-than-air (balloon) work
58-59 Establishment at Langley Field of AAF Antisubmarine Command; General Hap Arnold
59-60 Air Transport Command; Bowles hires consultants for assistance
60 Staffing of Bowles' War Department office: Alan Hazeltine and Minnie Mae Emerich
TAPE 4, SIDE 2
61-63 Organization of Bowles' office (contd); character of Stimson, Secretary of Navy Frank Knox; relationship between Stimson and General Marshall; Bowles' antisubmarine report
63-64 General Arnold's request that Bowles take over communications; Bowles' memo to Arnold
64-70 Arnold assigns Bowles to visit B-29 installations and operatingcommands; William Shockley prepares report on B-29 crew; Arthur Raymond and Frank Collbohm (both Douglas) and Ed Wells (Boeing) prepare report proposing modifications of B-29; construction of 15th Wing based on Raymond-Collbohm-Wells report; General Oliver Echols
TAPE 5, SIDE 1
70 Bowles' trip to the Galapogos; military supply problem
70-73 Bowles' interest in economics of warfare; arranged for Shockley to do a study of costs of putting B-29 over Japan; Patrick Blackett; Bush
74 Preparation of Bowles' papers for Library of Congress
74-76 1946 speech delivered by General Arnold, written by Bowles, with assistance of Rudolph Winnacker, concerning Air Force policy with respect to R & D
76-79 Alan Hazeltine's diary of events; Bowles request to Arnold that he relieve General McClennan of his command over Air Force communications
TAPE 5, SIDE 2
79-81 Origins of RAND: Bowles' belief that he persuaded General Arnold of advisability of studying military equipment problems through cooperative efforts between military and industry and providing industry with intelligence
82-85 Arnold interest in RAND concept; support for Theodore von Karman; McNarney; Marshall; Andrews; Navy and Army Air Corps debate, limits of Army's right to fly over ocean
85 Bowles' conception of the RAND idea
August 20, 1987
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
86-89 Origins of Project RAND: William Shockley paper on B-29 report and Russian capabilities; discussions with General Arnold of having industrial people behind the scenes in military planning; discussions with industry people: Don Douglas, Ed Allen of Boeing, Kindleberger of North American; request that each contribute person to planning effort
89-90 Produce Raymond-Collbohm-Wells report on B-29 recommending stripping of side turrets; possible origin of RAND name
90-91 Arnold's role in making concept of bringing industry into strategic planning an on-going effort; lack of planning in the military traditionally
91-92 Advantages to industry of their involvement in strategic planning
92-93 1946 Shockley report comparing US and U.S.S.R. weapons and technology; economic consequences of war; poor condition among B-29 crews
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
93-95 Impact on Bowles of Arnold's retirement; Tooey Spaatz; Ira Eaker; his success working for Stimson
95-96 British request to Marshall for help with V-1 attacks
96-99 Meeting between Douglas, Kindleberger, Allen, search for leader for Project RAND; George Doriot, Collbohm, Merle Tuve, DavidGriggs, Rudolph Winnacker, Dick Goldstein
99-100 Bowles' comments on Fred Kaplan's book, The Wizards of Armageddon; the V-1 problem; building up of RAND; meeting between at Hamilton Field, Bowles,Raymond, Collbohm, and Arnold concerning development of RAND
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
100-103 Hamilton Field meeting with Arnold (contd); Collbohm's interest in nuclear field; David Griggs; Raymond and Collbohm's sense of how Douglas might benefit from RAND concept; Bowles' firing by Royall
103 Bowles' disenchantment with RAND and Collbohm; discussion of re-establishing RAND at university location
103-106 1946 speech by Arnold prepared by Bowles; Curtis LeMay; Arnold's reliance on people who could deliver results
106-108 Arnold's trust in Bowles' recommendations; Arnold accepts Bowles' concept of RAND
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
108-109 Arnold and meteorological problems
109-110 Response of aircraft industries to opportunity to obtain intelligence information; importance of Donald Douglas and his interest in air
110-114 Establishment of Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Research and Development; Bowles' hope to introduce into Air Force some understanding of technology's importance; Oliver Echols relations with Arnold
114-115 Bowles' interest in joint studies; also studies of the enemy, in this case, Russia; Shockley study on economics of warfare; Bowles' idea that RAND would assimilate technology and direct it to the nation's welfare
115-117 Bowles did not attempt to promote RAND idea within Air staff; reliance on Arnold; Joe McNarney
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
117-118 Joe McNarney (contd); General Marshall's belief in airpower
118-119 Arnold's belief in science, role of Theodore von Karman; the von Karman Committee
119-120 Arnold's character; General Westover's interest in technology
120-121 Arnold's impetuous decision-making style
121-122 Bowles' perspective on university role in RAND-type planning; Compton; Radiation Lab at MIT
122 Raytheon role in radar development in US
123-124 Air Force thinking about science and technology, Arnold's thinking
124-125 Bowles discussion with General MacArthur in Korea
125-126 Amount of time Bowles devoted to RAND concept
TAPE 3, SIDE 2
126-128 Bowles' postwar activities; Compton's feelings about science
128-129 Removal of electronics from Signal Corps to Air Force
129 Bowles' resignation from MIT
Collbohm, Frank. Date: July 28, 1987. Interviewers: Martin Collins and Joseph Tatarewicz. Auspices: RAND. Length: 5.25 hrs.; 71 pp. Use restriction: Public.
