Caldwell, J. J. Date: October 1, 1984. Interviewer: Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 21 pp. Use restriction: Public.
Caldwell comments on his involvement with planetary observation from OAO 2. He first describes his family and academic background, including PhD studies at Wisconsin. Caldwell then describes analyzing planetary photometric data from OAO 2 while at Wisconsin. He extensively discusses programming OAO 2 to observe the Galilean Satellites and Titan while working as one of OAO 2's on-site operators at Goddard Space Flight Center.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Family background
3 Earliest encounters with astronomy
3-5 Reaction to the Sputnik and Gagarin launches
5-6 Interest in the US manned space program
6-7 Enrollment in the University of Manitoba
7-9 Caldwell's introductory astronomy course
9-10 The physics-mathematics honors program at Manitoba
10 Joining the astronomy Master's program at the University of Western Ontario
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
11-12 Astronomy studies at Western Ontario
12 Early interest in planetary studies; move to Wisconsin PhD program
13 Work reducing planetary data from OAO 2
13-14 Involvement with OAO as useful training for a planetary worker as well as an astronomer
14 Caldwell's early awareness of space astronomy at Wisconsin
14-15 Meeting of planetary scientists interested in OAO 2 observations convened by Arthur Code: Sagan, Owen, Wallace, and O'Leary participate
15-16 Details of Caldwell's OAO data reduction
16 The planetary science OAO meeting, cont
16-17 Involvement with computer-controlled ground-based photometry at Wisconsin
17 Ground-based photometry
17-18 Learning by doing while working on OAO data
18 Graduate student advising at Wisconsin
18-19 Postdoctoral work under William Baum at Lowell Observatory; move to Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) after one year
19 Work at GSFC operating OAO 2; stress of the OAO operating schedule
19-20 Using OAO 2 to observe the Galilean Satellites of Jupiter, and to observe Titan
20 Move to Princeton; combining OAO planetary data analysis with IR work for Robert Danielson
20 Analysis of planets through bimodal observations in the infrared and ultraviolet
21 Work on Venus with the Planetary Patrol at Lowell
Carr, Frank. Date: March 7, 1984. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 26 pp. Use restriction: Permission required for access.
Carr recalls first position at NASA, work on Explorer 12, and his first management position. Discusses Goddard's style and relationship to Headquarters. Describes his work on Small Scientific Satellite Project, involvement with IUE. Discusses parallels between ST and IUE. Discusses his one year at Headquarters working on Voyager. Discusses work as Program Manager of ST and participation in ST at Goddard. Describes quality of ST staff and need to attract talented, experienced people. Discusses team appointed to consider ST problems and subsequent reorganization of project. Discusses system engineering organization and staff.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 First position at NASA
2 Explorer 12
2 Atmosphere at Goddard
3 First management position
4 Goddard's style and its relationship to Headquarters
5 Post-IMP projects
6 After IMP 3
7 Masters degree and switch to Small Scientific Satellite Project
7 Involvement with IUE
8 Duties at DPM/T (Deputy Project Manager for Technical on IUE)
9 Parallels between ST (Space Telescope) and IUE
9-11 One year at Headquarters: The Voyager Program
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12-13 6 months as Project Manager of OPEN (Origin of Plasmas in Earth's Neighborhood)
13 Program Manager of ST at Headquarters
14-17 Deputy Engineering Director at Goddard
17-18 Participation in ST at Goddard
19 Tunnel vision when working on a project
20 Quality of ST staff
21-22 Attracting more talented, more experienced people
23-24 Meredith (Acting Center Director) appoints team to consider problems with ST
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
24-25 Reorganization of the project
25-26 System engineering organization and staff
Carr, Frank. Date: March 14, 1984. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 26 pp. Use restriction: Permission required for access.
Continuation of interview on March 7, 1984. Carr describes early relationship between Goddard and Marshall as they teamed together to work on ST. Discusses problems with instruments. Discusses responsibility for instruments at Lockheed. Describes coming together of ST project and anticipation of launch. Discusses proposal to build spare Wide Field Planetary Camera. Describes lines of command at Goddard and communications with contractors. Discusses management of ST and change of role of Headquarters with respect to Goddard and Marshall. Discusses communications with Congress. Describes organization of ground system, management of subcontractors and concerns for future of project.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
27-28 Early relationship between Goddard and Marshall
29 Goddard and Marshall forces to tackle the ST project
30 Continued friction between the Centers
30-31 Recognizing the need for cooperation
31-32 Problems with the instruments
33 Establishing a supply support in Sunnyvale
33 Responsibility for the instruments at Lockheed
34-35 The coming together of the system (ST); anticipating the launch and possible
36 Establishment of STAR (Space Telescope Axial Replacement)
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
37-38 The proposition to build a spare wide Field Planetary Camera
39 Lines of command at Goddard; Bill Keathley
39-40 Lines of communications with contractors (e.g. Perkin-Elmer)
40-42 Managing ST
42-43 Change in the role of Headquarters' program management from advocate to adversary of the Centers
43-44 Signaling problems and solutions to Congress
44 Organization of the ground system
45-46 Managing subcontractors
47 Major concerns and challenges of the future
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
48 Concerns (continued)
49 Rewards of being a project manager
50-52 Closing remarks and suggestions
Carr, Frank. Date: May 29, 1986. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.25.; 33 pp. Use restriction: Permission required to quote, cite or reproduce.
Carr discusses in depth the Challenger accident; its contributing causes and effects on ST launch and on NASA budgets and morale. Stresses importance of continuing ST testing and staff preparation during launch delay; discusses effects of budget uncertainties and civil service changes on maintaining trained staff. Considers ST Assembly and Verification process and instrument testing. Evaluates different testing philosophies of Goddard and Lockheed and cooperation between NASA and contractors. Discusses conservative nature of testing analyses; offers progress report on instrument tests, noting possible testing and hardware problems with Wide Field/Planetary Camera. Assesses in detail STScI's organization and its relationship to ST design and testing. Carr considers the peculiarities of ST project and the difficulties inherent in administration of it, then returns to effects of Challenger accident on Shuttle program and on NASA decision%making process. Concludes with discussion of SOGS and new Orbital Replacement Units.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Carr assesses effects of Challenger accident; ST launch delayed from October, 1986
2 Accident's effects on NASA; budget cuts; morale
3-4 Evaluates NASA handling of accident; phasing out of mixed fleet
4-5 Assesses NASA institutional factors contributing to accident
5 Political process of funding Shuttle
5-6 Accident's immediate effects on Goddard morale
6-7 Work force changes due to new retirement rules
7-8 Importance of retaining well-trained group to run ST from the ground after launch
8-9 Plans to stimulate and retain ground personnel during launch delay
9 Budget constraints; possible ST changes; needed repairs; opposition to changes
9-10 Importance of maintaining operating budget; possible cuts
10 Projecting budget while launch date uncertain
10-11 1986 hiring freeze
11 Recruiting difficulties
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
11-12 Reviews changes in last few years; notes assembly and testing of ST
12-13 Importance of continuing routine preparations
13 Assesses Assembly & Verification process
13-14 Problems with Spacecraft Automated Test System
14 Different cultures of scientists, Lockheed, Goddard engineers
14-15 Lockheed preference for component & subsystem tests
15 Goddard's requirement of systems tests; Lockheed's testing experience and philosophy
16-17 Goddard personnel at Lockheed; John Lesko, Joe Ryan
17 Plans to continue instrument testing during delay; progress reports on instrument tests; Wide Field, Charge CoupledDevices
17-18 Creating vacuum for high voltage tests
18 Extreme conservatism of testing analyses
18-19 Predicted accuracy of Pointing and Control System
19-20 Carr recalls development of WF/PC Quantum Efficiency Hysteresis problem
20 Additional WF/PC problems; possible contamination
20-21 Possible icing during WF/PC tests
21 Historical assessment of Goddard's relationship with ST Institute
21-22 Defining Institute's goals and size
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
22-23 Institute and pressure to improve ST during delay
23 Possible redesign of Science Operations Ground System software; Institute's role in Ground System Thermal Vacuum Test; tension between Institute's scientific mission and technical requirements; proposed second Institute building
24 Discusses ST Institute size
24-25 Carr's schedule; travel
25 Prioritizing items requiring attention; managing ST paperwork
26 Proliferation of paperwork; Goddard's assumption from Marshall of Maintenance and Refurbishment responsibilities; Goddard's need for larger staff
27-44 Discusses general considerations in decision-making process; peculiarity of ST project
28 Effect of Challenger on NASA decision-making ability; predicts more careful, conservative decisions
28-29 Richard Truly; new Shuttle launch policy
29 NASA response to political pressures
29-30 Risks inherent in Shuttle program
30 Discusses completion of SOGS; role of TRW; other ground system progress; Guide Star Selection
30-31 Planned SOGS modifications
31 New Orbital Replacement Instruments
32 Selection of ORIs; criteria
32-33 Reflects on ST construction and assembly
Chapman, Clark R. Date: October 10, 1984. Interviewer: Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.25 hrs.; 18 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Dr. Chapman reconstructs his early awareness of Space Telescope. He comments on historical relations between planetary science and stellar/deep space astronomy, and discusses personal experiences with those relationships. Chapman recalls George Field's address to the 1977 meeting of the Division of Planetary Sciences (DPS) of the American Astronomical Society, and reactions to the address. He concluded with a discussion of interactions between ST funding and appropriations for the Jupiter Orbiter Probe/Galileo mission in the calendar 1977 Congressional budget process, and discusses planetary scientists' increased involvement in lobbying for federal funding for their work.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Early impressions of Space Telescope (ST) and its potential for planetary science, ca. 1972-3
3-4 Chapman's space projects in the mid-1970s; awareness of NASA Astrophysics space observatories
4 Inviting George Field to address the December 1977 meeting of the Division of Planetary Sciences (DPS) of the American Astronomical Society
4-5 Historical relationship between stellar/deep space astronomy and planetary science; Chapman's experiences with such relationships
5-6 Planetary science at Kitt Peak National Observatory (KPNO); KPNO Planetary Division ca. 1963
6 Astronomy and planetary science, cont
6-7 Relationship of DPS with parent AAS ca. middle 70s
8-9 Inviting Field to the '77 DPS meeting, cont
10 Field's remarks on planetary science and astrophysics funding at the '77 DPS meeting
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12 Field's observations on planetary science access to ST at the '77 DPS meeting
13-14 Reactions to Field's observations before the DPS
14-15 Planetary scientists on ST instrument teams; JOP and ST connections
16-18 JOP politics; Interaction between ST and Jupiter Orbiter Probe/Galileo in the Congressional budget process ca. 1977; lobbying for JOP
17 DPS members and occurances; Lobbying for JOP 1977 Congressional budget
18 Galileo vote; Political process
19 JOP & JPL current staff and responsibilities
19-20 JOP lobbying as planetary scientists' introduction to legislative process for space science
20 Close of 1977 politics
Clark, John. Date: May 15, 1987. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 27 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Clark recalls joining NASA. Describes early work in NASA HQ. Discusses position as Chairman, Space Sciences Steering Committee and as Goddard director, 1969. Discusses conflict between ground astronomers and proponents of space astronomy; evaluating costs of space astronomy; Discusses use of sounding rockets to determine background illumination in space, for preliminary measurements across the spectrum; designs of experiments. Discusses decision to build orbiting astronomical Observatory and NASA's use of outside advisors. Describes NASA reliance on the university scientists; development and support of university based science. Recalls early expectations for Orbiting Astronomical Observatory. Discusses lack of priorities from Space Science Board between scientific disciplines and the use of subcommittees to develop priorities. Clark assesses Goddard's level of commitments to LST and evaluates the quality of Goddard's in-house astronomers. Discusses difficulty of promoting new programs.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Joins NASA in 1958 from NRL; early work
1-2 Chairman, Space Sciences Steering Committee; Goddard director, 1965; early work in NASA HQ
2 Composition and purpose of Space Sciences Steering Committee
2-3 Steering committee develops priorities for possible experiments
3 Evaluating costs of space astronomy
3-4 Conflict between ground astronomers and proponents of space astronomy; geographic divisions
4 Steering Committee, in 1958, prioritizes space astronomy goals
4 Use of sounding rockets to determine background illumination in space
5 Use of sounding rockets for preliminary measurements across the spectrum; designer of these experiments
5-6 Decision to build Orbiting Astronomical Observatory; NASA's use of outside advisors
6 Deliberate inclusion of supporters and opponents of space astronomy into NASA advisory groups; opposition from ground astronomers
6-7 Convincing opponents; strategies for persuading Congress to fund space astronomy
7 Using perceived Soviet threat to persuade Congress
7-8 Allocating funds to space projects; strategies for progressing from sounding rockets to Explorer, Observatory satellites
8-9 Suitability of first Observer to working in UV and visible wavelengths
9 Congressional responses to expert testimony
10 Assessing NASA's relationship with Space Science Board
10-11 NASA's early decision not to develop in-house scientific expertise; preference for outside authorities; use of advisory committees
11-12 Balancing scientific, technological requirements in designing experiments; project manager-project scientist relationship; functions of project scientists
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12 NASA reliance on university scientists; development and support of university based science
12-13 Structure of project groups to balance competing scientific and technological interests
13 Recalls early expectations for Orbiting Astronomical Observatory; seen as logical first step toward larger orbiting telescope
13-14 Steering Committee's Astronomy Advisory Subcommittee assumes OAO should be developed
14 Lack of priorities from Space Science Board between scientific disciplines; use of subcommittees to develop priorities
14-15 Funding priority to manned space program
15 Broad scientific support for unmanned planetary program
15-16 Astronomers gradually forced to support space platforms in order to ensure funding for own interests
16-17 Recalls early OAO failures; early failures do not cast doubts on goal of developing Large Space Telescope
17-18 NASA strategy for progressing after technological failure
18-19 Concept of lead center for LST; delegation of responsibilities to various NASA centers
20 Rising percentage of NASA projects go to Goddard while Clark is director; criticized for this because other centers' work declines; choosing a lead center for LST
20-21 Feels that Goddard had too much work, too few resources
21-22 Distribution of responsibilities among NASA centers for LST
22-23 Clark assesses Goddard's level of commitment to LST
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
23 Clark evaluates quality of Goddard's in-house astronomers; their suitability for a large number of small experiments
23-25 Clark recalls early efforts to secure funding from Congress and OMB; funding the LST; difficulty of expressing to Congress project's importance; does not testify for LST in last years at Goddard
25-26 Difficulties of promoting new programs
26-27 Reflections on NASA's early years; sense of urgency
27 Remembers awareness of changes occurring at NASA; need to promote and defend Goddard
Code, Art. Date: February 21 and 22, 1984. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 27 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Dr. Code describes his University of Wisconsin-Madison team's involvement with the OAO program of the early and middle 1960s, including team reactions to the failure of OAO 1, and the astronomical community's response to the success of OAO 2. He discusses his motivation in undertaking space astronomy research, and the sequence of attitudes and emotions typical of involvement in long-duration NASA projects. Dr. Code then comments extensively on Space Telescope issues, including the organization of support for LST/ST among astronomers and outside the community. He describes the origins of concept for a science institute for the Large Space Telescope, tracing the idea from the NAS studies of the 1960s through the Hornig Report of 1976. Finally, he discusses the actual NASA Request for Proposals for the Space Telescope Science Institute, and AURA's successful response to that request during his tenure as chairman of the AURA board.
