Simmons, F. Pete. Date: September 10, 1984. Interviewers: Robert W. Smith, Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 3.25 hrs.; 56 pp. Use restriction: Public.
Reviews Simmons' involvement with early orbiting telescope concepts (1965-71), with LST Phase A (1971-74), and with the early years of STScI (1981-2). Simmons discusses his work with the OAO Program as Grumman's Director for Space Astronomy, and his role in promoting early orbiting telescope studies in-house at Grumman in response to NAS space telescope planning documents. He discusses a major study he managed at Grumman which examined the impact of the potential Space Shuttle on orbiting telescope costs, and describes his efforts to market the LST concept to the public and the Congress. He discusses the 1974 AIAA meeting on ST, and its influence on ST planning. Simmons reviews his involvement as manager first of Martin-Marietta's and then of McDonell-Douglas' ST Phase B contract bid efforts, and finally discusses his work as a management consultant to Art Code during the latter's tenure as interim director of the newly-founded Space Telescope Science Institute.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Founding of the Grumman military space division; studies of Navy uses of satellites, ca. 1966
2 Becoming Grumman's Director for Space Astronomy; work with OAO and post-OAO observatory plans; curiosity about astronomy: Code, Bless as tutors; learning principles of astronomy in discussions with Ned Dyer of the Space Science Board (SSB)
3 Astronomers' perceptions of the OAO program, 1960s
3-4 Applying informal tutorials in astronomy to justifying OAO before Congress and the public
4-5 Grumman layman's guide to OAO scientific accomplishments
5 Scientific results from OAO 2; Simmons' excitement about OAO science
5-6 Simmons' lobbying for OAO
6-7 Freedom and access accorded Simmons as an industry rather than NASA or scientific lobbyist
7 Coordinating lobbying efforts with Goddard OAO personnel, and with NASA HQ
7-8 Arguments for OAO made to Congressional staffers
8-9 Funding for science satellite ground data support
9-10 Grumman studies of a 3-meter National Space Observatory following the '65 NAS Woods Hole study report
10 Grumman baselining for a series of OAO-style vehicles leading up to the 3-meter space observatory; advent of the Shuttle and new planning for on-orbit service of observatories
10-11 Goddard studies of the STAR modular science telescope concept
11 Grumman participation in STAR; OAO-STAR links
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
11-12 STAR, cont.; roles of Purcell, Clark, Kupperian
12-13 Origins, goals and conclusions of the 1970 Grumman OAO/LST Shuttle Economics Study
13-14 Use of the LST-Shuttle study to justify proceeding with Shuttle Phase B studies
14-16 LST-Shuttle study as a means of selling the shuttle to thespace science community
16-17 The LST-Shuttle 3-D nomogram cost model; using the nomogram to drive home LST cost projection presentations
17 Assumptions ca. 1970 that Goddard would be the lead center for LST
17-18 Grumman VIP activities surrounding OAO-B launch
19 Impact of OAO-B failure; declining Congressional enthusiasm for space astronomy
19-20 Difficulty of selling astrophysics programs in competition with planetary probes
20-21 Funding competition between astronomy, planetary science
21 Balancing funding among space science disciplines
21-22 Long-term benefits of continued substantial support of research and students in space science
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
22 Inertia of large space science budgets
22-24 Popularizing the LST concept to increase public support for space science
24 Selecting a lead center for LST
24-25 Marshall's enthusiasm for the LST lead role
25 LST Pointing Control System and Fine Guidance Sensors divided between contractors
26 Simmons' advocates a 3-meter LST primary rather than a rebaselined 2.4-meter mirror
26-27 Origins of the 2.4 ST primary mirror proposals
27 Grumman's decision to withdraw from all NASA activities after losing the Shuttle contract
27-29 Simmons joins Martin Marietta's LST activities, 1/73; moves to McDonnell Douglas when M-M's chances for LST are destroyed by Viking fallout
29 June 1974 Congressional deletion of LST funds
29-30 Submitting LST Phase B to Congress as a line item
30-31 Contractors' use of internal funds on NASA Phase B study contracts
31-32 Changes in NASA contracting procedures, 1974-84; their impact on Phase B and C/D activities; AXAF as an example of new A-109 procedures
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
33-34 Rationale for the new A-109 contracting procedure: establish fixed-cost contracts, and eliminate short-term funding fluctuations
34 Astronomers as industry consultants for LST
34-35 Allan Sandage's consultant work for Simmons on LST
35-36 '72 publicity activities, cont.: Superman comic, LST license plate
36-37 Contract teams' identification with their projects; size and cost of the Grumman LST team
37 Simmons' concern over Congressional support for LST during Phase A, before the '74 cuts
37-38 Efforts to assure Congress of LST feasibility, '74
38 Congress restores deleted LST funds, August 1974
38-39 Documents relating to Mc.-Douglas' LST Phase B bid
39 Descoping LST Phase B to a 2.4-meter baseline; contractors' efforts to persuade Congress to restore LST funds eliminated in June 1974
39-40 Scientists involved in '74 lobbying: Sandage, Spitzer, Greenstein, Code
40 Simmons' efforts to persuade the NAS to act for LST
40-42 Simmons discusses LST with Jesse Greenstein
42 Complete fusion of science and industry goals as a prerequisite for good space science
42-43 Simmons organizes the '74 AIAA meeting on LST as a means of fusing scientists, contractors, and NASA administrators into a pro-LST cadre
TAPE 3, SIDE 1
43 Funding the AIAA symposium
43-45 Simmons' career at Mc.-Douglas following the loss of the LST Phase B contract, 1974-80
45 Leaving retirement to help Code define ST Science Institute management plans, 1981-82
45-46 Interaction with Riccardo Giacconi at STScI
46-47 Code's desire to return to Wisconsin rather than continue as STScI director
46-47 Selecting a site, consortium to operate STScI and permanent director
47 Staffing at STScI
48-49 Morale at STScI, and on the ST scientific instrument teams
49 Simmons' role in a 12/71 AAS space astronomy symposium
50 NASA's A-109 fixed-cost contracts as a reaction to ST experiences; P-E and '80 ST Project management changes
50-51 Contrast between the OAO and ST contracting and management structures
51 ST Program management at NASA HQ
52 ST Optical Telescope Assembly cost growth; Lockheed's interest in beginning a NASA contract involvement by bidding for ST
53 Simmons' continuing interest in ST; McDonnell-Douglas 7.5 minute film included with the LST Phase B proposal
TAPE 3, SIDE 2
54 OAO-B launch VIP activity, continued
54-56 Simmons persuades Johnny Hart to create space science budgeting cartoon; Socrates on the merits of astronomy
56 Simmons' tenure on the ST project
Simmons, F. Pete. Date: September 11, 1984. Interviewers: Robert W. Smith, Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: .75 hrs.; 11 pp. Use restriction: Public.
Reviews in greater detail Simmons' involvement with early orbiting telescope concepts (1965-71). Simmons discusses the series of alternative plans Grumman presented to NASA as possible ways of expanding from the OAO technology base to a 3-meter primary mirror National Space Observatory or Large Space Telescope. He discusses tradeoffs between an incremental program of larger OAOs, and a more radical program leading to direct fabrication of a 3-meter LST. He discusses the influence of the 1965 and 1969 NAS reports on space telescopes on the Grumman plans. Finally, he recreates the role manned spaceflight played in Grumman's LST advanced planning scenarios.
TAPE 3, SIDE 2
56-57 Grumman's 1969 program proposals for a large post-OAO National Space Observatory (NSO) in the 3-meter class; composition of the study team
57 OAO subsystems' growth potential
57-58 Grumman publicity efforts for OAO: symposia, exhibits, presentations by OAO scientists
58 Grumman efforts to encourage graduate students to enter space astronomy; influence of the '65 and '69 NAS reports on LST on the Grumman NSO studies
58-59 Grumman's conception of NSO as a series of vehicles incrementally expanding OAO to a 3-meter telescope
59 Proposals to go directly from a 1-meter OAO-D to a 3-meter NSO, without incremental growth vehicles; variations on the OAO-NSO growth concept: a man-tended 40-inch OAO for Shuttle launch, followed by a 3-meter NSO
59-60 Summary of Grumman's range of proposed alternatives for establishing a 3-meter space observatory by 1978
60-61 Composition of Grumman's Advanced Space Astronomy Team, which conducted the post-OAO planning
61 Advanced Space Astronomy Team relations with the OAO program team; presenting the OAO-NSO concepts to Goddard
61-62 NAS influence on Grumman planning, cont
62-63 1970 Grumman studies of a 3-meter LST in response to the '69 NAS Spitzer report
63-64 Role of manned spaceflight in Grumman LST study; technical details of the '70 Grumman LST concept; consideration of Shuttle-deploying LST in the Grumman study
64 Grumman's 1970 estimation of the technological hurdles facing LST
64-65 Presenting the 1970 study to Goddard and NASA HQ
65 Further documents relating to early LST studies
65-67 Simmons' curriculum vitae
Sobieski, Stanley. Date: February 8, 1985. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.25 hrs.; 39 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Sobieski describes his involvement with the Space Telescope, first during his tenure as ST Phase A/B Instrument Scientist (1972-76), and then as team leader in a 1977 Goddard proposal to construct the ST Wide Field Camera. He begins with a brief review of his academic background and involvement with OAO. Phase A/B ST topics discussed include detector technology, CCD development, NASA funding of detector research, the SEC Vidicon, planetary science planning for ST, determining the size of the ST primary mirror, technology development for the ST project, and the 1977 ST Announcement of Opportunity. Sobieski also describes Goddard's CCD development projects, and the Goddard proposal to construct an ST CCD Wide Field Camera. He also reflects on the origins of the ST Science Institute.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Sobieski's academic background, his move to Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)
1-2 Early instrument development work
2-3 GSFC reaction to the loss of OAO 1
3-4 Work with Nancy Roman at NASA HQ; role as secretary to LST Phase A science working group
4-5 Film as an LST/ST wide field camera detector
5 Sobieski named LST Phase B Instrument Scientist
6 Work in Roman's office; organizing the first NASA electro-optical detector conference, '72
7 CCD research presented to the '72 detector conference
7-8 Other '72 detectors: CBS Corp. tubes, SIT Vidicon
8-9 Funding for NASA-supported detector work
9 Purposes of the 1972 detector conference
10-11 Funding of JPL CCD research, GSFC CCD research, and LST/ST SEC Vidicon research at Princeton
11-12 Princeton's detector work as direct support of LST
12 SEC Vidicon, Orthicon: two names for one device
13 Princeton as the only astronomical developer of the SEC Vidicon
13-14 Westinghouse Vidicon operations; Dr. Pietrzyk
14 Princeton's link with the LST/ST project
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14-15 October, 1976 ST Science Working Group (SWG) meeting on detectors: questioning the SEC
16 Opening the Announcement of Opportunity for the ST Wide Field Camera to all detectors
16-17 Joint CCD work between GSFC and the Night Vision Lab (NVL)
17-18 Origins of Sobieski's personal interest in CCDs
18-19 GSFC-NVL efforts to spur Texas Instruments' corporate interest in CCDs
19-20 Technical details of GSFC's Intensified CCD work
20-21 Funding sources for the GSFC ACHED research
21 Organization of the GSFC ST Phase B effort
21 Planetary science advocates on the ST project: Robert Danielson, William Bomb, Bradford Smith
22 1976 NASA HQ meeting with planetary scientists concerned about ST's planetary capability
22-23 Changing detectors to meet planetary requirements
23-24 GSFC support for Sobieski's bid for the ST Wide Field/Planetary Camera (WF/PC) Scientific Instrument (SI) contract
24-25 Maturation of CCD technology, 1976-77
25-26 The Phase B LST Detector Working Group, 1974
26-27 Early LST SI concepts: nonmodular
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
27 Origins of the modular SI concept
27-28 Relationship between imaging and spectroscopy in early ST planning
28 Impact of the ESA Faint Object Camera (FOC) SI proposal on Sobieski's WF/PC proposal planning
28-29 Discussion of an ST Science Institute in Phase B
29 Phase B concerns: detectors, IR instruments, budgeting observation time
29-30 Relationship between the IUE guest observer program and planning for ST observing time
30 Sobieski's reaction to reducing the ST aperture from 3 meters to 2.4 meters
31 Intermediate-size space telescope plans: 1971-2
31-32 GSFC reactions to loosing the ST lead center role
32-33 Lyman Spitzer and John Bahcall as ST advocates before Congress
33-34 Precursor studies and missions to ST: 1950-60s
34 Early work which built confidence that an ST was feasible: mirrors, detectors, pointing control
34-35 Proposals for a separate astrometer on ST; use of the Fine Guidance Sensors (FGS) for astrometry
35 Challenges of the FGS system
35-37 Challenges in CCD development
37-38 Details of the GSFC-Sobieski WF/PC proposal
38 Infrared Sis for ST
39 The GSFC WF/PC proposal team
Speer, Fred A. Date: February 26, 1985. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.25 hrs.; 49 pp. Use restriction: Permission required for access.
