Odom, James B. Date: February 26, 1985. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 53 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Odom recalls early career and work on launch vehicle/payload integration at NASA. Describes his work as Project Manager on Space Shuttle's external tank and move to ST project manager in 1983. Discusses changes in ST after 1983 and current status of ST assembly, including Fine Guidance Sensors, latch design, maintenance and refurbishment technologies. Discusses anticipated problems on orbit including effect of solar flares and need for periodic orbital re-boost. Discusses Science Working Group and STOPAT. Contrasts science and engineering cultures and role of scientists with engineering skills. Discusses effect of multi-center, multi-contractor nature of ST program and cooperation with ESA. Discusses his own role in directing project resources to troubled areas. Discusses distribution of Level I and Level II design responsibilities. Discusses challenges remaining before launch. Discusses art of project management and importance of experience. Discusses "Marshall Style." Discusses challenge of increase in data output anticipated in this project and effect on science community.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Early career with Army Ballistic Missile Agency
2 Career at Alabama after formation of NASA: launch vehicle/payload integration; Saturn S-IIC development
2-3 Odom's Phase B Space Shuttle work; work as Project Manager for the Shuttle external tank
3-4 Lucas nominates Odom to ST project manager position in April, 1983; Odom takes over ST rebaselining
4 Initial challenges facing Odom in ST project
5 Focus of 1983 ST changes on management rather than systems
5-6 ST project morale; project staff changes during rebaselining
6-7 Transfer of ST Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA) project management, led by Jerry Richardson, to Perkin-Elmer
7-8 Effect of management changes at Perkin-Elmer; OTA delivery
8-9 Transfer of ST Support Systems Module and Integration managers to Lockheed; Lockheed schedule performance
9 Current status of ST assembly
9-10 Role of Don Fordyce at P-E; relations between Fordyce and Richardson
10-11 Recent design changes to the Fine Guidance Sensors
11 Additional FGS design efforts under Bill Fastie at Johns Hopkins APL
12 Scientific Instrument latch design challenges
12-13 Phase B estimates of the difficulty inherent in ST maintenance and refurbishment technology; supplanting of development concerns by operations concerns
14-15 OTA truss strength problems; dangers and tradeoffs of the 'protoflight' development procedure
16 Protoflight concept and the proliferation of paperwork
16 Impact of protoflight concept on preflight testing
17-18 Changing conception of return-to-ground ST servicing vs. on-orbit maintenance; increase in Orbital Replacement Units
19 Effect of Shuttle orbital servicing demonstrations and SpaceStation concept on ST servicing planning
20-22 ST orbital parameters; influence of solar flares on ST orbit; periodic orbital re-boost
22-23 Science input into the ST project: Science Working Group (SWG), STOPAT, STScI
23 Odom's relations with the SWG, and with Bob Brown
23-24 Role of STOPAT; enthusiasm of ST scientists
24-25 Sources of ST action items; Odom's methods of managing them; action items resulting from the 1982-3 rebaselining
25-27 Difference between science and engineering cultures; Odom's response to ST scientists' access to all levels of the NASA chain of command; contributions of scientists to the project
27 Role of scientists with engineering skills
27-28 Effect of multicenter, multicontractor nature of ST program
28 Odom's previous work with scientists; cooperation with ESA
28-29 Challenge of coordinating the numerous organizations contributing to ST
29 Odom's role in directing project resources to troubled areas
29-31 Systems of resolving action items and engineering problems: Marshall-chaired engineering review panels; Change Boards
31 Role of Jean Olivier
31-33 Support of the ST project by the NASA center engineering laboratories and support staffs: testing and thermal bake-out
33-34 Definition of systems engineering
34-35 Systems engineering functions on ST; Interface Control Documents
35-36 Distribution of Level I and Level II design responsibilities
36 Communications and responsibilities between Odom and Welch
37-38 Modifications to the WF/PC as an example of a Level I design change decision
38-40 Cleaning the primary mirror; ST contamination budgets; press's role in mirror issue
40-41 Major remaining challenges: ground system development; integration; environmental testing, solar arrays
41-42 WF/PC modifications
42 Internal organization of Lockheed's ST efforts
42-43 Lockheed flight software development
43-44 Relations between Lockheed and the scientist SI teams
44-45 Schedule issues in the final year before ST launch
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
45-46 The art of project management; importance of experience
46-47 Impact of the ST project's geographical diffusion on the project manager's job
47-48 Benefits of experience: a feel for individual contractors' motivations, strengths, and weaknesses
49-50 Existence of a 'Marshall Style'; Marshall's historical involvement with manned spaceflight
50 Difference between maintenance and refurbishing planning and the remainder of ST planning: astronaut involvement
50-51 ST's dramatically increased data output compared with earlier NASA science missions; effect on science community
51-52 Increase in the number of Orbital Replacement Units
53 Conclusion
Odom, James B. Date: January 7, 1987. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 25 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Odom discusses in detail the testing of Space Telescope components and systems by NASA and Lockheed. Gives particular attention to thermal-vacuum and acoustic testing and testing low-frequency noise response. Discusses not only the tests, their design and use of computer models, but also the testing process itself and the cooperation of scientists, NASA, Lockheed and other contractor personnel. Considers ST's power deficiency. Odom also discusses budgets for and design of spare components for in-orbit repairs, especially for replacement of Wide Field/Planetary Camera; scientists' input on instrument design. Emphasizes necessity of developing long-term budgets and testing schedules. Considers inter-action of scientists and engineers and evaluation of scientific/technical tradeoffs. Odom recalls effects of Challenger accident and evaluates changes in ST program. He emphasizes importance of team%building and systems planning, and concludes by noting changes in Science Working Groups.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Odom discusses different philosophies of testing at NASA and Lockheed; Lockheed module testing; NASA's simulation of orbit conditions
2 NASA module testing; testing ST response to low-frequency noise
2-3 Difficulties measuring low-frequency response
3 Acoustic, thermal vacuum tests of ST
3-4 Provisions for thermal equilibrium of ST structures
4 Thermal vacuum tests; flight hardware satisfaction; ground test instrumentation problems
4-5 Tests of command links from Goddard to ST
5 Integration of scientists, NASA and contractor representatives on test teams; designing test programs
5-6 Testing subsystems; participation of Lockheed & science teams
6-7 Importance of models simulating flight for testing and problem-solving
7 Production of increasingly accurate models
7-8 Discovering power deficiency on ST; possible remedies
8 Crew training for in-orbit repairs
8-9 Computerized testing data for all ST components
9-10 Spare components for on-orbit servicing; pallets for delivering spares on Shuttle to ST
10 Support equipment for spare components; difficulty of designing spare instruments
10-11 Input of scientists, AXAF on instrument design
11-12 Budgeting for replacement instruments, such as Wide Field/Planetary Camera
12 Difficulty of anticipating by several years detailed activities and budget requirements
12-13 Developing schedule and budget guidelines
13 Responsibility of allocating money to specific projects within general guidelines
13-14 Preliminary and final reviews of budget
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14 Allocation and use of reserve monies by Marshall; decision to budget for WF/PC clone
14-15 Odom discusses interaction with Science Working Group
15-16 Importance of engineers, project scientists in evaluating technology/science tradeoffs
16-17 Effects on ST of Challenger accident; decision to proceed with thermal vac tests
17-18 Problems worked on during Challenger launch delay; more practice operating ground systems
18-20 Odom discusses body of knowledge particular to ST; hardware protection; contamination
20 1983 change in ST project philosophy and size
20-21 Building up AXAF program
21 Assesses quality, quantity of early systems engineering; decision to build up program rather than reduce ST's scientific capabilities
21-22 Coordinating centers and their hardware
22 Marshall Center and associate contractor system
22-23 Importance of systems planning
23-24 Odom assesses scheduling, team-building, and other accomplishments
24 Detailed manpower and cost tracking
24-25 Changes in Science Working Groups
Olivier, Jean R. Date: January 18, 1984. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 19 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Olivier discusses concepts and studies which led to ST. Discusses separation of Spacelab project from Space Telescope. Discusses impact of decline of enthusiasm for manned-space exploration on proposed space station. Discusses Marshall's Phase A planning for LST. Describes organization of his own Astronomy Group within Marshall structure. Describes Goddard LST design concepts and Marshall's designation as LST lead center. Describes progress of LST through Phase A. Describes his own role in providing engineering expertise as ST entered Phase B at Marshall. Describes Phase A Scientific Instrument design. Discusses his own responsibilities as ST Project Engineer. Discusses plan to have associate ST contractors. Discusses effect of Congressional budget cuts on ST. Describes evolution of optical telescope proposals.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Predecessor concepts and studies leading to the Space Telescope: Manned Orbiting Research Lab, Orbital Astronomical Support Facility
2 Manned spaceflight community's early space telescope studies
3 Bifurcation of early studies into separate Spacelab and Space Telescope lines of evolution; role of Jim Downey
4-5 Transfer of space telescope studies and interest from manned to unmanned community; link between declining manned enthusiasm and postponement of the space station
5 NASA HQ Space Telescope supporters: Jesse Mitchell, John Naugle, Nancy Roman
5-6 Marshall's use of the manned telescope studies in its Phase A LST planning
6-7 Organization of the Olivier's Astronomy Group within Downey's Marshall Program Development Directorate: positions of Paul Schwindt, Max Nein
7 Origins of the debate over assigning Marshall or Goddard LST Phase B development authority; role of Joe Purcell
7 Goddard LST design concepts
8 Arguments for Marshall's designation as the LST lead center
8-9 Roles of the various science advisory boards in Phase A; influence of Nancy Roman
9 Effect of the LST lead center competition on Marshall - Goddard relations
9 Olivier's expectations that LST would survive Phase A
10 Technical design aspects identified as challenges in Phase A
10-11 Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA) proof-of-concept efforts
11-12 Incorporation of active optics into the LST design
12 Reorganization of the Marshall LST office at the start of Phase B: roles of Olivier, Petrone, Downey
12-13 Olivier as the Marshall ST Project engineering input, and O'Dell as the science input
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
13 Phase A Scientific Instrument design: the Goddard Scientific Instrument Package (SIP); roles of ITEK, Kollsman, Ken Hallam
14 Olivier's responsibilities as ST Project Engineer; managementof the ST engineering interfaces between centers, contractors
15 Origins of and logic behind the decision to adopt associate ST contractors rather than one prime contractor