February 21, 1984
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Reactions at Wisconsin to loss in orbit of OAO 1; organizing the OAO 2 science team
2-3 Astronomical community's reaction to early papers derived from OAO 2 data
3 Code's understanding of potential NASA orbiting observatories to succeed the OAO series: Large Space Telescope (LST)
3-4 Personal motivations for pursuing space astronomy
4-5 Sequence of hopes and concerns experienced by scientists in the course of long-duration space projects
5 Astronomers' reactions to LST, middle 1960s
5-6 NASA funding climate for space science, 1960s
6 Visibility of LST to working astronomers, 1960s
6 Importance of science review committee endorsements in gaining funding for space science projects
6-7 Early proposals for a manned or man-tended LST
7-8 Scientists' preference for unmanned space platforms
8 NASA HQ supporters of LST, late 1960s: Nancy Roman, Jesse Mitchell
8-9 Scientific rationales for LST, late 1960s
9 Concern for detector technology available to LST
February 22, 1984
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
9-10 Code's involvement with early conceptions for a Space Telescope science institute; meeting with NASA Administrator James Webb, late 1960s
10-11 NAS studies of institutional arrangements for Large Space Telescope; Ramsey Report, 1966
11 Webb organizes Astronomy Missions Board, late 1960s; Board's response to LST
11-12 Relationship of Ramsey and Hornig Committees on LST/ST institutional arrangements
12-13 Considerations affecting NASA's role in LST operations; Code's"uncommittee"
13-14 Astronomers' perceptions of Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)
14 Institutional arguments for an ST institute
14-15 Models for planning the ST institute: Kitt Peak National Observatory, OAO control centers
15-16 Noel Hinners' support for the institute concept
16 Importance of the Hornig Report to institute advocates
16-18 Concepts for a comprehensive space science institute, 1970s; Riccardo Giacconi
18-19 AURA's decision to bid for the operations contract for the Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI), 1977; Code's role as AURA chairman
20 AURA's response to NASA's STScI guidelines
20-21 NASA's decision to link the site and consortium proposals in selecting an STScI contractor
21 Origins of Johns Hopkins' interest in becoming AURA's designated site in its STScI bid
21-23 AURA's internal STScI site selection process
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
23 Adding CSC to the AURA proposal team for STScI
24 Writing the AURA STScI proposal: John Teem, Barry Lasker, Nolan Walborn
24-25 Organizational outline for the Institute in the AURA STScI proposal
25-26 Code's contributions to the proposal document
26 STScI organization under AURA, cont
26-27 Astronomers' reactions to NASA's selection of the AURA-Johns Hopkins proposal for STScI
27 Code's role as interim STScI director
Costa, Frank V. Date: March 31, 1989. Interviewer: Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 3 hrs.; 44 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Costa recalls early work at Lockheed on Ranger Nimbus and Seasat. Discusses at length Hubble Space Telescope Structural Dynamic Test Vehicle which is being installed into museum. Bill Reese and Ann McCombs also participate in discussion. Examines and describes portions of mockup during interview. Discusses Flight Vehicle Customized (FVC) wiring equipment section of ST. Recalls work before Lockheed and start at Lockheed in 1960. Recalls early training. Discusses wiring for ST with special attention given to problem with blue-strip wire. Identifies a number of photographs from Lockheed. Describes Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA) equipment shelf wire assembly and plans for easy refurbishment in orbit. Discusses installation of TDRSS in museum.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Work at Lockheed: Ranger, Nimbus, Seasat
1-15 Discussion of Hubble Space Telescope Structural Dynamic Test Vehicle which is being installed into museum; Bill Reese and Ann McCombs also participating in discussion; examination and description of portions of mockup as encountered
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
15-20 Discussion of Hubble Space Telescope (cont'd)
20-22 Examination of photographs: Lockheed Data Offset No. 9216, ST Power Wire Harness Assembly; Trunnion Bay plus V 2; ST wire harness fabrication
22-23 Discussion of customized wiring in the equipment section of ST
23-24 Work on somewhat similar project with Seasat: Flight Vehicle Customized [FVC] wiring
24-25 Work before Lockheed
25 Work at Lockheed; start in 1960; wiring for Ranger
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
26 Early training
27-28 Wiring for ST; blue-stripe wire
28-29 Discussion of photograph: Lockheed Data Offset No. 9359
29-31 Discussion of photograph: Lockheed Data Offset No. 9360, Data Management Cable Installation
31 Return to Lockheed Data Offset No. 9359
31-32 Discussion of FVC wiring
32-33 Fixed head Star Tracker mockups
33-34 Planning wire routes
34-40 Optical Telescope Assembly equipment shelf wire assembly; discussion of design geared toward easy refurbishment in orbit
40-41 Discussion of installation of TDRSS in museum
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
41-43 Discussion of installation of TDRSS in museum
43-44 Additional remarks on Structural Dynamic Test Vehicle
Danielson, E. G. Date: September 27, 1985. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 3 hrs.; 45 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Mr. Danielson discusses his academic background, and his extensive work in laser optics firms such as United Aircraft Research Labs and Kodak. He describes his move to the NASA-CALTECH Jet Propulsion Lab in the late 1960s, commenting on his extensive work on imaging systems for late-series Mariner missions and for the Voyager outer planet fly by missions. He discusses the JPL managerial structure, relations between scientists and engineers on space science missions, and the CALTECH-JPL administrative and functional relationship. Finally, Mr. Danielson discusses his involvement in the development of the Wide Field/Planetary Camera for the Space Telescope. He comments on the development of CCD technology, the organization of JPL support for CALTECH's WF/PC proposal, the NASA Announcement of Opportunity for the ST camera, the proposal-writing process, and James Westphal's qualities as a manager of space science project.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Family background
2 Undergraduate career: Principia College, Ill.
3 Childhood interest in science
4-5 Summer work at USN Naval Weapons Lab, Dahlgren, Va.
5 Graduate work in physics at U. of Illinois
6 Work at United Aircraft Research Labs
7-8 Curriculum for the M.S. in physics at Illinois
9-10 United labs; academic and industry environments contrasted; work with laser optics; Tony DiMaris
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
11 United Labs contracts with the US Army
12 Ties to other industrial labs: Bell Labs, Kodak
13-14 Moving to University of Rochester Institute of Optics for PhD optics studies
14-15 Consulting for Kodak while enrolled at Rochester
15 Security considerations at Kodak
16 Work with holography at Kodak
16-17 Leaving Rochester after a second M.S.
17-18 Interviewing with industry; accepting a job at JPL
18-19 Contact with Bruce Murray and CALTECH's Bob Leighteon while working on Mariner 1969 at JPL
19 Mariner 1969 imaging system
19-20 Tensions between requirements of scientists and engineers on space science missions
20 JPL-CALTECH relations
20-22 Post-launch problems with Mariner '69 imaging
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
22-23 Briefing Mariner '69 project manager Bud Schurmeier on the imaging system degradation
23-24 Working with Ed Greenberg to program a fix for the Mariner '69 imaging system
24 Lessons of the imaging difficulties: working within NASA; getting the most from existing hardware
24-25 Involvement with Mariner 10 optics
25 Evolution of flyby optics from Mariner to Voyager
25-26 Importance of showing space science engineers that scientists understand and appreciate their work: example of Voyager image motion compensation
26 Redistribution of JPL staff among the reduced number of center projects, middle 1970s
27-28 Organization of the science teams for the planetary flights; role of the Principal Investigators
28-29 Policy for public disclosure of discoveries by the mission science teams: Mariner 10, Viking
29 Moving into center-level management at JPL
30 Position as assistant to JPL director Bruce Murray
30-31 Transferring back into direct science management
31 Joining the JPL support team for James Westphal's CCD camera proposal for Space Telescope (ST)
31-32 JPL perceptions of ST as a threat to planetary science funding
32-33 Leaving JPL to join CALTECH as a dedicated non-faculty staff member for space science
33-34 Problems in proposing for Principal Investigator (PI) slots on NASA missions without faculty standing at CALTECH
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
34 Early JPL activity on Westphal's CCD-based Wide Field/Planetary Camera (WF/PC) proposal for ST
34-35 WF/PC science team: Westphal, James Gunn
35 Proposal-writing process at JPL: informal efforts
35-36 State-of-the-art in CCD technology ca. 1977
36-37 JPL's interest in CCDs: Jupiter Orbiter-Probe (JOP)
37 Convincing NASA to open the 1977 ST science Announcement of Opportunity to all imaging detectors, especially CCDs, in addition to the SEC Vidicon
37-38 Ground-based observations using CCDs after joining CALTECH
38 WF/PC preliminary design
38-39 Selecting formats and illustrations for the WF/PC proposal; Nancy Evans
39 Including a science section in the WF/PC proposal
39-40 Pulling together the WF/PC proposal
40 Jim Westphal as PI: hands-on management style
40-41 Clearing the WF/PC proposal through JPL and CALTECH
41-42 Formal division of labor between CALTECH and JPL on the WF/PC effort
43 Recovering Halley's Comet with a ground-based CCD
43 Planetary science and astronomy compared
44-45 Danielson's awareness of project-level ST issues
45 Communication between Westphal and the WF/PC team
Davidsen, Arthur. Date: January 29, 1984. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 22 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Dr. Davidsen discusses his academic background and early career, including work with Lyman Spitzer and Herbert Friedman. He reviews the astronomy community's attitudes towards space astronomy in the early 1970s. Dr. Davidsen then turns to his association with Space Telescope, describing his response to the 1977 Announcement of Opportunity for ST investigators, and discussing his subsequent work with the Faint Object Spectrograph team. He describes his role on NASA HQ astronomer Jeffrey Rosendhal's 1977 area detector technology investigative team, and reviews differences between CCDs and the SEC Vidicon. He then turns to his involvement in the campaign for a Johns Hopkins site for the Space Telescope Science Institute, covering topics including early contracts with AURA, the NASA Request for Proposals, CSC's role in the AURA-Hopkins proposal, other consortia's proposals, and reaction to NASA's selection of the AURA-Hopkins bid. He also comments briefly on proposals for a general space science institute current in the middle 1970s.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Undergraduate career at Princeton, 1962-66; Lyman Spitzer, Martin Schwarzschild, Jerry Ostriker
2 Work with Herbert Friedman at Naval Research Lab; X-ray astronomy
2-3 Astronomers' attitudes towards space astronomy, late 1960s-early 1970s
3 Origins of Davidsen's interest in cosmology
3-4 Joining the Johns Hopkins faculty; rocket-based UV spectroscopy work
4-5 First impressions of Large Space Telescope (LST), early 1970s; astronomers' attitudes toward LST
5 Scientific justifications for LST/ST
5 Responding to the 1977 ST Announcement of Opportunity; joining the Faint Object Spectrograph (FOS) Scientific Instrument (SI) team
6 Involvement with the 1977 Rosendhal ST detector technology investigation team
6-7 Charge-Coupled Devices (CCDs) and SEC Vidicon compared as potential ST detectors
7-8 Operations of the FOS team
8-9 Early awareness of proposals for an ST science institute; rationale for the idea
10 Involvement with Ivan King's 1979 conference between prospective Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI) management consortia and site institutions
10-11 Davidsen's efforts to persuade his colleagues to put forward Johns Hopkins as an STScI site
11-12 Recruiting the Hopkins administration to support a Hopkins STScI site proposal
12 Contacts with John Teem and Art Code of AURA
12-13 AURA's internal STScI site selection process
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
13 Hopkins' contacts with other STScI consortia
13-14 Writing the AURA-Hopkins proposal
15 Selecting CSC as AURA's proposal support contractor
15-16 Division of labor in the proposal-writing process; William Fastie, Barry Lasker
16-17 Clarity of the NASA STScI Request for Proposals
17 AURA-Hopkins and AUI-Princeton STScI bids compared
18-19 Oral defense of the AURA-Hopkins proposal
19 NASA's selection of the AURA STScI proposal
19-20 Reactions to NASA's STScI decision; John Bahcall
20-21 Concepts for a comprehensive space science institute, middle 1970s; Riccardo Giaconi
21-22 Hopkins administration's enthusiasm for STScI; Richard Zdanis
Disney, Mike. Date: May 1, 1984. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1 hr.; 23 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Disney describes his involvement with the Space Telescope project as one of the US representatives on the Instrument Science Team of the ESA Faint Object Camera scientific instrument (1977- ). Topics discussed include revision of the FOC design, the organization of the IST, the internal organization of the FOC effort, ESA contracting and management methods, the European ST Coordinating Facility, and the science goals of the FOC. Disney also comments on the impact of ST on astronomy, the status of optical astronomy, and the role of scientists and engineers in the design of large telescope facilities.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Disney's initial involvement with ST
1-2 Faint Object Camera (FOC) redesign ca. 1977; ESA management's response to the FOC Instrument Science Team (IST)
2 Impact of ST on astronomy
3 FOC redesigned as v. high resolution complement to the Wide Field/Planetary Camera (WF/PC)
4 Division of IST redesign work; redesign priorities
5 FOC scientists' input to ESA engineers; Jan Burger
6 NASA's instructions to the FOC IST
6-7 Scientists' influence on FOC technical design
7 ESA contracting; IST lines of communication
7-8 IST involvement with the Verification & Acceptance Program (VAP)
8-9 Changing plans for the use of FOC: stress on high resolution work
9-10 Allotting ST observing time: long-exposure work
10-11 Allotment of FOC time to the IST; ESA politics
12 ESA internal organization's impact on science
13-14 Rationale for European ST Coordinating Facility
14 European influence on Science Institute proposals
15 Place of Europeans in ST program, STScI
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
15 International cooperation on FOC; ESA organization
16 Role of ESA ST Science Working Group (ESA SWG); site selection for ESTCF
16-17 US awareness of the European contribution to ST; publicizing FOC
18 Status of optical astronomy; views on danger of concentrating on a small number of large instruments
19 The case for an array of moderate-sized telescopes
20 Small scopes as preserves of unconventional work
20-21 Astronomers' role in facility design: to specify telescope performance, not physical design
21 Political considerations in telescope design
22-23 Reactions to ST's protracted development time among ST scientists
Downey, James A., III. Date: January 18, 1984. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 31 pp. Use restriction: Permission required to quote, cite, or reproduce.