Speer reflects on events during his tenure as Space Telescope Project Manager (1980-83). He first describes his early career at NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, and his tenure as HEAO Project Manager (1971-80). ST topics discussed include the organization of the ST Project Office, ST systems engineering, cost increases in the ST project, origins of ST's 1982-83 cost and schedule rebaselining, the 1983 ST budget supplement request, staff turnover at NASA, proposals to defer one of the ST scientific instruments, changes in Perkin-Elmer management of the ST contract in 1982-83, review team studies of the ST project in 1983, ST maintenance in orbit, and ESA management of its ST contributions.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Background in Germany; contacts with Dr. von Braun
1-2 Speer joins Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA); work on the Redstone booster
2 ABMA becomes NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC); work on Saturn, post-launch operations
2-3 Remote support to Kennedy/Johnson Space Centers
3-4 Speer becomes High Energy Astrophysical Observatory (HEAO) Project Manager; HEAO funding cut
4-5 HEAO replanned as a low cost three-payload series
6 Relations with HEAO contractors and scientists
6-7 Ernst Stuhlinger's role in the HEAO effort
7-9 Advantages and disadvantages of the protoflight design concept
9-10 Protoflight concept applied to HEAO
10 Testing protoflight equipment
11-12 Speer becomes ST Project Manager, 1980
12-13 MSFC ST Project Office management structure
14 Changes in the MSFC ST organization under Speer
15-16 Cost reviews of the ST project by teams under Warren Keller and James Murphy; Speer recognizes cost overruns
16-17 Speer freezes ST science requirement revisions
17 Relations with Project Scientist and the ST Science Working Group (SWG)
17-20 Relations with NASA HQ and the ST Program office; changes in NASA HQ staff
20 ST cost increases at Lockheed Missiles and Space Corp (LMSC)
21 Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA) systems engineering at Perkin-Elmer (P-E)
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
21-22 Establishing construction schedules for OTA support equipment, 1982: cost estimates rise
23 P-E presents revised cost estimate to Speer; new estimates relayed to NASA HQ
24 NASA HQ opts to ask for supplemental ST funding rather than reduce performance specifications
25 Changes in the ST Project after the 1982-3 funding supplement: increased systems engineering
25-26 NASA HQ resolve that ST stay in budget after '83
26 Difficulty of predicting costs of advanced technology projects
27 Reducing ST science requirements to stay within budget: deferring a Scientific Instrument (SI)
27-28 Timing of discovery of the '82-3 ST cost increase
28 NASA-contractor budgeting strategies
29 Changes in Perkin-Elmer ST management, 1983
30-31 1982-3 ST cost increases
31-32 MSFC presence at P-E
32-34 Institutional origins of the 1983 cost increase; P-E management experience, technical challenge
34-35 Review teams examine the ST project
35-36 ST project activity during the review period
37-38 ST management and contracting structure as established in 1977
38-39 P-E/LMSC interface: Pointing Control System
39-40 Effect of the NASA budgeting process and structure on the ST project
40-41 Impact of inflation on the ST project
41-43 Changing plans for ST Maintenance and Refurbishment (M&R)
43-45 ST orbital altitude: solar activity and air drag; shuttle glow
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
45 Important ST engineering figures: Richardson, Field, Harlow
46 Current status of LMSC ST efforts, ca. 1985
46 Stability of ESA ST contribution management
47 ST management at LMSC: William Wright
48-49 Speer's summary of his ST experiences
Spitzer, Lyman. Date: October 27, 1983. Interviewer: Paul Hanle. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1 hr.; 15 pp. Use restriction: Public.
Spitzer recalls his early interest in space astronomy. Discusses his role as chairman of Space Telescope Institute Council. Describes relationships between STIC, NASA, AURA and STScI. Discusses NASA's attitude toward his own advocacy of LST in 1960s. Discusses relations of space astronomers with Office of Manned Space Flight. Discusses Princeton's selection and support of the SEC Vidicon and NASA support of Princeton detector work. Describes himself as strong advocate of all space telescope developments and technologies. Discussion of selection of LST Project Scientist. Discusses main science rationales for ST. Discusses support for ST in top echelon at NASA. Discusses early lobbying efforts.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Spitzer's first contact with Oberth's ideas; his unfamiliarity with Oberth in 1946
1-2 Spitzer as a science fiction enthusiast; The Brick Moon; the American Rocket Society
2 WWII as a spur to serious thought about space astronomy for Spitzer; others show little interest in the promise of space
2-3 Prewar telescope advocates and articles; Richardson, John Stewart
3 Spitzer's role as chairman of Space Telescope Institute Council (STIC)
3 STIC's role in contrast to that of a standard academic board of trustees
4 Relations between STIC, Spitzer, and Giacconi
4 Information flow between NASA, STIC, AURA, STScI
5 STIC meeting schedule; NASA presence at STIC
6 Attitudes of NASA HQ figures toward Spitzer's late 1960s LST advocacy; Roman, Mitchell, Aucremanne
7 Space astronomers' relations with the Office of Manned Space Flight; Martin Schwarzschild, astronauts on LST; orbital servicing
8 Astronauts and the Advanced Princeton Telescope
9 1965 Boeing NASA-NAS Manned Orbital Telescope study
9-10 Princeton's early selection and support of the SEC Vidicon; NASA support of Princeton detector work; NASA contracting and development philosophy
11 Spitzer as strong advocate of all space telescope developments and technologies
11-12 Spitzer, O'Dell, and the selection of the LST Project Scientist; NASA's stipulation that the Project Scientist hold a full-time position; O'Dell's contribution to LST
12-13 Art Code's 'Uncommittee' commissioned to study the possibility of creating an independent LST science institute; Spitzer's contribution; relation to the Hornig Committee and Report
13-14 Main science rationales for ST; Spitzer softens his initial broad arguments; ST as a general purpose facility
14-15 Support for ST in NASA top echelons; effect of astronomers' lobbying
15 Hinners' support of ST in NASA and before OMB; role ofcontractors in early lobbying; Capitol Hill staffers reaction to 1st LST lobbying effort
Spitzer, Lyman. Date: March 7, 1984. Interviewer: Paul Hanle. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.25 hrs.; 38 pp. Use restriction: Public.
Continuation of interview on October 27, 1983. Spitzer discusses his involvement with Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory and his reasons for leaving. Discusses his own activities during mid-1960s. Describes evolution of specifications of LST primary mirror. Discusses introduction of LST science institute at Woods Hole conference. Describes relationship between his own institute ideas and his experience on Copernicus. Discusses Working Group's approval of institute concept. Discusses concerns over site selection. Discusses the request for proposals. Discusses Copernicus experience as model for ST institute. Compares relative strengths of various proposals for institute contract. Discusses Princeton's proposal and efforts to promote it. Compares academic contractors with those from industrial firms. Discusses NASA rationale for denying contract to Princeton/AUI. Compares AURA and AUI proposals. Discusses his own reaction to choice of Hopkins/AURA as contractors. Discusses impact of selection on work at Princeton. Discusses selection of director. Discusses Hornig Committee Report. Discusses role definition for Goddard with respect to STScI.