16-17 Effect of Congressional budget-cutting pressures on the ST
17-18 Relationship between the various transitional optical telescope proposals of the 1960s, and the 1.8 meter proposal made following the first Congressional review of LST Phase B: ASTRA, Medium Aperture Optical Telescope (MAOT)
19 Phase A/B concerns selection of a primary mirror material
Olivier, Jean R. Date: February 27, 1985. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1 hr.; 15 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Olivier discusses options considered during Phase B. Discusses impact of manned activity on ST design. Discusses effect of low cost-protoflight design approach on ST including use of standard equipment, predesigned instruments and predesigned computer lacking memory redundancy. Discusses challenges of Pointing Control System and Fine Guidance Sensor. Discusses his own views on protoflight development concept. Discusses impact of this approach on hardware testing. Contrasts ESA and NASA hardware development philosophies. Discusses long-term effect of complicated ST management structure. Discusses impact of international collaborative space efforts on organization and engineering. Discusses Phase C at Marshall and Marshall's responsibilities as lead center for ST program.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Detector options for ST considered during Phase B: SEC, CCD, film
1-2 Impact film detectors and astronaut activity would have had on ST design
2-3 Effect of the low cost-protoflight design approach on ST
3 Concerns with the graphite-epoxy OTA truss and protoflight design theory
3-4 Use of standard equipment to reduce ST costs: effect of using predesigned batteries, computers, gyros, transponders
4-5 NASA HQ efforts to promote the standard component approach
5-6 Effect on ST of the use of the predesigned DF-224 computer: lack of memory redundancy
6-7 Challenges of the Pointing Control System (PCS): interplay between isolated hardware selections and system expectations
7-8 Concern over the Fine Guidance Sensor (FGS); the loss of lock problem; the effect of FGS design on contractor selection
8 Efforts to define an alternate FGS: Jim Westphal, Bill Fastie
8-9 Concepts for a CCD-based FGS
9 Tradeoffs of the protoflight development concept; Olivier's views on the protoflight approach
9-10 Impact of the protoflight approach on ST hardware testing
10 Contrasts between the ESA and NASA hardware development philosophies
10-11 Other project concerns in Phase C/D: the primary mirror
11 Olivier's view of the Phase B decision to design around a 2.4-meter rather than a 3-meter primary mirror specification
11 Long-term effect of the complicated ST management structure
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12-13 Organizational and engineering impact of international collaborative space efforts; the role of interface documents; mutual conservatism of design
13-14 Rationale for the division of the PCS and FGS contracts between Lockheed and Perkin-Elmer
14 Effect of the Phase C manpower cap at Marshall on the ST program
15 Marshall's responsibilities as lead center for the ST Program
Olivier, Jean R. Date: January 8, 1987. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 3 hrs.; 34 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Olivier recalls early career in automotive engineering and subsequent shift to space industry. Discusses Advanced Astronomy Plan (1966) and emergence from that of ST plans. Discusses ST Orbital Replacement Unit designs and, at length, an instrument testing plan emphasizing thermal vacuum tests. Oliver moves to Lockheed in 1985 and recalls instrument testing there and extensive use of mathematical models and high speed computers. Recalls hardware problems and Wide Field Planetary Camera quantum efficiency hysteresis; development of coalitions for resolving problems. Olivier notes the creation of conflicts within problem-solving process and concludes with comments on budget constraints, ST launch schedule and Challenger accident.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Development of interest in engineering; BS, Mississippi State; work at Chrysler; Master of Automotive Engineering; graduation from Chrysler Institute
2 Move to Huntsville; shift to space industry; work on Redstone and Jupiter rockets
2-3 Establishment of Kennedy Space Flight Center [KSFC] at Cape Canaveral; separation of launch and ground support work from Marshall Space Flight Center [MSFG]; work at MSFG in Advanced Systems Office with Georg von Tiesenhausen and Wernher von Braun
3 Cryogenic storage of propellants; development of Advanced Astronomy Plan [AAP] in 1966
3-4 Emergence of Space Telescope from AAP
4-5 Involvement in Phase A and Phase B of ST project
5-7 Request for Proposals [RFP] for Phase C/D; process of RFP development; refinement of specifications
8-9 Development of level 1 requirements for ST
9 Change in Orbital Replacement Unit [ORU] design for ST instruments in 1980
9-10 Discussion of "umbrella specifications"
10-11 Approach to testing ST: focus on thermal vacuum test
11-13 Developing an instrumental test program
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
13-15 Continuation of discussion on development of test program
15 Move to Lockheed in July, 1985, to develop tests and analyze results
15-16 Work pace during testing at Lockheed
16-17 Analysis of test data
17 Impact of test data on design of guiding mathematical models
17-19 ST as assemblage of mathematical models guiding evolution of instrument design
19 Interdependence of mathematical models and test data
19-20 Impact of budget constraints on design/model loop
20 Impact of budget on engineer/vendor interaction
20-21 Balancing budgetary constraints and technical risk
21 Impact of fast computers on design/model turnaround
21-24 Discussion of design of kinematic mounts to prevent thermal deformations of Support Systems Module [SSM] from affecting the Optical Telescope Assembly [OTA]
25 Discussion of latches and "galling" in the latches
25-26 Discussion of "thermal creak"
26-27 Tests for thermal creak in SSM and OTA latches
27 Discussion of Wide Field Planetary Camera's [WF/PC] quantum efficiency hysteresis [QEH] problem as illustration of problem resolution process
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
27 Continuation of discussion of problem resolution process in WF/PC example
27-28 Coalition building in problem resolution process
28-30 Communication of problems and possible solutions to upper echelon
30 Debate over deletion of actuators in primary mirror: additional study in problem resolution
30-31 Dealing with differences in opinion over solutions adopted
31-32 Impact of budgetary constraints on handling of such problems as contamination, noisy gyros, jitter
32 Challenger disaster and affect on ST launch
32-33 Use of time until eventual ST launch to reduce operating risk
33-34 Discussion of anticipated post-launch work
Pellerin, Charles. Date: August 1, 1983. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 28 pp. Use restriction: Permission required to quote, cite or reproduce.
Pellerin recalls early educational background and work at Goddard on sounding rockets. Describes work with Spacelab and as director of Astrophysics Office of OSS. Discusses his own concerns at OSS in 1982. Discusses Headquarter's management of ST through 1982 and first awareness at OSS of ST's difficulties. Discusses roots of Perkin-Elmer 1982 crisis. Discusses rebaselining after 1982. Discusses removal of ST development from Astrophysics Office and its placement under independent Space Telescope Development Division under Jim Welch. Discusses impact of this shift on his own work. Contrasts centralized style of manned spaceflight programs at NASA with decentralized unmanned efforts and the impact of ST's shift from one to another. Discusses role and influence of scientists in Keller-Welch administration. Discusses O'Dell's management of Science Working Group and effect of "Black Saturday" on him. Describes relations between Marshall and Goddard and the lead center concept. Discusses the effect of joint center management on ST program as well as impact of working on fringes of classified technology. Discusses relation between military security and corporate advantage. Describes effect of ESA role on ST project. Discusses STScI and Hornig Committee report. Discusses development of instrumentation. Contrasts mission and users of Advanced X-ray Astronomy Facility with those of ST.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Academic background; work at Goddard on sounding rockets during graduate studies
1-2 Other projects at Goddard: balloon-borne particle flux studies; Gamma Ray Observatory
2 Transfer to NASA HQ in 1975; seven years work with Spacelab; positions in 1982 as deputy and then full director of the Astrophysics Office of OSS
3-4 Frank Martin and Pellerin's concerns in early 1982: IRAS cost overruns, impact on plasma physics; keeping alive the Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO)
4 NASA HQ management of ST through 1982; Program Manager Frank Carr's management style; flow of information
5 Concentration within top OSS echelons on GRO; desire to resolve GRO's troubles before addressing ST's
6 First awareness in OSS of ST's 1982 difficulties: Don Fordyce's report with Marc Bensimon on his rebaselining of Perkin-Elmer's OTA work; resulting one-year schedule slip
6-7 Roots of P-E crisis: Marshall/P-E negotiations concerning P-E's proposed cost estimate prepared for the 1980 rebaselining; roles of Ed Ronan, Bill Lucas, and Andy Stofan
7 P-E balance between management and technical efforts
8 Factors in the NASA HQ reaction to the Fordyce briefing: Martin's departure, Pellerin's ambiguous job status, Keller's interest in ST project
8-9 Keller's response to Fordyce briefing: Speer instructed to submit a budget which identifies and solves all ST problems; Welch's tiger team established to undertake a parallel independent effort
9-10 Pellerin's reactions to the parallel rebaselinings
10 Keller visits Marshall; impressions of MSFC
10 Welch completes his review, strongly commenting on the previous management of the ST project at HQ and the centers
11 Begg's reaction to Welch's comments
11 Frank Carr's management and the formal NASA center-HQ information flow
12 Relations between Marc Bensimon, Martin, and Speer
12-13 Beggs pushes for a separate ST division; Keller compromises by pulling ST development from the Astrophysics Office and placing it in an independent Space Telescope Development Division under Welch
13-14 Impact of the Astrophysics-STDD division on Pellerin
14 NASA's and Pellerin's reaction to Welch's introduction of contractor personnel to NASA HQ
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14-15 NASA administrative cultures: NACA, manned spaceflight (centralized), and unmanned spaceflight (decentralized)
15 ST's early administration (unmanned, decentralized); contrast with Welch's system (centralized)
16 NASA management difficulties related to the form of NASA's contracts: goods rather than services agreements
16-17 Role, influence of scientists in Keller-Welch administration
17-18 O'Dell's management of the Science Working Group; effect of 'Black Saturday' on O'Dell
19-20 Relations between Marshall and Goddard; budgetary authority
20 Goddard's reaction to STScI
20-21 Degree of Goddard's independence from Marshall; Tom Young and Bill Lucas
21 Goddard under Noel Hinners
22 Operating styles of NASA's unmanned space centers; lead center concept
23 Effect of joint center management on ST program
23-24 Impact on the ST program of working on the fringes of classified technology; contractors' attitudes toward security
24-25 Relation between military security and corporate advantage
25-26 Effect of the ESA role on the ST project; comparison with IRAS
26 STScI and the Hornig Committee report as a 'charter'
27 STScI and the development of instrumentation and SIs; role of STIC in NASA/STScI relations
27-28 STScI and AXAF; various possibilities for the operation of AXAF; differences between AXAF's and ST's mission and users