Downey discusses his role in early LST/ST development as head of Marshall Space Flight Center's (MSFC's) Mission and Payload Planning Office during Phase A (1971-73), and as LST/ST Task Team and later Project Manager for Phase B (1974-77). Topics discussed include 1960s studies which preceded LST, various NASA HQ and MSFC figures' roles in securing LST funding, manned space flight's role in LST planning, technical challenges faced in Phase A/B, and the organization of the MSFC Phase A/B efforts. Downey covers the MSFC-Goddard SFC links for the ST project, and its effect on ST science. He reviews the effort to secure ST Phase C/D congressional approval, including adding ESA participation on ST and reducing the ST primary mirror diameter. He discusses the contracting structure of the Phase B effort, and closes with a review of his contributions and of the technical challenges of Phase A/B.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Early career; work with ABMA; appointment in 1969 to head the Mission and Payload Planning Office of Lucas' Marshall Program Development Directorate; exposure to LST
2 Marshall climate in the late 1960s; in-house studies of a stellar telescope to follow the Skylab Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM)
2-3 Downey's familiarity with the 1965 Woods Hole LST summer study
3-4 Considerations about the size of the LST primary mirror in the 1960s and 70s; rationale for shifting from 3 to 2.4 meters
4 Medium Aperture Optical Telescope (MAOT) studies not closely related to LST
5 Downey's awareness of the Langley Center's mid-1960s space telescope studies
5-6 Downey's impression that Large Space Telescope evolved less from specific science committees or engineering studies than from individual interactions; roles of Mitchell, Roman, Aucremanne
6 LST Phase B approval; roles of Mitchell, George Low, Olivier, Bob Dougherty
7 Downey's involvement with LST during Phase A, 1971-1973; appointment as Marshall LST task team manager in 1973
8 Marshall supporters of LST: Lucas, Eberhard Rees, Stuhlinger
8 NASA HQ supporters: Jesse Mitchell, Roman, Aucremanne
8-9 Roles of O'Dell, Spitzer, Bahcall in ST development
9 Difficulties in securing LST approval and funding
9-10 Involvement of von Braun in early LST planning
10-11 Manned spaceflight involvement with LST; changing concepts of the degree of manned access to LST
11-12 Major project concerns in Phase B: Fine Guidance Sensors (FGS), Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA) metering truss
12 Attractive features of the 2.4 meter ST design
12-13 Debate between reaction wheels and control moment gyros for ST attitude control
13 Early 1970s intermediate space telescope concepts
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
13-14 Role of Jesse Greenstein and the Greenstein Committee in supporting LST
14 Organization of the Marshall LST effort in Phase A: roles of Olivier, Max Nein, Paul Schwindt, Eric Gerner, Jim Jackson
15 Membership of the Marshall Phase B LST Task Team: Jim McCulloch, Charles Wood, Olivier, John Humphreys
16 Downey's handling of the LST Phase B relations with NASA HQ
16 Bob O'Dell and the Operations & Management Working Groups's scientific input into Phase B LST design; educating engineers
17 Downey's interfaces with NASA HQ and with Goddard: Jesse Mitchell, Marc Aucremanne, George Levine
17 Effects of the location of the LST Project Scientist at Marshall, and the Scientific Instrument (SI) development at Goddard
17-18 Memoranda of Understanding between Marshall and Goddard
18-19 Downey's impressions of the decision to submit LST's Phase B funding to Congress as a separate line item
19-20 Response in the ST Project to the series of setbacks in Congress, 1974-1977
20-21 Scientists' lobbying efforts during the campaign for Congressional approval; roles of Bahcall, Spitzer, Field
21 NASA HQ's support of ST's campaign for Congressional approval
21-22 Senator Proxmire's response to ST; final approval for Phase C
23 Effect of Congressional stipulations on the ST project; cooperation with ESA
23 Impact of increasing the number of separate partners and interfaces on major technical projects
24 Reduction of the ST primary mirror from 3 to 2.4 meters
24 Concept within the ST Project of a funding 'choke factor'
24-25 Origins and rationales for the associate contractor system for ST; the effect of increasing technical interfaces
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
26 Associate contractors as a spur to bidding competition
26 Contractor attempts to balance between demonstrating expertise during Phase B bidding, and prematurely revealing proprietary advantages or techniques
27 Techniques for management of NASA Phase B contract work
27-28 Early efforts to ensure that ST retained a planetary science observation capability
28-29 Supporters of the STScI concept: Bob O'Dell
29 Dominant Project concerns in the late 1970s: FGS development, smooth functioning of the associate contractor system
30 Downey's analysis of his major contributions to ST: tying the disparate elements of the program together
31 Difference between project organization and actual relations between project personnel in large technical endeavors
Doxsey, Rodger. Date: July 22, 1987. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 53 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Doxsey recalls undergraduate and graduate education at MIT; involvement with Uhuru project. Joins STScI in 1981 after post-doc at MIT; recalls early days of STScI and relations between ST users and operators. Discusses design of ST, STScI budget and Science Operations Ground Systems; involvement with Technical Interface Meeting, Mission Operations Working Group and contractors, including TRW and CSC. Recalls in detail Preliminary Requirements review of SOGS (1982), instrument design and ST testing at Lockheed. Evaluates strategies for effecting changes at STScI and scientists' relations with Institute management. Describes organization of Institute and his duties there (including Data Operations Team); inter-action of different Institute teams and competition for funds. Doxsey also comments on ST's planetary tracking, the project's complexity, the Institute's relations with Goddard and its perception by public.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Early interest in science; undergraduate work at MIT
2 Part-time work at Cambridge Electron Accelerator; senior thesis with Hale Bradt: X-ray sounding rockets (1968); MIT graduate work: continued work on X-ray rocket payloads
3 Undergraduate choice of physics over mathematics; choice of career as experimentalist over theoretician; graduate work with Bradt and Saul Rappaport; interest in locating X-ray sources for optical identification: modulation collimator
4 Involved in whole process: developing, testing, calibrating payload; firing rockets at White Sands; analyzing data at MIT. Discusses launch of Uhuru; discovery of Hercules X-1; discusses study of Her X-1
5 Describes Ethan Schreier's work at American Science and Engineering (AS & E) on Uhuru data; Cygnus X-1; post-doctoral work at MIT
6 Work on SAS-3; MIT-AS&E collaboration on HEAO
6-7 Shift to software and data analysis
7 Move to STScI in November '81; recruitment by Ethan Schreier
7-8 Discussion on decision to leave HEAO for STScI
8 Discussion of awareness of space telescope project
9 Comments on working relations between users and operators; STScI in basement of Rowland Hall at Johns Hopkins in November '81
10 Discussion of transition from proposal team to working group; setting up scientific work
10-11 Preliminary work by Mission Operations Working Group (MOWG) and Data Operations Team (DOT); comments on these plans
12 Structural design of ST; first Technical Interface Meeting (TIM) attended
13-14 Control of Science Operations Ground System (SOGS); work on STScI budget
14-15 Discussion of SO-07, Science Operations Concepts, Part 1, Final, (May, 1983)
15 Work with Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC); "Christmas Massacre"; work on preliminary version of SO-07 (March, 1982)
15-16 Meeting with TRW to discuss draft of SO-07
16 Preliminary Requirements Review (PRR) of SOGS in May, 1982
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
16 First draft of SO-07 and the PRR
16-17 Discussion of PRR, continued negotiations on wording of SO-07
17 Discussion of launch schedule as understood in Spring, 1982; Preliminary Design Review (PDR) September, 1982
18 Comments on Quarterly Reviews at Huntsville; comments on dealing with launch schedule; discussion of Critical Design Review (CDR) Spring, 1983
19 Discussion of Review Item Discrepancies (RIDs); technical discussions between STScI and TRW (Spring '81 - May, '82)
20 Discussion of data pipeline: calibrating user data
21 Creation of Calibration Data Base System (CDBS); participation in SOGS review board starting in late '82
22 Preparation of STE-13, "Planning System Requirements"
23 Science Commanding Subsystem committee (SCS)
24 Making SOGS work efficiently
24-25 Discussion of SOGS non-interactivity
25-26 Discussion of means for suggesting and effecting change in the system
27-28 Discussion of means for gathering support for major changes
28 Comparison of process for effecting change as experienced at STScI compared to earlier experience at HEAO
29 Smaller scale of HEAO
30 On-going cost of operating ST's ground system
30-31 Need to translate commands used in testing instruments at Lockheed into SOGS's system
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
31 Discussion of ST testing at Lockheed
32 Discussion of impact of instrument design on complexity of ground system; discussion of potential impact of ground-system-led instrument design
33 Consideration of on-board memory needs; comments on ground system preparedness for October '86 launch
33-34 Comments on learning the ropes of politicking
34-35 Comments on effect of change in management in terms of response to scientists' concerns
35 Discussion of funding; effect of work at STScI on available research time
35-36 Creation of position of tenured scientist to accommodate those working on development of ST rather than basic science
37 Emergence of new type of support staff: scientists with astronomy background
37-38 Discussion of impact of limited research time on those trained as astronomers compared with those trained as physicists: individualized vs team work
38-39 Discussion of outside perception of STScI: its function, cost, operational limitations and advantages
40 Explication of current duties at STScI
40-41 Description of organization of operations department at STScI
41-42 Comments on own role as manager; discussion of evolution oftechnical organization of operations department
42 Designing software for 15 year lifespan; coordinating software subsystems
43 Comments on 15 year lifespan in relation to system maintenance and upgrading
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
44 Relationship of DOT to Investigation Definition Team (IDT); end of DOT as STScI became operational
45 Comments on Observation Support System's (OSS) interactions with DOT and MOWG; comments on responsibility for monitoring instrumental health and safety
46 Comments on competition for funds: STScI vs instrumentation
46-47 Discussion of post-'84 relations among STScI/Goddard/ public compared with those pre-84
48 Discussion of ST's planetary tracking capabilities
49 Creation of Planetary Target Implementation Team (PTIT); discussion of parallax correction problem
50-51 Need for coordination of individual Principal Investigators (PIs) in order to grasp big picture
52 Importance of informal networks
53 Comments on ST's complexity as object lesson for future project planners
Edmondson, Frank K. Date: June 9, 1984. Interviewers: Robert W. Smith, Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 22 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Edmondson discusses his awareness of large orbiting telescope concepts of the latter 1950s and early 1960s, gained through his position in AURA. Topics discussed include Aden Meinel's studies of orbiting telescopes, particularly those conducted while he directed Kitt Peak National Observatory's Space Division (1960-61); Lyman Spitzer's advocacy of space telescopes, and the KPNO remote operation telescope. Edmondson also describes his role in the Iowa City and Woods Hole conferences which discussed orbiting telescopes, and astronomers' reactions to those discussions. Finally, he comments on ground-based astronomers' early reactions to accepting government funds.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Aden Meinel's NSF-funded studies of 50-inch orbiting telescopes, 1959-1960
2-3 Meinel's concept for a 500-inch Yerkes telescope
3-4 Lyman Spitzer's advocacy of an orbiting telescope, ca. 1953; Gerard Kuiper's reaction
4-5 Astronomers' attitudes toward government funding; anticipated astronomy funding needs, ca. 1950s
5-6 Astronomers and government funding, cont
6-7 Meinel's role leading Kitt Peak National Observatory (KPNO) site surveys, and as KPNO's first director
7-8 KPNO's Space Division established, with Meinel in a new role as its first director, 1960
8 Meinel 50-inch orbital telescope concepts, cont
8-9 Funding and goals of the KPNO remote-operated telescope: testbed for space technology
9-10 Meinel seeks to persuade AURA's board to undertake full-scale space telescope development apart from NASA, ca. 1959-60
10 Space telescope studies at KPNO Space Division
10-11 Engineers involved with KPNO space studies
11-13 Air Force funding of Princeton Stratoscope studies, ca. 1950s
13 Meinel ends his tenure at KPNO Space Division, 1961
13 Proposed absorption of Herbert Friedman's NRL space research team by KPNO Space Division
13-14 Joseph Chamberlin named director of KPNO Space Division; Division abandons space observatory studies to pursue rocket-based space science
14 NASA contact with KPNO space telescope activity
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14-16 Documentation of 1962 meetings between NASA and KPNO concerning future Space Division planning
16-17 Staff and program changes in KPNO Space Division, 1962
17-18 Development timetables proposed in KPNO's space telescope studies
18 NASA-KPNO discussions on space science, cont
19 Edmondson's role in the Iowa City and Woods Hole Summer Study space telescope discussions
19 Air Force interest in space science, 1962-5
19-20 Spitzer's advocacy of space telescopes, ca. 1960s
19-20 Meinel-Spitzer contacts
20-21 Spitzer's 'Little Black Book', 1969
21-22 Reactions to space telescope concepts, ca. 1960s
Elliot, James L. Date: November 21, 1984. Interviewer: Joe Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.5 hrs.; 45 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Elliot anticipates effects of Space Telescope on astronomy discipline and evaluates planetary astronomers' professional organization and their use of data gathered by spacecraft. Recalls his entry into ST project while a Cornell post-doc, development of High Speed Photometer Team and scientists' input into design of photometer. Also recalls early experience with photometers and instrument design at Cornell and Kuiper Observatory; discusses in detail Kuiper's observations of Uranus occultation. Discusses his ST photometer proposal, plans for study of occultation and the High Speed Photometer Team's organization and design of photometer. Considers photometer team's relationship to ST issues such as target selection, planetary tracking and funding continuity. Makes concluding observations about importance of acquaintanceships and informal networks with in ST project and ST's possible effects on ground-based astronomy.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Elliot reflects that Space Telescope, like Kitt Peak before it, increases number of astronomers able to use latest, most sophisticated instruments