After a brief overview of his upbringing and his work for Douglas Aircraft, Collbohm (b. January 31, 1907) reviews the origins of RAND and his selection as its head in 1946. Collbohm then discusses a wide range of issues dealt with while head of RAND, including recruitment of
personnel, management philosophy, use of subcontractors and consultants, contracting with agencies other than the USAF, establishment of the Washington office, separation from Douglas Aircraft, relations with the Board of Trustees, contracting difficulties with the USAF, and the research process.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2, 5 Collbohm's early years, parents, education, first job at Westinghouse
2-4 Interest in aeronautical engineering, hired by Douglas Company
4 Defense of Douglas plant in WWII
4-5 Relations with Wright Field personnel
6-7 Early years at Douglas on special projects
7-8 Initial contact with MIT Radiation Lab
8-10 Administrator at Douglas; initiates research department testing and data collection; aeronautics instructor; relationship with Dick Goldstein
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
10-11 Relationships with Arthur Raymond, Donald Douglas
11-12 Work in sales and contracts
12-13 Contacts with Radiation Lab
13-14 Other activities in WWII: response to V-1 rocket, B-29 streamlining
14-15 Project RAND, its naming; Arthur Raymond; Ed Bowles' Hap Arnold correspondence; opposition to RAND
15-16 WWII consultant in Pentagon; Ed Bowles
16-19 Initial idea of starting RAND; Hap Arnold, meeting with Arnold and Douglas, et al
19-20 Earth-Circling Space Ship (first RAND project); Tiros; titanium
20-21 Project RAND startup
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
21-22 Project RAND startup (continued); staff recruitment; Warren Weaver, John Williams, Hans Speier, Charlie Hitch
22-23 Collbohm's management techniques
23-26 Selection of Collbohm to head RAND
23-24 Anticipated relationship between RAND and universities
24-25 Anticipated relationship between RAND and aircraft industry
25-26 Type of personnel sought
25-26 Relationships with Arthur Raymond, Donald Douglas Hap Arnold, Ed Bowles
26-28 RAND system of research memoranda, papers, reports; independence of department heads
28 Douglas Company, subcontracts with Collins Radio, University ofIowa, Battelle Memorial Institute
29-31 Decision to establish RAND as a corporation separate from Douglas Company, Ford loan to RAND, Pacific National credit line, RAND board of trustees, Henry Ford interest in RAND
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
31-32 Relations between Army and Air Force; resistance to RAND in Air Force
32 Influence of Collbohm's Manhattan Project work on RAND
32-33 Rad Lab and Los Alamos organizational structures; Oppenheimer
33-35 Transfer of Project RAND from Douglas to RAND Corporation; board of trustees selection and responsibilities
35-37 Contracting relationship between RAND and Air Force; establishment System Development Corporation
36 RAND contracts with AEC, CIA, NASA
37-39 Staff time allotted to projects, delegation of authority to RAND division heads
39-41 Collbohm's management communication system, management committee, selection and direction of projects
40 Dick Goldstein's function as right-hand person
41 Interdisciplinary concept of RAND; degree of understanding among department heads, Air Force
41-43 Relations with RAND board of trustees, with Rowan Gaither, with Lee DuBridge
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
44 Board of trustees (continued)
44-45 Collbohm's typical day; Wright Field; RAND Dayton office
44-47 Function of RAND Washington office, Larry Henderson
45-46 Other RAND staff: Glen Putt, Don Putt, Brownley Hayden
46 Collbohm's review of all printed Rand reports
47 AF pressure on RAND; Analytic Services (ANSER); Systems Development Corporation
47-48 Collbohm's management style; indoctrination of new staff,
48-49 Change in RAND research emphasis; systems analyses
49-51 Staff reward, management, and dismissals: official RAND positions; briefings
51-52 RAND security requirements
52-53 RAND network of consultants; staff loaned to government agencies
52-55 Decisions to initiate new projects
53-54 Encouraging interdisciplinary work; research council
54-55 Arnold Mengel, RAND Washington office, Larry Henderson, George Tanham
56-57 Allocation of Air Force fixed fee monies within RAND
TAPE 3, SIDE 2
57-58 Overseas RAND information-gathering assignments, active interest in new areas of study
58-59 Collbohm's aversion to publicizing RAND activities
59-60 RAND sources of financial support; RAND response to Air Force request for assistance; establishment of SDC
61 RAND openness about study results
61-62 Collbohm's opinion as to areas currently needing RAND-typestudy