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
16 Involvement with the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory; reasons for leaving the lab
17 Distribution of Spitzer's time in the mid 1960s; research, teaching, OAO, Princeton Research Board
17-18 Origin of the 3-meter LST primary mirror baseline
18-19 Working Group decision to reduce main mirror to 2.4 meters; effect on engineering hardware
19-20 Possible relation between 2.4-meter LST mirror size and contractors' previous military experience
20 Discussion of an LST science institute at the Woods Hole conference
21 First substantive discussion of a science institute: Code's "Uncommittee", 1974
21-22 Relation between Spitzer's institute ideas and his Copernicus experience
22 Spitzer's awareness of 1966 Ramsey Report's LST Institute provisions; relation to Spitzer's 1969 study group and report
23 Absence of institute concept in the 1969 study
23-24 Code Subcommittee recommendation in Working Group; Spitzer's contributions
25 Working Group approval of the institute concept; NASA HQ reaction; O'Dell's discussion of the concept with HQ
25-26 Institute site selection concerns and procedures; Hinners' and Al Cameron's roles
26-27 Relation between institute consortium selection and site selection; proximity to Goddard
27 New Jersey's advocacy of Princeton for the STScI site
28 Complexity of NASA's science institute Request for Proposals
28-29 Support and command software for OAO Copernicus; contrast with ST software; application of Wisconsin ideas to Copernicus operations; placing Copernicus scientists in residence at Goddard
29-30 Copernicus Guest Observer program as LST model; relation to Princeton Institute site bid
30-31 Sites designated by proposing consortia for their science institute bids; Princeton's position
31-32 Relative strengths of the various consortia's proposals for the institute contract
32-33 The specific process by which Princeton promoted itself to the proposing consortia; roles of Groth, Bahcall, Ed Jenkins, Dave Wilkinson
33-34 PACSI- the Princeton Advisory Committee for the Science Institute; outside advice to the Princeton team; role of Spitzer and Bahcall
34 Relations between Princeton astronomers and the consortia designating Princeton as their STScI site
34-36 Spitzer and Bahcall as director-designates for USRA and AUI; roles of Bowen, Neil Rudenstein
36-37 NASA allows for difference of academic STScI contractors from industrial firms
37-39 NASA's rationales for declining the AUI proposal designating Princeton as the STScI site; role of software subcontractors in proposal preparation
40 Authorship of AUI bid; Spitzer's contribution
40-41 Comparison of the AURA and AUI STScI proposals
41 Finding a Princeton campus site for STScI
41-42 John Bahcall's efforts to enlist the Institute for Advanced Study in support of Princeton's bid to be selected as the STScI site
42-43 NASA's relative weighing of the degree of host institutional support vs. tentative cost and organization structures in evaluating STScI bids
43 Spitzer's qualifications for STScI directorship
43-44 NASA's questions of and oral review of AUI's bid; Bahcall, Spitzer, Groth, OAO attend
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
45 Rumors and expectations surrounding the AUI-AURA final competition
45-46 Spitzer's reaction to the selection of AURA/JHU as the STScI contractors
46 Spitzer's OAO experience as a lesson in maintaining equanimity in the face of loss
47 Effect of the designation of AURA/JHU as the STScI contract team on Princeton Univ., IAS, and the Princeton astronomy department
47-48 AURA's STScI director search; Art Code as acting director, STIC composition; STIC role in search; NASA influence in search
48-49 Giacconi's qualifications as STScI director
49-51 Role and responsibilities of the STScI Visiting Committee; discussion of the pace of STScI expansion; Visiting Committee and NASA; astronomers' views on STScI
51 Hornig Committee Report as STScI 'charter'
51-52 STScI and the development of new SIs
52 Keller Report in relation to the Hornig Report
52-53 Consideration of Goddard during site selection and role definition for STScI
Stockman, Peter. Date: February 15, 1985. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 22 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Stockman describes his work as head of the Research Support Branch of the Space Telescope Science Institute (1983- ). He begins with a brief review of his academic background, and work at Columbia, with the Air Force, and with Arizona's optical astronomy group. Space Telescope topics discussed include the selection of CCDs as ST's prime camera detector, ground-based use of CCDs, and tube-based detector technology of the 1970s. Topics relating to Stockman's career at STScI RSB include ST mirror decontamination, CCD Quantum Efficiency Hysteresis, STScI relations with ST contractors, Fine Guidance Sensor issues, 'microripple' of the ST primary mirror, second-generation ST scientific instruments, and NASA managerial practices.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Academic background; Columbia space astronomers
1-2 Work with Columbia sounding rockets: Roger Angel
2 Work at Air Force Weapons Laboratory
2-3 Stockman joins optical astronomy group at Arizona
3-4 Move to Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI) to head the Research Support Branch (RSB), '83
4 Stockman's early sounding rocket spectrographs
5 CCDs and ground-based astronomy, 1978-83
5-6 Selecting CCDs for the ST Wide Field/Planetary Camera (WF/PC) Scientific Instrument (SI)
6 Kitt Peak National Observatory's CCD development
6-7 Solid-state detector concepts of the '70s; tubes
7-8 Ground-based use of SEC and SIT Vidicon tubes; advantages of CCDs over Vidicons
8-9 Stockman's awareness of ST, 1978-83
9 Organization of the STScI RSB
9-10 Changing role of the RSB
10-11 RSB work on ST: mirror cleaning, Fine Guidance Sensors (FGSs); ST project's responsiveness to protecting ST's science objectives
12 RSB work with Project Scientist Robert Brown: WF/PC Quantum Efficiency Hysteresis (QEH)
12 William Fastie as acting RSB Chief; his work with the OCS secondary mirror control system
12-13 STScI relations with the ST associate contractors
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
13-14 FGS issues and concerns
14-15 Awareness of FGS issues at STScI
15-16 FGS design considerations: level of complexity
16-18 ST mirror figure: 'microripple' and UV performance
18 Mounting scheme for the ST main mirror
18-19 Recent results on the QEH issue, ca. 1985
19-20 STScI's position on the QEH issue
20 Contrasts between work at Arizona and at STScI
20 NASA as a managerial organization
21 STScI staff as a source of second-generation SIs
21-22 STScI's role in SI development
Stuhlinger, Ernst. Date: April 2 and April 5, 1984. Interviewer: Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1 hr.; 23 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Dr. Stuhlinger discusses the role of visionaries and farsighted scientific and engineering advocates in preparing the ground for what eventually became the Space Telescope program. He emphasizes von Braun's desire to develop large launch vehicles to support astronomy, and describes Princeton astronomer Lyman Spitzer's seminal role in persuading his colleagues of the importance of orbiting telescopes. Stuhlinger further credits Spitzer with bring C.R. O'Dell to NASA as the ST Project Scientist. In the second interview Dr. Stuhlinger describes his family and academic background through 1939, particularly his research career under Dr. Honeys Geiger. He talks of his military service during World War II, and his eventual assignment to von Braun and Dornberger's A-4, or V-2, rocket group at the Peenemùnde. Stuhlinger discusses von Braun's interest in the scientific potential of the A-4, and postwar science conducted with V-2s in the US He describes the events leading up to the integration of James van Allen's radiation detector in the first US satellite, Explorer 1. Dr. Stuhlinger concludes with an account of the Peenemùnde team's experiences during Germany's collapse in 1945, and his recruitment to join the US rocket program.
April 2, 1984
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-5 History of the scientific and engineering aspects of Space Telescope
1 Process of getting a Space Telescope
2 Hermann Oberth
2-3 Lyman Spitzer and his 1946 Project RAND study
4-5 Bob O'Dell, LST Project Scientist
April 5, 1984
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
5-7 Biographical information
5 Family, early interests
5-6 University of Tùbingen, 1932-36: Honeys Geiger
6-7 Heisenberg, coordinator nuclear energy development in Germany (Fermi, America)
7-21 Service in German Army, 1941-1945
7 Year and a half on Russian front
8 Peenemùnde, 1943
8 Talk of doing science with V-2s
9 Atmosphere at Peenemùnde, von Braun in jail
9-11 Finding ways of doing science with the V-2: the Regener-Tonne
11 Bothe's cyclotron
12-13 Possibility of flying a Geiger counter
14 Plans to launch a satellite from a Redstone
15-16 Flying Van Allen instruments on Explorer
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
17 Stuhlinger's impression of American scientists
18-21 End of the war: decision to go to America
22-23 Fort Bliss, Texas
22-23 Role as a rocketeer
23 Contact with Edson and Tombaugh
Teem, John. Date: September 26, 1984. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.5 hrs.; 33 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Teem recounts his early career and recalls objectives of AURA when he became its president in October, 1977: Next Generation Telescope and STScI. Describes strategy for developing STScI proposal and relations between AURA and its constituency. Describes AURA's decision to offer site proposal and compares proposal with its competitors. Recalls selection of Computer Sciences Corporation. Describes astronomical community's conceptions about STScI site and director. Discusses relationships among proposing university groups and influences on AURA's STScI proposal. Recalls early work on and organization of proposal; discusses cost proposal and AURA's image of STScI as observatory. Also discusses anticipated ST launch dates and Institute's estimated staff requirements; discusses SOGS. Recalls work on proposal in early 1980. Concludes with observations on AURA-NASA relationship and AURA's continuing Large Telescope work.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Career previous to taking position as president of AURA in October 1977
3-4 AURA objectives at that time: Next Generation Telescope [NGT] and STScI; questions concerning ground-based vs. space-based astronomy
4 Presentation of issue of STScI to AURA community; developing strategy to develop STScI proposal
5 Relations between AURA and its constituency
6-7 Comparison of AURA and Associated Universities Incorporated [AUI], proposal competitor
7-8 Newsletter: AURA Issues to assess views on AURA becoming involved in STScI proposal; formation of Ad Hoc Committee on STScI
8 Decision to offer proposal for STScI; meeting in December 1978, to design strategy
8-11 Site selection
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
11-13 Continued discussion of site selection
13-15 Selection of subcontractor (Computer Sciences Corporation [CSC]) with experience in spacecraft operations to assist in proposal design
15 Evaluation of preproposals by select committee
15-17 Preconceptions of STScI among astronomical community regarding site, director
17-18 Relationship of Ad Hoc Committee to AURA board regarding site selection
18-19 Relationship among proposing university consortia (AURA/AUI/URA/USRA)
19 Influences on model for STScI in AURA proposal
19-20 Guide Stars
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
20-21 Continued discussion of influences on model for STScI in AURAproposal
21-22 Influence of the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab [APL]
22-24 Beginning work on the proposal
24-25 Organization of proposal team
25-27 Cost proposal
27 Image of STScI as an observatory
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
27-28 Estimating manpower required to operate STScI
28 Discussion of launch date: March 1984 in preliminary RFP; January 1985 in RFP
28-29 Discussion of Science Operations Ground Systems [SOGs] and its relationship to STScI
29-31 January-March 1980: coordination of proposal team
31-32 Work on proposal after preliminary competition
32-33 NASA's view of AURA's role: cultural differences between NASA and AURA
33 AURA's continuing efforts regarding Large Telescope
Teem, John. Date: October 4, 1984. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 3 hrs.; 37 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Teem describes STScI site selection and NASA's evaluation of AURA proposal. Discusses early development of Science Data Analysis System. Describes early relationship among Goddard, AURA and NASA; establishing chain of command. Recalls selection of Riccardo Giacconi as Institute director. Assesses Giacconi's interaction with NASA and Goddard and effects of 1983 Goddard reorganization. Discusses Institute's expected growth and establishment of direct interface with Goddard. Continues discussion of Institute's relationship with NASA HQ; also NASA's relations with NSF. Recalls early plans for ST time allocation. Compares NASA and NSF management styles and contract negotiation. Recalls Art Code as Acting Director and beginning of Giacconi's directorship. Discusses funding allocation. Comments at length on James Beggs and STScI budget and Beggs' interest in Space Station.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 STScI site selection: Johns Hopkins and development of astronomy program; reactions to selection of Hopkins
2-3 Evaluation of AURA proposal by NASA
3 Guest Observers [GOs] and space allocation
3-4 Science Data Analysis System [SDAS]: defining approach and scope of software development
5 Negotiations on management personnel allocation; ongoing reassessment of manpower needs
6-7 Relations between Goddard and AURA during debriefing and early stages of work on STScI
7-9 Role of NASA HQ in management of STScI; establishing a chain of command