2 Observes that ST will also accommodate astronomers not experts in how the instruments operate
2 Sees ST continuing trend of merging subdisciplines within astrophysics
3 How High Speed Photometer Team was assembled
3 Preliminary design proposals for photometer
4 Suggestion by Robinson and van Citters to use relay mirrors to increase number of aperture tubes
4 Discusses addition of photomultiplier as example of scientists' influence on photometer design
5 Meetings between engineers and scientists about instrument design
6 Responds to Announcement of Opportunity for Space Telescope while a post-doc at Cornell
7 Elliot's graduate and post-grad occultation work
8-9 Lunar occultation observations from Kuiper Airborne Observatory
9 Use of three channel photometer to profile Martian atmosphere
10 Three channel photometer; Uranus ring discovery
10-11 Instrumentation experience at Cornell
11 Contacts with Bill Brunk about Kuiper Observatory
12 Contacts with Nancy Roman, Al Boggess, et.al.
12-13 Difficulties getting on Kuiper Observatory
13 Problems funding new techniques through peer review
14-15 Fighting for Kuiper project from Cornell; support of advocates at Headquarters
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
15 Community of planetary astronomers; approval of Kuiper project before Viking probe
16 Gordon Taylor and planetary predictions
17 Flight tapes from Uranus occultation expedition aboard KuiperObservatory
19 Elliot recalls controversial talk given by George Field in January, 1977 about ST
20 Possible publicity value of ST photos; reaction of policy planners to Field's talk
20-21 Relation of planetary astronomy to other astronomical fields
22 Planetary astronomers' declining use of telescopes
23 Elliot suggests why planetary astronomers now rely more on spacecraft data
24-25 Institutes, organizations to which planetary astronomers belong
25 Submission, acceptance of Elliot's photometer proposal
26 NASA reluctant to fund occultation predictions for ST
27 Elliot criticizes ST Project for slow start on occultation
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
28 Advantages of studying lunar occultation from ST
29 Tom Sherrill and Lockheed Corp. movies projecting lunar occultation seen from ST
30-31 Funding for ground-based occultation predictions; Elliot discusses his proposal and the disadvantages of being on an ST team; Bob Bless and U. Wisconsin
31-33 Recalls how preliminary photometer designs were finalized
34 Elliot's time commitments to ST and high-speed photometer
34 Elliot's awareness of other instruments' designs
35 Recent involvement with planetary tracking problem
36 Awareness of larger ST issues, such as siting of the Institute
36-37 Bob Brown's and the emergence of ST's planetary tracking as a problem for ST
37 Elliot's acquaintanceship with Bob Brown; advantages of working together informally on planetary tracking
38 Elliot's contacts with Bob Bless; organization of photometer team
38-39 Selection of key planetary projects for ST
39-40 Elliot recalls discussions of ST's planetary role
40 Time Allocation Committee
41 Elliot's concerns about continuity of allocated time and money
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
42 Elliot assesses importance of having close colleagues on peer review committees
43 Considers key project concept
44 Elliot discusses possible effects of ST on ground astronomy
44 High-speed photometer filters
45 Astrometry; other ST instruments Elliot would like to use
Emanuel, Garvin. Date: December 2, 1985. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 3 hrs.; 30 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Emanuel discusses his involvement with ST pre-Phase A and Phase A/B technology research and development (1969-76). He first reviews his early career at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, work with the Saturn program, and space laser optics studies. Emanuel describes the process by which contractors were brought into ST studies, the anticipated technological hurdles facing 1970s ST planners, the Manned Orbiting Astronomical Telescope concept, extensive ST mirror technology research projects, the selection of ST primary mirror materials, and the selection of the size of the primary mirror. He also touches on writing the 1977 ST Announcement of Opportunity, working on ST on-board data systems, the ST Project rebaselining of 1983, and planning for on-orbit ST maintenance.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Early work with Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA); Redstone project
1-2 Emanuel joins Fred Speer's Saturn Flight Evaluation group at the new NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)
2 Emanuel joins Astronomy Group at MSFC Payload Development
2-3 Work with space optics research; lasers for space communication
4 Transfer to early Large Space Telescope (LST) studies; 1969-70
4-5 Large Telescope Experiment Package (LTEP) study
5 Itek study of an optical telescope science satellite
5 Stratoscope II and the Princeton/MSFC/Perkin-Elmer (P-E) relationship
6 Problems with 1970-era space optics technology
6 MSFC and Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) studies of telescope-instrument combinations
6-7 Bringing in contractors for LST studies; early LST lobbying efforts
7-8 Anticipated technological hurdles for LST: mirror materials, detectors, metering truss
8-9 Origins of Itek Corporation
9 Manned Astronomical Space Telescope (MAST) study; further Stratoscope studies
10 Results of the Itek Phase A LST study
10-11 Metering and fine guidance in Itek's LST concept
11 Concern over adequacy of contractor facilities for constructing an LST-sized satellite
11-12 Mirror casting and grinding technology: Corning
12 Astronomers' input to the LST Phase A effort
12 LST studies presented at a SPIE symposium, 1972
13 Providing an LST test mirror to the Multi-Mirror Telescope Project
13 Boksenberg reviews LST stray light suppression
14-15 Origin's of MSFC's bid for LST lead center role
15 Distributing LST Phase B contracts, 1974
15-16 Phase B technology development concerns: mirror, metering truss, pointing and fine guidance
16 Mirror curvature and telescope speed decisions
17 ST Scientific Instrument (SI) detector technology
17-18 Cer-Vit mirrors; ULE selected for the LST mirror
18 MSFC's pursuit of advanced LST designs rather than OAO technology upgrades
19 Distributing LST technology development contracts
19 Promoting LST as a candidate for Phase C/D funds
20 Concepts for a 2.4-meter ST, ca. 1974
21 ST aperture options smaller than 2.4 meters
21 ST technology development, ca. 1976
21-22 Emanuel joins ST Phase C/D cost modeling effort
23 Assigning ST Phase C/D tasks to MSFC and GSFC
23 Involvement with writing the ST Phase C/D Request for Proposals, 1976
24 ST Phase C management structure
24 Efforts to increase the amount of off-the-shelf hardware applied to ST
25 Involvement with ST on-board data handing systems
25 Changes in ST project management; data work, cont
26 Rebaselining the ST budget, 1982-3
26 Management changes, 1983; ST systems engineering
27 ST on-orbit Maintenance and Refurbishment (M&R)
27 Distribution of the 1982-3 ST funding increase; modifications and changes ordered
28 Current ST milestones, ca. 1986
28-29 Various figures involved with LST/ST
30 An LST/ST schedule and funding chronology
Fastie, William G. Date: June 4 & 6, 1986. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.25 hrs.; 70 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Fastie recalls work at Johns Hopkins University on Ebert spectrograph and subsequent adaptation of spectrograph for space flight by USAF and NASA. Also describes his development of photometer to measure marine bioluminescence. Discusses USAF and NASA's rocket programs and early space spectroscopy. Recounts participation of JHU physics faculty in early rocket programs; satellite instrumentation and spectrographic measurements of lunar and Venusian atmospheres. Describes Hopkins' participation in Faint Object Camera and evolution from that of Hopkins Ultraviolet Telescope. Recalls successes and failures of early rocket programs, such as Aerobee, in early 1960s; Apollo 17 projects and cooperation between JHU Physics Department and APL. Describes Science Working Group and its input into Fine Guidance System. Remembers early discussions about STScI site; site selection process and roles of JHU, Baltimore City in that process. Describes Institute's early administration, hiring of staff and high turnover; also his work on Fine Guidance System. Concludes by noting possible Telescope problems and budget difficulties.
June 4, 1986
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Fastie recalls returning to Johns Hopkins and working under John Strong to build Ebert spectrograph; discovered that curved slits eliminate astigmatism and improve spectrograph performance
1-3 Novel use of long, curved slits enables spectrograph to get the best spectra at all wavelengths
4 Briefly describes role as consultant to manufacturer of Ebert spectrograph
4-5 Attributes his interest in space research to fascination with Sputnik; realizes spectrograph is well-suited to space research
5 Describes getting USAF and NASA funding to adapt spectrograph for space flight
5-6 Fastie's early contacts with Office of Naval Research
6 Development of photometer to measure marine bioluminescence for ONR
6-8 Bioluminescence expeditions
8 Instrumentation work for ONR
8-10 Basing meter on spectral wavelength
10 Early contacts with USAF & NASA about space spectroscopy; Maury Dublin
10-11 Measuring UV spectrum of aurora borealis
11 Most early rocket researchers young grad students and post-docs without established reputations
12 Recalls acquaintances, including Herb Friedman; spectrometer to Mars
12-13 1962 day-glow experiment in Helsinki
13 JHU physics dept. begins rocket contracts with USAF & NASA; Fastie describes network of interested JHU faculty
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
13-15 Description of interested JHU faculty (cont'd)
15 JPL contract with JHU to design Mariner spectrograph
15-18 Difficulties producing Mariner spectrograph
18 Finding atomic oxygen in Venus' atmosphere
18-20 Apollo 17 experiment to search for lunar atmosphere
20-21 Fastie describes assembling payloads; work at JHU; subcontracting
21-22 JHU responsibilities for assembly, testing payloads
22 Recalls evolution of International UV Expedition
22-23 Westinghouse Corp's difficulties producing UV video cameras
23 Fastie describes brief JHU involvement with satellite instrumentation before Apollo 17
23-24 Faint Object Camera; first UV observation of quasar
24-27 Discusses evolution of Hopkins Ultraviolet Telescope from earlier Faint Object Camera
June 6, 1986
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
28 1963 rocket failure at Wallops Island
28-30 Preparations for launching payload from Ft. Churchill for July 1964 solar eclipse
30-31 Fastie evaluates problems, successes of early 1960 Aerobee rocket launches
31 Difficulties of dealing with press after failures
31-32 More Aerobee rocket failures
32-34 Fastie's comments on several sequences of consecutive Aerobee failures
34-35 Working with Jack Holtz; last-minute rocket repairs
35 John Doering; aurora borealis spectral measurements
35-37 Dayglow experiments; atomic oxygen; discovery of resonance radiation by R.W. Wood at Johns Hopkins
37 Recalls early "hands-on" rocket researches; contrast with Space Telescope
38-39 Johns Hopkins and 1965 Wallops Is. launch of experiments looking at comet
39-40 Launch procedure
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
40-41 Entry of Warren Moos into rocket program
41 Hopkins' physics department new hires; Apollo 17 experiment
41-42 Hopkins & Goddard develop system able to point instruments at any object in sky
42 Apollo 17 and Apollo-Soyuz projects help break down barriers between JHU and Applied Physics Lab; Fastie discusses natures of institutional conflicts between JHU and APL
42-43 Tendency of experiment planners to try to do too many things with each instrument
44-45 Prestige and influence of Space Telescope's Science Working Group
45-46 Science Working Group and Fine Guidance System
46-47 Fastie, other scientists, do not have inflexible assignments; can bring to Science Working Group any problems they see
47-48 Fastie outlines why Science Working Group wanted a SpaceTelescope Institute
48 Importance research facilities within the Institute
48-49 Science Working Group development of specifications for Institute from earlier reports
49 Desire to locate the Institute on university campus
49-52 1970's disputes about NASA's oversight of Institute
52 Early discussions about locating Institute at Hopkins
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
52 Interest and skepticism at JHU about having Institute
52-54 Support of physics department, JHU administration, Baltimore Mayor's office for Institute at Hopkins; preliminary architectural plans
54 Fastie sees JHU offer to help pay for new building as crucial to Hopkins' selection as Institute site
55 Staffing new Institute; selection of Riccardo Giacconi, Don Hall
55-56 Fastie evaluates management proposal of Association of Universities for Research in Astronomy
56 JHU wins state support for Institute building
57-58 Selection of Hopkins as Institute site
58 Fastie's responsibilities to Institute under Art Code and Riccardo Giacconi
59 Institute's hiring process; recalls Art Code's directorship; allocation of space to Institute by Hopkins
59-61 Many staff positions filled temporarily; period of high turnover
61-62 Importance of developing Guide Star Selection System; additional staff changes
62-63 Fastie's early work on Fine Guidance System
TAPE 3, SIDE 2
63-65 Fastie's suggested revision of specifications for Telescope mirrors
65 Discusses unnecessarily rigorous specifications
65-66 Fastie speaks of his reputation within NASA; how he expresses opinions
66-67 Discusses yet-unsolved (1986) Telescope problems
68 Addresses how financial costs of Telescope's redundant systems are weighed
68-69 Recalls his confidence that ST would eventually be launched and operate successfully
69-70 Fastie's role in increasing Headquarter's involvement when budget cuts threaten Telescope
Field, George. Date: March 10, 1986. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 3 hrs.; 47 pp. Use restriction: Permission required for access.