61-63 Collbohm's concerns about US Eastern intellectuals and press
63 Intellectual quality of RAND staff, future positions
63-65 Kennedy administration, McNamara Defense Department hiring of RAND staff
65-66 Challenges to Collbohm as RAND executive; his longevity in the job
66-67 Relationship between RAND and aircraft industry
67 RAND need for company private data
67-69 Impact of RAND on Air Force; Wohlstetter et al study
69-70 Uniqueness of RAND as center for study of strategic thinking
TAPE 4, SIDE 1
70 Collbohm's decision to leave RAND
70-71 His uncertainly whether RAND history will be helpful to those solving current and future problems
Davies, Merton. Dates: December 12, 1985; July 28, 1986. Interviewer: Joseph Tatarewicz. Auspices: RAND. Length: 3.5 hrs.; 39 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
After briefly reviewing his upbringing and undergraduate education at Stanford in mathematics, Davies (b. September 13, 1917) discusses his work at Douglas Aircraft from 1939 to 1947 on lofting techniques and other projects. He then describes his transfer in 1947 to the Missiles Division of the RAND Project; contributions to satellite, reconnaissance, and other studies; impressions of Amrom Katz; and RAND's relations with the USAF and the aerospace industry.
December 12, 1985
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Early Childhood and Family Background School activities; early interest in reading Interest in spaceflight; membership in the British
2-3 Interplanetary Rocket Society Years At the University
4 Decision to attend Stanford
4-5 Participation in amateur astronomical activities
5 Graduation with A.B. from Stanford; teaching one semester at University of Nevada at Reno Douglas Years: 1939-47
6 Decision to accept position at Douglas
7 Working with aerodynamic engineers in the lofting department
8 Computer analysis and new lofting methods
10 Description of the tooling process - work between engineers and machinists
10 Engineering considerations - dealing in terms of error budgets Years at RAND
10 Organization of the RAND project, 1947; transfer shortly thereafter
11 RAND access to documents; information on Air Force activities
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12 Further discussion of lofting techniques; teaching Hughes Aircraft employees mathematical formulas
12-13 Plans for building the D-558 aircraft; assistance with aerodynamic calculations
13-14 Interest in automated computing; RAND acquisition of a Von Neumann machine
14-15 Building of a telescope during WWII
15-16 Discussion of personal life and relationships
16-17 Interest in optics; theories and lens design
17-18 Enthusiasm in planetary observation; association with Wayne White and Vern Hamilton
18-19 Desire to work with spacecraft; work at RAND under George Clement
19-20 Discussion of satellite feasibility studies
20 Closing comments
July 28, 1986
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
Period with RAND Corporation
21-22 Perception of RAND prior to employment
22-23 Description of work in the lofting department
23-24 Satellite studies; aid from RAND missile department
24 Reconnaissance study headed by Jimmy Lipp and Robert Salter
24-25 Communication between RAND and the Air Force concerning studies and proposals
25 Discussion of RAND's mission and relationship with the aerospace industry
25-26 Involvement with satellites and payloads
26-27 Reconnaissance work; familiarity with airborne cameras and systems
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
26-27 Richard Churchill and photo interpretation
27-28 Contract with Battelle; strength testing of advanced materials
28 Working on payloads, 1951-54
28-29 RAND studies of various uses for satellites
29-30 Difference between reconnaissance and weather studies
30-31 Discussion of the Kellogg and Greenfield study
31 Amrom Katz and his position at RAND
31-32 Preparation of satellite proposal
32-33 Description of procurement procedure
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
33-34 New area of study; inspection for arms control Bob Buchheim and detailed studies of capability and utility of lunar launch vehicles
34 Importance of communication with professionals outside of RAND
34-35 Evaluation of Amrom Katz and his accomplishments at RAND
35-36 Working with Katz on satellite development
36 Testing of ablative materials for re-entry vehicles
36-37 Discussion of recoverable satellite proposal
37-38 Spin stabilized aircraft versus three axis stabilized
38 Knowledge of optics; advantages of Vidicon
39 Katz' abilities as a communicator
Frick, Richard H. Date: November 12, 1987. Interviewers: Joseph Tatarewicz and David DeVorkin. Auspices: RAND. Length: 3 hrs.; 43 pp. Use restriction: Open.