9-10 Discussion of selection of STScI director, Riccardo Giacconi
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
10-11 Giacconi's interaction with NASA HQ
11-12 Relationship between Headquarters and Goddard after reorganization by Jim Welch in April 1983; impact on AURA and STScI
12-14 Assessment of planned growth of STScI; discussion of alternatives to meet manpower cap
14 Meeting to discuss Goddard proposal and STScI counterproposal to manpower allocation
14-15 Impact on working relationship between Goddard and STScI
16-17 Establishment of direct interface between Goddard and STScI
17 Discussion of ground-based vs. space astronomy; concern in astronomical community over allocation of resources
17-18 Discussion of STScI/NASA HQ relationship and long-term impact on STScI
18 Relations between NSF and NASA
19 Ground-based telescope time allocation; coordination of data collection efforts to document cataclysmic event
20-21 Response of American astronomers to preplanning time allocation
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
21-24 Comparison of NSF with NASA in terms of management styles and contract negotiation
24 Experience in working with NASA as criterion for selection of STScI director
24-25 Art Code as Acting Director of STScI
25-27 Comparison of astronomers with other groups of scientists
27 Astronomers and nonscientific factors in funding allocation
28-30 Status of Code Committee; resignation of Art Code as chairman
30-31 Riccardo Giacconi, as STScI director
31 Competition for funding among astronomical observers; perception of STScI in this regard
31-35 James Beggs and STScI budget and project management
35 Beggs interest in Space Station; meeting between Jay Keyworth and Riccardo Giacconi
35-36 Chairmanship of Institute Visiting Committee
36-37 Concluding remarks
Tenerelli, Domenick. Date: January 11, 1985. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 25 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Dr. Tenerelli describes Space Telescope (ST) design and development activities at Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Sunnyvale, Ca., from 1971 to 1977. He discusses his part in Lockheed's pursuit of Large Space Telescope (LST) program contracts. He describes his efforts to familiarize himself with Lockheed-funded studies for the 3-meters Large Space Telescope concept which lead to a full-scale Phase B LST study contract for the company from 1973 to 1976. Dr. Tenerelli then details the work conducted under that study, especially efforts to meet NASA's strict pointing control requirements and recounts changes introduced into the spacecraft design when NASA redefined the system to the 2.4-meter ST configuration. He discusses debates concerning the proper mechanical linkages between ST's major subsystems, and the best means of adjusting the spacecraft's attitude. In concluding, Dr. Tenerelli develops the differences between ST design and testing philosophies and those practiced on previous spacecraft, examining in particular the influence of man-tending of the observatory by Shuttle astronauts.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Academic background
1-2 Tenerelli's enthusiasm for the Large Space Telescope concept, 1971
2 LMSC managers' attitude toward bidding for an LST contract
2-3 LMSC's in-house, unremunerated studies of the LST Support Systems Module (SSM); presenting the studies to NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), December, 1972
3-4 LMSC builds up an LST team in order to bid for a Phase B study contract, 1973
4 Lockheed negotiates to team with an optical contractor during Phase B; Tenerelli visits University of Arizona to educate himself in astronomical optics
4-5 LMSC as a subcontractor to ITEK for their LST Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA) studies, 1973
5-6 Further LMSC in-house SSM studies, 1973
6 Table of Organization for LMSC Phase B efforts
6-7 Suspicion within some branches of LMSC that NASA would not award a major contract to a firm - like LMSC - previously largely unknown to them
7-8 Tenerelli cultivates contacts with all aspects of MSFC's ST efforts, 1972-77
8-9 Technical challenges of completing LST-ST along the rough design set by MSFC: pointing accuracy
9-10 Testing control moment gyros on LMSC's ST Structural and Dynamic Test Vehicle (SDTV) to establish rough empirical figures on pointing jitter
10-11 Tenerelli's Phase B efforts to develop kinematic mounts between the OTA and SSM which would thermally isolate the OTA, preserving its alignment
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
11-12 Jitter control efforts during Phase A/B, cont
12-13 LMSC's increased confidence in their ability to meet pointing requirements once NASA dropped the 3-meter LST in favor of the 2.4-meter Space Telescope (ST) design
13-15 MSFC's concerns about using control moment gyros for attitude control and pointing on ST; changing the design to use reaction wheel assemblies (RWAs)
15-16 LMSC redesigns its proposal to incorporate RWAs; Robert Herzberg's contributions
16-18 LMSC efforts to define the interface between the OTA and SSM; various systems for mechanically coupling the two
18 Relations between Lockheed and Marshall, Phase B: Jean Olivier
18-19 Defining the OTA-SSM interface, cont
19-20 Specialty fields in spacecraft engineering vital to the ST development effort
20-21 Pointing control as the critical specialty for ST; respect LMSC pointing specialists enjoyed among Marshall engineers: Gerry Nurre, Sherm Seltzer, Honeys Connel
22 Low level of LMSC's previous contracting with NASA at the time of its ST bids; loss of Skylab and Space Shuttle contracts to other firms
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
22 NASA efforts to reduce ST development costs: cuts in testing during development, fabrication
22-23 Compensating for cut testing: increasing ST design tolerances, and therefore final spacecraft weight
23-24 Compensation, cont.: increased reliance on Orbital Replaceable Units (ORUs) to reduce the impact of an increased failure rate on ST performance
24 ST design practices seen as new design philosophy, predicated on man-tending and ORU capabilities
24-25 Advantages of a protoflight approach to spacecraft development
25 Elements of ideal Phase B development effort for a major spacecraft, from contractor's point of view
Tenerelli, Domenick. Date: December 23, 1985. Interviewers: Robert W. Smith, Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 3 hrs.; 30 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Dr. Tenerelli discusses events surrounding the release of the Phase C/D Space Telescope (ST) Request for Proposals (RFP), the document through which NASA solicited contractors to build the telescope. He describes the bidding process, and discusses Lockheed's proposal. Dr. Tenerelli then recounts events of Phase C, including Lockheed-Perkin-Elmer efforts to redesign the ST Optical Telescope Assembly's electronics systems and several efforts through the history of the ST project to refine the performance of the system's Fine Guidance Sensors (FGSs). Dr. Tenerelli concludes by reflecting on the early ST project focus on negotiating Interface Control Documents (ICDs) to coordinate the efforts of ST's numerous contractors and managers. He further comments on the role of scientists in the engineering process, touching on the influence of C.R. "Bob" O'Dell and Robert Brown during their tenures as ST Project Scientists, and on the influence of the Space Telescope Observatory Performance Assessment Team (STOPAT) and the ST Science Working Group.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Tenerelli flies to Huntsville to pick up the ST Phase C/D Request for Proposals (RFP) as soon as it was released by NASA's MSFC, January 1977
2 Phoning the RFP contents back to Lockheed Missiles and Space Company's (LMSC's) ST contract team in Sunnyvale, CA.
2-3 LMSC preparations for the RFP release: testing an ST engineering model, studying aperture doors
3 LMSC's ST Structural and Dynamic Test Vehicle (SDTV)
3-4 Tenerelli's confidence that Congress would fund ST
4 Confidence that LMSC would win the ST Phase C/D competition
4-7 LMSC's understanding of ST's requirements: Lockheed studies of straylight suppression coatings as an example
7-8 Allowable contacts between contractors and NASA's supervising center during an RFP
8 Tenerelli's reaction to Lockheed's selection by NASA as associate contractor for ST's Support Systems Module (SSM) and systems engineering
8 Changes in LMSC's ST team: William "Bill" Wright
8-9 Negotiating the ST SSM working contract with MSFC
9-10 MSFC-Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) relations
10-11 Technical challenges facing LMSC at the start of Phase C: repackaging the Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA) electronics
11-12 Developing concepts for an OTA equipment section with OTA contractor Perkin-Elmer; writing the concept into the ST program structure
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12-14 Communications and division of responsibilities between LMSC, Perkin-Elmer, and NASA-MSFC: OTA equipment section problem as example
14-15 Problems identified at the Phase C ST Program Requirements Review (PRR): incorporating an external radiator for the Wide Field/Planetary Camera (WF/PC) Scientific Instrument (SI)
15 Creating an ST operational 'safe mode'
16 Phase B efforts to better define an effective Pointing Control System (PCS) for ST
16-17 Changes in the design of ST's Fine Guidance Sensors (FGSs) from Phase B through Phase C/D: quadrant to interferometer principle
17-18 Importance of fully studying design changes before implementing them: FGSs as an example
18-19 Systems engineering on ST; budget pressures and systems engineering
19 Special abilities of the systems engineer
20 Systems engineering defined
21 Performance requirements as the basis and essence of quality systems engineering
21-22 Critical role of Interface Control Documents (ICDs) in assuring successful integration of ST's subsystems
21-22 Changes to ST ICDs over the course of the project
22-23 Engineers who represented the various ST program elements during formulation of the ICDs
23 High caliber of the ICD engineers
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
24-25 Scientists who contributed to the ICD process: James Westphal of the WF/PC, Robert "Bob" Bless of the High Speed Photometer
25 Other astronomers who contributed to Lockheed's efforts: William Fastie, Daniel Schroeder, Peter Stockman, Project Scientist Robert Brown
25 Contact with ST Project Scientist C.R. "Bob" O'Dell
26-27 Influence of the ST Observatory Performance Assessment Team (STOPAT); contrast between STOPAT and the ST Science Working Group
27-28 Science and engineering culture contrasted
28-30 Special qualities of astronomers as scientists; astronomers' understandings of the working environment of engineers, and vice versa
Tenerelli, Domenick. Date: December 27, 1985. Interviewers: Robert W. Smith, Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 3 hrs.; 37 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Dr. Tenerelli discusses the function and history of Lockheed's Space Telescope (ST) Structural and Dynamic Test Vehicle (SDTV) from 1974 through the early 1980s. He describes the pre- Phase B and Phase B SDTV, which was little more than an Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA) simulator. He then discusses the addition of Support Systems Module (SSM) components and cosmetic details to the SDTV, as well as the changing uses to which the vehicle was put. Dr. Tenerelli then considers differences between the 1974 Large Space Telescope configuration and the redesigned ST which was approved for construction, touching on questions of flexure, thermal balance, and coupling between subsystems. Dr. Tenerelli concludes with extensive reflections on ST design and testing philosophy, including the protoflight design concept and the program's shift from component-level to integrated testing, and on his relations with ST's project managers.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Origins of the Space Telescope (ST) Structural and Dynamic Test Vehicle (SDTV)
2-4 Various iterations of the SDTV, 1974-1977: adding a Support Systems Module (SSM) mockup
4-6 Differences between Itek and Eastman-Kodak's Phase B Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA) interface design, and final OTA contractor Perkin-Elmer's
5-6 Using the SDTV to simulate the Shuttle launch environment's effect on ST
7 Building up external appearance of SDTV to match projected ST design; Ed Wiggins
7-8 Various iterations of the SDTV, cont
8 Earliest iteration of SDTV described in detail: OTA only, no SSM components simulated
9 Second SDTV iteration: Light Shield and Forward Shell mockups added
9-12 Photographs of various SDTV configurations
13 Multi-Layer Insulation (MLI) on the SDTV and on ST
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
13-14 Differences in configuration and interface specifications between the original Large Space Telescope (LST) concept and the final ST design
14-15 Thermal balance in LST phase B planning configuration, and in final ST configuration
15-16 Importance of treating ST as a total system, rather than viewing it part by part
16-17 Flexure of the SSM; decoupling the OTA from SSM deformations
17-18 Preparing a mockup of the ST Scientific Instrument (SI) in order to evaluate crew systems intended to ease on-orbit servicing of ST by astronauts
18-19 Origins of the ST simulator used during neutral buoyancy astronaut training at MSFC
19-21 Modifying the SDTV in Phase C/D for crew systems evaluation in the Aft Shroud area
21-23 Documentation relating to the STV's history
24-25 ST spacecraft testing program as set in early Phase C/D
25 Change in the ST project's testing philosophy between Phase B and Phase C/D
TAPE 2, SIDE l
26-28 Change from separate testing of ST's major components to integrated testing of the assembled spacecraft at Lockheed
28-29 Justifications for the original separate testing philosophy
29 Linking the SIs mechanically with the SSM through a ground strap