Field comments on his involvement with orbiting telescope concepts and with the ST Program from 1957 through 1986. Topics from ST's earlier history include Lyman Spitzer's 1950s-60s advocacy of a space telescope, considerations of an ST by the Greenstein Committee (1971), and the influence of the Physical Sciences Committee under Field's direction on behalf of ST. Discussion of the lobbying activity surrounding ST includes consideration of Congressmen's and staffers' reactions to the concept, the arguments Field and others used to advocate the idea, and potential conflict between ST and planetary exploration funding. ST technology issues covered include selecting detectors, and determining the primary mirror size. Finally, Field discusses issues concerning the ST Science Institute, including site selection, STScI growth since 1982, and relations with the AXAF project.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Field's first awareness of space telescope concepts
1-2 Field's advocacy of a Space Telescope endorsement by the Greenstein Committee, 1971
2-3 Proposals for a space science institute, 1971
3-4 ST discussions with Spitzer while studying (1952-5) and teaching at Princeton
4 Lyman Spitzer's qualities as a scientist
4 Spitzer's scientific reputation as a buttress to space telescope advocates
5-6 East and West Coast astronomy: eastern focus on space astronomy
6 Intense activity in ground-based astronomy, 1960s
6 Involvement with Astronomy Missions Board; impressions of its role in science planning
7-8 Context of early space science planning: rapid revolutions in both theory and observation
8 Field moves to Berkeley, advocates study in non-optical wavelengths, 1965
8-9 Contact at Berkeley with C.R. O'Dell
9-10 Discussion of science institute concepts for LST (Large Space Telescope) at the Greenstein Committee meetings, 1971
10-11 NASA interest in a 1-meter space telescope, ca. 1971
11-12 Origins of Field's involvement with the LST Phase B Science Working Group
12 Lobbying Congress for LST funding
12-13 Chairmanship of the Physical Sciences Committee; PSC as an LST advocate to NASA administrators
13-14 Influence of Congress on ST planning: Congressman Edward Boland and staffer Dick Mallow
14-15 Chronology of Congressional voting on ST funds
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
15-16 Field organizes a 1976 meeting of astronomers with James Fletcher to discuss ST
16-17 Fletcher and establishing priorities within space science
17 Organizations influencing approval of space science missions: NASA administration, OMB, Congressional Committees
17-18 Influence of OMB on space science: Hugh Loweth
18-19 Field's justification of ST to Congress: scientific merit
19 Space science as a source of new high technology
20 Justifying space science in terms of potential practical applications: new energy sources
20-21 Field's pre-ST awareness of the federal science budgeting process and scientific lobbying
21-22 ST lobbying role: work with Spitzer and John Bahcall, contact with Congressman Lindy Boggs
22 Lobbying for the Very Long Baseline Array
22-24 Congressman Edward Boland, cont
24 Dick Malow, cont
24-26 Congressman Boland, cont
26 Possible tradeoff between ST and planetary probes
26-27 Presidential Science Advisor Frank Press and ST; Press' contact with Congressman Boland
27-28 Boland's management of the House Appropriations Committee having NASA oversight
28-29 ST as an example of science-politics interaction
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
29 Sen. William Proxmire and ST; contrasts between Proxmire and Boland
30 Dispute over ST at the 1977 AAS Division of Planetary Sciences meeting
30-31 Planetary science and the ST observing schedule
32 Visibility of planetary science to astronomers
32-33 Decision to open the 1977 ST Announcement of Opportunity to detectors other than the SEC Vidicon: planetary science requirements
33-34 Phase B decision to reduce the LST aperture from 3 meters to 2.4 meters
34 Consideration of 1.8-meter aperture ST designs
34 Detector development as the key Phase B ST issue
35 Reaction of Physical Sciences Committee members to projected ST costs, 1974-76; planetary scientists' reaction to ST
35-36 Field opens discussion of an ST Science Institute (later STScI) during Phase B; founding of the Code 'Uncommittee'
36-37 Phase B ST Science Working Group's reactions to NASA in-house space science
37 Astronomers' reactions to the STScI concept
37-39 Goddard Space Flight Center's presentation of its case as a site for the proposed STScI
39 Precedents for consortium management of national research facilities
39-40 Goddard space astronomy
40-41 X-ray science institute discussions; STScI's role
41-42 Involvement with STScI site selection; movements to designate Princeton the STScI sole site
42 ST's potential to further reduce wavelength specialization among astronomers
42-43 New astronomy specialization; functional rather thanwavelength divisions
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
43-45 Origins of the ST 'Key Project' concept; relation to past US astronomy methodology
45-46 ST's influence on the 1980-81 Astronomy Survey Committee
46-47 Strengths of the STScI leadership
Fordyce, Don. Date: October 31, 1983. Interviewers: Robert Smith and Paul Hanle. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 30 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Fordyce recalls his early career at NASA and his introduction to ST. Discusses relations between Goddard and Marshall and start of ST program. Recalls his career from 1979-1982. Fordyce as Director for ST. Discusses budget problems in 1982/83. Discusses the fine guidance system. Describes interactions between scientists and Marshall staff. Discusses cleaning of ST's primary mirror. Discusses communications with NASA and funding problems. Discusses cost overruns on synchronous Net Program and problems of funding large programs. Describes Perkin-Elmer's relationship with subcontractors.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Early career in NASA; introduction to Space Telescope (ST)
2-3 ST at Goddard
3 MSFC/GSFC relations
4 Start of ST program
5 Bill Keathley moves to Goddard
6 Career moves 1979 to 1982; Fordyce becomes Director for ST
7-8 Reorganization at Perkin-Elmer
9-10 Underfunding of ST; problem in 1982/83
11 MSFC staff at Perkin-Elmer
11-12 Associate contractors
12-13 Fine guidance system
13-14 Interactions with scientists; MSFC staff
15-16 Cleaning ST's primary mirror
17 Communications with NASA
18-19 Funding problems
19-20 Management style
20 Perkin-Elmer staff; hiring
22-23 Communications with NASA
23-24 Overrun on Synchronous Net Program; possibilities of overruns on big programs; funding large programs
25-26 Program difficulties in early 1983
26-27 Success on program; primary mirror. Koester prisms
27 Fine guidance Sensors; dynamic s-curve test
28 LMSC/P-E meetings
28-29 Optical control system
30 Perkin-Elmer's relationship with subcontractors; Fordyce's charter when he joined Perkin-Elmer
Fredrick, Laurence W. Date: May 2, 1986. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 33 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Fredrick discusses his work as a contractor to NASA Langley on early orbiting telescope studies (1963-5), and as member of the ST Astrometry science team (1977- ). Fredrick briefly covers his academic training, and then discusses involvement with the orbiting telescope studies which became the basis of the Woods Hole LST study group activity, with Boeing's Manned Orbiting Telescope study, and with the ASTRA and LST Phase B design work; in addition, he recreates astronomers' reactions to these studies. Discussion of ST lobbying activity focuses on the role of the AAS. Finally, Fredrick considers astrometry team issues including Perkin-Elmer's Fine Guidance Sensor design, modifications to the FGSs, interaction with the Hipparchos Project, astrometry data handling, and astrometry's rank among ST science goals.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Childhood interest in astronomy
1-2 Undergraduate work at Swarthmore
2 Graduate work at U. Penn
2-3 Image tube work as a Carnegie postdoctoral
3 Accepts chair of astronomy at U. Va, 1963
3-4 Discusses Carnegie image tube development project at Lowell observatory
5 Work under contract to NASA (Langley) to study the potential of a 3 m orbiting telescope; Fredrick's study as a starting paper for the industry studies presented to the 1965 Woods Hole orbiting telescope conference
6 Lyman Spitzer as the eminent early space telescope advocate; origins of Woods Hole meeting
7 Coining the name LST (Large Space Telescope)
8 Role in Boeing's '65 Manned Orbiting Telescope study; role of contractors at Woods Hole
9 Optical astronomers' reaction to LST proposals; astronomers' acceptance of ST by 1977
9-10 Windsor Sherman and Langley Mercury capsule telescope studies
10-11 Ernst Stuhlinger as space astronomy advocate
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
11 Ernst Stuhlinger, cont'd
11-12 Educating astronomers about LST under NAS auspices
12-13 Space astronomy at U. Va.
13 Involvement with LST Phase A studies
14 Phase B Science Working Group; assembling Phase B proposal for LST astrometry instrument; origins of the Koester's Prism ST Fine Guidance Sensor [FGS] design from Perkin-Elmer [P-E]
14-15 Proposals for an orbiting telescope intermediate to OAO and LST
15 ASTRA studies; role of manned spaceflight in LST planning; move from manned to EVA-serviceable concepts
16 Contact with P-E's Phase B LST study efforts; Phase B origin of proposals to use the FGSs for astrometry
17 Astrometry capability as a design consideration for FGSs
18 Melding of U. Va.-Texas astrometric proposals for Phase C/D
19-21 Involvement with 1974-77 ST lobbying activity
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
21 Role in lobbying for other space science missions
22 John Bahcall and ST lobbying
23 Reaction to proposed 1.8 m substitute ST concept
23-24 Johnny Hart's cartoons on space budgeting
24 Contact with industry representative Pete Simmons
25 Contact with ST Phase B industry teams
26 Role in Phase C/D
27 Efforts to advocate astrometry from space; Art O'Dell
28 Astrometry team's institutional connections; Marshall and Goddard
29-30 Technological challenges of FGS design; astrometry participation in FGS design changes
30-31 Astrometry's rank among ST science goals
31 Performing FGS astrometry in parallel with other Science Instrument observations
31-32 Consistency of ST astrometers' basic research goals over the course of ST development
32 Learning curve for astrometry among P-E staff
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
32-33 ST's potential to produce revolutionary data
Giacconi, Riccardo. Date: January 25, 1984. Interviewers: Paul Hanle, Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.75 hrs.; 45 pp. Use restriction: Permission required for access.