After reviewing his upbringing, undergraduate education in physics, work on ballistic problems for the National Defense Research Committee during WWII, and work for Bell Labs for a short period after the war, Frick (b. December 9, 1916) discusses his move to Project RAND in 1946. He then describes various aspects of his nearly forty-year career with RAND, including contributions in the celestial mechanics field to selected studies, freedom to engage in personal research, and relations with USAF and other military officials.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Family background, childhood, and youth; family members; fathers occupation
2 Reading interests as a child; appeal of mathematics and science
2-3 Influence of high school algebra teacher, Ruth Welbourne
3-5 Influences upon decision to attend UCLA
5 Science and technology as the academic focus UCLA YEARS
5 Enrollment in the fall of 1933; interest in physics
6 Description of undergraduate course work under department chairman Vern Knudsen
6-7 Position as graduate teaching assistant; discussion of fellow graduate students and professors
7-8 Balance between laboratory and theoretical experience
8-9 Contact with Samuel Merrick; exposure to celestial mechanics
9-10 Identification of thesis topic; decision to continue studies in graduate school
10-12 Discussion of thesis work in acoustical absorption and dispersion
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12-13 Post graduate plans-interest in sound ranging of artillery project at Duke University
13 OST Post Graduate Years Project head R.B. Lindsay; Knudsen in supervisory role
13-15 Relationship with military, working with the Field Artillery and Signal Corps
15-16 Reconstructing a ballistic trajectory from an acoustic sampling
16-17 Role in design procedure
17-18 Analysis for the construction templates
18-19 Data gathering with a photographic recorder
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
19-20 Military charts for measuring wind velocity
20 Description of reporting structure; writing final reports for the division
20-21 Internal organization of the division
21-22 Definition and distribution of division projects
22-23 Further discussion of working relationship with the military
23 Friends and colleagues in similar positions
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
BELL LABORATORIES
24 Opportunity for research at Bell Laboratories
24-25 Work on finding sources of noises in carbon filaments
25-27 Howland Bailey and Ed Sharkey move from Bell Labs to RAND; early RAND members; Dave Griggs, Glenn Peebles, Vic Sturdevant and George Grimminger
27-28 Discussion of report "Preliminary Design of a Satellite Vehicle"
28-29 Frick's first published report, RAND publication R-136 "The Effect of Missile Dynamics on Flight Path"
30 Accessibility of Collbohm, Goldstein and Williams
30-31 Research materials, library facilities and documentation available to RAND
31-32 Progression of Frick's work at RAND
32-33 RAND's reliance on broad trust trend studies
33 Introduction of computers to RAND; John IAC Open Shop System (JOSS)
34 Outside contacts in the ballistic field
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
34-35 Celestial mechanics learned as a tool by Frick
35 Collaboration with Ted Garber; co-author with Frick on reports
35-37 Timekeeping changes on individuals projects at RAND; scheduling conflicts
37-38 Freedom to choose research area in early days of RAND; tighter control overtime in present day RAND; Project Labor Status Report
39-40 Community feedback on RAND reports; classified status limits use of reports and recognition of authors
40-41 Frick's use of graphical data in his reports
41-42 Atmosphere at RAND during Sputnik era
42-43 Advance feasibility studies
43 Closing comments
Henderson, Lawrence J. Dates: August 28 and 30, 1989. Interviewer: Martin Collins and Joseph Tatarewicz. Auspices: RAND. Length: 5 hrs.; 72 pp. Use restriction: Permission required to quote, cite, or reproduce.