Reetz, Arthur J. Date: June 27, 1983. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length; 2.5 hrs.; 31 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Reetz recalls early educational background and early work on Mariner and Voyager programs at NASA. Discusses his first knowledge of Space Telescope and job of selling LST to Congress. Describes cost and definition problems in 1976. Discusses his own joining of ST program. Describes relations between Goddard and Marshall. Discusses challenges of achieving good optical system, pointing control system and guidance system. Discusses funding troubles. Describes managerial organization of project and his own activities and responsibilities. Discusses changes resulting from budget and schedule crises. Discusses problems mounting mirror and problems at Perkin-Elmer. Discusses James Beggs. Discusses response to crisis including set up of Tiger Team and review team. Contrasts Jim Welch and Fred Speer as project managers. Discusses technical problems like fine guidance sensors and cleaning the mirror. Discusses the Advanced X-ray Facility, and STScI and Headquarters.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Education and first employment; Project Orion
2 Program manager at NASA HQ in 1963
2 Program engineer on the Mariner Jupiter-Saturn 1977 mission (Voyager)
3 Warren Keller (Voyager program manager) and Jupiter radiation belts
4 Making Voyager a radiation-hardened vehicle
5 Interest in mathematics and engineering
6 First talk of Space Telescope
7 Selling Large Space Telescope to Congress
8 Cost and definition problems, 1976
9 Joining Space Telescope
10 Management problems
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
10 Problems with joint projects
11 Goddard/Marshall relations
12 Technological challenges: achieving a good optical system
13 The pointing control system, the fine guidance system
13 Funding trouble
14 Managerial organization of the project
15 Reetz' activities or duties
16 Changes resulting from the latest budget and schedule crisis
16-17 The testing program; difficulties mounting the mirror
17 Rescheduling the launch date
18 Problems at Perkin-Elmer; the severity of the problem for NASA
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
19 Mr. Beggs; the root of the problem
20 Managerial changes and other responses to the problem
21 Setting up a Tiger Team; Marc Bensimon
22 Setting up a review team headed by Jim Welch
23 Review team results
24 Jim Welch's versus Fred Speer's effectiveness as project manager
25 Fine guidance sensors and dust particles
26 Cleaning the mirror
27 Further discussions topics
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
28-29 Relations with the scientists
30 AXAF (Advanced X-ray Facility)
31 STSI and NASA HQ
Reetz, Arthur J. Date: September 21, 1983. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 30 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Continuation of interview on June 27, 1983. Reetz discusses motives and tactics of 1976 reevaluation of ST concept. Describes selling points for ST put before Congress. Discusses effect of Space Shuttle's 1978-80 difficulties on ST funding and considerations of alternatives to Shuttle for launching ST. Discusses ST testing and Fine Guidance Sensor development. Discusses motives for associate contractor structure of ST program. Discusses background of 1980 program rebaselining. Discusses "Black Saturday" and reactions to it. Describes origins and chronology of Perkin-Elmer's 1982 schedule crisis. Discusses need for rebaselining. Costs and benefits of rebaselining. Discusses role of various NASA HQ administrators in 1982 crisis. Discusses impact of changes made in response to crisis. Discusses ST Overview Committee. Discusses ST quarterly reviews. Describes Science Working Group meetings and "Marshall attitude." Discusses NASA's institutional character. Describes STScI including Giacconi's relations with NASA and the Institute's relation to Advanced X-ray Facility. Discusses role of STScI in the entire astronomical community.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
2 Motives and tactics of the 1976 reevaluation of the ST concept; reduction of the primary mirror to 2.4 meters as a cost-avoidance measure
3 Selling points for ST before Congress: long lifetime; Shuttle usage
3 Effect of shuttle-dependent design on the ST testing program; Reetz' demand for thermovacuum testing
4 Relationship between the ST shuttle-serviced, low cost design concept and the reduced ST testing program
4-5 Applicability of the protoflight design approach to large, state-of-the-art spacecraft
5 Relationship between the amount of non-Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) ST hardware and the ST orbital lifetime
5-6 Effect of the Space Shuttle's 1978-80 difficulties on ST funding
6 Alternatives to the Shuttle for launching ST
6 Fine Guidance Sensor (FGS) development and ST testing theories
7 Relative costs of a prototype-flight ST development program as opposed to the protoflight program
7-8 Preservation of competition as a chief motive for the associate contractor architecture of the ST program
9 Background of the 1980 program rebaselining
9-10 'Black Saturday'; the proposed cancellation of the ST spectrographs; the role of the project scientist; the logic behind Bob O'Dell's decisions during the incident
10 NASA HQ's reaction to the proposed spectrograph cancellations; HQ's decision to rebaseline ST; conflict with Shuttle funding
11-12 Origins of Marshall's 1980 concern that ST was in danger of cancellation; role of Bill Lucas
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12 NASA HQ's 1980 announcement that it did not intend to cutScientific Instruments (SIs) or ORUs to reduce ST cost
12-14 Origins and chronology of Perkin-Elmer's 1982 schedule crisis; P-E's operations style; the primary mirror-main ring integration
14 P-E's and Marshall's initial assessments of the impact of P-E's schedule slips; roles of Don Fordyce, Sam Keller, Burt Edelson
14-15 NASA HQ's December 1982 realization that P-E's slippage required another rebaselining; Beggs' reaction; rebaselined ST costs
15 High quality of P-E's finished primary mirror assembly
16 Costs of rebaselining: prolonged maintenance of standing efforts
16 Beneficiaries of ST rebaselining: Lockheed, SI teams
17 Changes in the P-E ST program management after 1982
17-18 Possibility of a large single-year ST Project budget increase
18 Role of various NASA HQ administrators in the 1982 ST problems; involvement of Burt Edelson, Sam Keller
18-19 Effect of NASA HQ staff changes on the awareness of ST problems and progress at NASA's highest levels; Burt Edelson
19-20 Effect of the turnover of ST Program Managers on the ST effort
20 Reetz' effort to promote ST institutional memory
20-21 Causes of the high turnover in NASA senior staff in the 1980s: retirement of the first NASA generation of the late 1950s
21 Impact of NASA HQ staff turnover on NASA-STScI relations
21-22 Different perceptions of the role of STScI; STScI as a permanent research institute; STScI and AXAF; STScI and SI construction
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
22-23 ST Overview Committee: Spitzer, Bill Tindall, and Bob Parks as advisors to Bill Lucas; Reetz' memories of a Leckrone advisory group
23 Reetz' division of his time as ST Program Engineer: technical vs. programmatic efforts
24 P-E and Lockheed consultations before the ST quarterly reviews
24 Bill Lucas' role in the ST quarterly reviews
25 Science Working Group meetings; Bob O'Dell's management style; assertiveness of scientists in broaching their concerns
25-26 The 'Marshall attitude'; role of Bill Lucas; Marshall ST staff's sources of information outside the quarterly review system
27 Reetz' concern that the experiences of ST's management become part of NASA's institutional memory
27-28 NASA's institutional character
28-29 STScI; Giacconi's relations with the NASA administration
29 STScI and AXAF
29-30 Role of STScI vis a vis the entire astronomy community; Reetz' drafting of the STScI Level I service requirements
Rehnberg, Jack. Date: November 1, 1983. Interviewers: Paul Hanle, Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.75 hrs.; 29 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Rehnberg describes his contact with ST as a manager in Perkin-Elmer Corp.'s Space Science Division (1966-83). Topics discussed from pre-1977 ST history include P-E involvement with the Stratoscope project and with Advanced OAO studies, work on LST Phase A/B research contracts, and industry involvement in the ST lobbying effort. Rehnberg describes incentives which encourage companies to accept NASA Phase A/B contracts with small immediate profit levels. He discusses P-E's winning ST Phase C/D bid, NASA supervision of the P-E ST effort, technical issues surrounding the 1980 and 1982-3 ST Project rephasing and rebudgeting efforts, P-E manpower issues, ST Project systems engineering, and ST technology challenges. Consideration of systems engineering and management in space science and of changes in P-E's ST management after 1983 conclude the discussion.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Joining Perkin-Elmer Corp. (P-E); work with Stratoscope and OAO 3 (Copernicus)
1 Work with USAF and Eastman-Kodak
1-2 Contacts with Lyman Spitzer and Robert Danielson of Princeton; Stratoscope, cont
2-3 Active and lightweight optics development under Advanced OAO and 3-meter orbital telescope contracts
3 Lunar-based astronomical telescope concepts
3-5 Considerations influencing primary mirror size selection for orbital telescope concepts
5 P-E and Large Space Telescope (LST) Phase A work
5-6 P-E involvement with Apollo Telescope Mount, AXAF
6 Organization of P-E's Phase B LST team
6-7 P-E's LST Phase B industry partners: TRW, Ball
7 P-E contact with Princeton regarding LST
7-8 P-E lobbyists' role in LST Congressional debates
8 LST's priority within NASA HQ
8-9 Coordination among LST industry lobbyists
9 Ground-based astronomers' reaction to LST
9-10 P-E's special interest in LST Phase B: historical P-E ties to astronomy, LST concept's prestige
10-11 Aerospace contractors' investment of corporate funds in NASA Phase B studies
11 Rewards of Phase B contracts even to companies not selected for Phase C
11 Amortizing cost vs. benefit over space science contract durations
11-12 Balancing corporate proprietary interests against disclosures required to win NASA contracts
12 On-site NASA supervision of P-E ST work
12-13 Organization of P-E's Phase C/D ST team
13-14 Consolidation of P-E's NASA contracts into a corporate Space Science Division; Rehnberg's role
14-15 1980 ST Project rephasing
15-16 Application of the protoflight design concept to ST; originsof the ST protoflight decision; funding for ST development test equipment
16 2.4-meter ST primary mirror as a lesser technical challenge than the proposed 3-meter primary
16-17 Unexpected ST technical challenges: Scientific Instrument (SI) latches
17 Systems engineering through ST project history
17-18 ST Fine Guidance Sensor (FGS) pointing demands
18 P-E advocacy of active ST primary optics
18-19 Impact of design changes on hardware fabrication
19 ST design changes and manpower distribution
19-20 Contrast of design changes suggested by contractors with those requested by NASA
20-21 FGS magnitude requirement changes as an example of NASA-requested design alterations
21 P-E ST project manpower issues: 1982-83
21-22 Increased contact between P-E and the Marshall Space Flight Center ST Project office
22 1982-83 ST Project rebaselining
22 ST systems engineering, cont
22-23 Funding levels for P-E's ST work
23 Unanticipated technological hurdles; impact of reduced ST testing budgets
23-24 Relation of science satellites to state-of-the-art technology: obsolescence by launch date
24 1977 decision to use CCDs as the detectors for the ST Wide Field Camera SI
24-25 Systems engineering demands of space science mission development
25 Contracting and management structure of the ST Project
25-26 ST hardware status
26 New technology development vs. 'routine' engineering as sources of ST cost increases
27 Changing focus of the P-E ST effort
27 Structure of Don Fordyce's onsite NASA team at P-E; increased prominence for the FGS effort
27-28 Changing P-E ST management to respond to changing program challenges
28 Effectively applying personnel on space projects
28-29 Status of the ST Project, ca. 1983