Giacconi discusses his background in X-ray astronomy, focusing on the construction of the Uhuru and HEAO-B/Einstein satellites (1964-1981). He comments on his perceptions of Space Telescope issues from his perspective as director of the Space Telescope Science Institute (1981- ). Topics covered include scientists' roles and responsibilities on space science missions in general and ST in particular, NASA management practices, big science, the ST Science Operations Ground System, ST technological issues, and STScI's role within the ST project.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Giacconi's X-ray astronomy background: methodology and experiments
2-4 The Uhuru X-ray survey satellite program
4-5 Planning and construction of HEAO-B/Einstein
5-6 Optical astronomy's enthusiasm for ST; 1970s
6 Role of instrument builders
7 ST project organization
7-8 Scientists' input into ST design
8-9 Organization of the scientific role in ST design and construction: scientist-contractor communications
9-10 US technical management style
10-11 Distinctions between scientific goals and technical performance goals in space science
11-12 High performance demands on ST as opposed to HEAO
12-13 NASA organization and management of space science
13 Changes in NASA management since the Apollo era
14-15 Optical astronomy's commitment to big science
15 Proposals for an X-ray institute
16 Scope of the Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI)
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
17-18 The ST Science Operations Ground System (SOGS)
18-19 Early conceptions of SOGS
19-21 Scientists as consultants to industry
21-24 Changes in SOGS
24 Scientists' input into ST design, cont
25-26 Changes in SOGS, cont
26-27 Early '70s discussion of an X-ray institute; the Ramsey Committee
27 Contracting structure for Uhuru
28-29 American Science & Engineering management of its Uhuru contract and rocket programs
29 Rationales for an X-ray institute
30-31 ST and cutting-edge technology
31-32 HEAO-B team's association with Perkin-Elmer
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
32-33 Space scientists as hands-on experiment builders
33-34 Troubleshooting in the ST project; STScI's role
34-35 Limitations of the ST design
35-36 STScI's work on the Scientific Instruments (SIs)
36-37 ST Maintenance and Refurbishment (M&R) in orbit
38 NASA management and contracting for ST
38-39 Optical industry awareness of ST, 1982-3
39-40 NASA-contractor negotiations on space science missions
41 Anticipated success of ST
41-43 Management of NASA space science
43-44 Management of high-energy physics projects
44-45 Giacconi's perspective on ST history
Goldberg, Alan. Date: April 23, 1985. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 3.5 hrs.; 56 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Goldberg recalls his early interest in astronomy and education at MIT, University of Hawaii; discusses his preference for observation over theory and how this affected his choice of research problems. Discusses CCDs: their problems, utility for planetary astronomy, NASA funding of CCD research, astronomers' preferences for CCDs. Recalls development of Fine Guidance Systems and development of CCDs. Relates his initial impressions of ST and reactions of planetary astronomy community. Discusses in detail the formation of instrument teams, his work at Perkin-Elmer beginning in 1978, and P-E's work on ST. Comments on Preliminary Design Review process, interferometer sensors, use of analytical models and problems with the mirror; on evolution of Pointing Control System and star selector idea. Also discusses 1979-80 changes in and problems with Fine Guidance System, especially momentum disturbances. Mentions effects of NASA oversight, manpower shortages and outside assistance on resolution of FGS problems; relation of P-E to Lockheed. Comments in detail on thermal control plans for FGS; also photon and gyro problems. Analyzes FGS specifications, the process by which they are written and some technical difficulties (eg., astigmatism) in meeting them. Recalls work with Astrometry team; relation to other teams, Goddard and Marshall. Comments on operation of FGS by STScI and contingency plans.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 First interest in Astronomy; MIT; Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences; Dr. Tom McCord; University of Hawaii; Left MIT with all but dissertation completed; Likes research, instrumentation, observation, but not theory; Methane; Ammonia; Jupiter; P-E
1-2 Brad Smith; CCD's; Studies at MIT; Uranus; 8870-band; Narrow-band imaging filters; Spectroscopic; Saturn; SIT's
2 Problems with CCD's; Silicon-vidicons; Low noise pre-amps; Pedestals; CCD usefulness with planets; Subsampling; Thin-backed illuminated IR transparent; Dewars
2-3 Jim Westphal; NASA begins funding CCD research
3 800x800; AAS; Linear arrays; Astronomers want thin area arrays and free samples; Area arrays; Pixels; Front end amplifiers; Image orthicon; Kliege lights; Astronomers very demanding on what kind of CCD they want; TI; Xerox JPL; Alternate FGS (early) with CCD; Fine Guidance System
3-4 WF/PC [pronounced "whiff-pick" by Goldberg]; Fine Guidance Sensor; Decision to drop alternate FGS
4 Manpower a problem on CCD development; Galileo; Specs; Interferometric sensor; F/ratio; Problems with CCD sensors for guidance; Non-interferometrically
4-5 DPS/AAS meeting in January 1977; DPS; Honolulu, Hawaii; George Field
5 Little attention to ST early on; Phase B; Itek; Planetary community not interested in ST 200-inch; Viking; Lunar Orbiter; Mariner Jupiter-Saturn; Planetary people had plenty of data analysis to keep them "fat, dumb, and happy"; Galactic; Cosmological
6 Few, if any, planetary astronomers from MIT are members of instrument teams; Jim Eliot; High-speed photometer; Teams put together from top people on the proposing teams ("shotgun marriages"); None from MIT; Rings of Uranus; High-speed photometry; How he got involved with P-E; Laser fusion; Herbie; Started with P-E in February '78; Optical Technology Division
6-7 Space Systems; Danbury, Conn.; Early days at P-E; Terry Facie
7 Al Wissinger; Stratoscope; Apollo Telescope Mount; Small turnover at P-E; Best people going to ST project; Head of Lewis; Don Hearth report; Hearth Report; Preliminary Requirements Review; Purpose of the PDR: Preliminary Design Review
8 Near-term milestone; Initial work on the interferometer sensor; Fringe formation; Interferometer; Degradation; Angle tolerances; Digression on the Koesters interferometers.; Koesters interferometer; Amplitude splitting; Magic phase shift; 30-60-90 triangles; Dielectric coating; /4 phase shift [ = "pi"]; Constructive interference; Destructive interference; Faces; Incident Power; 0 or 180; Symmetry arguments; Unequal path lengths
8-9 Solid interferometer; Splitter; Skewed; Tolerance; Building of analytical models; Problems with the mirror; Thin-film lifetimes
9 Bob O'Dell; Koester's prisms; Transmissive surfaces; O'Dell's frustrations; One-g; zero-g; Splitting of the Pointing Control System to Coarse and Fine-pointing; Image Dissector Star Tracker; Figure 3-5 in P-E Vol. IIB, part 4 (FGS); Phase B final report
10 Acquisition mirror with field stop; One arc second optical hole; Boresighting; Handoff mechanism; Ball Brothers CT-501; F/ratio; Problems with the beam passing through the optical hole in the AMw/FS; Nutation Pattern; Star Centroid; Computational modeling
10-11 Neutral Density Beamsplitter; Dichroic beamsplitter; 4660 Å - 7000 Å; Edge Effect
11 Bandpass dichroic; Coarse and fine beam positioning; 60 square arc minutes; Vernier concept; Pages flipping; Fig 5-35 (Sheet 8) Perkin-Elmer Report No. 11880; Star selectors; Phase C/D Coarse scanning mechanism; Risley prisms; Vertices
12 21 bit encoders; Milliarc second quantization; Object space; Complicated light path; Aperture stop; Foam core board; Nutation; ROM [Rough Order of Magnitude]; Star selector concept reaches a dead-end
12-13 Star selectors more accurate than necessary; Flying spot scanner; Lockheed; Pointing Control System
13 Lockheed problems with slew accuracy; Actuators; Slew accuracy; 3-sigma pointing error; Mosaicing algorithms
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
13 Search mode mosaicing; Drunkard's walk torus distribution; TV scan
13-14 Mosaic the telescope
14 Revised design resulting from above problems; Reimaging optics; Collimated; Mutual alignment tolerance; Number of refractive and reflective elements was halved; Throughput
14-15 Major changes in FGS design at end of 1979; Delta PDR Changes in star selector lever arm geometry; Virtual Risley prism; Radius to the mid-line of the FGS torus; Conical torus; Momentum disturbances on board the vehicle - "an unending problem" first looked at by Lockheed in 79-80; Torque as a function of frequency restraints
16 Beryllium; DEI; Replaced electrostatic scanning with mechanical scanning upon elimination of IDT's; Moment of inertia; Spec; Rotors; No net torque; V2 or V3 vehicle axes; V1; Algorithm fuse
17 Filter wheel in the FGS box; Detent force; Lockheed's own disturbances (rate gyros, tape mechanisms, reaction wheels); Real problem is reaction wheels; PCS (Pointing Control System); SSM; FGS a logical subsystem of the PCS (SSM); Magnetometers; Rate gyros
17-18 Digital sun sensors
18 DF-224 computer; Contracts written as if FGS was separate from SSM and PCS; Only part of the OTA since it uses light collected by OTA; OTA
18-19 Pointing Error Budget (PEB) allocated between OTA and SSM; Pointing Error Budget; FGS PEB is a suballocation from the SSM PEB; Descoped; Inverse square reduction; Diffraction Size; [Search for PEBs]; .002 to the SI's
19 Zero-5 Hertz; Bandwith; Root bandwith dependence; Interaction between PCS and FGS is getting very complex by '79; Third-order control loop; One-sigma numbers; Frequency domain; Creaking, yawing, and stretching; Contract problems; CEI specifications; Contract end Item; STR-01; STR-02
19-20 Interface Requirements Document [IRD-01]; Interface Control Document [ICD]
20 Marshall Space Flight Center; Systems Integration Contract to Lockheed; PCS/FGS interface; Models produced by P-E; TIM's [Technical Interface Meetings]; FGS/PCS problem not a "big" (i.e. system-wide) problem, so not discussed at formal meetings; Insufficient technical oversight by NASA - too few people; Fred Speer; Gerry Nurre
21 End of manpower cap at Marshall
22 Argument over body-pointing vs active optics; Active secondary mirrors; SOT; Huntsville; Help from the labs (science and engineering); Hans Kennel
23 Institutional politics - reaction caused by solar arrays; British Aerospace; ESA; P-E's design problems caused by lack of communication on solar arrays; Torsion rod resonances
24 P-E always had to be one step ahead of Lockheed, always under tighter tolerances. Therefore P-E is always blamed for delays; PRR, PDR, CDR
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
24-25 Thermal control in the FGS; Graphite-epoxy; Invar
25 Outlandish designs; Glass optical bench; ULE glass; Problemof temperature uniformity due to large opening; Annulus; MLI [Multi-layer insulation]; Conformal oven; Emissivity; Thermistors; Radiative equilibrium
26 Isothermal envelope; conductive equilibrium; Motor encoder; Distortions based on athermal design; Athermalized bipods; Flexible printed circuit
26-27 Kevlar
27 Cleanliness problem on FGS due to large hole facing cold space; Window on WF/PC; Water vapor outgassing; Outgassing of FGS; Baked out mylar barrier
28 Engineering model of FGS; Air bearing testing; Elimination of air bearing testing - 1980; Closed loop testing; Hard Vacuum
29 How the first FGS became the E model; E-model; SSTS; Jitter simulator
29-30 Problems documenting flight model FGS; Kibitzing; First FGS became "flight qualifiable"; Fine Guidance
30 Electronics design; Harris Corporation; E-model would have old electronic design; "Spec"; Unspoken problem with OCS and FGS requirements
31 Requirement for FGS to measure star diameters (apparent) even without interferometric quality images; Raster scan mode; Defocus and coma; Trying to make OCS and FGS compatible
31-32 Almost no one knows how OCS works; ScI may have to focus the mirror
32 FGE model; Marshall and Lockheed don't understand nuances of interferometry; Charlie Jones; Photon Statistics; Lockheed always assumed that polarity of error signal would be reliable; Pseudo-rate signal monotonicity
33 Lockheed doesn't understand photon noise; Poisson statistics; Lockheed having own problems with gyros - NASA using cheap gyros; Draper Labs; Astrometry; Bendix, Peterborough; Juan Dawson
34 Solutions to gyro problem proposed by Bendix; Sunnyvale; Low viscosity; Shrouding; Corotate; Viscous drag; Gyros that NASA went with could be the ones that failed on IUE; IUE; Gyro performance goal controversy
35 Fine lock mode of FGS; PCS was to have taken over at one point and pointed S/C
35-36 Canonically; Gaussian process; Problem of linear range of interferometer going from fine lock mode to fine mode
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
36 Decision to eliminate fine mode and just stay in fine lock mode; Let PCS look at star selector readings; Incremental detector; Null detector; Transient
36-37 Lockheed couldn't come up with algorithm to go from fine lock to fine mode, so they accepted the decision
37 BEI folks; Star selectors now add a torque disturbance through the system during guidance; Torque disturbance; Opto-mechanical feedback
38 Modelling the molecular joints in the OTA; Damping coefficients; Titanium; Laminates; Dissipative; Modal surveys to measure for resonances; Indicates how far off their predictions are for frequency position A and V; Modal surveys
39 Sweep oscillator; Shift in magnitude of the guide stars; Early on the requirements were for FGS to use guide stars down to 13th magnitude V, and probability of having 2 G.S. in any 2 of 3; FGSs be at least 85% in sparsest part of the sky; V-system
39-40 Galactic poles
40 Problems with "back of the envelope" calculations; Numbers from Allen are wrong; Astrophysical Quantities by Allen; Interferometer does not work on certain classes of double stars; Needed 14.5 magnitude, says NASA (No one knows how this was decided)
40-41 Otto Franz; O'Dell; Radiant Flux; V-magnitude; G3V; Absorption bands
41-42 John Bahcall - Soneira; "Double" star problems with magnitude difference; Institute for Advanced Studies ..."No longer coherent sources, interferometer won't work."; Fringe modulation
42 Acceptable guide star pairs; Should be widely separated; Lever arm
43 Meaning of "85% probability"; GFE [Government furnished equipment]; V1-V3 plane
44 How requirements get written in the first place; Fastie; Hopkins; Spitzer; ="lambda" [greek letter]; Diffraction disk 1.22/d; "Root n over n" n/n; Cosmic rays
44-45 Field of view of the FGS; Astigmatized
45 Astrometry requirements taken from original instrument and forced on FGS .002 positional accuracy [2 thousandth positional accuracy]; Optical protractor
46 Astigmatized images require a corrector group; Collimator; Characteristics of correction of the image; Asphere; OCS [Optical Control System]
47 Problem of looking at crowded fields (e.g. Milky Way); Zodiacal light; Flux background
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