Henderson (b. June 11, 1911) begins by describing his background, graduate education in law and business, and work for MIT and the Secretary of War during WWII. He then discusses his recruitment by RAND in 1947 to head the Washington office; his relations with Collbohm, Bowles, and others in the late 1940s; the RAND/Douglas Aircraft relationship, the establishment of RAND as a separate entity, and the search for financial support for the new entity; RAND's contact points with the USAF and how its work product was disseminated within the USAF; and the role of the Washington office in the RAND organization.
August 28, 1989
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-3 Family background; school, college, and graduate education
1-2 Employment at Chemical Bank and Trust Company, at Board of Economic Warfare
2-12 Employed during World War II by MIT Radiation Laboratory Transition Office; Work with Louis Ridenour, Lee DuBridge, John Trump
3-5 Advisor to Air Force headquarters in Italy
4-7 Assigned to radar operations, SHORAN system, SER 584 antiaircraft radar
9-12 Assigned to Office of Secretary of War, air navigation and traffic control; establish "all-weather airline"
10-11 Relationship with Ed Bowles
11-12 Recruited and hired for Washington office of Project RAND
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
13-14 Recruited and hired for Washington office of Project RAND (cont. from Tape 1, Side 1)
14-24 Responsibilities when Washington Project RAND office was first set up; initial with Air Force, Curtis LeMay, Project RAND in policy and organizational issues
16 Relationship with Air Force operations analysis office
17-18 Air Force support for Project RAND
18-21 Air Force initial uncertainty about requesting assistance from Project RAND; materials research; titanium
21-22 Ed Bowles' disenchantment with Project RAND, relationship with Henderson
21-22 Henderson's perception of, relationship with Frank Collbohm
22-23 Project RAND advisory council
23-24 Henderson's perception of, relationship with Arthur Raymond
24-25 Relationship between Project RAND and Douglas Aircraft Company; issues leading to separation and establishment of RAND Corporation
24-25 Donald Douglas' motives for separating Project RAND from Douglas Company
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
25-29 Relationship between Project RAND and Douglas Aircraft Company; issues leading to separation and establishment of RAND Corporation
25-26 Exploration of possible affiliation with university
26-27 Search for financial support to establish independent RAND
27-29 Negotiation with Ford Foundation; involvement of Rowan Gaither
29-31 Incorporation of RAND
30 Selection of board of trustees
30-31 Air Force response to transfer of contract from Douglas to RAND
August 30, 1989
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
32-35 List of document citations prepared by L. Henderson, related to origins and RAND history
33-34 Early interviews of RAND staff
35-43 Incorporation of RAND
35-39 List of people to consult during incorporation process; Henderson's role in talking with people; helpfulness of General Lauris Norstad, Clyde Williams of Battelle, Lee DuBridge, Berkeley scientists, Warren Weaver of Rockefeller Foundation, Charles Dollard of the Carnegie Corporation, Ed Bowles
39-40 Reasons for initial contract arrangement between Douglas Company and Air Force for Project RAND
40-41 Reasons for Project RAND to separate from Douglas; options explored for new organizational arrangement
41-42 RAND acquires Ford Foundation support and board of trustees
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
43-46 Role of Frank Collbohm in transition of Project RAND to RAND Corporation; search for RAND president; appointment rejected by Lee DuBridge, George Doriot
46-55 Relationship of RAND with the Air Force
46-48 Initial confusion about appropriate mission for RAND; conflict with Wright Field; disagreement over reporting requirements
48,52-54 RAND key points of contact with Air Force (Curtis LeMay, R.C. Wilson, Don Putt)
48-51 Controversies as to whether RAND should make recommendations to Air Force, structure of RAND divisions, whether RAND should provide information or do contract work for other government agencies
53-54 Henderson's friendship with General Gordon Saville
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
55-65 RAND Washington Office role in review of RAND reports and dissemination to Air Force; in formulating strategy to acquaint Air Force staff with information and findings; in coaching RAND staff
59-60 Albert Wohlstetter report and Air Force perceptions of him
60-61 Henderson's recollections of Oliver Picher
61-62 Henderson's perception of Air Force decision making
64-65 RAND briefings
66-69 Henderson's philosophy of management of RAND-type organization: flexibility and lack of hierarchy
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
69-71 RAND's commitment to long-term or operational studies versus pressure to accomplish short-term or technical research
71-75 Origins of, establishment of, and operation of ANSER
71-72 Channeling of Air Force requests to RAND
Hitch, Charles. Date: February 9, 1988. Interviewers: Martin Collins and Joseph Tatarewicz. Auspices: RAND. Length: 1.1 hrs.; 22 pp. Use restriction: Open.