Richards, Evan. Date: February 20, 1984. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.5 hrs.; 52 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Richards recalls his involvement in the Orbiting Solar Observatory and Pioneer-Venus programs. Discusses work with Bob Bless on successful ST photometer proposal. Describes first exposure to LST concept. Describes relationship between Wisconsin's Space Astronomy Center and its Space Science and Engineering Center. Discusses division of responsibility between these two groups in work on High Speed Photometer. Contrasts university space science teams ability to operate with those of government or industry. Discusses effect of 1982 ST budget crisis on Wisconsin HSP project. Discusses shift in management style after reorganization in 1982. Discusses need to define ST hardware interfaces. Describes HSP team's time allocation. Discusses relationship with Goddard. Discusses his own concerns for schedule slippage. Contrasts Goddard and Lockheed test managers' relations with ST scientists. Discusses problems leading up to 1982-3 rebaselining. Compares schedule and performance position of Perkin-Elmer in 1982 with that of Lockheed in 1984. Discusses need for NASA to harness existing public support for ST.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Richards' career before joining Wisconsin; move to Madison ca. 1970 as Quality Assurance manager for the Orbiting Solar Observatory (OSO) program
2 Involvement with Pioneer-Venus, 1974-8; work with Bob Bless on a modest ST photometer proposal
2-3 Bless' team's reaction to being commissioned to construct a full-scale ST High Speed Photometer (HSP) Scientific Instrument (SI)
3 Richard's initial exposure to the concept of an LST as an undergraduate at Wisconsin enrolled in Code's astronomy course
4 Relationship between Wisconsin's Space Astronomy Center and its Space Science and Engineering Center (SSEC)
4-5 Division of responsibilities between Space Astronomy and SSEC for the ST photometer proposal
5-7 Final organization of and division of responsibilities between the Wisconsin teams immediately before an October 1977 report to Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) on the subject
8 Fiscal responsibilities and PI-project manager relations on the HSP project
8-9 Management styles of various Wisconsin Pis: Suomi, Kraushaar, Bless
9 Staffing the Space Science and Engineering Center for the HSP
9-10 Space Science's ability to tap talent in other Wisconsin centers
10-11 Goals and rationale for HSP testing program; HSP as an extremely flexible instrument
11-12 Relations between the engineers of the Space Science Center and the scientists of the HSP IDT (Instrument Definition Team)
12-13 Contributions of scientists to HSP design: influence of Van Citters, Elliot, Robinson
13-14 Turnover of ST Project technical officers at GSFC: Dick White, Ed Mundy, Wayne Sours; Project morale at GSFC
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14-15 University space science teams' ability to operate with somewhat less paperwork than government or industry teams
15-16 Contrasts between NASA's treatment of industry and university space contractors: presence and absence of the profit motive
16 Wisconsin's ability to solve scotian design problems more cheaply than could a contractor
17-18 Effect of the 1982 ST budget problems on the Wisconsin HSP team: conflicting instructions to cut and then maintain staff
18-19 Style of the ST Project during the Keathley/Levine management era: engineer-to-engineer contact, numerous working interfaces
19-20 Management style during the Speer/Burdett era: drawing of decisions away from engineer meetings, and into the formal project chain-of-command
20-21 Effect of the Speer/Burdett system on the circulation of information within the ST Project, and on the lag time in decision-making
21 Odom/Carr management as a synthesis of the two previous ST managements' styles
22-23 Instrument teams' ability to work directly with the spacecraft contractors during the Speer/Burdett era; roles of Guha, Sours
23-24 Richards' most distressing moment in his relations with GSFC
24 Scope of the contrast between the Keathley and Speer eras
25 Effect of relations between Goddard and Marshall on the daily workings of the instrument teams: testing philosophy
26 Sequence of major reviews of the HSP and the other SIs: Preliminary Requirements Review, Preliminary Design Review, Critical Design Review; importance of HSP's thermal model
27 Relationship between major design reviews and critical design changes: changes in HSP weight and thermal specifications
28 Wisconsin team's conservative design philosophy exemplified in the planning of the HSP weight budget
28-29 Wisconsin space science's conservatism as a result of workers' hands-on involvement with all phases of instrument development
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
29-30 Effect of the large number of ST hardware interfaces on the SI design teams; ST Project's responsiveness to demands that interfaces be defined and settled
30-31 Portion of the HSP team's time which is devoted to meetings; division of meeting responsibilities
31-33 HSP teams' experience with testing their SI at Goddard's facilities; final responsibility for decisions during testing; professionalism among Goddard test crews
33 Wisconsin representation at the Goddard test facilities
34-35 SI activities at Lockheed; tests to be performed on the SIs before complete integration into the spacecraft
35-36 Richards' concerns for the schedule performance of the Lockheed testing program, particularly the SATS software
36-37 Richards' predictions of possible sources of schedule slippage during the Lockheed testing
37-38 Contrast between Goddard and Lockheed test managers' relations with ST scientists
39-40 Concern within the ST Project for systems engineering followingthe 1982-3 rebaselining
40-42 Difficulties of grafting a systems engineering structure onto the ST program: managers unfamiliar with the system; SI alignment as an example
42 Results of the Goddard VAP testing of the HSP
42-43 Estimates of the actual ST launch time circulating within the Project; Richards' launch date 'straw polls' at the Project quarterly reviews
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
43-44 'Straw poll', continued; roles of Westphal, Keller
44-46 Visibility within the ST Project of the problems leading up to the 1982-3 rebaselining: contractor work suspensions, Marshall's policy on cost control
46-47 Parallels between Perkin-Elmer's schedule and performance position in 1982 and Lockheed's in 1984
47-48 Strength of the public interest in the Space Telescope
48-50 Lack of aggressive moves by NASA to take advantage of the existing public support for ST; NASA's reluctance to support PIs' and contractors' own public awareness efforts
51 Awareness of ST among young people
52 Degree of presidential support for ST
Roman, Nancy. Date: February 3, 1984. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 38 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Roman recalls her first exposure to LST concept in 1962. Discusses early enthusiasm for LST and early visions of its form and structure. Discusses beginning of Phase A. Discusses influence of Lyman Spitzer's 1969 NAS report and founding of LST Steering Committee. Discusses impact of success of various space astronomy missions on gaining support within astronomical community; impact of success of Copernicus mission in answering concerns over pointing control and mirror technology. Discusses need to justify LST to Congress during Phase B; Marshal-Goddard division of LST management; role of cosmology as influence on LST design and promotion; her own changed role in LST project after 1974. Describes her own role in 1974-7 lobbying effort. Describes her own involvement with Congressional staffers. Discusses concern that LST would be cancelled. Discusses her own lobbying priorities and strategies. Discusses the negotiations to win ESA's participation in LST. Discusses US reaction to ESA's guaranteed observing time. Discusses impact of funding concerns on LST design and primary mirror specifications. Discusses impact of Shuttle on LST design and selling efforts. Discusses changing name from LST to ST. Discusses concerns of Phase B. Discusses change in focal ratio. Discusses concerns in Phase C. Discusses systems engineering on ST and Marshall's expertise. Discusses role of the program scientists on ST and early ideas for scientific management of ST. Discusses Marshall and Goddard's reactions to STScI concept. Discusses astronomers early responses concerning proposal to locate STScI at Goddard. Discusses her own reaction to STScI concept and to ST itself. Discusses "Black Saturday." Discusses general astronomical community opinion of ST. Compares "space awareness" among different wavelength communities in astronomy and impact of ST on optical astronomers.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Roman's first exposure to LST concept: Iowa City Study, 1962
1-2 NASA's early Manned Orbiting Telescope (MOT) studies
2 Maturity of NASA's 1960s technology for building an LST
2-3 Degree of enthusiasm of scientific committees for LST; regional variations in support
3 Spitzer as an ST advocate; others include: Meinel, Code, Whipple, Tifft, Henize
4 Concept of a lunar astronomical telescope; concept for the Manned Orbiting Laboratory
5 Concepts for the National Astronomical Space Observatory; man-tended, multiwavelength orbital astronomy complexes
6 Debate over the pace of NASA's post-OAO advance toward larger space optical observatories; ASTRA 60-in. instrument
6-7 STAR Committee as part of the early LST planning process
7 Position of scientists towards Apollo and Apollo Applications; Apollo's effect on NASA science funding
7-8 Committees influencing LST planning: Astronomy Missions Board, STAR, Space Science Board, Astronomy subcommittee of the Space Sciences Steering Committee
8 Beginning of LST Phase A: Woods Hole, role of Sophan; nature of Phase A work: not one study, but many
8-9 Early supporters of LST in NASA HQ: support from HQ and center engineers: von Braun, Stuhlinger at MSFC; Purcell, Cepollina at GSFC
9-10 Influence of Spitzer's 1969 NAS report
10 LST Steering Committee founding, membership, mission; Phase B Working Group; roles of Spitzer, Code, Danielson, Bahcall, Bless
10-11 NASA reaction to and effect on LST project of the Greenstein Report; use of report before Congress
11 Astronomers' support for space observation in the 1970s and 1980s; effect of Copernicus, IUE, X-ray missions; regional prejudices among astronomers
12 Early 1970s LST project concerns with pointing control and mirror technology; effect of Copernicus mission success on such concerns
12 Other challenges to LST planners: structural stability
12-13 Necessity of justifying ST to Congress during Phase B
13 NASA's presentation of large Phase B programs to Congress
13-14 Origins and impact of the Marshall-Goddard division of ST management; role of Clark; Goddard as applications center
15 Cosmology as a major influence on LST design, promotion
15 Roman's involvement with LST during Phase A/B
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
15-16 Roman's changed role in the LST project after 1974
16-17 Effect of Headquarters management on the ST program: roles of Bland Norris, Jesse Mitchell, Dick Ashworth
17-18 Fletcher's attitude toward ST
18 Roman's role in the 1974-7 lobbying effort for ST; difference between lobbying efforts internal and external to NASA
19 Roman's involvement with Congressional staffers, with NASA budget alterations, with BOB/OMB
20 Fear that ST would at some point be finally cancelled
20 Roles of and Roman's relations with scientist/lobbyists; Spitzer, Bahcall, Code, O'Dell
21 Roman's lobbying priorities: education and involvement of laymen
21-22 Motives for and advantages of ESA involvement in ST
22-23 Negotiating ESA's participation in ST
23-24 Astronomers' responses to the 15% observing time allocation in the ESA ST agreements
24 Effect of funding battles on ST design and progress
24 Effect of funding on ST primary mirror specifications
25 Astronomy's fascination for the layman as an ST selling point; Proxmire's response
25-26 Impact of the Shuttle on LST design and selling efforts
26 Name change from LST to ST
26-27 Phase B concerns with detector technology; role of the IDTs; possible use of film as a detector
27-28 Emergence of CCD's; the relation between the CCD decision and NASA's 'conservative' management style
28 Relationship between ST and Viking