47-48 Work with Astrometry team; IDT [Instrument Definition Team]
48 Differences between astrometry team and other IDTs: work through Marshall, not Goddard; Responsibilities of Astrometry team
48-49 No ties at all with Goddard; This is a big problem
49 Astrometry considered a "no-cost option" of FGS; Bill Jeffreys; NASA didn't want to hear about design, changes caused by astrometry requirements Rms; one-sigma; P-E snuck in changes to facilitate astrometry, but used other reasons to justify them; Uplinkable parameter set
50 In 1984 astrometry created Level 1 requirement; Until then only P-E worked for an astrometry capability; CSC
50-51 Problems in processing data from astrometry; PASS contractor; Data stream; SIC and DH computer; Trend line; frustrations of astrometry team
51 The astrometry team tried to produce their own analytical software
52 File-in, file-out; Catenate; MORTRAN; FORTRAN; POL; Project did not back up the astrometry team
52-53 "Diplomacy is not a high priority in Baltimore"
53 Suggested specifications for GSSS issued by astrometry team; PDSs; Microdensitometers
53-54 Guide star system given to STScI and not Texas; UT not even invited to participate; SDAS and Guide Star; Art Code; Barry Lasker
54 Problems with instrument calibration; "Hokey" equipment; Least squares; Polynomial; PDP-11; VAX
54-55 Separate contract with UT to develop a separate GSSS from Marshall; Harrington; Orbital verification; OV Guide Star Selection System; UNIX; Contingency planning for guide stars
55 Huntsville Operations Support Center [HOSC]
55-56 Marshall wanted to know how to operate spacecraft (always Goddard's field); AXAF
Goldberg, Alan. Date: May 1, 1985. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith and Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.5 hrs.; 42 pp. Use restriction: Not established
Goldberg discusses in detail 1979 changes in Fine Guidance System and star selector design. Comments on star selector bearing and lubrication problems, 2nd photomultiplier tubes and importance of spectral sensitivity; operation of PMTs. Discusses astronomy's connections with NASA, contractors, STScI. Analyzes Fine Guidance Electronics and relative merits of hardwiring, programmable computer. Also discusses LMSC errors, coarse tracking; political undertones LMSC.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Pre-1979 FGS design compared to post-79 design; Fine Guidance Sensor; Bob O'Dell; Phase B; Interferometer; Fore Optics; Star Selectors; Coarse guidance image dissector; Essence of the FGS design; Bore sighting; OTA; FGS
1-2 Demagnification; Collimating; Refractive Group
2 Purpose of star selectors; Reimaging collimated beam; Beam splitter; Photomultiplier tubes; Flux; Simplification of 1979 - change in concept of star selectors; 60x60 arc second; Coarse track mode; Field stop; Flying spot scan; Nutation; Raster scan; Encoders [21-bit]
3 Implementation of star selectors; Flats; Stepper motors; Torque motors; Ultralock; Encoder vendor; Encoder disks; BEI; Baldwin Electronics Inc.; Two to the twenty one = 221; .618 arc seconds; Least significant bit; Mask; Gray code; Sine and cosine tracks; FM decoding
3 Rate control; Carrier; Sinusoidal mask; Beat frequencies
4 32 KiloHertz [kHz]; Design problem caused by very fine imperfections on bearings; Important at such fine pointing requirements; Raceway; Torque exerted on ball bearings; "Stiction"
4-5 Excess force required to get bearings moving; again, but need ability to ramp down after bearing starts moving
5 Bandwidth; 400 Hertz [Hz]
5-6 Turning out the "buzz" from the FGS model; Spring constants; Damping constants; Stator; "Specs"; Third-order loop
6 Overshoot and Undershoot; Analog electronics; FGE; Lockheed; Perkin-Elmer [P-E]; SSM; Lubrication problem with the star selectors due to low vapor pressure and subsequent evaporation
6-7 Labyrinth seals prevent line-of-sight paths for molecules; Labyrinth seals; Hard vacuum; Photons; Filter wheels
7 Star selectors are off-the-shelf items; Beryllium tweaking; Design of the two types of star selectors orthogonally; Risley prism
8 Design of Internal corrector (refractive) group; 5-element corrector group inertia; Angular acceleration; I.D. [inner diameter]; Graphite-epoxy; Vectorially; Scalar
8-9 Sketch of FG pieces (P-E OG 271684)
9 Graphite-epoxy structure in star selector given; asymmetric cutout; Asymmetric; 25 milliseconds [ms] Modelling the tower; Microseconds [us]
10 Purpose of the refractive group; Curvature of field; Ritchey-Chretien; Aberration cased by foreoptics; Aspheric; Conic section; Hyperboloid, paraboloid; Quarter-torus; Optical diagram of inside of FGS from presentation in June '84 to SWG, att. [!] 24 to minutes - Jay Humphreys'; view graphs from OSR; Science Working Group; Jay Humphreys; Operations Systems Review; Mask alignment problem
11 Correctors group and SS-A; Pick-off mirror; Origami; How the corrector group is on optical axis; Coaxial
12 Glasses in the corrector group; KZFS4; Ronald Cossus; Irwin Friedman; Ultraviolet; Near infrared; Color correction in the group; Astigmatism
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12 2nd star selector implementation; Front-surface; Total internal reflection; Wedge angles; Thermal coefficient; Zerodur
13-14 Exit pupil location; Exit pupil
14 Why exit pupil isn't at interferometers; Design of optical system after the 2nd star selectors; Fold mirrors; Interferometer assembly
14-15 Purpose of design of polarizing beamsplitter; Koesters' interferometer; Thin film laws
15-16 Luck in the design of interferometer polarization; A priori
16 X and Y channels; Optical Operations Division, Norwalk; Sensor axes
17 Measurement of interferometer fringes, unconventional method; PMT tubes; Bulkhead; Interferometer as a black box: input and output; Shadowgram; Spiders; Secondary mirror
18 Hold-downs; Output of interferometer XA, XB channel; Wavefront; Effects of tilt on output; 1/4-wave; "Lambda over four" = /4
18-19 Optics that follow the interferometer - Collect light on PMT's; Photocathodes; Proprietary chemicals
19 How to limit fov seen by interferometers after elimination of image dissector; Alignment problems of field stops
20 Coarse processing in interferometer; 8 images produced by interferometer
21 Photomultiplier tube manufacturers; ITT, Fort Wayne; EMR; Schlumberger; Hamamatsu; RCA; Varian; Ruggedized; Well-logging; Scintillations; Inconsistency inherent in photocathode production; 3 difficult specs called for in PMT's; Problems with dark noise; Dark noise; Dry ice; Liquid nitrogen; 60 counts per second; Problems with sensitivity matching of PMT's; Trying to get matched pairs
21-22 Problems with spectral matching of PMT pairs
22 Spectral matching is more critical-harder to fudge; Astrometry; Null; Color insensitivity for astrometry is real driving force for spectral tube response; Speer regime
23 Astrometry could set goals, but not specs; 13th magnitude
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
23 Operation of PMT's; Pulse-counting, not analog current; Pulse-counting; Analog current; Line driver; Problems with specs on minimum pulse length due to inadequacy of line drivers
24 EMR could provide entire PMT-amp assembly as one package; "Potting"; Encapsulation; End-to-end responsibility; Available contingencies for FGS systems engineering - especially for astrometry requirements; Jack Coniff; Stan Enhouse
25 No budget for astrometry at contractor level; LMSC; had no astrometry requirement, only P-E; Marshall; Goddard; Astrometry could be influence but not a driving force
25-26 Why no astronomers at P-E or Lockheed; NASA's job to provide clear guidance
26 Problems in understanding astronomical questions at contractor level; Institute
26-27 How would one know if the guide star obtained is right one?; Problems with communication between engineers and astronomers
27 "Astronomical systems engineering" O'Dell over his head; John Warner
27-28 Problems with Institute's attitude upon coming in after hardware is done; ST; Astrophysical Quantities; SOGS; TRW; Giaconni
28-29 Goddard not writing "complete" contracts-insufficiently specific
29 Institute people never tried to understand system as it was, but as they'd like it to be; Schreier; Institute now has copies of OTA blueprints; Don Fordyce; Pete Stockman
29-30 Problems due to lack of documentation; Fred Speer; Bow wave
30 Problems with FGE (Fine Guidance Electronics); FGE was a source of problems, not a victim; Electronic pathways in FGS (original); Ball CT-501/CT-503; Coarse-track; DF-224 (PCS computer); Fine error signals
31 FGE does very little processing; Normalizing; LMSC misconception of error signals; Clock pulse; FGE to be hard-wired integrated circuit board - not a programmable computer; Harris
31-32 Proposal to replace hardwire by programmable computer similar to OCS computer; Optical Control System; Jackscrews; OCS; RAM; Firmware; Read-Only Memory [ROM]; 1802 processor; RCA CMOS 32; 2900; Advanced Microdevices; differences in 1802 and 2900 processors; Bit-slice computer; Milspec; TTL, bipolar; Number crunching; Power available upon eliminating CT-501; duty cycle; Idling
32-33 New firmware for FGE
33 New problems arise due to programmability of new computer - requirements grow; Electrostatic; With mechanical scans, have to mitigate disturbances; Half-rate command; Spiral scan; Spiral scan of FGE vs. roster scan of CT-501; Archimedes spiral
33-34 Rate of spiral scanning and torque effects "two pi" - 2; cumulative azimuth
34 LMSC creates 1/2-rate command to keep spiral scan from disturbing system. Later dropped Algorithm
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
34-35 LMSC comes up with greater error after slewing, and drift or jitter; Slew; Drift and jitter
35 Problems with Dougherty; Hugh Dougherty; Modify the spiral scan rate, in the angular rate and radial rate; Photon noise; Archimedes scan
36 Incompatible requirements for LMSC and P-E; Photometry; Theta-rate; 3-sigma
36-37 Coarse track with FGE-circular nutation; Centroid; Radars; Feed horn
37 Square aperture compared to circular aperture on FGS using an octagon; Octagon; Nulling algorithm
38 Hierarchy of acquisition and resulting improvements in position; Bench top alignment
38-39 Coarse track drift estimation to update rate gyros (done away with); Trend line; Bias error
39 Hold command; Shrouded; low-viscosity; Political undertones-LMSC wants to be known as the contractor who will be designing the basic pointing system-who "controls" the S/C; Early fine-track algorithm, transition from CT501 to interferometers; Dead-reckoning
40 Back-off from anticipated star, then close in, not as spiral, but slowly in X&Y until star located on one axis and then other; "Zero-zero" = (O,O); Fine lock mode; Crosshairs; Interferometers in fine lock mode; reaction wheels; "Antsy"
41 Repositioning of ST after acquisition of guide stars; Parallax; Yaw, pitch
41-42 Fine mode (now gone) allowed PCS to control ST
Goldberg, Alan. October 21, 1985. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 4.30 hrs.; 62 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Goldberg discusses interferometric guidance debate: active optics vs. body-pointing. Comments on Science Working Group work on Fine Guidance; Quarterly Meetings. Analyzes roles of Bob O'Dell and William Fastie on ST design. Recalls original FGS design concepts; emphasis on planetary tracking and planning observations. Recounts his work as Project Engineer on Guide Star Selector System and contributions of many individuals and institutions. Also recalls early work of Institute and its computers; difficulties with CSC. Describes Institute's environment and relations with Goddard. Describes guide star problems. Recalls his work at Institute and staff changes at Institute and Goddard. Discusses FGE specs. Turns to Space Station project; also analyzes OAO-Huntsville-Goddard relationships. Recalls work of other people involved in ST.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Concepts of interferometric guidance; P-E; Interferometric; Al Wissinger; Phase A
2 Early uses of Koesters prism; Koesters; National Bureau of Standards; ST; Saunders
2-3 Active optics design and how it was deleted vs. body-pointing; SOT (Solar Optical Telescope); P-E; Marshall; Momentum Control; Reaction wheels; Moment gyros
3 People who may know about the active optics vs. body-pointing issue; Jerry Nurre; Hugh Dougherty; Lockheed; Bendix; Juan Dawson; Goddard; Sahag Dardarian; Mike Palitas; Hans Kennel
3-4 Science Working Group effect on FG design; Bill Fastie; Science Working Group; Fine Guidance
4 PI's on the SWG have their own problems; Jim Westphal; Loss of lock; PI's; NASA; 7-thousandths of an arcsecond; Project Scientist
5 Quarterly meetings at MSFC; Huntsville; Fine Guidance System; PCS loops; PCS/FGS
5-6 Technical and Managerial Quarterlies; Quadrant Digicon Lucas
6 Contractor presentations; FGS/PCS
6-7 O'Dell's influence on ST; [C.R.] O'Dell; Widgets; TIM's, Technical Interface Meetings; Astrometry; Graphite-epoxy; Invar; Spectroscopy
7-10 Guide star probability problems; Guide star probabilities; Astrophysical Quantities; 13th magnitude; Binary stars; John Bahcall; Moment arm; Arcminutes; Otto Franz; Guide Star Selection System; V spectral band; Johnson UBV system; Band shape; Smithsonian; Palomar Sky Survey; Interstellar absorption; GFE: Government Furnished Equipment
10 Influence of Fastie on ST design; Mid-frequency figure
11 Problem of minor fabrication; Ultraviolet; Micro-ripple; Diffraction; APL; Digicon
11-12 Science push for alternate FGS - Loss of Lock problem; RMS noise figure; Loss of lock; Filter wheels; WF/PC; Scoped; HRS carousel; Omega; Torque; Servo; Torque couple; Bandwidth
12 Noise from star selectors; Star selector
12-13 Reaction wheel disturbances; Sine-like
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
13-14 Reacquire considerations, loss of lock indicator; Null; Westphal; Lockheed; Accelerometer; Micro-meteorite; SIC & DH
14-15 Power considerations of FGS; Variance; Photon noise; WF/PC; Axial SI
15 Science Verification Working Group; Duty cycle
15-16 Tracking moving targets - Original concepts; Juan Dawson; Hugh Dougherty; Halley's Comet; Piecewise linear approximation; Velocity vector; Great circle
16 Problems in Lockheed algorithm
16-17 Emphasis on planetary tracking and planning observations; Algorithm; Bob Brown; Cosmological; Ramp up; Ephemeris; Red Spot; Jupiter; Jovian longitude; Trigonometric; Polynomial; Moving Target Working Group
18-19 Moving the vehicle via guide stars; Monotonic; Zero mean Gaussian; Quantization; Near real time; Inner Galilean satellite
20-22 On-board vs ground compensation for optical distortion WF/PC; HRS; 7 minutes in y; Radial; tangential; Gamma-ray; Pick-up mode; Error bars; Global polynomial a priori; a posteriori
22-24 Works as Project Engineer on GSSS; Art Code; Barry Lasker; Goddard; Institute; Science Data Analysis System (SDAS); GS3 (Guide Star Selector System); AURA; Preliminary Requirements Review (PRR); Conrad Sturch; CSC
23 Tony Mallama; Latrobe Hall
23-24 Johns Hopkins; PDS machines; Chutzpah; Georgetown; Laurel
24 Aid from staff at Hopkins; Applied Physics Lab; Arthur Davidsen; (Richard) Henry; (Warren) Moos; Fastie; SDAS
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
24 Early activities at the Institute; VAX's; VAX 750; 780; Throughput