After discussing his upbringing and education as an economist, Hitch (b. January 9, 1910) reviews his work in World War II for the War Production Board and Office of Strategic Services and his return to Oxford after the war. He then describes his recruitment as an economist by John Williams and Dana Bailey of RAND in 1947, input into the bomber study and other projects, utilization of economics in systems analysis, professional support given by others within and outside of RAND, and relations with the USAF and other government agencies.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Hitch's parents and education; Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford; early interest in economics
2-3 Studies at Harvard University; Frank Taussig
3-4 Studies at Oxford University
5 Work with Averell Harriman on study of British wartime material controls; later in Washington D.C. for War Production Board; creation of Controlled Materials Plan
5-7 Assignment to Office of Strategic Services in Britain during WWII; assessments of economic effects of air raids and effectiveness of RAF bombing
7-9 Administrative experience during WWII; manages physical vulnerability directorate of Pentagon study of Japanese targets
9-10 Return to Oxford after WWII; marriage; contacted by RAND (John Williams and Dana Bailey)
10-11 Conference of Social Scientists in New York; systems analysis; John Williams
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12-13 Systems analysis; Conference of Social Scientists; John Williams
13-14 Decision to join RAND; Ed Paxson study of bombers; Hitch's interest in economics of government expenditure
14-15 First impressions and activities at RAND; hires Dave Novick to run cost analysis department; study of Russian product pricing
15 Reception within RAND to economics division
16-17 Sources of assistance to Hitch; Dave Novick, Stephen Enke, Armen Alchian, Roland McKean; Hitch's independence within RAND; Jack Hirshleifer Research Center, Columbia Russian Institute; relations with consultants; recruiting of new staff
20-22 Hitch's relations with CIA and Air Force clients; briefing on the H-Bomb
Katz, Amrom. Date: July 24, 1986. Interviewer: Martin Collins and Joseph Tatarewicz. Auspices: RAND. Length: 4 hrs.; 71 pp. Use restriction: Open.
After briefly reviewing his upbringing and education in the physics field, Katz (b. August 15, 1915) discusses his career from 1940 to 1954 at Wright Field. He covers, among other things, his initial work in the photo lab during World War II; relations with George Goddard, James Baker, and others; work immediately after the war heading the photo unit at the Bikini atomic tests; and subsequent involvement in such projects as balloon photography. Katz then describes certain aspects of his career at RAND beginning in 1954, including his work on reconnaissance projects. He next discusses the art of photo interpretation, his collection of photographic materials, and key developments in the late 1940s and 1950s in the development of a US reconnaissance capability.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Early Family Life
1 Parent's occupation; family move to Milwaukee, WI
2 Childhood interest in reading
2-3 Entering University of Wisconsin Extension Division in Milwaukee; interest in journalism
3 Interest in astronomy; switching college major to physics and mathematics
3-4 Graduate school in physics at Madison; obtaining bachelor's degree
4-5 Consideration of career choices; position with the civil service
5-6 Working in the Census Bureau for W. Edwards Deming
6 Improved skills in mathematical statistics; working for Morris Hansen Work at Wright Field
6 Position at Wright Field in the photo lab
6-7 Continued interest in astronomy
8 Assignment to the photo lab at Wright Field
8-9 Duties in the sensitometry laboratory
9 Testing methods of camera shutters; working with OSRD
9-11 Various aspects of moving photography; work with George Goddard
11-12 Photograph resolution testing
12-14 Image Motion Compensation experimentation
14 George Goddard and his management style at Wright Field
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14 Organizational structure at Wright Field laboratory
14-15 Professional relationship with James Baker, consultant to Wright
15 Description of the OSRD series; chapter written by Jim Baker on lens testing
15-16 Discussion of H.E. Ives book
16 Attempts to solve the Image Motion Compensation problem
17 Evolution of the aerial strip camera
18-20 George Lawrence and his work with Goddard
20 Discussion of context as the main contributor to photo interpretation
21 British contributions to photo interpretation; discussion of Constance Babbington-Smith's book Air Spy
21-23 Reasons for Goddard's push for better equipment
23 Goddard's relationship with Minton Kaye and the concept of the imaginary axis
23-24 Development of the Defense Mapping Agency