29-30 Reasons for adopting the integrated testing philosophy: reducing cost, improving the test program's examination of ST's increasingly complicated interfaces
30-31 Protoflight spacecraft design concept; influence on testing philosophy
31 Design philosophy on ST program: use of preexisting components and government furnished equipment
32-33 Goddard Space Flight Center's (GSFC's) early concepts for the ST SI focal plane structure; GSFC-Lockheed relations
33-34 MSFC-Lockheed relations
34-35 Influence of the NASA Project Managers on the culture of their space science projects: William Keathley and ST
35 Keathley's role in ST interface definition
36-37 Changes in the MSFC-Lockheed relationship during ST Project Manager Fred Speer's tenure
Tenerelli, Domenick. Date: December 31, 1985. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2.5 hr.; 28 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Dr. Tenerelli discusses several design problems and issues which emerged during Space Telescope (ST) Phase C/D, 1977-1985. He comments on the challenge of silencing ST's pointing control mechanisms so as to meet the .007 arc second pointing requirement set for the system, and on efforts to secure a reliable Fine Guidance Sensor design through alternate design studies by James Westphal and William Fastie. Dr. Tenerelli then considers the influence of the Space Shuttle launch environment on ST design, and describes Lockheed's testing program to address Shuttle-related issues. He discusses the application of Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs) in ST design. Finally, he considers the impact of the 1980 and 1982-83 rebudgeting and rescheduling exercises on the ST project.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Challenges facing the Space Telescope (ST) program in Phase C/D: meeting the .007 arc second pointing requirement
2 Shrouding the ST gyros to reduce noise; distribution among subsystems of the ST pointing error budget
3 Consideration of Control Moment Gyros and Reaction Wheel Assemblies as alternative pointing control mechanisms in Phase B
3-4 Selecting the SSM computer system
4 Pointing control, cont.: loss-of-lock concerns
5-7 Pointing requirements and ST Scientific Instrument (SI) performance
7-8 ST Fine Guidance Sensors (FGSs) and loss-of-lock: FGS performance as the source of the .007 arc second ST pointing requirement
9-10 Proposed alternatives to P-E's FGS design: James Gunn-James Westphal alternate idea
10-13 Johns Hopkins University alternate FGS studies led by William "Bill" Fastie
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
11-12 Degradation of the ST orbit and its relation to pointing stability: South Atlantic Anomaly, sunspot activity, and reaction Wheel Assembly operating speeds
13-14 Influence of the Space Shuttle launch environment on ST design: acoustic vibrations
15 Shuttle environment influence, cont.: load alleviation for the ST primary mirror
15-18 Shuttle environment, cont.: possibility of contamination of the ST primary by Shuttle-derived particles or gasses
18-19 Concepts of earth-return refurbishing for ST; concerns about increasing particulate contamination through earth-return servicing
19-20 Changing place of Orbital Replacement Units (ORUs) in ST design philosophy, 1977-85
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
20-21 Relations between crew systems engineers and mechanical engineers on the ST project
22-23 Tenerelli's perspective on changes introduced into the ST program during 1980's rebudgeting activities
23-24 Changes associated with the 1982-83 rebudgeting
24-25 Reorganization of the Lockheed ST management structure, 1982-83; Tom Harvey
25-27 ST project manager Fred Speer's remarks on the 1982-83 ST project difficulties, made before the ST Science Working Group
27-28 Redesigning the ST Wide Field/Planetary Camera to eliminate Quantum Efficiency Hysteresis (QEH) in its CCD detectors
Tenerelli, Domenick. Date: January 16, 1986. Interviewers: Robert W. Smith, Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 3 hrs.; 31 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Dr. Tenerelli discusses his involvement in the effort to outline and implement a solution to Quantum Efficiency Hysteresis (QEH) in the CCD detectors of the Wide Field Planetary Camera (WF/PC) Scientific Instrument (SI) for the Space Telescope, ca. 1984. He discusses WF/PC Principle Investigator James Westphal's suggestion that OEH could be eliminated by flooding the WF/PC CCDs with ultraviolet light. Tenerelli then describes the three proposed means of bringing UV light to the CCDs: cutting a filtered hole in the ST aperture door and pointing the observatory at the sun; building a UV lamp into the WF/PC, and building a 'light pipe' to reflect a thin solar UV beam onto the CDDs from the side of the telescope. Dr. Tenerelli recounts studies of each solution, describes scientists' negative reactions to solar pointing, and recounts the ST project decision to implement the light pipe. Dr. Tenerelli concludes the interview with reflections on the qualities and abilities demanded of engineers on major space science projects, the functioning of lines of communication in such projects, and on the final testing activities required to prepare ST for its then-imminent 1986 launch date.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Tenerelli's first exposure to the problem of QEH degrading the performance of the CCD detectors of the WF/PC Scientific Instrument for ST
1-2 WF/PC Principle Investigator James Westphal discusses with Tenerelli the possibility of cutting a whole in the ST aperture door to permit periodic flooding the WF/PC with solar ultraviolet light in order to eliminate QEH
2 Lockheed studies of the aperture door UV flood idea
2-3 ST scientists' reaction to the aperture UV flood
3-4 Early ideas for bringing UV light to the WF/PC through a 'light pipe' from the side of the telescope
4-5 Further studies of the aperture door UV flood; difficulties of that means of bringing UV light to the WF/PC CCDs
5 Other solutions: building a UV lamp into the WF/PC
5-6 Pros and cons of the various QEH solution proposals
6-7 Eliminating the UV lamp idea from consideration
7-8 Westphal expresses renewed interest in the light pipe as a means of providing a UV flood to the WF/PC CCDs
8 Origins of the light pipe concept
8-9 Establishing the feasibility of the light pipe idea
9-10 Program manager James Welch and Project Manager James Odom select the light pipe as the mechanism for achieving the WF/PC UV flood
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
10-11 Preliminary Design Review of the light pipe system
11-12 Tenerelli's efforts to ensure that each proposed means of providing the WF/PC UV flood received a detailed technical evaluation
12-13 Measuring clearances in the flight WF/PC to ensure that sufficient unused space remained for installation of the lightpipe
13 Clearing the light pipe design through the ST-Space Shuttle interface control system
13-14 Contamination of the WF/PC CCDs; reduced UV response at shorter wavelengths
14-15 Ultimate success of the UV flood solution to QEH
15 Impressive scientific potential of the WF/PC
15-16 Proposals to delete ST's aperture door as a cost-cutting measure, 1980
16 Impact on ST science of the proposed aperture door deletion
17-18 Decision-making process on major space engineering projects: role of intuition or educated instinct
18-19 Emotional stresses on astronautical engineers involved in major programs
19-20 Contrasting functions of systems and design engineers
20-21 Propagating solutions to technical problems through the many management levels of large space projects
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
21-22 Importance of ensuring communications among all the engineers and scientists involved with all facets of any given problem in space science engineering
22 Amount of travel required for a project like ST
21-23 Role of personal commitments by key managers in making complex engineering interfaces work
23-24 Creative function of conflict in engineering
24 Influence of seismic activity on Lockheed's precision engineering facilities at Sunnyvale
25-26 Final activities as ST approaches launch, ca. 1986: test planning and scheduling
26 Hardware glitches during ST's final integration and testing
26-27 Systems compatibility tests to simulate on-orbit ST science operations
27-28 Working with the SI teams during final testing
29 Other important episodes in ST engineering history: contamination control, FGS design
30 Important episodes, cont.: changing concepts for orbital operations; water resorption on orbit from graphite-epoxy Optical Telescope Assembly structures
30-31 Contamination control, cont
Tenerelli, Domenick. Date: March 4, 1987. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 21 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Tenerelli discusses tests and hardware changes during ST's "caretaker status" at Lockheed. Recalls 1982 planning for thermal vacuum tests and development of functional tests. Considers possibility of second thermal vacuum test. Reviews at length 1982 planning for systems and systems compatibility tests. Test schedule. Conducting thermal vacuum tests. Assesses relationships between Lockheed and Scientific Instrument teams and effects of new Goddard management team. Evaluates risks and results of ST thermal vacuum tests. Discusses ST's power capabilities and potential problems; hardware changes made during post%Challenger launch delay. Discusses problems related to size of ST project. Concludes with summary of Lockheed testing philosophy and importance of pre-test planning.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Tenerelli discusses recent hardware tests on ST in Lockheed's Vehicle Assembly and Test Area; plans for remote-control testing from Goddard
2 GST-3 tests; delays in beginning of ST's "caretaker status"
2-3 Repairs and changes planned during caretaker period
3 Caretaker period defined as time for mechanical work
3-4 Proposed plans to conduct thermal vacuum tests on Structural Dynamic Test Vehicle and ST C&DH
4-5 Tenerelli discusses SDTV, C&DH tests as possible substitute for additional ST thermal vacuum test
5-6 Collecting data on all hardware changes since first thermal vacuum test; assessing need for second test
6 Tenerelli recalls October, 1982 planning meeting for first thermal vacuum test; discusses concerns about ST project's direction before October, 1982 meeting
6-7 Identifying necessary vehicle tests
7 Developing functional tests; plans for conducting systems tests in segments; system compatibility tests
8 Tenerelli compares ST testing with that of other space vehicles; preliminary plans for testing thermal interface under simulated operating conditions at Lockheed; recalls 1982 effort to develop systems testing
9-10 Tenerelli recalls efforts of Pat Eddy to carry out systems compatibility testing
10-11 Discusses response of scientists to Lockheed's systems testing
11 Scientists' concerns over possible elimination of tests
11-12 Thermal vacuum test schedule
12 Added systems-level tests
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
13 Expected problems obtaining sufficient vacuum for tests; use of GSE door
13-14 Discusses communication between Lockheed and Scientific Instrument teams
14 Effects of new Goddard management on communication
14-15 Goddard responsible for approving instrument changes
15 Limits on direct contact between Lockheed and Scientific Instrument teams; evaluates results of thermal vacuum tests
15-16 Tests verify ST's light gathering capability, cleanliness, and hardware
16-17 Risks of thermal vacuum testing
17 Discusses possible power problem
17-18 Changes made during launch delay after Challenger shuttle accident
18 Power capabilities; discusses problems of fully informing ST's large numbers of users of its capabilities
18-19 Personal stresses of preparing ST for launch
19-20 Effects of time constraints on Lockheed's thermal vacuum testing philosophy
20 Substituting systems compatibility tests for segment testing of instruments
20-21 Emphasizes importance of thorough planning for successful tests
Tenerelli, Domenick. Date: October 13, 1988. Interviewer: Joseph Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: .75 hr.; 16 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Tenerelli discusses the ST's open loop pointing requirements and the use of control moment gyros and reaction wheels to reduce vibrations transmitted to mirrors. Discusses elimination of harmonic vibration in mirrors. Evaluates advantages and disadvantages of using reaction wheels. Describes at length several tests: of the gyros in 1973, of reaction wheels in 1975 and of control system in 1977. Tenerelli recounts modifications to Structural Dynamics Test Vehicle and development of Support Systems Module. Also discusses control of flexure and evaluates several types of joint designs.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Tenerelli discusses ST open loop pointing requirements
2 Describes ST's control moment gyros
2-3 Calculations of budgets for pointing errors
3 Allocating half of allowable error to gyros
3-4 Testing ST's control moment gyros
4 Successful 1973 tests of gyros
4-5 Means considered to avoid harmonic vibrations in mirrors
5 Program design of isolators for damping vibrations in gyros
5-6 Possible modifications to secondary mirror to prevent harmonic vibrations
6 Tenerelli discusses proposed use of reaction wheels to dampen vibration in control system
6-7 Tenerelli recalls his objections to reaction wheels
7-8 Tenerelli's contributions to control system
8-9 Limitations of reaction wheel speeds
9-10 Papers documenting reaction wheel tests in 1975
10-11 Additional testing; reducing flexure
11 1977 acoustical & vibration tests of control system
11-12 Modifications to Structural Dynamics Test Vehicle; incorporation of SDTV 1 into SDTV 2
12-13 Adoption of Support Systems Module terminology
13-14 Discusses Itek and competing joint designs
14-16 Different joint designs on Support Systems Module and Optical Telescope Assembly
Tifft, William G. Date: December 13, 1984. Interviewer: Joseph Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 41 pp. Use restriction: Not established.