24-26 Early guide star concerns; Numerology; PDS; Cross-trapping
25 Photometric; European Southern Observatory (ESO)
26 Golberg's responsibilities on GS3; Texans; Response to original proposal for GS3; Index sequential system
27 Problem managing CSC; Bubble modules; (Helmut) Jenkner ESA; Maxwell's Equations; Newton's Laws; FORTRAN
27-28 (The great CSC massacre); Baltimore; Columbia; Silver Spring; Vic Church; NSF
29 Environment of work at Institute; Riccardo (Giacconi)
29-30 Guide star availability and selection measurement; Coarse resolution; 50 micron; Centroid
30-32 Atmosphere at Institute when Giacconi arrives; All-but dissertation
31 CEO
32 X-ray satellites; Field committee; AXAF; Space Telescope Science Institute
33 Self-sufficing of the Institute; Prima facie JHU; HomewoodCampus; Ethan Schreier
33-34 Institute relationship with Goddard; TRW; Fitz format
34-35 Software problems and protocol and documentation; VAX 8600; UNIX; VMS; Jane Russell; Bruce Gillespie; Lockheed-Palo Alto; Critical Design Review; Preliminary Design Review; SO-04 (Science Operations 04)
36 GS3 Work in crowded fields and blemishes; Flux; Microdensitometer; Galaxies
37 Fastie solid to getting guide star specs; CCD cameras
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
37 Problems with guide star specs; Slew; Modem; Supernova; Areal coverage; n-thousand dollar
38 Goddard's involvement in guide star data base; ADP; GSA; Procurement of processors; Motorola 6800; Kluge; ASCII; Problems with data stream in software; Op-codes; PDP-11; RS232
39 Algorithms for processing survey plates; Algorithms; Halos
40 Image problems on survey plates; Helmut Jenkner; Barry (Lasker); Guide Star Advisory Council; Harrington; Nancy Roman; Jane Russell; Astrometrist
40-41 Microdensitometer/PDS systems; Bill van Altena; Yale; Anatoly Evzerov; 236-inch; Leningrad; HP
41-42 Working for Ethan Schreier; Riccardo (Giacconi); Bubble charts; 20x20; 10x10
42 Goddard's concern on foundation of PDS's; Interfacing Institute w/SOGS; TRW, SOGS; Science Operations Ground Support; FDOR, Flight Data Operations Review; Bill Oegerle
42-43 Responsibility as FGS scientist; Alain Fresneau; ESA
43 Leaving the Institute; Bob Brown; Pete Simmons; Turnover at the Institute; Art Code; Adrienne Timothy
43-44 Severo as Business Manager; Vince Severo
44 Goldberg at OAO Corp.; OAO; Danbury; Barry Kirkham; Dave Leckrone; AXAF
45 Changes in Goddard staff affecting ST; Frank Carr; STAR
46 Test procedures at Goddard vs. Lockheed; UV emission lines
46-47 Working arrangements with Leckrone; Tom Sherrill
47 Scheduling arrangements; OV/SV (Orbital Verification/Science Verification); Dummy scheduling; Design Reference Mission
47-49 Scattered light and background considerations; How to determine exposure times; Flux noise; 103 to 104; Anti-solar
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
49-50 Relationship between P-E and Harris; Harris; Tiger Team; FGE (Fine Guidance Electronics); Radians; 2-16
50-51 Harris' understanding of FGE specs; Internal rate calculations; Microarcminutes; Spherical trig; Ron Capaso
51 Calculation of trig functions; Polynomial; Sine functions
51-52 Lockheed requirements imposed; Microseconds; APL; CMOS processor
52-53 Putting in the uplinkable parameters; Uplinkable; RAM locations; ROM; Firmware
53-54 NASA and Harris relations; Beggs; Kodak
55-56 People wanting to go work for the Space Station project; SpaceStation; Carr; Aaron Guha; Fairchild; Martin; Odett; Mona Tycz; John Martin; CTA; SMO-1000; Joe Rothenberg; Fred Speer; AXAF; (Jim) Odom
56-57 OAO-Huntsville-Goddard connection; Buzz Rudow; HOSC; Huntsville Operations Support Center; POCC; Payload Operations Control Center; TDRSS; White Sands; Bob Harrington; Barry Kirkham
57-58 Tiger Teams and finding solutions in PCS/FGS; interfacing with contractors; DOD
58-59 Concept of using quadrant detector in place of Koester interferometer; Quadrant detector; Koesters
59-62 Other character involved in ST project; Juan Dawson; Bendix; Hugh Dougherty; Astigmatism; Root 40; Sahag Dardarian; John Martin; Charlie Jones; Jack Cunniff; Tom Harvey; Bob Jones
Groth, Edward. Date: March 15, 1984. Interviewer: Paul Hanle. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 45 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Groth recalls research and teaching at Princeton since 1968. Discusses his early interest in ST; also discusses Telescope's capabilities and instrument design. Recounts his proposal for ST and his role as team leader; assesses ST observational capabilities, communication between project scientists and engineers and the work of Data and Operations Team. Other topics include NASA contractors (especially those for scientific instruments), securing funding for ST and allocation of time on ST. Also discusses STScI's establishment and its promotion policies; reviews Princeton's proposal for STScI (in which Groth participated) and compares the proposal with that from Johns Hopkins.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-3 Science and capabilities of Space Telescope
3-4 NASA's Science Working Group and Space Telescope instrument design
4 High Speed Area Photometer; team leader Bob McNall
5-6 Groth's arrival at Princeton in 1968; subsequent research interests and teaching positions
6-7 Proposal for Space Telescope: Data and Operations Team Leader
7 Early opinion of Space Telescope
8 Interest in Space Telescope
9 Proposal for Space Telescope accepted; decision-making process
10-11 First team members of Science Institute
12 Science team selection process
13-14 Interface Requirements Document; Mission Operations Requirements
15 Tracking and Data and Relay Satellite System
16-17 Real time observations with Space Telescope
18 Communication between scientists and engineers
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
18 Goddard Operations Scientist Bob Hobb; Mission Operations Manager John Martin
19 Redundancy in NASA functions
20 Contractors on NASA projects
21 NASA chain of command
21-22 Contracting and subcontracting of scientific instruments; Einstein and Copernicus
22 How the Data and Operations Team functioned
23-24 Engineering data-flow; contractual responsibilities to NASA
24 Project managers Keathly and Speer; Ethan Schreier, Chief Data and Operation Scientist
25-26 Jeff Scargle-SIRTF; positive continuation of Data and Operations Team
26 Bob O'Dell-Project Scientist; interest in Data and Operations
26 Princeton and CALTECH Wide Field Cameras
27 Characterization of Bill Keathley's management style
28 Problems of Project Managers; reshaping of STHP management in 1982
29-30 Participation in selling of Space Telescope; Greenstein Report
30-31 Guaranteed time on Space Telescope
31 Observation with Wide Field Camera and Faint Object Camera
32-33 Handling of Data and Operations Planning by the Institute
33-34 Data Storage Systems
35 Riccardo Giacconi: Director of the Institute; management and scientific abilities
35 Original reasons for establishing Institute
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
36-37 Further discussion on Giacconi and the Institute; policies involved in promotions
37-38 Groth's role in preparing the Princeton Proposal for the Space Telescope
38-39 Science Institute: AURA's interference in the proposal
39-40 Consortia working with Princeton: AUI, USRA and AURA
40-41 Site Selection Committee: predetermination to pick Hopkins
41-42 Differences between Princeton and Hopkins proposals
42-43 CSC role in Hopkins proposal and presence at Goddard
44 Groth's role on Space Telescope; consulting with TRW
45 Involvement in Red Team
45 Closing comments
Guha, Arun K. Date: July 26, 1983. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: .75 hrs.; 13 pp. Use restriction: Permission required for access.
Guha recalls early career at Goddard, involvement with IUE, Solar Max and Space Station. Describes his move to ST in 1980. Discusses ST-Goddard management structure and communications between Goddard and Marshall. Discusses origins of Marshall-Goddard ST management division. Discusses choice of Marshall as lead ST center. Describes Goddard's early approach to ST responsibilities and Goddard engineers' reaction to ST project. Discusses modification of plans following joint center management decision. Discusses effect of Hinners' appointment as Goddard director on ST
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Guha's career at Goddard; involvement with IUE, Solar Max, Space Station
1-2 Move from Solar Max to ST, 1980; role of Gerry Burdett
2 Guha's knowledge of ST during the 1970s
3 Reports of ST management difficulties circulating at Goddard
3-4 ST Project-Goddard management structure, late 1970s; communications between Goddard and Marshall
4-5 Origins of the Marshall-Goddard ST management division; role of the post-Apollo NASA work slowdown on the decision
5 Influence of the concept of manned orbital servicing in the choice of Marshall as the lead ST center
5-6 NASA HQ's intention to transfer the ST project to Goddard after launch
6 Communication and cooperation between Goddard and Marshall
7 John Clark's degree of interest in the ST project
7 'Goddard Culture': a focus on small projects
8 Early Goddard approach to ST responsibilities; Jim Kupperian, Joe Purcell; instructions to Goddard ST manager George Levine
8-9 Goddard engineers' reaction to the ST project
9 Modifications to the ST Phase B design following the joint center management decision
9-10 Impact of the aggressive promotion of ST on the difficulty of project engineering; the degree of user expectations for ST
10-11 Role of wide-ranging justifications in selling large engineering projects
11-12 Staff changes in and above the Goddard-ST project, 1980: transfer of Keathley from ST-Marshall to Goddard, assignment of Burdett and Guha to ST-Goddard, appointment of Young as Goddard director; the hiring of new engineers at Goddard
12-13 Degree of support of ST-Goddard from Young
13 Effect of Hinners' appointment as Goddard director on ST-Goddard; Goddard's position in the 1982-3 project scrutiny
Guha, Arun K. Date: August 1, 1983. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 3 hrs.; 32 pp. Use restriction: Permission required for access.
Continued from interview on July 26, 1983. Guha discusses changes in ST effected by Frank Speer's appointment as ST project manager at Marshall. Discusses motives for 1980 ST project changes. Describes post-1980 relations between Goddard and Marshall. Describes relations between ST and ESA. Discusses 1980 proposal to cut back on scientific instruments. Discusses competition between astronomers. Discusses his own effect on Goddard ST and engineering staff relations. Describes Goddard's role in planning for STScI. Discusses Giacconi's conception of role and mission of STScI. Discusses staffing of STScI and role of non-optical astronomers. Describes changing attitude of planetary scientists toward ST during '70s. Describes contrast between Marshall and Goddard in terms of ST design and engineering. Describes his own role in identifying flaws in Pointing Control System design. Discusses Marshall's approach to problem solving. Discusses Perkin-Elmer's problems in 1982. Describes his own prognosis for ST's continued progress. Discusses his own reaction to report of House Appropriations ST investigating committee and to Welch Report. Discusses the effect of micro-management. Discusses Lockheed/Perkin-Elmer pre-quarterly conferences. Discusses the role of government scientists and differences between performing science and management of science.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
14 Changes in the ST project in 1980: the effect of Frank Speer's appointment as the ST project manager at Marshall
14-15 Status of Lockheed's ST design effort in 1980; relocation of all ST systems engineering to Marshall
16 Motives for the 1980 ST project changes; concerns about ST systems engineering
16 Role of Keathley in the Goddard ST project management
17 Post-1980 relations between Marshall and Goddard ST staffs
17-18 Tom Young's role in the Marshall-Goddard ST project interface; changes in the ST quarterly review procedures; ST funding
19-20 Relations between the ST Project and ESA; interplay between Marshall and ESA management styles; role of Jan Burger
20-21 Background of the 1980 proposal to reduce the number of Scientific Instruments included on ST at launch; NASA's and scientists' conceptions of ST's scientific responsibility
22 Relations between O'Dell and Jack Brandt after the 1980 crisis
23 Professional competition between astronomers; Bob O'Dell
23-25 Relations between the Goddard ST Project office and the Goddard astronomers of the center Sciences Directorate; Goddard astronomers' self-image; involvement of Dave Leckrone, Jack Brandt, and Al Boggess with ST
25-26 Relations at Goddard between the ST Project and the Engineering Directorate; long-term results of Goddard engineers' early experiences with ST; role of George Levine
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
26-27 Goddard reorganizations effect support of Goddard ST effort by Engineering Directorate
28 Guha's effect on Goddard ST and Engineering staff relations
28-30 Goddard's role in planning for STScI and negotiating its relationship to the ST Project; changes in planning between the Code and Giacconi directorships
30-31 Giacconi's conception of the role and mission of STScI; relations between Giacconi and Hinners
31-32 STScI as the potential science center for AXAF
32 Staffing of STScI; the role of non-optical astronomers in STScI; Don Hall and Adrienne Timothy
33 Changes in the attitude of planetary scientists toward ST in the 1970s
33-34 Planetary science and the CCD-Vidicon debate; roles of Westphal and Spitzer; the Wide Field/Planetary Camera (WF/PC)
34 Public relations importance of the WF/PC's ability to yield images intelligible to laymen
34-35 Convergences of design between the WF/PC and the ESA Faint Object Camera (FOC)
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
35-36 Contrasts between Marshall's construction perspective and Goddard's management perspective on ST design and engineering
36-37 Problems with the Lockheed PCS design, 1981; Guha's role in identifying PCS flaws; contrasting responses to his efforts from different management levels at Marshall
37-38 Marshall's involvement with the Scientific Instrument latch design
38 'Marshall Culture'; the Marshall approach to problem-solving
38-39 Perkin-Elmer's problems in 1982; origins of the P-E decision to hire Don Fordyce
39 Impact of Fordyce's announcement of P-E's severe problems on the ST Project and on NASA HQ
40 Guha's prognosis for ST's continued smooth progress; the involvement of various NASA Administrators with ST
40-41 Precedents for the establishment of Welch's NASA HQ ST management division
41-42 Guha's response to the report of the House Appropriations ST investigating committee, and to the Welch Report
42-43 The effect of micro-management; management styles of Bill Keathley at Goddard and Frank Speer at Marshall
43-44 'Getting well'; contractors' use of the get-well procedure
44-45 Lockheed-P-E pre-quarterly conferences; the effect of discussions on the quarterly reports
45-46 The role of government scientists; differences between performing science and management of science
Rev. 10/13/95