24-25 Discussion of reconnaissance photographic operators; Colonel Karl "Pop" Polifka
26 Assessment of contributions made by Goddard's group at Wright Field during WWII
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
26-28 Discussion of the Bikini Diary, September 13, 1995-November 21,1946; Katz's role in forming group to document tests at Bikini
28-29 Museum policy concerning archival donations
30 Further discussion of the Bikini diaries
31 Developing special equipment such as the photometer
31-32 Using a bang meter to detect atomic bursts and measure yield
33-34 Discussion of various learning experiences at Wright Field
34-35 Discussion of issues relevant to nuclear warfare
35 Changes in work at Wright Field after WWII
35-36 Bill Kellogg and Stan Greenfield; experiences with balloon photography
36-37 Disposition of Katz's diaries and personal papers
37-39 Calculating theoretical resolution from a hypothetical satellite orbit
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
YEARS AT RAND
39 Impressions of first contact with RAND
39-40 Photographic experiments and RAND's early satellite program
40-41 RAND's focus on re-entry and recovery after 1954
41-43 Reasons for joining RAND; influence of Phil Bahrman and Alec Wylly
43-44 Early positions held at RAND; story of Jules Moch
44-45 Idea of using reconnaissance for disaster relief during the late 1940's and early 1950's
45-46 Colonel Philbrick, Colonel Leghorn, and interest in world government
46-48 RAND project in Vietnam
48-49 A.G. Wilson's move from Lowell Observatory to RAND
49-50 Joint work with Mert Davies; satellite and arms control projects
50-51 Personal reflections on the post WWII era
51-54 Discussion of reconnaissance and US-Soviet relations
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
54-55 Further discussion of photo interpretation
54-55 Katz's recollection of particular photo interpreters
55 The goal of greater resolution
56-58 Methods and techniques of photo interpretation; Goddards' appreciation of the technical challenges
58-59 Experimentation with the strip camera
59-61 Discussion of Katz's current photographic materials
61 Further discussion of the disposition of Katz's personal collection
62-63 Jim Baker and his experiments with film
63-64 The V-2 and satellite photography
65 Photography at NRL
66-67 The evolution of the Development Planning Objective into the Beacon Hill Committee; work with Colonel Leghorn
67-68 SAC assessment of photo surveillance
TAPE 3, SIDE 2
68-69 Dick Philbrick and the invention of SLAR-Side Loading Aircraft Radar
69-70 Discussion of the development of aircraft for photographic reconnaissance missions: the Hughes F-11 and Republic F-12
70-71 Goddard's reaction to Katz's move to RAND
King, Scott J. Date: July 22, 1987. Interviewers: Martin Collins and Joseph Tatarewicz. Auspices: RAND. Length: 2.25 hrs.; 40 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
King (b. April 22, 1918) initially reviews his upbringing, education, and work as a contracts administrator for Douglas Aircraft before and after World War II. He then describes moving to the RAND Project in the same capacity in December 1946, relations with AAF and later USAF contracting officers, policies and procedures for subcontracts and individual consulting contracts, personnel recruitment and salaries, creation of the accounting and purchasing systems, and the background of and his role in RAND's incorporation. King next discusses the increase in his staff over the years, RAND's contracts with agencies other than the USAF and some of the problems these generated, the internal decision-making process on fiscal issues, and the impact of RAND's growth on this process and fiscal procedures in general.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Early years, education, employment at Douglas; WWII service; joins RAND in 1946
2-6 Douglas Aircraft at close of WWII; functions of Douglas contract administrators; King's reasons for returning to Douglas after WWII
6-8 Dick Goldstein solicits King to join Project RAND; initiation process; impression of RAND's uniqueness
8-11 Contract administration at Project RAND; Air Corps contracting officers and working relationships with King; Air Force Advisory Group; industrial advisory group
11 Policy problem of Project RAND remaining part of Douglas
11-12 Subcontracting at RAND
12 Individual consulting contracts
12-13 Mismatch between R & D purpose of RAND and Douglas administrative structures and systems
13-14 Project RAND contract administration, impact of security requirements
14 Earth-circling satellite study
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14-18 Overhead received by Douglas for Project RAND
15-16 King's approach to contract negotiation
16-18 Project RAND personnel recruitment and salaries
18-20 King's role in RAND incorporation; Project RAND at that time
20-21 King's establishment of RAND accounting and purchasing systems