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
28-29 Rationales for the shift in focal ration from f/12 to f/24
29 Hardware concerns in Phase C: detectors, FGS, PCS, structural stability, solar arrays
29-30 Roman's organizational concerns in Phase C: two associate contractors, two associate managing centers, lack of a full systems management contractor
30 Systems engineering on ST: Marshall's expertise
30-31 Role of the program scientist on ST; unusual circumstances specific to the ST project
31 Scientists' avenues of input into the ST project; role of the program scientist; relations between Roman and Keller
32 Early development of ideas for the scientific management of ST; Ramsey Report
32-33 Marshall and Goddard's respective reactions to the science institute concept; change in astronomers' views of Goddard since IUE
33 Astronomers' early responses to the location of an ST science institute at Goddard
33-34 Roman's reaction to the concept of a comprehensive space science institute; concept of an AXAF institute
34-35 Roman's concerns about ST at the time of her 1980 departure from NASA
35 Relationship between the change in project managers in 1980 and the crisis of that year
35-36 Black Saturday; Roman's reaction
36 Roman's broad conception of her roles with ST, and with the astronomy community
37 The general astronomical community opinion of ST
37-38 Variations in 'space awareness' among different wavelength communities in astronomy
38 Educational effect of ST funding battles on optical astronomers
Rose, James. Date: July 14, 1987. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 35 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Rose recounts his computer experiences and leaving Computer Sciences Corp. for STScI; describes 1982 staff organization of STScI and division of labor there; also relation of Science Operations Ground System to other STScI software projects. Describes changes in STScI work environment during growth after 1982. Rose assesses requirements for and early involvement of Science Data Analysis Software (SDAS), its development by TRW; roles of CSC and STScI. Discusses SOGS at length: views of it by TRW and Goddard as turnkey system, performance requirements and software design. Evaluates economic and institutional effects of large-scale software design; also considers relations between TRW, Goddard, STScI staff. Describes engineers' understanding of scientists' software requirements and TRW's past experiences with science software. Evaluates TRW's SOGS software and discusses SOGS design philosophy. Describes STScI employees' satellite experiences and communication between them and Goddard; STScI's development of SDAS and its efforts to increase SOGS maintainability. Also describes atmosphere of STScI downtown Baltimore office and current (1987) software development. Discusses controversies over instrument calibration software. Considers improvements in SOGS' planetary tracking abilities, and use of ground software in real-time, integrated testing of ST. Notes difficulties with hard- and software supporting SOGS data handling. Describes STScI's software activities apart from SOGS; Institute's relations with TRW and evolution of SDAS. Assesses guidestar selection and scheduling software difficulties. Concludes with overview of complexity of ST ground software.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Work with LANDSAT ground data systems as a Computer Sciences Corp. (CSC) employee at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)
1 Joining CSC's new ST Science Institute (STScI) software development group
1-2 Background in computerized research for urban management
2 Decline in US remote sensing capabilities
2-3 Organization of STScI staff in 1982; early STScI facilities in JHU's Latrobe Hall
3-4 CSC staff at STScI, ca. 1982; division of labor
8 Relation of the Science Operations Ground System (SOGS) to other STScI software efforts
5 Atmosphere of STScI in 1982; early informality; changes in STScI during post-1982 growth
5-6 STScI staff perceptions of STScI directors
6 Early involvement with the Science Data Analysis Software (SDAS); defining SDAS requirements
6-7 Relations with GSFC's ST Project office staff
7 Defining requirements for SDAS, cont
7-8 Portability of SDAS and other ST software systems
8 Command language for SOGS
8-9 TRW's winning SDAS proposal; the proposal's use of a turnkey command language, with no true interactive architecture
9 CSC's reaction to TRW's selection for SDAS
9-10 Attempts by STScI to assume SDAS development
10 STScI's effort to have Kitt Peak National Observatory's IRAF command language adopted for SDAS
10-11 TRW and GSFC's conception of SOGS as a turnkey system
11 Complexity of SOGS performance requirements; requirements for SOGS, and TRW's interpretation of them
11-12 Fast prototyping as a tool for software design
12 The economics of large-scale software development; their effect on software houses' interpretation of contract requirements
12-13 STScI's relationship to TRW's software development efforts
13 Relationship between STScI and GSFC staff
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
13-14 GSFC's and TRW's understanding of scientists' software requirements
14-15 TRW's past experience with science software
15-16 TRW's use of a poorly documented support software package in SOGS
16-17 Systems architecture in SOGS
17 Subsystems of the SOGS package
17-18 SOGS design philosophy: a single systems language ties together unrelated subsystem languages
18 STScI staff members' experience with satellite software and observation
18-19 Process by which CSC and AURA employees at STScI arrive at an institute position, and then relay their concerns to GSFC
19-20 Maintainability of the ST ground software systems
20 STScI efforts to improve maintainability; development of new tools
20-21 Institutional memory in software development
21-22 Atmosphere of software development efforts at STScI
22 STScI's authority over SDAS development
22-23 Functions of the PEPSI software system
23 Repeated physical relocations of the SDAS group
23-24 Atmosphere at the STScI downtown Baltimore annex
24 Current ST software activity, ca. 1987: debugging
25 Debate over instrument calibration software philosophy: degree of automation
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
25-26 Calibration software issues, cont
26 Priority concerns: increasing the speed and robustness of the ST ground system
26-27 Improving SOGS planetary tracking capability
27 ST ground software system participation in whole- observatory, real time integrated testing
27-28 Demands on SOGS during Orbital Verification of ST
28 Improving ground system robustness, cont
28-29 Difficulties with IDM hardware and software used to support SOGS data handling
29-30 SOGS as an aspect of ST operations not critical to ST survival: SOGS crashing cannot kill ST
30 Current STScI software branch links with GSFC; changes in GSFCstaff
30 Software activity besides SOGS and SDAS at STScI
31 STScI software branch relations with TRW since STScI took over responsibility for the installed SOGS system
31-32 Integrating TRW support staff with STScI staff
32-33 Evolution of SDAS; improving SDAS portability
33 Contrasts between the development of SOGS and that of SDAS-IRAF
33-34 Guidestar selection software issues
34 ST Guest Observer scheduling issues; propagation of tacit or hands-on knowledge from ST astronomers to general users
35 Complexity of the ST ground software system
Rosendhal, Jeffrey D. Date: September 12, 1984. Interviewer: Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.25 hrs.; 43 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Dr. Rosendhal discusses his family background and undergraduate education. He describes the summer seminars on space science led by Robert Jastrow of the NASA Goddard Institute several NASA scientists and managers of the 1960s and 1970s. Rosendhal reviews the changing character of NASA science from the early 1960s through the 1980s, tracing the origins of the current focus on major missions. He discusses management structures for NASA science missions, and cities examples of their application. Finally, Dr. Rosendhal reviews the management of the Space Telescope program from 1977 through 1983. Topic include contributions of various individuals, the effect of the SY management structure on the program's performance, division of ST congressional responses to changing ST cost projections in 1980 and 1982-3.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Family background
2-4 Secondary education; interest in science
5-6 Undergraduate education in physics at Williams
6-9 Participation in summer courses offered by NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies at Columbia University, 1962
9-11 Faculty and students in the GISS-Columbia summer sessions; Robert Jastrow
11-12 Changes in NASA space science 1962-1984: shift from numerous small projects towards a decreasing number of larger projects
12-13 Effect of NASA shift towards large science projects on graduate education in space science
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
13-14 Scientific arguments for small-scale space science
14-15 NASA as a mission-oriented rather than research-oriented organization
15-18 Interactions between space- and ground-based astronomy; NASA-NSF relationship; events concerning the Infra-Red Telescope Facility
18-19 NASA's principal investigator (PI) system for managing science projects; IUE and IRAS as case studies of the application of that system
19-20 Scientific management on large NASA projects: roles of Project Scientist, Program Scientist, Science Working Group
20-21 Cost review of Space Telescope (ST) expenditures conducted by T. Bland Norris, 1979
21-22 NASA HQ expectations for the ST program; HQ role in cost/performance tradeoffs
22 Rosendhal's role in 1980 ST program rebudgeting
23-25 1980 and 1982-83 ST program rebudgeting exercises compared: causes, effects, impact on program
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
25-26 ST managers of the late '70s: Fred Speer
26-27 William Lucas and Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) management culture
26-27 Proposals to reduce the initial ST scientific instrument complement, ca. 1979-80
27 NASA space science managers in the late 1970s
27-28 Warren Keller; his contributions to ST
28-29 Mobility of NASA managers; effect on NASA space science projects
29-30 Edward Weiler's role in the ST program
30-31 Responsibilities of and demands on NASA HQ scientists
31-33 Division of effort between Headquarters and field centers in managing NASA science: program- and project-level engineering and scientific managers
33-34 Origins and role of NASA HQ's Space Telescope Development Division (STDD)
35 High-level management structure for future NASA space science missions: AXAF
36-37 Changing congressional response to ST funding requests: 1974-8, 1983
37-38 Renewed national interest in space science in early 1980s
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
38-39 Congressional oversight of ST program; program personnel changes, 1980, 1982-3
39-40 Congressional response to ST cost projections, 1983
40-42 NASA process for obtaining supplemental ST appropriations, 1983: OSTP, OMB, congressional staff members
42-43 OSTP director George Keyworth as an advocate for space science
Rosendhal, Jeffrey D. Date: October 1, 1984. Interviewer: Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 36 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Dr. Rosendhal discusses further his experience at the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies summer courses of the early 1960s (see OHI 9/12/84). He describes his graduate studies at the University of Illinois and at Yale, with particular attention to the curriculum and faculty of the Yale program in the middle 1960. He discusses his graduate association with Rupert Wildt, and Wildt's teaching and administrative style. Dr. Rosendhal reconstructs his years as a predoctoral researcher at Kitt Peak National Observatory, including work with Helmut Abt and Thomas Gehrels. Finally, he relates the events of his research and teaching career through his one-year stint at University of Washington, and offers reflections on the nature of scientific discovery in astronomy and on the waxing and waning of astronomers' enthusiasm for various research subdisciplines.