Tifft recalls early career, including Harvard undergraduate education, CALTECH graduate work and post%doctorate work in Australia. Discusses work at Vanderbilt and Lowell Observatory. Becomes involved in space astronomy in 1963; work in Manned Space Program and Skylab. Recalls work on UV sky survey camera and other involvements with NASA, 1963-65, including work at Marshall and participation in 1964 meeting to coordinate manned and unmanned space programs. Recalls his involvement with Space Telescope dating to 1965 meeting at Woods Hole. Makes suggestions for managing observing time in space astronomy and discusses moon-based observatory plan. Comments on scientist-astronaut programs and reflects on his decision to return to ground-based astronomy.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Biographical information: early life, involvement in AAVSO [American Association of Variable Star Observers]
3 Undergraduate work at Harvard
4-5 Graduate work at CALTECH
6 Early career plans; interest in extragalactic problem; postdoctoral work at Mt. Stromlo Observatory, Australia
7 Move to Vanderbilt; Carl Seyfert's death
8 Move to Lowell Observatory; early interest in Space Program; contact with Jocelyn Gill
9 NASA advisory group meeting, Chicago, October 1963; Aden Meinel
10-1 Move to Steward Observatory; civilian space program work
12-3 Plans for Manned Space program
13 Work on Skylab payload design
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14-15 Work on ultraviolet sky survey camera
15-17 Astronaut-scientist program, 1965
18 Correspondence between Tifft and McVittie
19 Discussion of minutes from Chicago meeting [Oct 1963]
20 Meeting in Flagstaff, June 1964, to coordinate manned and unmanned programs
21 Photograph of early version of sky survey camera
22 Work at Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, Alabama
23-24 Distribution of tasks among Centers by NASA HQ; coordination of astronomical work
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
25 Early involvement in Space Telescope planning
26-29 Meeting at Woods Hole, summer 1965
30 Career plans after manned space astronomy effort waned; work on image dissection
31 Work on galactic redshifts
32 Interest in moon-based observatory
33-35 Suggestions for managing observing time in space astronomy facilities
36-37 More on moon-based observatory plan
TAPE 2, SIDE 2
38-40 More on scientist-astronaut program
41 Decision to return to ground-based astronomy
van de Hulst, Hedrik C. Date: May 27, 1983. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 29 pp. Use restriction: Open.
van de Hulst recalls his interest in space science. Discusses Space Science in Holland and the effect of Sputnik. Discusses the foundation of the European Space Research Agency (ESR). Describes the connection between american and european ideas concerning the Large Astronomical Netherlands Satellite (ANS) and knowledge of NASA Large Space Telescope. Describes the Williamsburg Conference of 1976 and the deadlock between NASA and ESA (European Space Agency. Discusses changes in IST (Instrument Science Team) and its original organization. Discusses NASA-ESA relations. Describes the effect of NASA's cancellation of the ISPM (International Solar Polar Mission).
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Interest in space science
2 Space Science in Holland; the effect of Sputnik
3 The foundation of ESRO (European Space Research Agency)
4 Package deals
5-6 Connection between American and European ideas concerning LAS (Large Astronomical Satellite)
7 A committee to consider organizational changes for LAS
8 Working within ESRO in the Dutch context and outside of it the national context
9 Support of the ANS (Astronomical Netherlands Satellite)
10 Knowledge of NASA Large Space Telescope
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
11-13 Williamsburg Conference in 1976; a deadlock between NASA and ESA (European Space Agency)
14 Decision to have a 15% European involvement, specifically involving the Faint Object Camera (FOC)
15 Changes in IST (Instrument Science Team)
16 Original organization and current reward systems within IST
17 How IST decisions become ESTEC (ESA's Science and Technology Center in Noordwigk, Holland) actions
18 Design changes in FOC
19 The complementarity of the FOC and the FPC (Field Planetary Camera)
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
20 NASA - ESA relations
21-22 The effect of NASA's cancellation of the ISPM (International Solar Polar Mission)
22-24 Other people with whom it might be helpful to talk
Appendix
25-29 Notes for Pages 1,4,5,7,13,16,17
Weiler, Edward. Date: October 20, 1983. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 43 pp. Use restriction: Permission required to quote, cite, or reproduce.
Weiler discusses ST events during his tenure as ST Program Scientist (1980-83). He briefly covers his work for Princeton at Goddard Space Flight Center on the OAO 3 operating team, and his move to NASA HQ's Astronomy Branch and the Space Telescope program. Space Telescope issues described include the Space Telescope Science Institute site selection process, Goddard Space Flight Center's role in the ST program, roles of the ST Program and Project Scientists, the 1980 ST rebudgeting process, the organization of the ST contractors and centers, the 1982-83 ST rebaselining, the Space Telescope Observatory Performance Assessment Team, the relationship of ST to AXAF, distribution of ST observing time, and relations between NASA and ESA on the ST project. Weiler also considers optical astronomers' relations with NASA, the nature of public support for space science, and the role of corporate memory on NASA projects.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Weiler's academic background; Princeton position
2 Locating STScI at Princeton; Spitzer, Ted Snow, Don York
2 ST under discussion at Goddard
3 Weiler as ST Program Scientist; science staff at NASA HQ
4 Relations between the Program and the Project Scientists
5 Weiler's role in the 1980 reprogramming; Black Saturday; role of Frank Martin
6 ST verification testing; budgeting for contingencies
6-7 Mechanisms for addressing scientists' concerns and problems; STOPAT
7 Program morale
8 Distribution of responsibilities between LMSC and Perkin-Elmer
8-9 The effect on scientists of the Marshall-Goddard administrative division
9-10 1980 rebaselining; schedule slippage at Perkin-Elmer
10 Weiler's reaction to the 1982 scheduling crisis
11 Distribution of slippage blame between HQ, Marshall, Goddard, Lockheed, P-E
11-12 Constraints affecting the Project Manager's response to potential schedule delays
12-13 Scientists' technical and engineering concerns; Weiler-O'Dell-Boggess-Leckrone committee; convergence of science concerns with Welch Report
14 1983 meeting of Science Working Group members with Headquarters personnel
15-16 Root causes of ST's difficulties: early underscoring; effect of inflation
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
16-17 Effect of inflation joined with delays
17-18 Origins of STOPAT; Weiler's role in its formation; qualifications of members
19 Reason's for STOPAT's success
20 STOPAT members' responsibility for their advice
20-21 Comparison of STOPAT and the Science Working Group
21-22 Program Scientist's relation to and responsibilities for the Science Institute
22 Barring of Goddard from the Science Institute Request for Proposals
22-23 STScI and the management of AXAF, Starlab, and FUSE
23-24 NASA control over STScI; STScI's role in the construction of SIs
25 Expansion of STScI plant and personnel
25-27 Distribution of ST observing time; fixed time allocations for STScI astronomers; balance of STScI's service and science roles; concept of an overall space science institute
27-28 Changes in astronomers' opinions of NASA
28-29 STScI and the management of other NASA missions
29-30 Opening future institute competitions to NASA centers
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
31 Difficulties of having dual managing centers and dual associate contractors; problems with systems engineering
32 Scientists as able contributors to engineering problems; understaffing of ST at NASA HQ
32-33 NASA's management structure
34 Problems with pricing the development of cutting-edge technology; NASA as an R&D agency
34-35 Weiler's efforts to explain ST's mission and possible discoveries to nonscientists, especially contractor employees and legislators; the dearth of such efforts in the project in the past
36-37 The responsibility of future program and project scientists to promote lay support for space science; ST as a spur towards philosophizing
37 The effect of split-center management on NASA/ESA relations
38 NASA/ESA relations on ST vis a vis IRAS
38-39 NASA's lack of a corporate memory; HQ staff turnover
39-40 Future applications of ST technical developments; AXAF
40 Turnover on ST staff; Art Reetz, Keller, Art Fuchs
41 Huge scope of ST as a bar to comprehensive understanding of the program by contractors, managers
42-43 Paperwork at NASA; proliferation of documents
Weiler, Edward. Date: February 11, 1986. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1 hr.; 16 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Weiler reviews his involvement with ST while chief of Astronomy/Relativity programs at NASA HQ, a job which includes the title and responsibilities of ST Program Scientist. Discussion focuses on ST issues of the middle 1980s, including ST Project morale, testing and integration scheduling, scientific instrument status, and Quantum Efficiency Hysteresis in the Wide Field/Planetary Camera. Weiler covers in detail advanced planning for the post-launch period, including plans for ST maintenance and refurbishment, operations, Guest Observer support, and construction of advanced scientific instruments, particularly infra-red devices.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Growth of confidence in ST capabilities
1-2 ST Project morale
2 Maintenance and Refurbishment (M&R) planning; 2nd generation scientific instruments (SIs)
2 Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) as ST operations lead center; data archive issues
2-3 Challenger delay's effect on ST
3-4 ST Project activity while waiting for the STS: contamination control, contingency scheduling
4 ST testing schedule at Lockheed Missiles and Space Company (LMSC)
4-5 Scientists' interaction with LMSC ST managers
5 Issues surrounding the ST Science Institute (STScI) and science support for ST operations
5 Relations between ST scientists and LMSC during the ST testing program; testing issues
5-6 Success of ST's NASA and industry designers in meeting or exceeding ST specifications
6 Development issues concerning SIs: Faint Object Camera (FOC), Faint Object Spectrograph (FOS)
6-7 Effect of FOS performance on 2nd generation ST Advanced SI (ASI) planning
7 Reliability of proposed ASI detectors compared to current SI detectors
7 Importance of detector technology development
7-8 Space Telescope Observatory Performance Assessment Team's (STOPAT's) changing role, 1983-86
8 P-E's performance on the Fine Guidance Sensor system; scientists' reactions to P-E
8-9 STOPAT cont., ST Project Scientist's role
8-10 Relations between scientists and aerospace contractors on the ST Project
10-12 Relations between ST scientists and NASA managers; planetary tracking issue
12 Budgeting for ST Guest Observers (GOs)
12-13 Quantum Efficiency Hysteresis (QEH) in the Wide Field/Planetary Camera (WF/PC) CCD detectors; operations planning for the WF/PC UV floods
13 Solar pointing as a proposed solution to QEH; potential 'hidden' costs of solar pointing
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14 Decision to construct a WF/PC Clone before an advanced radial camera SI; STScI's role
14-15 Importance of Infrared ASIs to ST objectives
15-16 Peer review and selection process for the ASIs
Weiler, Edward. Date: March 17, 1986. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1 hr.; 23 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Continues exploration begun in previous interviews of Weiler's ST involvement as chief of Astronomy/Relativity programs at NASA HQ, and as ST Program Scientist. Weiler discusses in detail both defining requirements and selecting proposals for Advanced Scientific Instruments, and planning for the ST Data Archiving and Distribution System. Other topics reviewed include the impact of Space Shuttle delays on the ST Project, the role of the ST Science Institute, and relations between NASA's ST management centers. Concluding topics include the ST Project's lessons for other NASA programs, and ST's potential effect, once launched, on the astronomy community.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Selection procedures for the ST 2nd generation Advanced Scientific Instruments (ASIs); feasibility review at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC); ST Science Institute (STScI) role
1-2 Peer review of the ASI proposals; consensus on the importance of Infrared ASIs to ST goals
2 NASA reception of the ASI review
2-3 IR and imaging spectrograph ASIs selected to continue studies pending final ASI selection
3 Failure rate predictions for ST SIs
3-4 Issues surrounding the Faint Object Spectrograph (FOS) detectors
4 Importance of heavy funding for advanced detector technology research and development
4 Chief lesson of ST development: importance of detector research
4 Planned lifetime of ST SIs vs. previous space astronomy missions
4-5 Impact of post-Challenger STS delays: ST manpower curves; costs of clean-room storage of ST
5 Importance of continuing ASI and ST data archive development during STS delays
5-6 Contamination issues and long-duration ST storage
6 ST scientists' response to STS delays
6 ST's place in the STS launch manifest
6-7 Reliance of the ST system on a two-TDRS network
7-8 Issues surrounding Space Telescope Science Institute (STScI) growth; proposals for new construction, Gordon Committee report
8 STScI's role in the ST Project
9 Influence of Project Managers on the ST Project; James Odom's contribution to ST
9 Relations between the ST managing centers at GSFC and Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)
10-11 GSFC and MSFC as representatives of different engineering philosophies: example of ST maintenance and refurbishment (M&R) planning
11 Percentage of Weiler's time devoted to ST issues
11-12 Increased role of scientists in ST decision making, 1983-86; ASI selection example
12 Budget planning for ST Guest Observers (GOs)
12-13 Team decision making among NASA HQ ST managers
13-14 Issues concerning release of ST data archiving and distribution system (DADS) requirements
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14-15 Factors in ST decision-making
15 DADS issues in relation to NASA center autonomy
15-16 ST lessons for space science management
16-17 ST's effect on astronomy: breaking down wave- length-based observing communities
17-18 Importance of widely distributing space science observation data; reducing the role of sole investigators in space science
18-19 ST's potential to reshape ground-based optical astronomy; large telescopes as 'light buckets'
19-20 ST Project response to the 'Shuttle glow' issue
20-21 ST Project as a source of research money for peripherally related activities: ground-based astronomy
21 The ST SI Principle Investigators
21-22 Contrasts between scientific and engineering culture
22 Management of the SI teams; ASI team management
22-23 ST's potential for meeting current launch mile-stones, ca. 1986
Weiler, Edward. Date: March 9, 1987. Interviewers: Robert Smith and Joe Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 2 hrs.; 30 pp. Use restriction: Permission required to quote, cite or reproduce.