21-22 Initial disinterest within RAND of seeking support outside Air Force
22 RAND contract with Atomic Energy Commission
22-23 RAND contract with Office of Secretary of Defense
23-24 Review of 1950 RAND organizational chart
24-25 Other aspects of establishment of RAND with which King was involved; relationships with Air Force administrative and procurement contracting officers
25 RAND calculation of overhead
25-27 Place of profit in contracts with RAND as a nonprofit organization; six percent fixed fee; building use charge
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
27-30 RAND decision-making process on matters related to fiscal administration: personnel involved, role of trustees, King's relationship with Frank Collbohm, weekly management meetings, fringe benefits
30-31 Attempt to prevent administrative paperwork and procedures from interfering with research environment
31 More careful time record keeping necessary by late 1950s; contract unchanged
32 Increase in personnel and RAND logistical research had no impact on management structure
32-33 King's staff: Crawford Thompson, secretarial staff, accounting staff
33-34 Impact on RAND of proposed budget cuts; decision to diversify funding sources
34-36 Systems Development Corporation (SDC)
36-37 Interdisciplinary nature of RAND and development of matrix organization; other organizational changes
37 Excitement in RAND mission pervaded entire organization
37-38 Establishment of RAND branch offices
38 New York City RAND Institute
39 Selection of RAND subcontractors
39 Security classification had no impact on costing out procedures
39-40 King's satisfaction with RAND career
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
40 King's satisfaction with RAND career (continued)
Klein, Burt. Date: August 12, 1988. Interviewer: Joseph Tatarewicz. Auspices: RAND. Length: 2 hrs.; 33 pp. Use restriction: Open.
After briefly reviewing his upbringing, pre-World War II education in economics, and Army Air Forces training during the war, Klein discusses his work as an economist on the Strategic Bombing Survey in 1945 and obtaining a PhD in economics from Harvard immediately after the war. He then describes working for the Council of Economic Advisors from 1948 to 1952, participating in a RAND summer study in 1950, and his initial work at RAND beginning in 1952 at the Development Planning Office in DCS/Development. Klein next reviews his impressions of systems analysis, heading a project studying USAF R&D and the reactions of different RAND personnel to it, assuming the leadership of the Economics Division in 1962, the growing difficulties between RAND and the USAF in the early 1960s, and his reasons for leaving RAND in 1965.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-3 Dr. Klein's early life and undergraduate education at Harvard (Joseph Schumpeter)
3-4 Graduate studies in economics
4-6 Army Air Forces duty in WWII; navigation training
6-8 Becomes Galbraith's assistant for OSS bombing damage survey
8 Employment at Council of Economic Advisors
8-9 Klein's PhD studies and dissertation
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
10 PhD thesis
10-11 Employment at the Council of Economic Advisors; made a representative to National Security Council
11-14 Klein's split from the Keynesian tradition; contradiction between theory based on assumptions of stability in economy and reality of instability Issue of macro-micro relationship; impact on work at Council
14-15 First introduction to and impressions of RAND
15-18 Begins employment at RAND; on loan to Air Force Development Planning Office (General Bernard Schriever); Lockheed proposal for U-2 reconnaissance plane (Kelly Johnson); RAND Washington office
18 Klein transfers to Santa Monica RAND office
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
19-20 Air Force R&D system, flexibility during Klein's AFDAP assignment
20-22 Klein's first impressions of RAND; systems analysis, and Klein's view of its utility, situations in which it is not useful; different views within RAND on systems analysis; U-2 development
22-25 Klein's R&D project at RAND to test empirically his criticism of systems analysis; superiority of Sidewinder to Falcon missile
25 Klein's criticism of Air Force approach to R&D; briefings of R&D study
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
26-27 Briefings of R&D study (continued); Klein becomes head of economics department
27 Use of outside consultants in economics; interaction between economists within RAND and outside RAND on question of systems analysis
27-29 RAND attitudes toward Klein's R&D study; collegiality among RAND economists; Klein's experience as a manager
29-31 Pressure on RAND for accountability in early 60's; the manned bomber question; B-70 proposal; SOFS study; changing relationship between RAND and Air Force
32-33 American military attitude toward nuclear war post-WWII, contracted to other nations
33 Decision to leave RAND
Rev. 10/13/95