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
1-2 Curriculum of the summer courses in space science offered by Robert Jastrow and NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies at Columbia University, ca. 1962
2-3 Graduate work in physics at University of Illinois
3-4 Early contacts with Yale astronomer Rupert Wildt
4-6 Curriculum and academic culture in Illinois physics graduate program
6-8 Astronomy faculty at Yale, middle 1960s
9 Yale astrophysics: Wildt, Oster
9-10 Wildt's graduate teaching style
10-11 Transferring to Yale astronomy; early course work
11-12 Graduate preliminary examinations at Yale
TAPE 3, SIDE 2
12-13 Preliminary exams, cont
13-14 Early thesis topic ideas: planetary physics
15-16 Summer internship at Kitt Peak National Observatory (KPNO); work with Tom Gehrels
16-17 Second thesis proposal: Saturn photopolarimetry
17-18 Scientific and administrative styles: Gehrels and Wildt compared
18-19 KPNO Planetary Division
19 Arranging resident status at KPNO while still affiliated with Yale
20-21 First observing experience at KPNO: 84-inch Coude
21-22 Final thesis topic: calculating variations with age in stellar angular rotation rates from spectrographic observations
22-23 Working with Helmut Abt to take the thesis data; offshoot discoveries from that data
23-24 Responses to Rosendhal's work on stellar atmospheric turbulence; fashions in science topics
TAPE 4, SIDE 1
24-26 Other work on supergiant polarization variability
25-26 Moving from KPNO to join George Wallerstein's spectroscopygroup at Univ. of Washington, 1968
27-28 Research environment at Washington; teaching load
28-29 Research activities: further thesis data reduction
29-30 Rosendhal's reflections on his seven-year active research career
30-32 Collaboration on stellar atmospheres with Dimitri Mihalas
32 Professional journals' publication criteria
33-34 Mental preparations and attitudes prerequisite to successful scientific discovery in astronomy
35 Collaboration with Mihalas, cont
35-36 Process of discovery in astronomy, cont
Rosendhal, Jeffrey D. Date: December 23, 1985. Interviewers: Robert W. Smith, Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 36 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Dr. Rosendhal discusses his early contract with NASA, and his first position under Nancy Roman in the NASA HQ Astronomy Branch, 1973. He discusses the organization and staffing of the Branch, describing the roles of Nancy Boggess, William Brunk, and others, and the original general function of scientists as NASA administrators. Rosendhal reconstructs the creation of the NASA HQ Missions and Operations Working Groups of the middle 1970s and their role in setting Agency astronomy policy, and describes the Outlook for Space study. Finally, he extensively covers issues relating to Space Telescope in the middle and late 1970s, including studies of proposed aperture sizes for the instrument, the campaign to secure support for ST among astronomers and from Congress, the relation of ST to planetary science missions, and the team Rosendhal organized to advise NASA on European capability to provide a Faint Object Camera as an ST Scientific Instrument.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Early contacts with NASA, 1973: William Tifft, Nancy Roman
2 Study work for NASA on a 1-meter-class UV/optical orbital telescope
2 Joining NASA HQ: 'culture shock'
3-4 Staffing and programs of the NASA Astronomy Branch office in the early 1970s; Nancy Boggess
4-5 Role of NASA HQ astronomers in shaping agency programs and policy; contrast with NSF
5-6 Importance of maintaining diverse funding sources for astronomy; danger of science 'funding czars'
7-8 Institutional rationale for establishing NASA Mission and Operations Working Groups (MOWGs)
8-9 Activities of the MOWG for Shuttle Astronomy, 1970s
9-10 Relationship between the Shuttle MOWG and the Large Space Telescope (LST) Phase B Science Working Group (SWG)
10-11 Outlook for Space study chaired by Don Hearth, 1975
11 X-ray astronomy in the middle 1970s; Roman's role
11-12 Involvement with Solar Maximum Mission, Explorer
12-13 Rosendhal's contact with studies of various aperture sizes for ST, ca. 1974
13-14 NASA Administrator Fletcher's response to ST
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14 Astronomers' and astrophysicists' reactions to ST, early and middle 1970s: Riccardo Giacconi
15-16 Tradeoffs between NASA funding for astronomy and for planetary science
16-17 Role of competition in the NASA mission definition process
17-19 Tension between NASA's increased reliance on high-cost, long-duration missions and its efforts to support several research disciplines in parallel
19-20 Merits of large facilities for space science compared with merits of frequent small missions
20-21 Consideration of various ST aperture sizes, ca. '74
21-22 Changes in NASA HQ astronomy administrators, 1978-9
22-25 ST aperture size considerations ca. 1974, cont
25-26 Role of scientific lobbying in securing ST funding from Congress
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
26 T. Bland Norris' review of ST expenditures, 1979-80
26-27 NASA HQ concern over ST cost projections, 1975-6
27-28 Origins of the NASA review team, chaired by John Thole, which examined European ability to provide an ST Faint Object Camera (FOC ) Scientific Instrument (SI)
28-30 Composition of the team; members' competence
30-31 Agenda and conclusions of the Thole-FOC Team
31-32 American astronomers' reactions to European SI participation proposal
32-33 FOC compared with US Wide Field/Planetary Camera
33-34 Role of the expectations for the Thole-FOC Team
34-35 Rosendhal drafts the Thole-FOC Capability report
35-36 Communications among members of the Thole-FOC team
Russell, Jane. Date: December 18, 1984. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 33 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Dr. Russell discusses her work as astrometry scientist for the Space Telescope (ST) Guide Star Selection System (GSSS) development effort at the Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI), 1981-1984. She describes the working atmosphere in the early years of STScI, touching on the Institute's physical location changes and the number of STScI's contractual functions. Dr. Russell the discusses planning for the GSSS, including early concepts for the system, and the development of the Guide Star Catalogue approach finally adopted. Dr. Russell relates the technical process of creating the GSS catalogue, including the creation of a 1,500-plate sky survey an the scanning of objects on the plates to an accuracy of 25 microns. She describes the evolution of ST's Fine Guidance Sensors and their characteristics as astrometry instruments, and comments on some proposed ST astrometry program. Finally, she reflects on the culture of the ST project and STScI, contrasting them to the academic astronomy environment.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Institute; Don Hall; Boulder; AAS; Iowa State; Joins STScI Jan. 1, 1982; reason for joining STScI; Astrometry; Early days at ScI, state of chaos; Had worked on pointing
2 IUE; IUE to find Sirius B; Ralph Bohlin; Sirius B; Cattel's; Jim Van Allen; Exposure to space astronomy; "Absolute chaos!", early state of ScI
3 Rowland; Baltimore; Barry Lasker; CSC; The great CSC massacre; Latrobe; PDR; Boulder; Space Telescope Astrometry Team; Great deal of interest in SCI at AAS meeting at Boulder
4-5 Iowa; Vince Severo; Riccardo Giacconi; SOGs; NASA; Getting used to ScI culture; "culture shock"
5 Perkin-Elmer; SDAS; Guide Star selection system; Two ScI deliverables; SCAS; GS3; "...Astronomy on a production line basis"
6 Schmidt plates; Difficulties of doing astrometry from Schmidt plates; Falkland War; PDS; Van Altena; Challenge of GS3; current estimate is 40x106 stars; only one proven PDS machine in the world; schedule difficulties
6-7 Kibblewhite machine; ARR; Lick machine; Luyten machine
7-8 Minnesota; Aug. 1981 meeting NASA approval for 2 PDS and 2 VAX 750's, consideration among staff at SCI of other machines; NASA would not consider it; To cover the sky will take 1,478 plates but missing sliver requires 22 or 23 plates more; each plate is 7 1/2 hrs or 50 microns; at 25 microns resolution takes 12 hours; Going to higher resolution much better able to distinguish stars and galaxies
8-9 Fine scan; Schmidt plates; Able to avoid fine scanning for any target on the Schmidt plates
9 PDS; IDT; FOS; How the astrometry team fits into the ScI
9-10 Larry Frederick; NASA astrometry is full with space telescope
10-11 Otto Franz; Larry Frederick; Bill van Altena; Perkin-Elmer; O-V; Ast team working on data reduction software; their contract is with MSFC, not GSFC; Ast. team did early analysisof GS3; the guide stars for O-V will be provided by a small guide star system being built in Texas; heavy politics; Marshall; Goddard
11-12 AURA; Proper motions of guide stars will cost us later; input of GS3 to Ast team is via the GS3 instrument scientist
12 Photometry; Marshall; Alan Goldberg; Perkin-Elmer; Goddard; AG designer of FGS at Perkin-Elmer; color response of FGS was one of the first questions for GS3
13 OPD; ST; Perkin-Elmer; OAO; Goddard; FGS; SV; Goldberg went to OAO then back to P-E; he was the designing engineer at P-E for the FGS
14 Interferometer; Koester's prism; Jim Kinsey; Jim Kinsey arrives July 1982
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14 PSC; Latrobe; Marc Damashek
14-15 CSC; Originally planned a very large CSC team for ScI, a very large CSC team for GS3; at time of CSC massacre they kept only those working on photometry, 18 people removed
15 Bruce Gillespie; Helmut Jenker; Dennis Kilwright; Conrad Struch; Changes of structure in GS3 organization
16 Neta Bahcall; Binary stars for GS3
17 Mike Shara; Densely populated Milky Way; impact on GS3 Alan Goldberg
18-19 Royal Observatory Edinburgh; Impact of FGS not working to magnitudes; Proper motions; impact on GS3
19 Faint Object Spectrograph; Need for new survey; Light Resolution spectrograph; Palomar
20-21 SERC; Moving targets; difficulty of pointing to unseen sources
21-22 Ecliptic; Halley's Comet; Goddard; Cost growth of GS3
22-25 PDS; Goddard; FGS; Doing astrometry with the FGS
26 Riccardo Giacconi; ST & planet searches; NASA Ames; Faint Object Camera
26-27 Rick White
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
27-28 FGS; FOC; Wide Field Camera; Difficulties of doing planet searches with ST; Van Altena; WF/PC very limited by field size for astrometry; FGS has field distortion and odd color properties
28-29 Hipparchos; Use of Hipparchos for astrometry; relationship to astrometry with ST
30 Evolution of SCI; cultural differences working with NASA; different culture among support staff; "...an industrial touch [to ScI] and yet maintain some scientific atmosphere"
31 Pittsburgh; Iowa State; Ames Laboratory; Closed Communication within ScI; Ideology of "small is beautiful" for astronomers
32-33 Goddard