Weiler discusses planning for and capabilities of ST's planning tracking hardware; tracking controversy of 1980-81. Also discusses relations of planetary astronomers with ST and recalls in detail process for improving Science Operations Ground Systems. Assesses ST management and analyzes strategies, such as informal networks within NASA, for solving ST problems. Briefly discusses Maintenance and Refurbishment and Wide Field/Planetary Camera issues. Recalls getting funding for SOGS improvements and criticisms of Assembly and Verification procedures. Assesses effectiveness of NASA management structure and NASA's relations with planetary astronomers.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 General discussion of Space Telescope's planetary tracking abilities
1 Design process of planetary tracking hardware
2 Weiler asserts that ST was designed to accommodate needs of planetary astronomers
2 Recalls becoming aware of planetary tracking issue shortly after joining ST project in 1980 or '81
3 Credits Bob Brown with identifying and correcting deficiencies of Science Operations Ground Systems
3 Recalls efforts to get money to improve SOGS
4-5 Describes meeting with Jeff Rosendhal, summer 1985, in which ST's planetary capabilities are discussed
5 Recalls process by which most of Bob Brown's proposed SOGS improvements are eventually funded
6 Importance of prioritizing even Level 1 requirements
7 Weiler assesses effects of personality and managerial style on getting SOGS improvements funded
7 Discusses strategies for handling SOGS problems
8 Emphasizes importance of informal networks in solving problems
8-9 Discusses approval of Wide Field/Planetary Camera as example of effectiveness of informal networks in NASA
10 Weiler recalls several years spent learning how to get things done at NASA HQ; discounts idea that new managers must be brought in to maintain contact with newest ideas
12 Laments frequent changes in ST program management; suggests that the system doesn't provide adequate incentives for personnel stability
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14 Weiler discusses evolution of Planetary Target Implementation Team
15 Efforts to get extra $4 million for SOGS
16 Funding request for supplement to SOGS
16 Recalls Brown's hiring as Project Scientist; discusses NASA's lack of training for new managers
18 Describes John Clarke's handling of the MTAG team which reviewed Brown's requests for SOGS
19-20 Weiler describes meeting at which NASA and Lockheed Assembly &Verification procedures are strongly attacked
21 Asserts that NASA system does permit its managers to hear criticisms of people working below them
21-22 Specifies how criticism must be given in order to be effective; uses Assembly & Verification procedures as example
22-23 Marshall Center's Maintenance & Refurbishment plans for ST
23 Discusses how the scientists' training and work fail to prepare them to be effective managers
24 Weiler agrees with interviewer's suggestion that ST project's size makes it quantitatively different from other space programs; suggests that ST is too large for its administrative structure
25-26 ST Institute and money and personnel
27 Lists planetary astronomers on whom he relies for advice
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
29-30 Defends NASA's record of assisting planetary astronomers; denies an "anti-planetary" bias
Welch, James C. Date: August 20, 1984. Interviewers: Robert Smith and Paul Hanle. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 28 pp. Use restriction: Public.
Welch recalls joining NASA at Anthony Calio's invitation. Discusses formation of Tiger Team and implementation of its recommendations. Discusses creation and staffing of Space Telescope Development Division at NASA HQ. Discusses challenge of overseeing this complex program. Discusses need for formal project plan between NASA centers and HQ. Discusses NASA authority after 1980 rebaselining. Discusses causes of ST's difficulties including lack of program design, lack of center-contractor coordination and lack of systems engineering. Discusses evolution of ST specifications and effect of schedule slippage and budget pressure on program. Discusses STOPAT's contributions. Describes division of responsibilities and authority between STDD and OSS Astrophysics Division. Discusses role and mission of STScI. Discusses plans and funding for maintenance and refurbishment. Discusses need for centralized control and risk management. Describes importance of rigorous ground testing. Discusses future relations between NASA HQ and field centers.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Reasons for joining NASA: classified experience; Anthony Calio's invitation
1 Formation of the Tiger Team
2 Implementation of Tiger Team recommendations; Sam Keller's response; OSS management style
3 Chronology for Welch's review; creation and staffing of the NASA HQ Space Telescope Development Division (STDD)
4 Relations between STDD staff and NASA centers; STDD chain of command; Weiler's role
4-5 Challenge of exercising program oversight from NASA HQ: information handling and access
5-6 Application of Artificial Intelligence to identify potential trouble spots and schedule slippage on ST, and on future OSSA programs
6 Importance of 'Program Design' for future NASA programs
6-7 Early lack of systems engineering on ST; connection with project's use of defense technology
7-8 ST as a demonstration of the need of a formal project plan between NASA centers, HQ
8 Types of authority exerted by NASA HQ after the 1980 rebaselining
8-9 Role of the Program Director; scope of HQ authority
9 Outside agencies to which the Program Manager may have some responsibility: NOAA, USDA, OMB, DOD, Congress
10 Root causes of ST's difficulties: lack of program design, lack of coordination between centers, contractors, lack of systems engineering
11 'Evolution' of ST specifications; writing of Level 1 performance requirements, 1983
11-12 Effect of slippage and budget pressure on the program
12-13 Difference between technical and management expertise; NASA managers at Perkin-Elmer; Jerry Richardson
13-14 NASA managers at Lockheed; managing LMSC's testing program
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14 STOPAT's contributions; relationship between STOPAT and the Science Working Group; STOPAT and the science community's sense of access to the ST project
15 Applicability of STOPAT and STDD concepts to other projects
16 Division of responsibilities and authority between STDD and OSS Astrophysics Division; maintenance and refurbishment
17 Status of STScI; decisions on STScI physical plant expansion
17-18 Impact of automation on STScI's role and mission
18 Possibility of establishing other space science institutes
19-20 Use of the Space Station for on-orbit ST maintenance
20 Funding for maintenance and refurbishment
21 Earth-return servicing; ST orbital parameters
21-22 Necessity for periodic ST orbital re-boosts
22-23 Effect on ST of orbital glow and surface erosion
23 Lessons of ST: the need for centralized control
24 Application of risk management to NASA space science programs
25 Importance of balancing systems engineering with systems management
26-27 Importance and methods of controlling and channeling early uncertainties in major space science projects
27 Importance of rigorous ground testing; inverse relationship between testing problems and operational problems
28 Future relations between NASA HQ and the field centers
Welch, James C. Date: February 12, 1987. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 24 pp. Use restriction: Public.
Welch discusses hardware problems in late 1984 including Optical Telescope Assembly, High Resolution Spectrograph and Faint Object Camera. Discusses Science Operation Ground System's review of data processing system. Discusses Marshall's and Goddard's plans for maintenance and refurbishment. Discusses pointing and control system, Quantum Efficiency Hysteresis problem and clone for Wide Field/Planetary Camera to be used as spare. Discusses working relations between Lockheed contractors and Marshall Principal Investigators. Discusses Spacecraft Automated Test System in terms of test redundancy and confidence in results. Discusses impact on test schedule of changes. Discusses impact of Challenger explosion on HST program. Discusses attrition at Lockheed and STScI. Discusses needs for support of orbiting spacecraft. Discusses the qualitative and quantitative differences in operating a large-scale program like HST.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Hardware problems in late '84
1-2 Arrival of Optical Telescope Assembly [OTA] at Lockheed from Perkin-Elmer; work on the fine guidance sensors
2 Work on the High Resolution Spectrograph [HRS] and Faint Object Camera [FOC]; Science Operation Ground System [SOGS] review of data processing system.