Schreier, Ethan. Date: July 6, 1987. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 40 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Schreier recalls his childhood scientific interests, education and 1960's experience with Uhuru. Compares optical and X-ray astronomy communities and their experiences with computer data. Recalls decision to computer-calibrate ST data. Recalls his entry to ST project in 1981 and hiring of Rodger Doxsey. Discusses at length efforts to create ST data analysis system; SOGS and work of TRW on command language. Assesses relationship between Goddard and STScI in early 1980s. Continuing discussion of SOGS: attitudes at Institute and software changes. Assesses Lockheed's Spacecraft Automated Test System. Compares management of ST with that of earlier scientific satellites. Discusses at length development of Data Archiving and Distribution System: Institute support for DADS in 1982-3, use of optical disks, funding, proposed cuts, efforts to develop DADS at STScI. Relationships between ST engineers and scientists. Reflects on changes at NASA. Considers relationship between ST project and Institute. Reviews development of Calibration Data Base System. Discusses ST management and overall philosophy. Role of Institute in ST systems engineering. Considers ST as "Big Science" and effects of government funding on astronomy. Assesses relationships between NASA and contractors. Concludes with discussion of changing ST launch dates and creation of NASA Science Internet.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Schreier recalls childhood interests in science; education in physics at City College, MIT
1-2 Late 1960s experience with Uhuru satellite; interest in space astronomy
2-3 Handling Uhuru data; experience operating satellites; problems, advantages of theoretical physics training
3 Adaptation of optical, X-ray astronomy to Big Science
3-4 Organizational and intellectual differences between X-ray and optical astronomy
4 Decision to calibrate ST data by computer; reflects on optical astronomy community's relative experience handling computer data
4-5 Schreier's decision to follow Riccardo Giacconi to STScI in Baltimore
5 Experience scheduling satellite observations
5-6 Schreier's entry to ST project in 1981 as consultant
6-7 Hiring Rodger Doxsey as assistant
7-8 Schreier reflects on astronomers' lack of satellite operations experience
8 Preliminary plans for calibrating ST's Star Trackers; recalls early efforts to create data analysis system
8-9 Contacts with NASA about data analysis system in 1981
9-10 Development of command language and SOGS; conflicts between NASA and Institute
10-11 Work of TRW on command language
11 NASA's 1981 contract with TRW for developing SOGS
11-12 Writing requirements for TRW contract
12-13 Previous experience with Goddard and contractors
13 Schreier evaluates TRW's work on SOGS
13-14 Goddard's technical oversight of TRW work
14 Goddard-Institute relations in early 1980s
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14-15 Critical Design Review of SOGS
15 Work of Mark Johnston on SOGS
15-16 Participants in 1982 Critical Design Review
16-17 Institute strategy for gaining control of SOGS
17 Institute's changes to SOGS; SOGS' initial problems in real-time operation
17-18 Considers influences on ST vehicle and software of military designs
18 Assesses Lockheed's Spacecraft Automated Test System
19-20 Compares management of ST with that of Uhuru and other small scientific satellites
20 Institute's 1982-3 support for Data Archiving and Distribution System; planned funding
20-22 Projected cost of DADS; NASA control of archive development
22-23 Proposed cuts in DADS
23 Discusses 1984 attempts to develop DADS at STScI
24 Schreier assesses NASA changes since 1960s; discusses role of innovation in ST project
24-25 Command software for Einstein, High Energy Astronomical Observatory
25-26 Evaluates recent relationship between ST project and STScI
26-27 Creating Calibration Data Base System
27 Developing CDBS at the Institute; recalls disputes over inclusion of engineering data in CDBS
27-28 Offers overall assessment of ST management
28 Discusses relationship between ST engineers and scientists
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
28 Discusses expanded role for Institute made in Phase B proposal; Institute's role in instrument engineering
29 Discusses overall ST philosophy; compares philosophy in High Energy Astronomical Observatory to that of ST
29-30 Recalls experiences with classified ST data
30 Discusses adaptation of optical astronomers to "Big Science" environment; proposed transportability of ST software
30-31 Schreier discusses ST "Big Science" and his own research productivity
31 Considers role of government funding in astronomy
31-32 Discusses political strategies for influencing direction of large project
32-33 Compares ST's planning and scheduling complexity with that of Einstein satellite
33-34 Role of Institute in ST systems engineering
34 History and functions of Data Operations Team
34-36 Comments further on ST's complexity and Institute's effects on project; instrument command management
36 Optical disk archives; Schreier offers suggestions for improving future scientific satellite programs
36-37 Evaluates NASA-contractor relationships
37-38 Reflects on NASA history
38 Recalls decision about location of DADS
38-39 Schreier reflects on his personal, emotional response to ST experiences
39 Discussion of launch dates; satisfaction derived from "Big Science" project
40 Creation of NASA Science Internet
Schroeder, Daniel J. Date: October 7, 1985. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 3 hrs.; 33 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Dr. Schroeder discusses his twenty-five years of experience in space astronomy, beginning in 1957 with his work as spectrographic expert in Art Code's University of Wisconsin OAO 1 team. He then discusses his long involvement with the Large Space Telescope-Space Telescope (LST-ST) project. He describes NASA support for detector technologies applicable to orbiting observatories, discusses his participation in the LST-ST Phase B camera definition team, and comments on astronomers' reactions to the LST concept thought that period. Schroeder further describes his work as Telescope Scientist for ST in Phase C/D, the second major facet of his ST experience. He describes his close involvement with ST contractor Perkin-Elmer's testing procedures, with the redesign of the Fine Guidance Sensors for Schroeder concludes with general observations on the management of the ST project and the role of scientists in major NASA space science missions.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Family background - parents; college work at Wisconsin; Julian Mack; spectroscopist; attraction to physics and experimental work; "Isotope Shift in the Arc Spectrum of Nickel"
2 Beginnings in astronomy; Clark Refractor; quantum physics; Art Code; Washburn Observatory; vacuum systems; coatings; Fabry-Perot plates; joining with Code on OAO program; Orbiting Astronomical Observatory (OAO); NASA; ultraviolet; evaporator
3 General readings in astronomy; photons; George Gamow; return to Beloit to teaching after delays in OAO; Beloit College
3-4 Keeping a hand in space astronomy; Madison; Space Astronomy Laboratory; Explorer; Small Astronomical Satellite
4 Problems with space astronomy; photometers; photomultiplier tube; filer wheel; prime focus "Wisconsin style"; HSP (High Speed Photometer) Space Telescope
4-5 Disappointment with First OAO filters on the 2nd OAO; Bob Bless; development of Echelles
5 Echelles spectrographs; Pine Bluff Observatory; Fabry-Perot interferometers; grating instruments; discrete emission-line; Echelle grating
5-6 Diffraction grating; angle of incidence
6 George Harrison; MIT; ruling; Bausch and Lomb; NASA support of echelles
6-7 Large Space Telescope (LST); precursors to LST-no involvement; ASTRA
7 Man-Maintained OAO; Stellar Apollo telescope mount; Aerobee rocket; Cass focus; Marshall; involvement with OTTW; Optical Telescope Technology Workshop (OTTW); Bob O'Dell; Yerkes Observatory; Huntsville; Piper Cub
7-8 Dr. von Braun
8 Lyman Spitzer; Aluminum; Mag[nesium] fluoride; feelings on an LST at OTTW; Princeton; Marshall's involvement in an LST program; Dr. Stuhlinger; attraction to planning for LST; Phase B
9 Kitt Peak; Art Hoag; work on Transmission gratings; quasars; transmission grating; converging beam; Cassegrain beam; dispersion
10 Applications of this to LST camera; Technical challenges with camera and other SI's; "Instrument kluge"; focal plane; detectors on the SI's; SEC vidicon; non-linear response
10-11 CCDs
11 Linearity; workload on the IDT; Bob Danielson; Antoine Labeyrie; Speckle; Fred Schaaf; Westinghouse; planned uses of the camera; extra-galactic; Jupiter, Uranus; Hubble parameter; adequacy of the SI's
12 Ray tracing; feelings on the actual launch of the ST, the feasibility of a new start; Phase A; ITEK; Perkin-Elmer; near ultraviolet; politicking on LST; Bill Proxmire
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
13 LST discussion in astronomical circles; AAS meetings; Announcement of Opportunity (AO); involvement in Phase C/D as telescope scientist; Phase C/D; Telescope scientist
13-14 Effect of having O'Dell on the project; ST; responsibility of telescope scientist
15 Alignment; secondary; Marshall Space Flight Center working with Perkin-Elmer; Science Working Group; RMS wavefront error; interferograms
16 More of an OTA Scientist; Optical Telescope Assembly; problems of FGS-too complicated; Fine Guidance Sensors; how he communicated problems he saw to people at MSFG or SWG; Charlie Jones; prisms; optical train; sub-micron; angstrom units
17 Technical challenges in Phase C/D; Optical Control Sensor (OCS); lambda over twenty; edge plate; problems in the mirror blank; edge band; Corning; coatings of the mirror
17-18 Lithium fluoride; UV
18 Copernicus; ripples on the mirror surface; micro-ripple CCP; Halo; sub-aperture
19 Contamination of the mirror; Jim Westphal; Class of 10,000; Lockheed; Kennedy; arc lamp
19-20 Acoustic testing
20 Baffles; seriousness of the mirror problems; Bob Brown; alternate FGS at APL - concerns of original FGS; Alternate Fine Guidance Sensor; APL
21 Corrector Group; Koester's prisms; Spec
22 How he worked with Fastie; Point Spread Function; HST; Bert Edelson
22-23 Scale of the HST Program; Chicago
23 Working in the HST environment; Sunshade
24 Effect of project manager changes; Keathley, Dr. Fred Speer; Jim Odom
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
24 Lessons to be learned from the HST Program; Segmented
24-25 Keck Telescope; Monolithic
25 Benefits of STOPAT; STOPAT; SIRTF; Effects of arrangement of HST program
26 Goddard; Fine Guidance Electronics; Welch; major challenges that lie ahead for HST; Wide Field/Planetary camera
27 "Astronomy from Space"; Is HST better than ground-based?; Advances in Space Research
27-28 NNTT
28 Spatial resolution; major technical achievements of HST; milliarc seconds
28-29 Concerns with assembling the individual units into a functioning system
29-30 Systems engineering (what is it?)