2-3 Science Planning and Scheduling System; assessing the scope of the program
3 Goddard's and Marshall's plans for maintenance and refurbishment
3-4 Programmatic options and budget
4 In-house STScI programs: development of Guide Star Selection System and Science Data Analysis System
5 Interface test for Space Telescope Operations Control Center in Dec '84; pointing and control system on HST
5-8 Quantum Efficiency Hysteresis [QEH]
8-10 Wide Field/Planetary Camera [WF/PC] clone as spare
10-12 Working relations between Lockheed contractors and Marshall Principal Investigators [PIs]
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12-14 Spacecraft Automated Test System [SATS]
14-15 Test redundancy and budget
15 Confidence in test results
15-16 Impact on schedule of testing and government changes
16 Critical issues system; Phillips Committee
17-19 Challenger: impact on HST program
19-20 Attrition in the program: Lockheed and STScI
20 Support structure needs for orbiting spacecraft
20-22 Maintenance and refurbishment
22-23 Automated management information system
23-24 Qualitative and quantitative differences in operating large scale program like HST
Westphal, James A. Date: September 28, 1985. Interviewer: Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 3 hrs.; 33 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Reviews Westphal's involvement with ST as Primary Investigator and chief designer of the Wide Field/Planetary Camera (WF/PC) Scientific Instrument. General topics discussed include Westphal's perceptions of NASA space science before joining ST, use of 'facility' or NASA-provided instruments for space science, and the importance of early and effective scientific input into the design of scientific spacecraft. WF/PC issues covered include assembling the WF/PC team, changes in responsibilities of the team over time, relations between Westphal and the team members, and issues surrounding allocation of guaranteed ST observing time. ST areas discussed include the Data Operations Team, and planetary scientists' attitudes toward ST.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 Perceptions of NASA space science before joining the ST Project
1-2 Misgivings about proposed designation of ST's radial camera as a facility instrument
2-3 Limitations placed on science performance of past missions using facility instruments due to lack of scientists' input: Viking, Voyager
3-4 Interaction between CALTECH faculty and JPL
4 JPL's style of instrument-building: facility instruments as 'black boxes'
4-5 ST Wide Field/Planetary Camera (WF/PC) team as an alternative model for science instrument design: control by engineer-scientists
5 Limits to WF/PC model: small pool of available engineer-scientists
5-6 Ground-based astronomers increased use of 'black box', observatory-provided facility instruments
6 Astronomy's failure to encourage and develop students talented at instrument fabrication
6-7 WF/PC team organized around its members' skills
7 Criteria for selecting the WF/PC team members
7-8 Adding people unavailable in 1977 to the team
8-9 CALTECH's willingness to allow Westphal to work on ST full time, without teaching
9-10 CALTECH planetary scientists' perception of ST
10-11 Determination to insulate the WF/PC team from NASA paperwork
11 WF/PC as an instrument for all astronomers
11 Placing filters in the WF/PC to accommodate re-search proposed by scientists not on the team
11-12 Team contributions to early WF/PC design
12 Team's later role
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
12-13 Westphal, James Gunn, Edward Danielson, and Jerry Kristian form the working nucleus of the WF/PC team in Pasadena
13 The Data Operations Team (DOT) as a major contributor to ST science capabilities
13 Importance of science input into specification definition earlyin space science projects
13-15 DOT's specific contributions: bit error rate, flexible observation scheduling
15 Transferring responsibility from DOT to the ST Science Institute (STScI)
15 WF/PC team members as consultants to Westphal
15-16 Milestones requiring full-team participation: thermal-vacuum testing at JPL
16-17 Dedicated computers for use during WF/PC team members' own ST data analysis
17 Westphal as the WF/PC team's sole liaison to the ST Science Working Group (SWG)
17 WF/PC members' independent participation in ST
18 WF/PC teams' handling of its guaranteed observing time: team science
18-19 Sandy Faber joins the WF/PC team
19-20 Team decision-making; level of team paperwork
20-22 Planning for observation scheduling among the guaranteed time observers (GTOs); 1985 meeting at Princeton University
22-23 WF/PC team reaction to the GTO meeting proposal
TAPE 2, SIDE 1
23 WF/PC team meetings to prepare a team target list for the Princeton GTO meeting
23 Atmosphere of the GTO meeting
24 STScI and NASA participation in the GTO meeting
24-25 Atmosphere of the GTO meeting, cont
25-26 Agreements between the WF/PC and Faint Object Camera GTOs: duplication and finding chart issues
26 Agreements with the astrometry team GTOs
26-27 Benefits of the GTO compromises; drawing up written agreements
27-28 Finalizing the Princeton GTO target lists; later emendations of the lists
28 Relations between GTOs and STScI
28 WF/PC team offers to release its research proposals to other teams, in order to better avert conflicts
28-29 The GTO meeting as a model for problem solving
29-31 Debate over ST at the 1977 AAS Division of Planetary Sciences meeting
30 STScI support for ST planetary observations
30 Allocating ST observing time to planetary science
30-31 Potential budget conflicts between ST and Galileo in 1977
31 Planetary science representation on the ST SOG
31 Issues surrounding the ST ground software's planetary tracking capabilities
31-32 Inadequacy of requirements documents as tools for software design
32-33 ST Project's impending choice between constructing either a WF/PC clone, or an advanced replacement radial SI, ca. September 1985; reliability issues
Westphal, James A. Date: May 15, 1987. Interviewer: Robert Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1.5 hrs.; 17 pp. Use restriction: Public.
Westphal remembers discovery of Quantum Efficiency Hysteresis problem and modification of Wide Field/Planetary Camera tests to determine its cause. Discusses color sensitivity of QEH and discovery of the problem's source. Comments on use of research groups to devise solution to QEH and proposed solution of flooding ST with UV light. Recalls treatment of QEH at October, 1984 Quarterly Meeting, meeting with Riccardo Giacconi and December, 1984 NASA HQ meeting; organization of Tiger Team. Discusses concern over risks involved in solving QEH; analyzes development of consensus within Goddard/PI relationship to solve problem. Comments on his work with Frank Carr and Jim Odom. Assesses organization of PI's and effects of high level changes at Marshall.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Serendipitous discovery of Quantum Efficiency; hysteresis [QEH] problem
3 Modification of test parameters to isolate cause of QEH; initial assignment of difficulty to Wide Field Planetary Camera [WF/PC], June 1984; subsequent assignment of difficulty to detector Color-sensitivity of QEH
4 Identification of source of problem; masking of QEH in ground-based CCDs due to their use of green light; questions about sensitivity of ground-based CCDs had been raised earlier by Peter Young
5 Conjecture concerning design of WF/PC had this problem been attended to at that time; ultraviolet flooding as solution to QEH problem; explanation of cause of QEH
5-6 Delay in bringing QEH problem to light as solution sought within research group
6 Methods of exposing flight WF/PC to ultraviolet flooding: pointing ST at sun; concern about opening and closing ST door
7 Additional solutions: internal lamps; variations on sun exposure plan; looking at Moon, Venus, Earth, other sources of ultraviolet; quarterly meeting in October, 1984; Westphal absent
7-8 Reaction to status of QEH problem
8-9 Meeting with Riccardo Giacconi on technicalities of QEH; organization of Tiger Team to produce White Paper on QEH
10 Meeting at NASA HQ in December, 1984, to discuss QEH White Paper
10-11 Atmosphere as project members focussed attention on technical aspects of QEH problem
11 Origin of idea to bring in light through side of ST; problems with this plan
12 Locating sufficient space in ST to guide light through side; reference to original ST drawings in Computer Aided Design [CAD] system
13 Concern over pointing ST at sun vs. view that QEH required some solution
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
14 Consensus in belief that QEH had to be fixed
14-15 Developing consensus within structure of Goddard/PI relationship
15 Isolation of PIs
15-16 Concern over PIs organizing themselves
16 Work with Frank Carr and Jim Odom
16-17 Impact of changes at high levels at Marshall Space Flight Center
White, Richard L. Date: April 6, 1984. Interviewer: Robert W. Smith. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1 hr.; 24 pp. Use restriction: Open.
White discusses his role as the Instrument Scientist for Space Telescope's High Speed Photometer scientific instrument at the Space Telescope Science Institute (1982- ). He briefly discusses his academic background as a PhD student at Wisconsin, and his work with HEAO-B (1978-81). White covers HSP and STScI issues including the role of the Instrument Scientists within STScI and the organization of the Instrument Support Branch, verification of HSP performance at Goddard Space Flight Center, integration of HSP into the ST spacecraft at Lockheed, and redesign of the HSP power supply. He also describes his involvement with ST-related issues other than HSP, as well as travel demands on ST project members.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1-2 Academic background: undergrad, grad, postdoc
2-3 Doctoral work at U. Wisconsin-Madison
3-4 Madison astronomy: space astronomy, interstellar medium; congeniality of professors
4-5 ST awareness at Madison, '77; OAO and X-ray work
5-6 White's work with Einstein X-ray Observatory at Columbia
6-7 White joins STScI as Instrument Scientist for the High Speed Photometer (HSP) Scientific Instrument (SI)
7 Madison HSP team's influence on White's hiring
8 White's acclimatization to the HSP
8-9 Role of the Instrument Scientist within STScI
9-10 White's relations with the HSP team
10-11 Responsibility of Instrument Scientist to STScI, SI team
11-12 White's involvement with the ST Verification and Acceptance Program (VAP) at Goddard
12 Travel demands on ST scientists and engineers
12-13 White's scientific research while at STScI
13-14 Involvement with non-HSP ST issues
14-15 Communication within the greater ST Project: NASA centers, contractors, STScI, SI teams
TAPE 1, SIDE 2
15-16 Changing morale in the HSP team, at STScI, and at the ST Project Office at Goddard (STP-G)
16-17 VAP at STP-G
17-18 HSP low-voltage power supply
18 HSP testing schedule before Assembly and Verification (A&V) of SIs at LMSC
19 STP-G's involvement with the SIs during A&V
20-21 Internal organization of the Instrument Support Branch (ISB) of STScI
22-24 Role of ISB within STScI
Zedekar, Ray. Date: January 8, 1986. Interviewer: Joseph N. Tatarewicz. Auspices: STHP. Length: 1 hr.; 14 pp. Use restriction: Open.
Zedekar discusses his involvement with ST as the Space Shuttle Payload Integration officer in charge of ST integration planning (1977- ). Issues covered include the nature of the documents which govern payload integration and the process by which they are defined, past and current plans for ST deployment procedures, astronaut EVA support for ST deployment, modifications to the shuttle bay to support ST, and the differences between hardware used during ST deployment and that used in ST maintenance Shuttle missions.
TAPE 1, SIDE 1
1 First contact with ST: Zedekar posted to Shuttle program's Payload Integration (PI) office, and assigned to ST integration planning, 1977
2 Working groups from the Shuttle PI office, Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), and Lockheed Missiles and Space Company (LMSC) meet to define ST integration requirements, 1977-78
2-3 Design flux of both Shuttle and ST, ca. 1977-78
3 Evolutionary trend in payload integration: structural interfaces remain set, but avionics interface requirements grow: ST as example
4 Early integration issues: rewiring the Shuttle bay to support ST power/data port positions
4-5 Differences in shuttle-based equipment used in ST deployment as opposed to maintenance missions
5 ST release procedure for the deployment mission
5 Astronaut EVA as a backup for ST solar array and antenna boom deployment
6 Origins of the change from deploying ST by means of a custom rotating platform to deployment by use of the Remote Manipulator System alone
6 Goddard's ST Flight Support System as part of a larger modular hardware development effort
7 Relation between discarding the erector platform and the ST budget issues of 1980
7 Impact on PI effort of changes in ST deployment planning
7-8 Defining an Interface Control Document (ICD) for the ST deployment mission
8 Difference between ICDs and the Payload Integration Plan (PIP): specific interface specification vs. broad requirements
8-9 Sequence of development: PIP then ICD
9 ST's influence on Shuttle bay design
9-10 Changes in the Shuttle launch profile and their impact on ST deployment planning
10-11 Change from table-deployment to RMS direct deployment, cont.: effect of EVA astronaut
working on an ST secured only to the RMS arm
11-13 Institutional structure and