30 Concerns of people to get the job right; straddling the different "cultures" involved in HST program
31 Accuracy of the SWG minutes
31-33 People who know a bit about the mirror: Hufnagel, Bud Rigby, Lou Montanino
Sherrill, Thomas J. Date: September 24, 1985. Interviewer: Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 3 hrs.; 439 pp. Use restriction: Permission required for access.
Sherrill describes his involvement with flight software design and orbital operations planning for ST through his work with Lockheed Missiles and Space Company (LMSC) (1973- ). He discusses his family and academic background, and then covers topics including ST Phase B orbital models and simulations, graphic display of ST orbital planning information, and integration of ST operations constraints with orbital mechanics to produce scheduling models. Sherrill also discusses his role in providing ST Pointing Control System flight software with algorithms for tracking moving targets and planetary features, as well as the roles of Hugh Dougherty, Roger Doxsey, and Robert Brown. Other topics include LMSC's management style and philosophy, and planning for ST operations during the Science Verification period.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Family background
1-2 Influence of science fiction
2-3 Physics studies at Case; awareness of Sputnik
3 Involvement with Cleveland moon watch team
3-4 Studies with Sidney McCuskey and Victor Blanco
4 Summer work at NASA Lewis Research Center
4-5 Matriculating at Berkeley for PhD studies
5-6 Work at Lewis, cont
6 Family background, cont
6-7 Course work at Berkeley: interest in celestial mechanics
7-8 Faculty at Berkeley; place of celestial mechanics in the astronomy profession, ca. 1960s
8-9 Graduate students at Berkeley
9-10 PhD dissertation topics in celestial mechanics
10 Journals publishing celestial mechanics papers
10-11 Mechanics at Berkeley: summary impressions
11 Summer work at JPL
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
11-12 Work at JPL, cont
12 Accepting work at Lockheed Missiles and Space Corp. (LMSC) Space Systems Division after graduation
13 Professional and scholarly societies
13-14 Early experiences at LMSC
14-15 Work with satellite ephemeris generation software
15 Attitudes toward publishing at LMSC
15-17 Contact with colleagues in celestial mechanics
17 Role of the orbital theory branch at LMSC: proposal support
17-18 First exposure to ST: 1973 work on ground-based tracking of a Large Space Telescope (LST) in its deployment orbit
18-19 Contact with developments in astronomy; publishing at LMSC cont
19 Computing facilities at LMSC
20 Computer-generated movies as an aid to science satellite orbital and operational analysis
20-21 Phase A LST involvement: analyzing alternative orbits from lowearth to geosynchronous
21 Importance of earth shadow time to ST observing
21-22 Members of LMSC's Phase A LST team
22 Sherrill's ST work as a fusion of orbital mechanics with systems analysis
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
23 Expansion of Sherrill's ST role
24-25 Displaying orbit and operations constraints in graphic form; power of graphic analysis
25 Simulating earth-stellar occultation observations
25-26 Organization of the Phase B LMSC ST team: role of LMSC scientist Jerry Drake
26-27 Phase C/D LMSC ST Mission Operations team
27 Planetary tracking capability of ST on-board software
27-28 LMSC decision to implement planetary tracking requirements through linear scan software
28-29 Initial use of a small-angle approximation created for stellar parallax to account for planetary parallax in ST flight software
30 Proposal to use linear scans to account for planetary parallax
30 LMSC Pointing Control System (PCS) Group's role in planetary tracking issues; Hugh Dougherty
30-31 Robert Brown and Rodger Doxsey of STScI propose an alternative method for flight software planetary tracking
31 Efforts to convince LMSC's PCS group to adopt new planetary tracking methods
31-32 LMSC PCS group adopts planetary change proposals
32-33 LMSC' response to planetary software changes
33-34 ST Project teams formed to examine planetary tracking: Planetary Target Implementation Team (PTIT)
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
34-35 Proposals to change planetary tracking implementation
35-36 Documentation of planetary tracking issues
36-37 Institutional memory on the LMSC ST software design teams
37-38 Management style and structure at LMSC; Sherrill's integration into LMSC management
38-39 Work with ST Science Instrument (SI) teams on their observing schedules for the post-launch Science Verification (SV) of the observatory
39-40 SV and the need for SI team documentation
40 Sherrill's contact with the Science Working Group
40 LMSC management style, cont
40-41 Throughput optical distortion of the Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA)
41 Involvement with the LMSC ST Missions Operation Contract (MOC) team; science liaison role
41-42 Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) and the real-time ST spacecraft operating software system
42-43 Sherrill's relations with LMSC management, cont
43 Involvement with SV, cont
Sherrill, Thomas J. Date: July 21, 1986. Interviewer: Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.25 hrs.; 26 pp. Use restriction: Permission required for access.
Sherrill discusses implementation of planetary targeting and planetary tracking in Science Operations Ground System [SOGS]. Discusses variety of approaches used in planetary tracking. Recalls involvement in Planetary Target Implementation Team [PTIT]. Discusses selection of flight software used for planetary tracking. Describes computer generated moves developed to simulate instrument operations for Design Reference Mission [DRM]. Discusses computing facilities available to develop DRM. Discusses involvement of STScI personnel in DRM as part of Flight Design Operations Reviews [FDORs]. Recalls reaction to DRM within scientific community. Discusses use of software in design planning, particularly power system in DRM and high gain antenna pointing. Describes his responsibilities ties for Science Verification [SV] after move to Mission Operation Contract [MOC]. Discusses timeliness particularly those of SOGS, SV and GTO. Recalls reaction of scientists to SV timeline. Describes impact of South Atlantic Anomaly.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Implementation of planetary targeting and planetary tracking in Science Operations Ground System [SOGS]; Planetary Target Implementation Team [PTIT]; discussion of moving target approach
1-3 Discussion of "the 48 command" and others used in planetary tracking
3-5 Discussion of involvement in PTIT; refinement of planetary tracking capability in ST
5-6 Selection of flight software for planetary tracking; need for ground planning compatible with flight software
6-9 Discussion of planning exercises: computer generated movies developed out of Design Reference Mission [DRM] to simulate instrument operations
9 Discussion of other support work being done at ST involving celestial mechanics; discussion of DRM
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
9 Discussion of DRM (continued)
9-10 Computing facilities available to develop the DRM
10-11 Modifications to these computing facilities required by ST mission
11-12 Payload Spacecraft Operations Simulation
12-13 Involvement of STScI personnel in the DRM as part of Flight Design Operations Reviews [FDORs]
13-15 Reaction to the DRM within scientific community
15-16 Simulation of power system in the DRM
16-17 Simulation of high gain antenna pointing
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
18-19 Discussion of use of software in design planning
19-20 Discussion of responsibilities for Science Verification [SV] after move to Mission Operations Contract [MOC]
20 Impact of the DRM on operating software for ST
20-21 Discussion of SOGS timelines as representations of contractors' understanding of task to be performed
21-22 Discussion of work on SV timeline
22-23 Matching observing schedules to actual instrument test experience
23 Reaction of scientists to SV timeline
23-25 Impact of South Atlantic Anomaly
25 Comparison of GTO timeline with that of the DRM and SV
26 Concluding remarks